Opinion
2012-UP-043
01-25-2012
Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Heard November 2, 2011
Appeal From Horry County Edward B. Cottingham, Circuit Court Judge.
Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Anthony Quentin Scott appeals his conviction for murder, arguing the circuit court (1) erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and (2) abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on criminal intent. We affirm.
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
1. An appellate court reviews the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). "If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [an appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury." Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648. The circuit court may not consider the weight of the evidence. Id. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648. "' Murder ' is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (2003). "In order to be guilty as an aider or abettor, the participant must be chargeable with knowledge of the principal's criminal conduct." State v. Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1987). He must "assist in the commission of [the] crime through some overt act." State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 459, 385 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1989).
Here, the State presented substantial circumstantial evidence that, in a light most favorable to the State, supports submitting the charge to the jury. Scott was with his co-defendant both immediately before and soon after the shooting, and Scott was witnessed holding a long gun, "a shotgun or something, " after. This circumstantial evidence is sufficient to imply he had a role in the murder, if not pulling the trigger in fact. The evidence presented by the State showed Scott's co-defendant was upset with the victim. Moreover, the rifle was found hidden on the co-defendant's property, and two matching shell casings were found in his vehicle, the vehicle a witness placed at the scene of the crime around the time of the shooting. Finally, an investigator testified he believed the victim was shot twice, in both the head and the ankle, with a bullet consistent with the type fired by the rifle. Therefore, in light of all of this evidence, we hold the circuit court did not err when it submitted the murder charge to the jury.
2. We hold whether the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on criminal intent is unpreserved for review. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. State, 364 S.C. 173, 178, 612 S.E.2d 702, 705 (2005) ("When given the opportunity, counsel must articulate a reason for the requested charge.").
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.