Opinion
Case No. 20010906-CA.
FILED February 27, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable William Barrett.
Attorneys: David M. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
David E. Yocom and Trina A. Higgins, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Appellant Sun Surety Insurance Company ("Sun") appeals the district court's denial of its Motion for Order to Set Aside Default Judgment and to Exonerate Bond.
Sun challenges the district court's interpretation of the notice requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-101 (2000) that allowed notice to the bail bondsman listed on the bond rather than to the surety. A district court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that we review for correctness. See Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, ¶ 4, 57 P.3d 1079. Sun further challenges the district court's refusal to set aside the default judgment and exonerate the bond. "`A motion or action to modify a final judgment' . . . will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)).
Sun argues that the plain language of section 77-20b-101 requires notice to Sun, rather than to an apparent agent. We agree. Section 77-20b-101(1)(a) requires the court, upon issuance of a bench warrant, to "mail notice of nonappearance . . . [to] the surety who posted the bond."Id. Further, section 77-20b-101(3) provides "[i]f notice of nonappearance is not mailed to a surety . . . the surety is relieved of further obligation under the bond if the surety's current name and address are on the bail bond in the court's file." Id.
"`When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.'" Furthermore, "in construing a statute, [we] must assume that `each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.'"
Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112, ¶ 19, 61 P.3d 1053 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
The plain language of section 77-20b-101 requires notice to the surety whose name and address appear on the bail bond. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-101(1), (3). Although both Sun's name and address and that of the bail bondsman appeared on the bond, it is clear from the face of the bond that Sun was the surety for the bond. Thus, section 77-20b-101 required notice to Sun, as surety, at its address rather than to the bondsman at his address. Further, without such notice, Sun "is relieved of further obligation under the bond." Id. § 77-20b-101(3).
Thus, we conclude the trial court erred in interpreting section 77-20b-101 to allow notice to the bail bondsman and not the surety listed on the face of the bond. We further conclude the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against Sun and exonerate the bond. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 9, 11 P.3d 277 ("A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion."). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of Sun's motion and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and James Z. Davis, Judge.