Opinion
C.A. CASE NO. 2016-CA-13
05-12-2017
STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. CHARLES E. STEWART Defendant-Appellant
RYAN C. SPITZER, Atty. Reg. No. 0093515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 201 West Main Street, Safety Building, Troy, Ohio 45373 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee NIKKI TRAUTMAN BASZYNSKI, Atty. Reg. No. 0091085, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
T.C. NO. 10-CR-377 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court) OPINION RYAN C. SPITZER, Atty. Reg. No. 0093515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 201 West Main Street, Safety Building, Troy, Ohio 45373 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee NIKKI TRAUTMAN BASZYNSKI, Atty. Reg. No. 0091085, Assistant State Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Charles E. Stewart appeals from a judgment of the Miami County Court of Common Pleas, which held that he was not entitled to have jail-time credit applied against his term of commitment to a mental health facility, following the court's finding that he was not guilty by reason of insanity of felonious assault. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
{¶ 2} On November 12, 2010, Stewart was arrested for felonious assault arising out of Stewart's stabbing a nurse with an ink pen at the Upper Valley Medical Center adult behavioral unit. His bond was set by the municipal court at $100,000. On December 16, 2010, Stewart was indicted for the same offense, a felony of the second degree, and the bond was continued. Stewart did not post bond, and he remained in the Miami County Jail.
{¶ 3} On December 30, 2010, Stewart filed a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court ordered forensic evaluations of Stewart's competency to stand trial and his mental condition at the time of the offense. On March 3, 2011, after a trial to the court, Stewart was found not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to Northwest Psychiatric Hospital.
{¶ 4} The trial court's order of commitment did not state a specific term of commitment. However, pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(J)(1), termination of commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity occurs upon the earlier of one of the following:
(a) The defendant or person no longer is a mentally ill person subject to court order or a person with an intellectual disability subject to institutionalization by court order, as determined by the trial court;
(b) The expiration of the maximum prison term or term of imprisonment that the defendant or person could have received if the defendant or person had been convicted of the most serious offense with which the defendant or person is charged or in relation to which the defendant or person was found
not guilty by reason of insanity;
(c) The trial court enters an order terminating the commitment under the circumstances described in division (J)(2)(a)(ii) of this section. [Having to do with competency to stand trial].
{¶ 5} The maximum term for a felony of the second degree is eight years; thus, pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b), unless Stewart were found to no longer be mentally ill or his commitment were terminated for another reason, his commitment would terminate at the expiration of eight years.
{¶ 6} On April 7, 2016, Stewart filed a Motion for Proper Application of Jail-Time Credit. His motion asserted that he was confined in the Miami County Jail for 245 days before his commitment and transfer to the Northwest Psychiatric Hospital, because he could not afford to post the bond, and that his term of commitment should have been reduced by this number of days. The trial court denied the motion.
{¶ 7} On appeal, Stewart raises one assignment of error, which incorporates several arguments regarding his entitlement to jail-time credit.
{¶ 8} First, Stewart argues that the trial court improperly relied on State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-6239, 818 N.E.2d 272, because it conflicts with cases decided more recently.
{¶ 9} Tuomala held that persons adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity are not entitled to have their commitment to a behavioral or mental health facility reduced by the amount of time spent in pre-adjudication confinement ("jail-time credit"). The court reasoned that R.C. 2967.191, which provides for jail-time credit, requires a "conviction" as a condition precedent to the reduction of a prisoner's sentence, and that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity has not been convicted. Id. at ¶ 12, ¶ 15.
* * * R.C. 2967.191 provides, "The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced * * *." When a judge or jury determines that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, however, it does not "sentence" the defendant to a "prison term." To the contrary, R.C. 2945.40(F) authorizes the trial court to "commit the person to a hospital operated by the department of mental health." Rather than being "sentenced," therefore, a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity is committed; and rather than being a "prisoner" who receives a "prison term," such a defendant is a patient who is committed to a hospital. Thus, the language that surrounds the word "conviction" in R.C. 2967.191 removes any doubt that the statute does not apply to a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity.(Emphasis sic in Tuomala.) Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 10} Tuomala further held that the language of R.C. 2967.191 unambiguously evinced an intent to exclude individuals who are found not guilty by reason of insanity, and that adopting a different view of the terms "conviction," "prison," "prisoner," and "sentence" for purposes of R.C. 2967.191 "will have unintended and undesirable consequences in other contexts." Id. at ¶ 22, ¶ 24.
{¶ 11} Stewart also argues that Tuomala was wrongly decided and that his Ohio and federal equal protection rights were violated by the supreme court's conclusion in Tuomala that jail-time credit, as set forth in R.C. 2967.191, is inapplicable to a term of commitment to a mental health facility imposed following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.
{¶ 12} As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow the law as set forth by the Supreme Court, and we cannot make a determination that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court that has not been reversed or overruled. State v. Rigsbee, 174 Ohio App.3d 12, 2007-Ohio-6267, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.); State v. Croskey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-57, 2009-Ohio-4216, ¶ 7. Tuomala is directly on point, and we must follow it, even if we might decide the issue differently.
{¶ 13} We note that Tuomala was a 4-3 decision with two dissents. Both dissents argued that, pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b), the maximum term of commitment occurs at the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment that the defendant could have received had there been a conviction, and that Tuomala, if he had been convicted, could not have been sentenced to more than eight years less credit for pre-sentence detention. The second dissent also argued that R.C. 2945.401 and R.C. 2967.191 require the same credit whether a defendant is subsequently hospitalized or imprisoned and that R.C. 5122.01(B), allowing involuntary commitment of a mentally ill person who represents a substantial risk to others, provides additional protection to the community, if necessary.
{¶ 14} In addition to uncertainty about the majority's almost hyper-literal reading of the terms of R.C. 2967.191 in Tuomala, we share Stewart's concern, as generally voiced in State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856, 883 N.E.2d 440, ¶ 7 (discussed below) that "the equal protection clause does not tolerate disparate treatment of defendants based solely on economic status," particularly where, as here, the disparity results in harsher or more lengthy confinement. Stewart served 245 days in jail awaiting the resolution of his criminal case, and then was "civilly committed" for up to eight years, the maximum he could possibly receive had he been "criminally convicted." If he had had the funds to post bail, he still would have been committed for up to eight years. The reality is that he, unlike someone with the funds to post bail, will be forcibly confined for 245 more days than a similarly situated sane offender or a non-indigent person found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Compare Learned Hand, "How Far Is a Judge Free In Rendering a Decision," Law Series I Lectures, No. 14 (National Advisory Council on Radio in Education) (1933) for a discussion of the "dictionary school" of statutory interpretation.
{¶ 15} Nonetheless, in accordance with existing supreme court precedent, we cannot conclude that Stewart was entitled to the jail-time credit afforded to criminal defendants.
{¶ 16} Stewart cites several cases, decided since Tuomala; he asserts that these cases conflict with Tuomala or suggest that the supreme court's position on the issues decided in Tuomala has changed or is changing.
{¶ 17} First, Stewart argues that the supreme court's holding in State v. Fugate, 117 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-856, 883 N.E.2d 440 conflicts with and undermines the holding in Tuomala. But Fugate did not involve a defendant who was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Rather, the question presented in Fugate was whether a defendant who is "convicted" and then "sentenced" concurrently on multiple charges is entitled to have jail-time credit applied toward all of the "prison" terms. The supreme court answered this question affirmatively, reasoning that if courts were allowed to apply jail- time credit to only one of the concurrent terms, the practical result would be to deny jail-time credit for that offender. Id. at ¶ 12. The holding recognized that the concept of jail-time credit is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause and ensures that defendants who are unable to post bond are not treated more harshly than others by being required to serve a longer term of imprisonment. Id. at ¶ 7. Fugate did not mention Tuomala, and Tuomala's lengthy discussion of the distinction between a conviction and a commitment, for purposes of jail-time credit, does not directly support Stewart's suggestion that the reasoning of Fugate can be applied to situations involving a "finding" of not guilty by reason of insanity with a subsequent "commitment" to a hospital.
{¶ 18} Stewart also relies on In re A.G., 148 Ohio St.3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646 and State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 770 to argue that the supreme court has shown some indication of moving toward limitations on "civil" confinement on due process grounds. We will briefly comment on these cases, but we nonetheless are bound to follow Tuomala, a case directly on point, until the supreme court overrules or otherwise modifies it, even if we were to agree with Stewart that other pronouncements by the court may "suggest" a shifting of its position on the applicability of jail-time credit to commitment in a mental health facility.
Williams was not cited in Stewart's brief, but his counsel discussed it at oral argument.
{¶ 19} Williams involved a civil commitment under R.C. 2945.39, which authorizes a common pleas court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who has been charged with a serious violent felony, who has been found incompetent to stand trial, and who remains incompetent to stand trial after the expiration of R.C. 2945.38's one-year time frame for restoring competency. R.C. 2945.39 authorizes the common pleas court to order the involuntary commitment of such a person to a mental health facility when certain statutory criteria are met.
{¶ 20} As the expiration of the one-year maximum time for restoration of competency under R.C. 2945.38 approached, the State asked the trial court to retain jurisdiction under R.C. 2945.39(A), whereas Williams moved to dismiss the indictment on due process and equal protection grounds. Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, held that R.C. 2945.39 was constitutional, made the statutory findings for retaining jurisdiction, and ordered Williams to remain hospitalized. Id. at ¶ 4-5.
{¶ 21} On appeal, this court reversed and held R.C. 2945.39 to be unconstitutional. State v. Williams, 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042 (2d Dist.). We held that: 1) an involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 is criminal in nature, rather than civil, and Williams had been denied the procedural safeguards that a criminal defendant should receive; 2) the statute violated Williams's right to equal protection; and 3) the trial court's retention of jurisdiction, based only on an indictment, and up to the maximum potential term of confinement for his most serious offense, violated Williams's due process rights, because that term was not reasonably related to the purpose of commitment (protecting society). The State appealed to the supreme court.
{¶ 22} The supreme court reversed this court's holding in its entirety. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 770, at ¶ 6-8. It held that R.C. 2945.39 was civil in nature, notwithstanding that it and other related statutes linked the maximum length of detention to the maximum criminal sentence the defendant could have received if convicted, because its primary purpose was protecting the public, rather than deterrence or punishment. Id. at ¶ 31, ¶ 33. The court also agreed with the State that Williams's equal protection rights were not violated, because the procedures set forth in R.C. 2945.39 were justified by the State's interest in restraining mentally ill persons subject to hospitalization who have committed a serious crime. Id. at ¶ 44. Additionally, the supreme court found no violation of Williams's due process rights, because although he "may be committed until the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment that he could have received for the charged offenses, due process is satisfied by the fact that he may be released sooner if he is no longer subject to hospitalization by court order." Id. at ¶ 62, quoting the appellate court's dissenting opinion.
{¶ 23} Williams does not mention Tuomala or support a finding that it has impliedly been overruled.
{¶ 24} Stewart also argues that In re A.G., 148 Ohio St.3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646 implies the supreme court's willingness to provide constitutional protections in certain civil proceedings. A.G. applied double jeopardy protections - specifically the merger of allied offenses - in juvenile proceedings, and Stewart notes that both a juvenile proceeding and a commitment following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity are civil proceedings. While it is true that juvenile proceedings, like commitment proceedings following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity under R.C. 2945.401(J), are civil in nature, the supreme court has recognized that "numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings." See, e.g., State v. Hand, Ohio Sup. Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5504, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 26. The supreme court has noted that "there 'is little to distinguish' an adjudicatory hearing in a juvenile-delinquency case from a traditional criminal prosecution," concluding that "juveniles in delinquency proceedings bear essentially the same heavy pressures and psychological and physical burdens that are borne by adults in criminal cases, so that adults and juveniles alike should be subjected to only one such experience for the same offense." A.G. at ¶ 9, citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Thus, the supreme court has recognized, to some extent, the criminal nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings, such that certain protections available to adult criminal defendants must also be extended to juveniles. Indeed, the court has held that a juvenile is entitled to credit for time he or she was "confined in connection with the delinquent child complaint upon which the order of commitment is based." In re D.S., 148 Ohio St.3d 390, 2016-Ohio-7369, 71 N.E.3d 223, ¶ 15. However, the supreme court has not similarly extended such protections, including the availably of jail-time credit, to civil commitments following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Although the court in D.S. recognized that jail-time credit has its roots in the equal protection clause, it based its holding on the language of R.C. 2152.18(B). --------
{¶ 25} Stewart's assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 26} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. TUCKER, J., concurring:
{¶ 27} I write separately to note that while I agree State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-6239, 818 N.E.2d 272 compels affirmance of the trial court's judgment, I do not necessarily share the majority's uncertainty regarding Tuomala's interpretation of R.C. 2967.191. I do, however, share the majority's equal protection concern because Stewart, based upon his economic status, will be, unless he is found to be no longer mentally ill or his commitment is otherwise shortened, involuntarily committed 245 days longer than a similarly situated person found not guilty by reason of insanity who was able to post bail. This issue was not addressed in Tuomala, and, without expressing an opinion concerning the appropriate resolution, it is an issue that deserves to be considered and decided. This court, however, is not, given Tuomala's dictate, the appropriate forum for such consideration and resolution. WELBAUM, J., concurring:
{¶ 28} I concur with Judge Froelich's well-reasoned opinion. However, I find no fault with the Supreme Court of Ohio's interpretation of the plain language of R.C. 2967.191 as expressed in State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-6239, 818 N.E.2d 272. Copies mailed to: Ryan C. Spitzer
Nikki Trautman Baszynski
Hon. Christopher Gee