Opinion
No. 36335-6-II.
November 18, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 06-1-01763-7, Richard D. Hicks, J., entered May 24, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Van Deren, C.J., and Quinn-Brintnall, J.
Richard Stone appeals his residential burglary jury conviction. He argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to show he intended to commit a crime when he unlawfully entered the victim's house; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. We affirm.
FACTS I. Residential Burglary and Arrest
At approximately 4 am on September 22, 2006, Richard Stone forced open a locked door and entered Shauna Haggerty's home without permission. In the kitchen, Stone removed a bottle of liquor from the refrigerator and drank most of the contents. He also removed several food items from the refrigerator and freezer, apparently attempting to prepare food to eat. Stone threw several food items in the trash can. He also returned some items to the refrigerator when he was finished with them.
During the same period of time, screams outside her home and her dogs barking awakened Haggerty. While putting in her contact lenses so that she could see what was going on outside, she heard something hit against her front door. She headed toward the living room until she heard voices coming from inside her house. In her kitchen, Haggerty saw a half-clothed man she did not recognize (Stone) standing at her refrigerator. She retreated to the bathroom and called 9-1-1.
Although Haggerty thought she heard multiple voices, only Stone was inside her house.
When Deputy King and another police officer finally arrived, Stone was "dancing around inside the house and jumping off the couches like he was playing air drums." Report of Proceedings (RP) (May 7, 2007) at 51. He had music (Led Zepplin) playing loudly on Haggerty's stereo and was singing along at a high volume. When the officers entered the residence and told Stone to lie down, Stone told the officers to "fuck off" and charged toward them. Deputy King used a stun gun to incapacitate Stone in order to arrest him.
Stone did not have Haggerty's permission to use, to take or to consume any of the items from her refrigerator. Haggerty estimated $70 as her financial loss from Stone's unauthorized consumption.
II. Procedure
The State charged Stone with one count of residential burglary under RCW 9A.52.025(1).
A. Pretrial
At Stone's preliminary appearance on September 25, he stated that his name was "Luke Skywalker," not Richard Stone. The court ordered a "safety to be at large evaluation." At the next hearing, on September 27, Stone again maintained that he was not Richard Stone. The court set bail at $20,000, but ordered that Stone be held pending a competency evaluation, in part because his behavior in court showed that he was "not in a position to assist his counsel" in his defense.
On February 15, 2007, Stone appeared in court for his arraignment. He finally admitted that he was Richard Stone. He stated that he had been at Western State Hospital, where he had received medication. Western State Hospital's evaluation found Stone to be capable of understanding the charges and working with counsel to aid in his defense. The defense and the State signed an agreed order of competency. Following a brief dialogue with Stone, the court found him competent to stand trial.
The court entered a not guilty plea on Stone's behalf and set his case for trial.
B. Jury Trial
The State presented evidence establishing Stone's unauthorized entry of Haggerty's residence and consumption of her food and drink, as set forth in the opening Facts section of this opinion. Haggerty testified that (1) she had locked the front door before she went to bed; (2) she did not recognize Stone; (3) she had not authorized anyone to enter her house that night; (4) Stone had consumed and destroyed food from her kitchen without her permission; and (5) Stone did not call out or announce his presence in the house, as one might expect a person visiting friends unannounced to do. Deputy King testified that a gap between the door and the frame allowed Stone to push the locked door open with a small amount of pressure.
Although Stone did not testify, he presented both a general denial defense and an insanity defense. He based his general denial on the following assertions that defense counsel argued during closing: (1) Stone believed that the house belonged to his friends, Dale and Frank; (2) four years before the incident, his friends had actually lived in the house for several years; (3) he believed that he had an open invitation to enter the house and to make himself something to eat; and (4) therefore, he did not intend to commit a crime when he unlawfully entered Haggerty's house.
In support of Stone's story, Haggerty's landlord testified that he had rented the house to two men named Dale and Frank from 1998 to 2002. Stone's mother also testified that (1) she used to drive Stone over to Dale and Frank's house and (2) Dale had an open invitation to enter her house and to "help himself to anything." Two psychologists (discussed below) also testified that Stone had relayed this story to them as an explanation for his behavior. But Stone had also given other explanations for his unlawful entry, including that the world was turning into hell and he needed to escape, and that the house was actually his and had been stolen from him.
Stone's mother did not have personal knowledge about whether Dale and Frank had extended a reciprocal open invitation to Stone to enter their house.
To establish his insanity defense, Stone presented two expert witnesses: Dr. Julie Gallagher, a forensic psychologist employed by Western State Hospital, and Dr. Vincent Gollogly, a clinical psychologist retained by the defense. Gallagher based her evaluation on (1) multiple interviews with Stone, the first of which took place on October 16, 2006; (2) interactions with Stone when Gallagher was "on the ward" at Western State Hospital; (3) records of Stone's psychiatric history; and (4) Stone's criminal history. Gallagher testified that she diagnosed Stone with bipolar disorder and polysubstance abuse. Gollogly based his evaluation of Stone on an interview with Stone on April 14, 2007, and his review of Stone's psychiatric and criminal records.
Both psychologists opined that, under the legal definition of the word, Stone was "insane" at the time he entered Haggerty's house because he was unable to understand the nature and quality of his actions. Both experts also testified that Stone had reported to an emergency room doctor that he had taken "ice" (methamphetamine) before entering Haggerty's home. On cross examination of both experts, the State elicited that methamphetamine can cause psychosis and that there is no way to tell whether a particular psychotic episode is caused by methamphetamine or by the bipolar disorder.
No toxicology screening was done at the time Stone was arrested. Stone's statement to the emergency room doctor was apparently contained in reports the psychologists used in their diagnosis of Stone.
At the end of the defense case, Stone moved for a directed verdict "on the grounds that no reasonable jury could find that [he] had the mens rea necessary for the events." RP (May 9, 2007) at 193. In denying the motion, the trial court noted that the State had made a prima facie case of residential burglary, and stated, "I think it's up to the jury to decide whether or not he voluntarily triggered what he should have known or did know was an underlying mental condition from which he suffers." RP (May 9, 2007) at 196.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Stone guilty of residential burglary, guilty of the lesser included offense of trespassing, or not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court also instructed the jury that "[n]o condition of mind directly induced by the voluntary act of a person . . . constitutes insanity." Clerk's Papers at 76, Jury Instruction Number 22. Stone did not object to any of the instructions. The jury found him guilty of residential burglary.
Stone appeals.
ANALYSIS I. Evidence of Intent To Commit Crime Inside Residence
Stone argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to commit a crime when he unlawfully entered the victim's house and, therefore, the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime of residential burglary.
Stone does not dispute that he unlawfully entered or remained in Haggerty's home. Nor does he argue that his mental illness made him incapable of forming the requisite intent.
Citing RCW 9A.52.040, the State argues that, although intent is an essential element of the crime, it did not need to prove that Stone intended to commit a specific crime inside the house because that statute permits the jury to infer intent to commit a crime where the State proves unlawful entry or unlawful remaining inside. Reaffirming that the State must prove all essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict.
The State also proffers a burden-shifting analysis, which current case law does not support: The State contends that once it proves unlawful entry, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference of intent to commit a crime. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d. 819, 827, 132 P.3d 725 (2006), holding that the State retains the burden of proof.
A. Standard of Review
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. State v. Theroff, 25 Wn. App. 590, 593, 608 P.2d 1254, aff'd 95 Wn.2d 385 (1980); State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992) (en banc). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility of witnesses and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75 (citing State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985)).
B. Statutory Permissive Inference of Intent
A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle. RCW 9A.52.025. RCW 9A.52.040 creates a permissive inference of intent to commit a crime from the act of unlawfully entering or remaining in a building:
In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent.
(Emphasis added).
A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the jury to find a presumed fact from a proven fact. State v. Brunson, 128 Wn.2d 98, 105, 905 P.2d 346 (1995) (En banc). Where the permissive inference is only part of the State's proof supporting an element and not the "sole and sufficient" proof, it still must prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt, even though it need show only that the presumed fact flows "more likely than not" from the proven fact. Brunson, 128 Wn.2d at 107; State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d. 819, 826, 132 P.3d 725 (2006); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166-67, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979).
The jury may infer intent from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of an act, as well as from conduct that "plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability." State v. Bergeron, 38 Wn. App. 416, 419, 685 P.2d 648 (1984), aff'd by 105 Wn.2d 1 (1985). But the jury may not infer intent from conduct that is "patently equivocal." Id.
Here, the statutory permissive inference was not the State's sole proof that Stone intended to commit a crime inside Haggerty's house. Haggerty testified that, upon entering her house, Stone took alcohol and food from the refrigerator and consumed or destroyed those items. Because Haggerty did not give him permission to take or to consume those items, he stole them from her. The State carried its burden because the inference — that Stone intended to commit a crime inside the residence — flows more likely than not from the proven facts of Stone's unlawfully entering the residence and stealing Haggerty's food and drink while inside.
Stone argues that he intended only to enter a house, which he mistakenly thought belonged to friends, and to help himself to food, as he believed he had been invited to do. The jury was entitled to disbelieve this story. As appellate judges, we do not second guess the jury's decisions on persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874.
Stone also argues that the evidence of his intent was "patently equivocal," citing State v. Woods, 63 Wn. App. 588, 592, 821 P.2d 1235 (1991). This argument fails. In Woods, Division One of our court reversed the defendant's conviction where the State presented no direct evidence of intent and the defense presented evidence that, although the defendant had entered unlawfully, he had not intended to commit a crime inside. Woods, 63 Wn. App. at 591. Woods was a juvenile who entered his mother's the residence; although he was no longer allowed in the house without her permission, his belongings were still stored there. Id. at 589. The only direct evidence of Woods' intent to do anything inside his mother's house was a friend's testimony that Woods had entered the house to retrieve his own jacket, which was not a crime. Id. at 591. Under these circumstances, the court held that evidence of intent to commit a crime inside was equivocal and the State was not entitled to rely on the statutory inference of intent. Id. at 591-92.
But Stone's conduct here is distinguishable. Regardless of whether Stone believed that he had an open invitation to enter the house and to take the food, he entered another's home in the middle of the night without announcing his presence with the intent to consume items that did not belong to him. Additionally, Stone's friends had not lived in the house for four years and aside from Stone's self-serving statement to the psychologists, there was no other evidence of such an invitation. Further, unlike the evidence in Woods, Stone's explanation was just one of several that he offered to explain his unlawful entry into the house. When viewed all together, the evidence of Stone's intent was not patently equivocal. Therefore, the jury was entitled to consider the statutory permissive inference of intent.
Accordingly, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Stone intended to commit a crime when he unlawfully entered Haggerty's house.
Stone also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict for insufficiency of the evidence supporting intent, a material element of the crime. Generally, if the defendant presents a defense case in chief after unsuccessfully moving for a directed verdict, the defendant may not appeal the trial court's denial of the directed verdict motion. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 608, 918 P.2d 945 (1996), rev. denied, 131 Wn.2d 1006, 932 P.2d 644 (1997). But, even if we were to reach the merits of this issue, Stone's argument fails because we hold that sufficient evidence supports the element of ntent and the jury's guilty verdict. See State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 420, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000) (En banc) (a directed verdict is appropriate only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a guilty verdict).
II. Insanity Defense
Finally, Stone argues that he presented sufficient evidence to prove that he was insane at the time he committed the crime of residential burglary; therefore, the jury should not have rejected his insanity defense, and we should set aside the jury's verdict. The State counters that, even if Stone had been insane when he burglarized Haggerty's home, the evidence did not require the jury to find that Stone had been insane at the time. Nor did the evidence require the jury to find that Stone's own voluntary methamphetamine intoxication did not cause any insanity Stone may have manifested; any self-induced insanity caused by voluntary ingestion of illegal drugs could, as a matter of law, have defeated Stone's insanity defense. We agree with the State.
RCW 10.77.030(3). See also State v. Wicks, 98 Wn.2d 620, 622-23, 657 P.2d 781 (1983).
A. Standard of Review
In determining whether to reverse a jury's rejection of an insanity defense, we look to see whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Matthews, 132 Wn. App. 936, 941, 135 P.3d 495 (2006), review denied, 160 Wn.2d 1004 (2007) (citing State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 17, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996)).
To establish an insanity defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time he committed the act, he was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act or to tell right from wrong with reference to the act. RCW 9A.12.010. But "[n]o condition of mind proximately induced by the voluntary act of a person charged with a crime shall constitute insanity." RCW 10.77.030(3). Thus, even where the defendant suffers from a preexisting mental illness, he must prove that his mental condition was not proximately induced by his voluntary act, such as voluntary intoxication. State v. Wicks, 98 Wn.2d 620, 622-23, 657 P.2d 781 (1983) (holding that defendant could not avail himself of an insanity defense where he had a mental illness that was aggravated by his abuse of alcohol and other drugs).
B. Voluntary Methamphetamine Intoxication
In cross examining Stone's expert witnesses, the State elicited testimony that (1) Stone was diagnosed with polysubstance abuse; (2) Stone admitted to an emergency room doctor that he had taken methamphetamine before he unlawfully entered Haggerty's house; and (3) Stone's methamphetamine use could have triggered the psychosis from which he suffered at the time he entered the house. Based on Stone's own evidence, a rational jury could have found that he failed to prove that his voluntary methamphetamine intoxication did not cause his psychosis at the time he burglarized Haggerty's home.
Stone further argues that, even if his psychosis was caused by his voluntary use of methamphetamine, his methamphetamine "use triggered a psychotic disorder as settled, profound and debilitating as delirium tremens addressed in Wicks." Br. of Appellant at 15. This argument also fails. The Wicks court states in dicta that "the only time alcohol and drug related insanity may successfully be used as an insanity defense is when the influence of alcohol or drugs triggers an underlying psychotic disorder of a settled nature, such as delirium tremens." Wicks, 98 Wn.2d at 623. But the Wicks court does not hold that introduction of such testimony removes from the jury's consideration the factual issue of whether the defendant's voluntary drug use is the proximate cause of his insanity at the time he committed the charged crime.
Despite Stone's arguments to the contrary, we hold that the evidence is sufficient for the jury to have found that Stone caused his insanity by his voluntary methamphetamine use.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
QUINN-BRINTNALL, J. and VAN DEREN, C.J., concur.