Opinion
No. CR07 022 73 95 T
((July 25, 2008))
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT
In this criminal case, the defendant is accused of attempted murder and assault arising out of an incident wherein he allegedly ran a man over with a car severely injuring him. The defendant has moved to suppress an oral statement he made to an off-duty Bridgeport police officer at Bridgeport Hospital. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the motion on July 23 and 24, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to suppress is denied.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the court makes the following findings of fact:
On September 20, 2007, the defendant was arrested by the Stratford Police Department. Officer John Steedley was assigned to transport the defendant to police headquarters. During the trip, the defendant became quite agitated and banged his head against a cage and window in the police car, thereby injuring himself. Upon arrival at police headquarters, Stratford Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was called. The EMS personnel treated the defendant and took him to Bridgeport Hospital. Officer Steedley traveled with the defendant in the ambulance and stayed with him in the emergency room.
At Bridgeport Hospital emergency room, the defendant was placed on a hospital gurney and moved to several locations for treatment and tests. At one point, the defendant was on the gurney waiting in a hallway. Office Steedley was also in the vicinity. While there, Detective David Evans walked through the hallway and saw the defendant and Officer Steedley. Detective Evans had been dispatched to the hospital to attempt to interview the alleged victim in the defendant's case, but was unable to speak with the victim. Detective Evans stopped and engaged in some casual conversation with Office Steedley.
At that same time, Officer Clive Higgins of the Bridgeport Police Department was walking through the emergency room hallway. Officer Higgins had been assigned to the hospital to watch another patient and had completed his shift. He was off duty although still in uniform. Officer Higgins had had no involvement in the Stratford investigation that had resulted in the defendant's arrest.
As Office Higgins proceeded through the hallway, the defendant called out "Hey Higgins." Officer Higgins stopped and went over to the defendant whom he recognized. Officer Higgins had, on prior dates, twice assisted other officers who had arrested the defendant for selling bootleg CDs in Bridgeport. Officer Higgins approached the defendant and asked "What are you doing here?" The defendant stated to Officer Higgins that he (the defendant) had been partying with a friend who had taken some of his money and was supposed to pay him back. The defendant further stated that he had "kicked his ass" and ran him over with a car because he had robbed his money. Detective Evans overheard this statement to Officer Higgins. Several weeks after the incident, Detective Evans filed a supplemental police report regarding the defendant's statement.
At the time of the defendant's statement, he was in the custody of the Stratford Police Department and had not been advised of nor waived his so-called Miranda rights.
DISCUSSION
Our Supreme Court has ruled that two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation. State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 757 (1996). It is the defendant who bears the burden to prove custodial interrogation. State v. Doyle, 104 Conn.App. 4, 11, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 935 (2007).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384, U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant was in police custody while at Bridgeport Hospital. Moreover, there is no evidence that he had received Miranda warnings prior to his statement. Accordingly, the motion to suppress turns on whether the defendant has proven that he was subjected to police interrogation.
The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. State v Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 588 (2007); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 281, 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The definition of interrogation extends only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they knew or should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id.
Every question posed to a defendant in custody, however, is not equivalent to an interrogation. State v. Dixon, 25 Conn.App. 3, 8 (1991). The routine gathering of background information will not constitute interrogation; nor are questions asked after an event or occurrence that would naturally tend to evoke such an inquiry. Id. Such questions, unlike the sort of interrogation that prompted implementation of the Miranda safeguards, are characterized by brevity, neutrality and absence of intent to elicit a confession or admission. Id. Most are typically spontaneous. Id.
The defendant asserts two grounds in support of his motion to suppress. First, that Officer Higgins' question "What are you doing here?" is an inquiry that Officer Higgins should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Second, that the conflicts in the testimony among Officer Steedley, Officer Higgins and Detective Evans are such that the court should conclude that the statement attributed to the defendant was not made. The state, on the other hand, asserts (1) that the police testimony is substantially consistent and, (2) that the "What are you doing here?" inquiry is akin to similar questions our Supreme and Appellate Courts have ruled not to be interrogation. See e.g. State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 413, 410 n. 4 (1985) (question by prison guard to defendant whom he knew from high school as to why defendant was arrested held not to be interrogation); State v. Dixon, supra, 25 Conn.App. 8 (police question: "What are you doing here?" held not to be interrogation).
The court finds that the defendant's remarks to Officer Higgins were not in response to police interrogation. The defendant's claim that the officers lack credibility because in some respects they were inconsistent, is not persuasive. This court finds the officers to be credible and has made the above findings of fact based on the full record presented at the hearing.
The defendant's principal claim, that Officer Higgins' question was reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response, is also unpersuasive. Any statement given freely and voluntarily is admissible in evidence. State v. Vitale, supra, 197 Conn. 396. "Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 300. The court finds Officer Higgins' question not to be interrogation for three reasons. First, he was not the investigating officer on the case. To the contrary, he was an off-duty officer from a different police department. Second, the encounter with the defendant was in a hospital hallway and was initiated by the defendant. Such circumstances are far different than the hostile environment of the police interrogation room about which Miranda was concerned. Third, and most important, the question itself — "What are you doing here?" — was neutral, spontaneous and does not reasonably suggest an intent to obtain a confession. Both Connecticut and other courts have consistently ruled such statements not to be interrogation. See e.g. Hairston v. United States, 500 A.2d 994, 997 (D.C.App. 1985) (warnings not required when officer, who was greeted at the scene by suspect stating he shot victim, asked "what happened?"); People v. Quicke, 71 Cal.2d 502, 514, 455 P.2d 787 (1969) (no interrogation when officer came upon suspect lying on top of dead body, handcuffed suspect and asked "What had happened?"). Indeed, as noted above, in State v. Dixon, supra., our Appellate Court ruled that the exact question posed in the present case — "What are you doing here?" — was not police interrogation. State v. Dixon, supra, 25 Conn.App. 9.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to suppress the defendant's oral statement is denied.
So ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 25th day of July 2008.