Opinion
No. CR06-352303
June 7, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The defendant, Robert Shields, moves the court to suppress the evidence seized from his residence during the execution of a search warrant on the ground that the seizure constitutes a violation of his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The events that led to the issuance of the search warrant in question are set forth in the sworn search warrant affidavit, dated November 15, 2005, filed by Officer Christopher Grillo of the Southbury Police Department and Trooper Gerard Johansen of the Connecticut State Police Department. According to the search warrant affidavit, on November 4, 2005, Grillo received a telephone call from Detective Brian Sprinkle of the Ferguson Township Police Department, located in State College, Pennsylvania. During the call, Sprinkle informed Grillo that through his investigation of Brian Gayan, a Pennsylvania resident accused of having unlawful contact with minors through the internet, he learned of an online conversation between Gayan and Jerome Cariaso of 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. Sprinkle informed Grillo that Cariaso had made comments regarding sexual contact between Cariaso and Cariaso's eight-year-old son during that conversation.
Immediately after the call, Grillo used the "COLLECT" system to perforrn a motor vehicle search on Cariaso. The search indicated that Cariaso did, in fact, reside at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. A reverse phone directory search revealed the same information. Further, on November 4, 2005, Grillo drove by 141 Rocky Mountain Road. He observed no vehicles in the driveway, but noted a black and grey basketball hoop that appeared to be adjusted to lower than ten feet in height. Three days later, on November 7, 2005, Grillo went to the Pomperaug Elementary School in Southbury to inquire whether any children with the last name Cariaso were enrolled at the school. The principal of that school informed him that there were not.
On November 10, 2005, Grillo received a package of materials at the Southbury Post Office that Sprinkle had sent to him. The package contained the following materials: (1) a two-page letter from Sprinkle; (2) a copy of a Yahoo, Inc. chat log; (3) a copy of a Pennsylvania court order sent to Yahoo, Inc.; (4) a copy of the results from Yahoo, Inc.; (5) a copy of a Pennsylvania court order sent to Charter Communications; (6) a copy of the results from Charter Communications; and (7) a copy of an "arin Whois" database search.
A portion of the letter from Sprinkle, as incorporated into the affidavit, provided that during the last week of June 2005, Sprinkle was notified that Gayan, using the screen name "Centralpamaster," was having unlawful contact with minors via the internet. As a result, on July 1, 2005, Sprinkle executed two search warrants at Gayan's residence and place of employment. The forensics performed on the computer seized from Gayan's place of employment revealed several hundred child pornography images as well as several Yahoo, Inc. chat logs. The forensics expert was able to identify seventy-five screen names of people with whom Gayan had unlawful contact or suspects who spoke to Gayan about sexually abusing children.
A portion of the letter from Sprinkle also provided that on August 3, 2005, Sprinkle obtained a court order, which asked Yahoo, Inc. to release all information it had for the seventy-five screen names, including log-in Internal Protocol (IP) addresses for each one. A week later, Yahoo, Inc. revealed that there was a recent log of IP addresses listed under the screen name of "Bi06488." Though the "Whois" function of www.arin.net, Sprinkle determined that the IP addresses were owned by Charter Communications. On November 4, 2005, Charter Communications informed Sprinkle that the name of the subscriber for the IP address of 24.151.2.100 was Jerome Cariaso and that he was residing at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut.
In addition, the copy of the chat log that came in the package, as incorporated into the search warrant affidavit, contained a Yahoo, Inc. messenger conversation between "Centralpamaster" and "Bi06488," in which "Bi06488" asked "Centralpamaster" for pornographic pictures of Centralpamaster's son. "Bi06488" informed "Centralpamaster" that they could not swap pictures because he did not currently have pornographic pictures of his own son on his computer. The chat log provided that this conversation took place on July 1, 2005.
Based on the material provided in the package sent by Sprinkle, on November 14, 2005, Grillo obtained land records from the Southbury Assessor's Office. The records indicated that the residence located at 141 Rocky Mountain Road was owned by Cariaso, Robert Shields and Rosalie Shields. On November 15, 2005, Grillo went to the Southbury Post Office and learned that four people received mail at that address: Cariaso, Robert Shields, Rosalie Shields and Peter Modica.
In response to the aforementioned investigation, on November 15, 2005, Grillo and Johansen submitted a warrant application seeking to search the main residence at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. The warrant affidavit alleged that there was probable cause to believe that Cariaso had violated the following statutes: General Statutes § 53-21, risk of injury to a child; General Statutes § 53a-196d, possession of child pornography; and General Statutes § 53a-49/ § 53a-196d, attempt to possess child pornography. The court, Brown, J., issued the warrant on the same day, authorizing a search of the residence at 141 Rocky Mountain Road, the seizure and subsequent investigative review of any computer systems found for evidence of violations of § 53-21, § 53a-196d, and § 53a-49/ § 53a-196d and the transport of the computer systems to the Connecticut State Police Computer Crime and Electronics Evidence Unit (CCEEU).
The events that led to the arrest of the defendant, Robert Shields, are set forth in the sworn affidavit attached to the arrest warrant, dated May 8, 2006. The search warrant for the residence at 141 Rocky Mountain Road was executed on November 16, 2005. Rosalie Shields, Cariaso, and the defendant were all present in the home when the search warrant was executed. The police found numerous computer systems in the home. In all, fifty-seven exhibits were seized from the residence and were transported to the CCEEU. On February 14, 2006, Trooper John Farnham, a forensics investigator with the CCEEU, reported to Grillo that numerous child pornography images and videos were discovered through forensics on the seized exhibits. Farnham stated that a large portion of the images had been traded using Kazaa, a peer-to-peer software program for sharing files, which was registered under the email address BKNYC11204@yahoo.com.
"Search warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of place[s] and the seizure of things, and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). Accordingly, "[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 556. A search warrant, unlike an arrest warrant, does not require the identification of "any particular person as the likely offender. [This is] [b]ecause the complaint for a search warrant is not filed as the basis of a criminal prosecution, [so] it need not identify the person in charge of the premises or name the person in possession or any other person as the offender." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 557 n. 6. Therefore, arguments that the warrant and supporting affidavit did not identify the defendant as the owner of the computer, as a resident of the premises, or as a probable suspect for child pornography offenses are essentially irrelevant.
During the search, Rosalie Shields informed the officers that Peter Modica was her deceased husband.
On February 12, 2006, Grillo sent a search warrant to Yahoo, Inc., asking for all subscriber and account information assigned to that email address. On March 27, 2006, Yahoo, Inc. replied, via letter, that the email address was registered to a "Mr R J" (DOB 8/15/74), of Brooklyn, New York. The letter also indicated that the email account was created on November 29, 1999, and had a registration IP address of 209.244.183.90. The account status was still active as of March 27, 2006.
According to the CCEEU, the initials and date of birth provided by Yahoo, Inc. were consistent with the defendant (Robert J. Shields) and the defendant had a previous address of 1833 63rd Street in Brooklyn, New York, between September 1997 and November 2003. In addition, forensics performed on the hard drive seized from the residence revealed that the Windows 2000 Professional program installed on it had a log-in screen with the user name Robert and a password determined to be "password." A black spiral notebook seized from the defendant's office at 141 Rocky Mountain Road contained information that indicated that the defendant used the word "password" as a password for various other accounts. Farnham also found Kazaa installed on the hard drive, with the user name "BKNYC11204."
According to the CCEEU, Cariaso did not have a previous address in Brooklyn, New York.
The officers made out a warrant for the defendant's arrest, which was issued by the court, Iannotti, J., on May 8, 2006. The arrest warrant charged the defendant with violating the following statutes: § 53a-196d, possession of child pornography in the first degree; and General Statutes § 53a-196c, importing child pornography.
On April 14, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized and obtained as a result of the execution of the search warrant at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. On November 14, 2006, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion to suppress. The state filed a memorandum of law in opposition on January 19, 2007. On March 27, 2007, the parties presented oral argument to this court in support of their respective positions.
DISCUSSION
The defendant sets forth the following three arguments in support of suppressing the evidence seized at his residence on November 16, 2005: (1) "there was insufficient information within the four corners of the affidavit to establish probable cause to believe either that a resident of the home was sexually abusing a child or that there was within the home child pornography or similar type illegal materials"; (2) "the information provided by the affiants — specifically information with respect to the computer technology and internet connections — was inaccurate, incomplete, incompetent, insufficient and misleading to the extent that the issuing magistrate was misled to believe that probable cause existed"; and (3) "neither affiant established in the body of the affidavit that either has sufficient qualifications to present accurate technological information concerning computers and internet connections upon which a magistrate was entitled to rely in deciding to issue a warrant."
In support of his first argument for suppressing the evidence, the defendant asserts that the following three failures created a lack of sufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that a resident in the home was sexually abusing a child and that there was child pornography in the home: (1) little independent investigation performed by Connecticut police officers to determine if he, or any resident of the subject premises, had actually been involved in criminal behavior involving a minor or actually possessed child pornography; (2) no information that any resident of the premises was the father of a minor child; and (3) no information that the visual depictions of child pornography sought by the warrant were on the premises.
The state, in its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to suppress, counters that contrary to the defendant's contentions, the application and affidavit provided sufficient facts for the magistrate to believe that a minor in the home was being sexually abused and that child pornography would be found there. The state argues that there was a substantial reason to believe that a minor child was living in the home, as evidenced by the instant messenger conversation between "Bi06488" and "Centralpamaster" in paragraph ten of the affidavit, in which "Bi06488" told "Centralpamaster" that he had a son who was currently attending "practice." The state also contends that based on the information the police received from the United States Postal Service and the Department of Motor Vehicles, they had reason to believe that four persons, three of them male, were living at 141 Rocky Mountain Road, and that three out of the four had registered vehicles, thus suggesting that the fourth, who was male, may have been a child. Furthermore, the state argues that even though "Bi06488" stated that he had no pictures of his own son on his computer, it was reasonable to infer that he had child pornography on it because he asked "Centralpamaster" for pictures to view while masturbating.
As to the first of the failures asserted by the defendant, police departments can rely on the information and investigation of other police departments. "Fourth amendment law recognizes that the collective knowledge of the police determines probable cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 698, 916 A.2d 788 (2007). "[W]hen [courts] test the quantum of [evidence supporting] probable cause, it is not the personal knowledge of . . . officer but the collective knowledge of the law enforcement organization . . . which must be considered . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 377, 288 A.2d 439, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 677, 30 L.Ed.2d 664 ("the existence of probable cause is to be determined on the basis of the collective information of the law enforcement organization"). Thus, Sprinkle's information and investigation is imputed to Grillo and Johansen. Moreover, Grillo and Johansen performed their own independent investigation to ensure that an adult male named Jerome Cariaso was residing at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. Consequently, the court disagrees with the first failure alleged by the defendant.
As to the second asserted failure, this court agrees with the defendant that there was a lack of probable cause to believe that a minor residing at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut, was being sexually abused by an adult residing at that address. The portion of the online conversation in which "Bi06488" informed "Centralpamaster" that he had a son who was at "practice" and Grillo's observation of the basketball hoop, which appeared to be lowered to less than ten feet, do not support probable cause to believe that this type of criminal activity was occurring within the residence.
Nevertheless, as further discussed below, with respect to the third asserted failure, the information in the search warrant affidavit did provide the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that physical evidence of child pornography would be found in the residence. As provided in the affidavit, in the online conversation between "Centralpamaster" and "Bi06488," "Bi06488" asked "Centralpamaster" to send pictures of Centralpamaster's son. It was reasonable to infer that these pictures were of the pornographic nature. Moreover, the affiants stated that through their training and experience, they knew that those individuals engaged in the sexual exploitation of children will trade child pornographic pictures with others via the internet and will retain those pictures on their computer systems for long periods of time, as the pictures have economic and emotional value. Thus, the court disagrees with the third failure asserted by the defendant and denies the motion to suppress with regard to the defendant's first argument.
The defendant's second argument for suppressing the evidence is that the affiants improperly suggested a connection between the subject IP address and the screen name "Bi06488." The defendant argues that because IP addresses change constantly, nothing can be inferred from the fact that a 24.151.2.100 IP address was associated with the screen name "Bi06488" prior to August of 2005 and a resident of 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut, in November of 2005. The defendant argues: "In order to support such a connection, the [a]ffidavit, at a minimum, would have to establish the IP address `24.151.2.100' was connected to the screen name `Bi06488' and Jerome Cariaso at the same time . . . [T]he affiants merely had to undertake a simple investigation to determine who had the IP address at the time of the relevant conversation. That was not done . . . Because the affiants suggested a connection to an IP address associated to each at least four months apart, without informing the issuing judge that such IP was dynamic and subject to constant change, the affidavit was misleading and could not have supported a finding of probable cause."
The state, in its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to suppress, counters that based on the information provided by the Pennsylvania police, the magistrate could reasonably infer that someone residing at 141 Rocky Mountain Road was communicating with a person in State College, Pennsylvania, about sexually abusing a child and possessing child pornography, and that the warrant detailed the connection between the screen name and the IP address. The state claims that the information was not stale, as there was probable cause to believe that the evidence identified in the warrant would be found on the subject premises to be searched. Thus, the state maintains that the information provided by the affiants was not inaccurate, incomplete, incompetent, insufficient nor misleading to the extent that the issuing magistrate was misled to believe that probable cause existed.
An IP address is a unique address that certain electronic devices use in order to identify and communicate with each other on a computer network utilizing the IP standard. Just as each street address and phone number uniquely identifies a building or telephone, an IP address can uniquely identify a specific computer or other network device on a network. Register Corp., Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 409-10 (2d Cir. 2004). Any participating device on a network must have its own unique numeric identifier. The numbers currently used in IP addresses range from 10.00 to 255.255.255.255. This does not provide enough possibilities for every internet device to have its own permanent number. To deal with this problem, many internet service providers limit the number of IP addresses that are permanently assigned to a specific device, otherwise known as static IP addresses, and economize on the remaining number of IP addresses they possess by temporarily assigning an IP address to a requesting Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) computer from a pool of IP addresses known as dynamic IF addresses. Dynamic IP addresses can be shared or rotated amongst many devices, although no two devices can use the same IP address at the same time. A requesting DHCP computer receives a dynamic IP address for the duration of an internet session or for some other specified amount of time. Once a user disconnects from the internet, his or her dynamic IP address goes back into the IP address pool so it can be assigned to another user.
In the present case, it is unclear whether the IP address associated with the screen name "Bi06488" was a static or a dynamic IP address. It was most likely a dynamic IP address, as residential internet connections, whether broadband or dial-up, typically employ dynamic IP addresses, while commercially leased lines and servers typically employ static IP addresses. Because it was most likely a dynamic IP address, the defendant is correct in his assertion that a person using that address one month may not have been the same person using it the next. In order to use a dynamic IP address to identify the name and residential address of its user, a court order must ask the owner of that IP address, i.e., the internet service provider (ISP), who used the particular IP address on the date in question. See, e.g., United States v. Dietz, 452 F.Sup.2d 611, 614 (E.D.Pa. 2006) (after being served with a subpoena, the ISP informed police of the name and address of the subscriber using the IP address at the time in question); (5th Cir. 2007) (after being served with a subpoena, the ISP provided information on the user of the particular IP address on the dates when the child pornography was transmitted).
In the letter Sprinkle wrote to Grillo, as incorporated into the affidavit, Sprinkle writes that after Yahoo, Inc. sent him the IP addresses associated with the Yahoo, Inc. screen name "Bi06488," he was able to resolve, through www.arin.net, that the IP addresses were owned by Charter Communications. After sending a court order to Charter Communications on September 19, 2005, he received a fax from Charter Communications on November 4, 2005, indicating that the subscriber for the IP address of 24151.2.100 was Jerome Cariaso of 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. Sprinkle failed, however, to indicate in the letter whether he had asked Charter Communications who the subscriber for that IP address was on the particular date the incriminating conversation between "Bi06488" and "Centralpamaster" took place. By failing to include this information, it is not clear in the affidavit whether Charter Communications supplied the subscriber information of the person using the IP address on the date the incriminating conversation took place. Therefore, the affidavit for the search warrant contains an omission. Nevertheless, the court finds this omission to be a harmless defect that does not invalidate the search warrant.
"Although the facts of the present case involve late twentieth century features of [i]nternet technology, so called cybercommunications, computer hardware, software and jargon that developed only late in the twentieth century, the applicable law remains constant insofar as search and seizure issues are concerned." In Re Property of Perry Forgione, 49 Conn.Sup. 613, 621, 908, A.2d 593 (2006). "The law regarding probable cause and the standards for upholding the issuance of a search warrant are well established." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lasaga, 269 Conn. 454, 469, 848 A.2d 1149 (2004).
"Probable cause, broadly defined, [comprises] such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buddhu, 264 Conn. 449, 460, 825 A.2d 48 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030, 124 S.Ct, 2106, 158 L.Ed.2d 712 (2004). "Probable cause to search exists if (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction . . . and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Moreover, "[i]n determining the existence of probable cause to search, the issuing magistrate [should] [assess] all of the information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should make a practical, nontechnical decision whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Buddhu, supra, 264 Conn. 460. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). "In making this determination [of probable cause], the magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zarick, 227 Conn. 207, 223, 630 A.2d 565, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1025, 114 S.Ct. 637, 126 L.Ed.2d 595 (1993).
Furthermore, the probable cause standard is a "practical, nontechnical conception"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 231; and "[i]n dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, [courts] deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 232." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zarick, supra, 227 Conn. 222. "[C]ourts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner . . . Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 236 . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mordowanec, 259 Conn. 94, 114, 788 A.2d 48, cert. denied, 536 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 2369, 153 L.Ed.2d 189 (2002).
In ruling upon a motion to suppress, a reviewing court must "uphold the validity of [a search] warrant . . . [if] the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual basis for the magistrate's conclusion that probable cause existed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Batts, supra, 281 Conn. 699-700, "When a magistrate has determined that the warrant affidavit presents sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify a search and has issued a warrant, a court reviewing that warrant at a subsequent suppression hearing should defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate. Where the circumstances for finding probable cause are detailed, where a substantial basis for crediting the source of information is apparent, and when a magistrate has in fact found probable cause, the reviewing court should not invalidate the warrant by application of rigid analytical categories." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 236.
"In other words, a reviewing court's responsibility is not to determine whether, presented with the same facts, it would have issued the warrant, or whether the warrant affidavit could have contained additional information or have been more artfully drawn. Rather, the court must view the information in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the magistrate's determination of probable cause . . . [and] [i]n a doubtful or marginal case . . . our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause leads us to afford deference, to the [issuing judge's] determination . . . State v. Buddhu, supra, 264 Conn. 460 . . ." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foran, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CR 04 0216603 (October 6, 2006, Gold, J.). "[A] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants . . . is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant . . . Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 236 . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mordowanec, supra, 259 Conn. 113-14.
In the present case, the omission of certain technical information does not invalidate the search warrant because the search warrant affidavit still provided the issuing magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that physical evidence of child pornography would be found at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut. The affidavit presented to the magistrate included information that a person using the screen name "Bi06488" attempted to possess child pornography and was currently residing at that address. Although the affidavit lacked a statement explicitly linking the IP address to 141 Rocky Mountain Road at the time "Bi06488" had the incriminating conversation with "Centralpamaster," the issuing magistrate was free to draw upon his common sense to infer that there was a fair probability that Charter Communications supplied the address of the IP user on the particular date and time of the conversation because that was the only sensible thing for Charter Communications to do. As provided in the search warrant affidavit, Grillo stated that "[o]n November 4, 2005, I received a fax back from `Charter Communications' indicating the subscriber for the IP address of 24.1512.100 is Jerome Cariaso of 141 Rocky Mountain [Road] Southbury, Connecticut . . ." (Emphasis added.) As previously explained, given the nature of dynamic IP addresses, it was more than likely that Charter Communications would have come back with multiple subscribers for that IP address if it had not limited its search to the subscriber of the IP address on the date and time the incriminating conversation took place.
As previously discussed, the court finds, however, that there was no substantial basis for the issuing magistrate to believe that a resident at that address was placing a minor at risk of injury.
This court gives the requisite "greatest deference" to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate and views the information in the affidavit in the light most favorable to upholding the issuing magistrate's decision. Therefore, the court disagrees with the defendant's hypertechnical analysis of the affidavit and finds that the affidavit, read in a commonsense and realistic manner, stated specific facts and circumstances from which the issuing magistrate could reasonably conclude that there was at least a fair probability that child pornography would be found in the residence. Consequently, contrary to the defendant's argument, the information in the affidavit was not stale, inaccurate, incomplete, incompetent, insufficient, nor misleading to the extent that the issuing magistrate was misled to believe that probable cause existed; thus, the court denies the motion to suppress with regard to the defendant's second argument.
The defendant's third argument in support of his motion to suppress is that the affidavit and application for the search warrant lacked probable cause due to the affiants' lack of specialized training in the investigation of child exploitation, child pornography or computer crimes. The defendant argues that the affidavit and application for the search warrant gave no indication that either Grillo or Johansen had specialized training for the following reasons: (1) it failed to give any information about Grillo's experience or training regarding computer crimes, child exploitation or child pornography; (2) it failed to provide the length of Johansen's tenure with the CCEEU; (3) it failed to provide any specifics as to Johansen's training on the number and types of similar cases he has investigated through the CCEEU; and (4) it failed to provide background information on any cases or investigations similar to the instant case in which Johansen may have been involved.
The state, in its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to suppress, counters that the magistrate does not need to see a detailed listing of courses attended and cases pursued by the affiants before authorizing a search warrant. The state argues that "[t]he affiants' training and experience provided the basis for the information provided . . . As such it was credible material that the magistrate could rely on in finding the existence of probable cause."
Paragraph one of the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided that Grillo had been a member of the Southbury Police Department since December 9, 2002. Paragraph two of the affidavit provided that Johansen had been a member of the Connecticut State Police Department for five years and was assigned to the CCEEU, working exclusively in the field of computer related criminal activity. Paragraph two of the affidavit also provided that the CCEEU is a member of the Internet Crimes Against Children Taskforce (ICAC), which is a taskforce devoted to the apprehension of individuals committing offenses against children that often involve the use of computer based technology.
The court agrees with the state. The affiants provided sufficient information that they had the proper training for the investigation of child exploitation, child pornography and computer crimes to make an assessment on the existence of probable cause. This holds particularly true for Johansen, as the affidavit provided that he is a member of the CCEEU, a group that is specifically trained to investigate these types of cases. See State v. Toccaline, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, geographical area #11 at Danielson, Docket No. CR000109519 (July 18, 2003, Swienton, J.) (members of the CCEEU executed a search warrant upon the defendant's residence as part of an ongoing child pornography investigation). The affiants are not required to make the detailed showing that the defendant requests, for this is not the standard. Thus, the defendant's argument that the search warrant lacked probable cause due to the affiants' lack of specialized training is also without merit and the court denies the motion to suppress with regard to the defendant's third argument.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the court finds that there was sufficient information within the four corners of the affidavit to establish probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found in the residence located at 141 Rocky Mountain Road in Southbury, Connecticut, but there was insufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that an adult was sexually abusing a child in the residence. As indicated by the arrest warrant, the defendant has only been charged with possessing child pornography in the first degree and importing child pornography; therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence during the execution of the search warrant.