Opinion
A22-0318
01-17-2023
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jaye William SNYDER, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Dawn R. Nyhus, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent) Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, Dawn R. Nyhus, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)
Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Jaye William Snyder was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Due to a prior third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, the district court sentenced Snyder to serve a lifetime period of conditional release pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2022), upon his release from incarceration. On direct appeal, Snyder argues that the district court erred when it imposed lifetime conditional release because the state charged him by complaint rather than indictment. We affirm.
While Snyder committed the assault underlying this appeal in 2019, we cite the 2022 Minnesota Statutes to signify that intervening amendments to the statutes cited herein do not change the analysis.
Snyder argued in his principal brief that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to grant a continuance sua sponte. Because Snyder withdrew this claim at oral argument, we do not address it.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Snyder on April 3, 2020, by complaint with one count each of third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct based upon a mentally impaired, incapacitated, or physically helpless victim. The complaint's probable-cause statement noted that Snyder was on supervised release at the time of the offense for a 2016 third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
On October 27, 2021, a jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. Before sentencing, Snyder asked the district court to impose a ten-year conditional-release term rather than lifetime conditional release. He argued that because the state charged his offense by complaint rather than indictment, imposing lifetime conditional release would be improper. At sentencing, the district court stated that its research had not identified legal authority to address Snyder's sentencing argument, but that it understood the relevant statutes to require lifetime conditional release. The district court sentenced Snyder to 140 months in prison and lifetime conditional release.
Snyder appeals.
ISSUE
Does Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1, require the state to charge a defendant by indictment to impose a lifetime period of conditional release?
ANALYSIS
Snyder argues the district court erred when it imposed a lifetime term of conditional release as part of his sentence because the state charged the underlying crime by complaint rather than indictment. Determining whether the state needed to charge Snyder by indictment for the district court to impose lifetime conditional release requires us to interpret Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1. We interpret rules of criminal procedure de novo. State v. Thomas , 891 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
When interpreting court rules, "we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose." State v. Dahlin , 753 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Minn. 2008). If the language is plain and unambiguous, we follow the plain language. State v. Lee , 929 N.W.2d 432, 439 (Minn. 2019). "We interpret court rules in accordance with the rules of grammar and give words and phrases their common and approved usage." Dereje v. State , 837 N.W.2d 714, 720 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Hohenwald , 815 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Minn. 2012) ).
Rule 17.01, subdivision 1, states in relevant part that "[a]n offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment." Unlike a criminal complaint, which requires a judicial officer to make a probable-cause finding, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, an indictment requires a grand jury to make the probable-cause finding for the charged offense, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.06. Under existing law, when the state prosecutes an offense by complaint and the offense is punishable by life imprisonment or a lesser sentence, the district court lacks the authority to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. See State v. DeWalt , 757 N.W.2d 282, 289-90 (Minn. App. 2008) (remanding for resentencing after holding the district court lacked the authority to impose an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree criminal-sexual conduct because the offense was not prosecuted by indictment). Accordingly, the question we must resolve is whether a lifetime period of conditional release constitutes "life imprisonment" under rule 17.01, subdivision 1.
A.
To contextualize our analysis, we review Minnesota's sentencing scheme regarding supervised release, conditional release, and life sentences.
In Minnesota, when a district court imposes an executed prison sentence for a felony conviction, it may sentence the defendant to either "life imprisonment" or "to imprisonment for a fixed term of years" as otherwise authorized by law. Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1 (2022). When a district court sentences a defendant convicted of a felony to an executed sentence of a fixed duration, "the executed sentence consists of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence." Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2022). Minnesota law mandates release from incarceration at the completion of the term of imprisonment along with supervision during the remaining period of the sentence. State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian , 755 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Minn. App. 2008) ("By statute, the [department of corrections] must release offenders after they serve their term of imprisonment and must supervise offenders during their period of supervised release."); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 244.101, subds. 1, 2 (2022); 244.05, subd. 1 (2022) ; 243.05, subds. 2, 6 (2022). If a defendant thereafter violates a condition of his supervised release, the department of corrections (DOC) may revoke supervised release and reincarcerate the defendant for a period not to exceed the time remaining in the defendant's executed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 (2022).
Certain crimes, such as felony driving-while-impaired and most criminal-sexual-conduct offenses, require an additional period of DOC supervision—referred to as conditional release—after the defendant completes their executed sentence of fixed duration. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (2022), 609.3455, subds. 6, 7 (2022). Unless an exception applies, DOC administers a conditional-release term under the same provisions governing supervised release. A violation of any conditional-release provision may result in DOC reincarcerating the defendant for a time, up to and including the expiration of the conditional-release term. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.276, subd. 1(d), 609.3455, subd. 8(c) (2022).
In contrast to supervised and conditional release, Minnesota law does not guarantee a defendant's release from incarceration when a district court imposes a life sentence. Certain life sentences preclude a supervised-release term by prohibiting any release from incarceration, and others require a minimum period of imprisonment before a defendant becomes eligible for supervised release. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (2022). And even in the latter cases, supervised release is not guaranteed and is instead discretionary with DOC. Id. , subd. 5(a) (2022) ("The commissioner of corrections may, under rules promulgated by the commissioner, give supervised release to an inmate serving a mandatory life sentence ... after the inmate has served the minimum term of imprisonment specified in subdivision 4.").
B.
Given the legal distinctions among supervised release, conditional release, and life sentences, we conclude that a district court's imposition of lifetime conditional release is not equivalent to "life imprisonment" under rule 17.01, subdivision 1. In the context of Minnesota's sentencing structure, "life imprisonment" contemplates a sentence of incarceration from which there is no requirement or assurance of release.
Examining the facts of this case, we conclude the district court did not sentence Snyder to "life imprisonment" as the term is used in rule 17.01, subdivision 1. Because Snyder was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and had a previous conviction for that offense, his sentence must include a mandatory lifetime period of conditional release. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 7(b) ("[A]fter the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for the remainder of the offender's life."). Consistent with the statute, the district court sentenced Snyder to an executed, fixed-duration sentence of 140 months in prison. The sentencing statutes entitle Snyder to release from prison after serving a minimum of two-thirds of this duration. Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1. Only upon his release from prison after serving two-thirds of his sentence will he begin DOC supervision on conditional release. And while on conditional release, Snyder will remain in the community unless and until he violates a condition of that release and is reincarcerated as a sanction.
Structured in this manner, the sentencing statutes guarantee Snyder's release from prison, at which point he will have the opportunity to remain in the community indefinitely, provided he complies with the terms of his conditional release. Thus, although DOC will supervise Snyder for the remainder of his lifetime, he was not sentenced to "life imprisonment" because a release from incarceration is both certain and not subject to DOC's discretion.
C.
The theoretical possibility that DOC could revoke Snyder's conditional release and return him to a correctional facility for the rest of his life does not render the "offense punishable by life imprisonment." In his brief, Snyder places great emphasis on the word and suffix "punishable " in rule 17.01, subdivision 1. He argues that because a violation of his conditional release could result in his return to custody for the remainder of his life, he technically faces the potential punishment of life imprisonment, so the state must charge him by indictment.
While we agree with Snyder that DOC could potentially return him to prison for the rest of his life if he violates the terms of his conditional release, we disagree that this would constitute a punishment for the offense itself. Rather, such imprisonment would result from the violation of conditional-release terms and not the conduct for which the district court originally sentenced Snyder. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1 ("An offense punishable by life imprisonment must be prosecuted by indictment. (emphasis added)).
Although the statute governing conditional release theoretically provides for this result, we are aware of no case in which DOC reincarcerated an offender for life following the revocation of lifetime conditional release.
When a district court imposes a life sentence for an offense, it commits the defendant to prison for an indefinite period as the punishment for that crime, subject to release—if at all—only at DOC's discretion. Conversely, when a district court imposes a fixed-duration sentence followed by a conditional-release term, the only imposed incarceration for the underlying crime is the term of imprisonment the defendant must serve under Minn. Stat. § 244.101 (2022). DOC does not have the discretion to extend this imprisonment or to reincarcerate the defendant after their statutorily mandated release based upon the original offense. DOC can only extend the term of imprisonment, or return a defendant to prison after release, if DOC punishes the defendant for separate behavior—either disciplinary infractions within the institution or violations of the defendant's release conditions. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subds. 1b, 3 (2022).
Although the imposition of a lifetime conditional-release term has a lifelong consequence for the offense of conviction, the fact that this sanction does not involve either an initial indefinite commitment to prison or the possibility of a return to incarceration based on the underlying crime itself, we conclude that such a sentence does not render that crime an "offense punishable by life imprisonment."
DECISION
The state need not prosecute by indictment a case where a defendant faces a sentence of a fixed-duration prison term, followed by a lifetime period of conditional release, because such a sentence does not constitute "life imprisonment" within the meaning of Minn. R. Crim. P. 17.01, subd. 1.