Opinion
No. E2007-01523-CCA-R3-CD.
Assigned on Briefs March 26, 2008.
Filed April 24, 2008.
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Union County; No. 3004; E. Shayne Sexton, Judge.
Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed.
Martha Yoakum, Jacksboro, Tennessee (on appeal); Dan Korth, Tazewell, Tennessee (at trial); for the Appellant, Robert L. Short.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General; William Paul Phillips, District Attorney General; Tracy Jenkins, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
Robert W. Wedemeyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jerry L. Smith and J.C. McLin, JJ., joined.
OPINION
A Union County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert L. Short, of driving under the influence, violating the implied consent law, and failing to provide proof of financial responsibility. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty nine days, with sixty days in confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant claims on appeal that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.
I. Facts
At the trial, the parties presented the following evidence: Union County Deputy Todd Beeler testified that he responded to a 9-1-1 call around 1:30 a.m. on January 19, 2005. The call reported a possible accident on State Highway 33. Upon arriving at the scene, Deputy Beeler saw a white Chevrolet car off the road with damage to the driver's side. When he approached, he found the Defendant in the driver's seat of the car, and the Defendant then exited the car through the passenger side. The Defendant did not respond when asked if he was hurt and needed help or to any of Deputy Beeler's other questions. In fact, instead of verbally responding, the Defendant just gave a "glaring glance which would be northbound up the highway and . . . only point[ed]" in that same direction.
Deputy Beeler testified he did not observe any alcohol in the Defendant's car, but there "was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and about his person." The Defendant eventually provided his Tennessee ID card and began talking with the Deputy. Deputy Beeler described the Defendant as having "slurred speech, mumbl[ing] a lot, talk[ing] to me rather confusingly." He said the Defendant had "signs of someone that's under the influence of alcohol." In addition to his difficulty talking, the Defendant also "stumbled or staggered, could not stand with balance on his own." In fact, Deputy Beeler said that when he was going to perform field sobriety tests on the Defendant, the Defendant "went to place his hand on the hood of [the patrol car] for support or bracing, at which point in time he fell to the ground." After Deputy Beeler explained the sobriety tests and read him the implied consent form, the Defendant refused to consent to the testing. By this point, the Defendant had become rather "agitated" and "us[ed] foul language." When asked whether he consumed any alcohol recently, the Defendant reported that he drank two beers that day. When Deputy Beeler asked the Defendant to show proof of financial responsibility for the car, the Defendant did not produce anything, such as proof of car insurance. Deputy Beeler testified that, in his professional opinion, the Defendant "was impaired to the point to where he could not safely operate a motor vehicle."
On cross examination, Deputy Beeler conceded that perhaps the Defendant was already out of the vehicle when he arrived at the scene. Deputy Beeler said Highway 33 runs north-south and it was two lanes wide, with a center turn lane. The Defendant's car was parked facing southwest, with both the front and rear passenger tires on the grass. The front driver's side tire would have been on the gravel strip between the road and the grass, but the tire was missing. Deputy Beeler said he initially saw the Defendant kneeling and looking out the back window of the vehicle. When the Defendant exited the vehicle, Deputy Beeler asked him if there were any other vehicles involved, to which the Defendant did not respond. Later, Deputy Beeler noticed the wounds on the Defendant's elbow and arm. Additionally, with regards to the two beers the Defendant claimed he drank that day, Deputy Beeler said the Defendant "could not tell me when, how big the beers were, what size they were, what brand they were, or where he drank them at."
Linda Johnson, the paramedic driver, testified that the Defendant would not "let [her or the other paramedic] near him." She said, at the time, the Defendant was "very agitated . . . sitting on the side of the road with his arms folded and his head down" while the police officer tried talking to him. The Defendant kept telling the officer, "Get the `F' away from me, I don't want you." Johnson stated that "There was a strong odor of alcohol on [the Defendant's] breath." She said she does not remember the Defendant having any blood on him, but she admitted that it was in the middle of the night, so visibility was minimal at best. The Defendant also would not let the paramedics close enough to him to inspect or treat any wounds. Additionally, he continually cursed and insisted he retrieve his guitar from the car. Johnson then stated that in her opinion, the Defendant "was dog drunk."
On cross examination, Johnson said that she could smell alcohol on the Defendant's breath and, "when he talked, the odor got stronger." She also smelled alcohol on the Defendant's clothes.
Henry Short, the Defendant's brother, testified that, on the night of January 18, 2005, the Defendant came to his house, and they "watched movies, play[ed] guitar, and watched two tapes." Short said he did not see the Defendant consume any alcohol during that time period, and moreover, he had not seen the Defendant drink any alcohol in six years. On cross examination, Short said the Defendant arrived at his house around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., and the Defendant stayed there for at least six hours, leaving around 12:15 a.m.
The Defendant testified that he was not driving a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating drug or liquor. When recounting the night of the accident, the Defendant stated, "I went westward down toward where Wal-Mart is, and that's the last memory I have with the exception of glass breaking, a nudge on my elbow, and I was out." He said he next remembered "waking up in a metal room." The Defendant said he did not drink the night of the accident. He also denied cursing and being rude to the police officer and paramedics. He said he was injured. The Defendant testified the car he drove that night belonged to Dr. Delmar Harley of Chicago, one of his business associates. The Defendant believed Dr. Harley still paid insurance on the vehicle, even though the Defendant had driven it for two years and renewed the license plates on it twice.
On cross examination, the Defendant admitted he was ashamed about being rude to the police officers and paramedics. He does not remember being drunk that night, nor does he remember the police officer reading him the implied consent form, and then refusing to consent to the sobriety tests. The Defendant testified that he does not "normally drink."
The jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence ("DUI"), violating the implied consent law, and failing to show proof of financial responsibility. It is from these judgments the Defendant now appeals.
II. Analysis
The Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. The State disagrees, arguing the evidence is sufficient. We agree with the State.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court's standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999); Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). "Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact." State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); Liakas, 286 S.W.2d at 859. "A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State." State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:
This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a written record in this Court.
Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S .W.3d at 775 (citing State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilty against a defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000). Importantly, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given to their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659.
A conviction for DUI requires a "person to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state . . . while: (1) under the influence of any intoxicant . . ." T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a)(1) (2005). No blood alcohol test need be administered for a conviction of driving under the influence. State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988). In this case, the Defendant was found getting out of his car, which he wrecked on a state highway without involving any other cars. The Defendant was the only person in the vicinity, and Deputy Beeler saw him behind the driver's seat. Moreover, the Defendant admitted that he drove the car that night. Detective Beeler described the Defendant as unable to stand on his own, speaking with slurred speech, and being generally belligerent. In addition, Deputy Beeler testified that the Defendant displayed the signs of someone who was under the influence of alcohol. Paramedic Johnson testified that the Defendant's breath and clothes smelled of alcohol, and that he was "dog drunk." This evidence provides sufficient grounds for the Defendant's DUI conviction.
A conviction for violating the implied consent law requires that a person "refuse to submit" to taking "a test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of that person's blood" when the "test is administered at the direction of the law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe such a person was driving under the influence of an intoxicant or drug." T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006). "Any person who drives any motor vehicle in the state is deemd to have given consent to [this] test." Id. The Defendant wrecked a vehicle on a state highway on January 19, 2005. When the police arrived, Deputy Beeler smelled alcohol on the Defendant, and noticed the Defendant's slurred speech and inability to stand or walk. These observations gave Deputy Beeler reasonable grounds to believe the Defendant had been driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Deputy Beeler read the Defendant the implied consent form, but the Defendant refused to consent to any sobriety tests. This evidence provides a sufficient basis to support the Defendant's conviction for violating the implied consent law.
For a conviction of failing to show proof of financial responsibility, a person must fail to provide evidence of financial responsibility with respect to a vehicle driven on a state highway. T.C.A. § 55-12-139 (2006). Documentation of an insurance policy is one of the necessary aspects of proof for financial responsibility. Id. The Defendant had an accident while driving a vehicle on a state highway. When Deputy Beeler asked him for proof of insurance, he did not provide any. The Defendant admitted he had not bought any insurance for the car in the two years he had been driving it. There was sufficient evidence showing the Defendant failed to show proof of financial responsibility. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues.
III. Conclusion
After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence sufficiently supports the Defendant's convictions for DUI, violating the implied consent law, and failing to show proof of financial responsibility. Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.