Summary
denying state's motion for stay of execution of judgment in Santiago pending resolution of appeal in present case
Summary of this case from State v. PeelerOpinion
No. 17413.
10-30-2015
STATE of Connecticut v. Eduardo SANTIAGO.
Opinion
PALMER, J.
Following the release of our decision in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1 (2015), in which a majority of this court concluded that the enactment of Public Acts 2012, No. 12–5 (P.A. 12–5), rendered the imposition of the death penalty on offenders sentenced prior to the passage of that act unconstitutional; and our denial of the state's motion for argument on October 7, 2015; see State v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 912, 124 A.3d 496 (2015) (order on state's motion for argument); the state filed a motion with this court, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60–1, 60–2, 61–14, 66–2 and 66–3, to stay the execution of the judgment in this case pending the resolution of an appeal in a different capital felony case, namely, State v. Peeler, Docket No. SC 18125 (argued July 10, 2014), which appeal is currently before this court. Although it appears that a party could, under appropriate circumstances, move this court pursuant to those rules to stay the execution of a judgment, it would be improper for this court to grant such a stay when, as in the present case, the party that has not prevailed in an appeal before this court seeks the stay in the hope that the outcome of a different appeal—one filed later, by a different party, and that will be decided subsequently by a different panel of this court—may be more to its liking. See Practice Book § 69–3; cf. Roberts v. Cooper, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 467, 481, 15 L.Ed. 969 (1858) (“there would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its members”). Accordingly, the state is not entitled to a stay in the present case.
On pages 4 and 5 of the state's motion for stay, for example, the state argues that it would be unfair for it to be bound by the decision of the Santiago panel if “a majority of the present (i.e., the Peeler ) court concludes that it was wrongly decided....”
I agree with the defendant's contention in his opposition to the state's motion to stay that there is no authority for the proposition that this court may stay a judgment in a particular case pending resolution of a similar issue in an entirely separate case. Although this court has occasionally arranged its docket so that similar issues raised in separate cases may be decided at the same time, I am aware of no case in which it has followed the procedure that the state is advocating. I emphasize, however, that I express no opinion here as to whether the decision in Santiago II will be binding on this court in Peeler, an issue that must be decided not in the present case, but in Peeler.
We further note that the state, in both the present motion and its motion for argument, repeatedly has complained that the majority opinion in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. at 1, 122 A.3d 1 was reached on the basis of issues that were raised sua sponte by the court, issues that the state contends it had no opportunity to brief or argue. As we explained at some length in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. at 120–26, 122 A.3d 1 this contention is simply unfounded.
Among the purported “issues” that the state contends this court was precluded even from considering without first notifying the state thereof are basic facts that indisputably are matters of record, such as that the death penalty is rarely imposed in Connecticut, that offenders remain on death row for decades awaiting execution, that individuals sentenced to death in other jurisdictions have subsequently been exonerated, and that the trend among our sister states is in favor of abolition.
As the majority opinion in Santiago observed, the defendant indisputably raised and preserved “the claim that, following the enactment of P.A. 12–5, the death penalty now offends the state constitution in that it (1) fails to comport with contemporary standards of decency, and (2) is now devoid of any legitimate penological value. We recognized as much in our initial decision in [Santiago ] ... and, on reconsideration, the defendant dedicate [d] pages of discussion to this claim in his supplemental briefs. Indeed, his argument on reconsideration begins with the statement that ‘[P.A. 12–5] represents the considered judgment of our legislature and governor that the death penalty is no longer consistent with standards of decency in Connecticut and does not serve any valid penological objective.’ ” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., at 121, 122 A.3d 1. Later in his supplemental briefs, in connection with his discussion of the relevant Geisler factors, the defendant expressly asked this court to again consider the concerns that have been raised in one-half dozen lengthy dissenting opinions of this court, written over the past several decades, that expressed the view that capital punishment offends the state constitution for a variety of reasons. In his reply brief, the defendant discussed this state's failed historical experience with the death penalty and again argued that capital punishment no longer serves any legitimate penological purpose. That was more than sufficient to put the state on notice that the court was being asked to comprehensively reexamine the constitutionality of the death penalty, in light of recent developments.
In ascertaining the contours of the protections afforded under our state constitution, we utilize a multifactor approach that we first adopted in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). The six nonexclusive factors to be considered are (1) the text of the relevant constitutional provisions, (2) related Connecticut precedents, (3) persuasive federal precedents, (4) persuasive precedents of other state courts, (5) historical insights into the intent of the constitutional framers, and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms. See id.
At no point did the defendant suggest that this court's review of the constitutionality of the death penalty should be limited exclusively to the theory that a new consensus had emerged in opposition to that punishment.
More important, however, any suggestion that the state was not on notice that the issues discussed in the majority opinion in Santiago were before this court, or that the state was not afforded a fair opportunity to address them, is belied by the state's own submission in this case. See id., at 126, 122 A.3d 1. In its supplemental brief, the state systematically reviewed the Geisler factors, explaining why, in its view, the Connecticut constitution provides no greater protection from cruel and unusual punishment than does its federal counterpart. See State v. Santiago, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 2013, State's Supplemental Brief pp. 32–38. Specifically, the state argued that the death penalty continues to find support in (1) the text of the Connecticut constitution, (2) federal constitutional developments—despite the elimination of capital punishment for certain categories of offenders, (3) developments in sister states—despite the repeal of capital punishment in those states, (4) recent Connecticut precedents, including this court's lengthy discussion of the evolving standards of decency in State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011), and (5) various public policy considerations. It is precisely on the basis of our disagreement with the state on each of these fundamental points of contention that a majority of this court concluded that capital punishment no longer passes constitutional muster in Connecticut. Quite clearly, the state's analysis of the various Geisler factors refutes its contention that it lacked notice that this court would consider those factors in evaluating the defendant's claim. See State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. at 17–46 and n. 14, 122 A.3d 1 (analyzing Geisler factors and explaining that those factors also are interwoven into our consideration of legal framework applicable to defendant's state constitutional claim).
In addition, the state dedicated no less than six pages to arguing that “Connecticut's standard[s] of decency [have] not evolved to the point that the death penalty has been rejected....” State v. Santiago, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 2013, State's Supplemental Brief p. 18. See generally id., at pp. 18–23. The state spent six more pages contending that “[e]xecuting the defendant would not violate the Connecticut constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment....” Id., at p. 32. See generally id., at pp. 32–38. In making those arguments, the state recognized that “[t]he defendant ... presumes throughout much of his brief that Connecticut has made a moral decision that executing a guilty prisoner is no longer an acceptable form of punishment.” Id., at p. 18. In response to the defendant's claims, the state contended that neither the legislature, the governor, nor the people of Connecticut have come to see the death penalty as indecent. Id., at pp. 18–23. It further argued that the death penalty continues to satisfy the legitimate penological objectives of deterrence and retribution, and that the continued imposition of the death penalty would not be impermissibly revengeful. See id., at pp. 23, 29–31.
In repeatedly arguing to the contrary, the state demonstrates its fundamental misunderstanding of this court's decision in Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (Blumberg ). In Blumberg, we held that, “with respect to unpreserved issues that do not involve subject matter jurisdiction, plain error or constitutional error, if the reviewing court would have the discretion to review the issue if raised by a party because important considerations of justice outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules governing the preservation of claims and adversarial principles, the court may raise the claim sua sponte, as long as it provides an opportunity for all parties to be heard on the issue.” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 162, 84 A.3d 840. We also hastened to add, however, that, “when [a case] is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law....” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 148, 84 A.3d 840 quoting United States National Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993). As we explained in Santiago, this is all the more so “when plenary consideration is necessary to thoroughly address and accurately decide constitutional claims and other matters of substantial public importance, our resolution of which will surely redound to the benefit or detriment of parties not presently before the court.” State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. at 124, 122 A.3d 1.
It is this court's responsibility to construe the constitution of the state of Connecticut, and parties' briefs and arguments play an indispensable role in that process. It has never been the practice or policy of this court, however, to refuse to consider any factor or point or line of reasoning that may be relevant under Geisler, including relevant scholarship, sister state authority, historical context, undisputed or unchallenged facts, and legal argument and analysis, unless first fully vetted by the parties themselves. In other words, as long as the state constitutional claim is adequately briefed in accordance with Geisler, as it unarguably was in this case, it is this court's responsibility to identify and evaluate all of the relevant factors and considerations so that we may reach the correct constitutional result. For these reasons, the state's contentions in its motion for stay of execution are without merit.
We are baffled by the suggestion of Chief Justice Rogers, in her concurring opinion on this motion, that, in addressing the concerns that the state has raised in its various postjudgment motions in this case, we are somehow engaging in an “irregular,” “eleventh hour attempt to justify the majority opinion [in Santiago ]....” In the majority opinion in Santiago, we responded at length to Chief Justice Rogers' contention that the constitutionality of the death penalty was not at issue in the case, notwithstanding that the defendant repeatedly had asked us to consider that very question and had briefed it at some length. Despite our explanation, the state, in the present motion, contends that it was denied the opportunity to address the questions decided in Santiago. There is nothing irregular or improper about us pointing out that the state not only was on notice, but did in fact spend more than one dozen pages briefing those issues. Indeed, we note that Chief Justice Rogers herself chose to write and publish an eight page dissenting opinion in response to the state's postappeal motion for argument in this case, in which she expounded at length on the arguments in her initial dissenting opinion in Santiago.
In this opinion NORCOTT, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js., concurred.
ROGERS, C.J., with whom ZARELLA, J., joins, concurring in the denial of the state's motion to stay.
I write this concurring opinion to explain why, despite the fact that I voted to grant the state's motion to reconsider this court's decision in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) (Santiago II ), I have now voted to deny the state's motion to stay the judgment in that case pending resolution of the separate appeal in State v. Peeler, Docket No. SC 18125. In Santiago II, supra, at 140, 122 A.3d 1 a majority of this court concluded that the death penalty is now unconstitutional under our state constitution as the result of the prospective abolition of the death penalty in No. 12–5 of the 2012 Public Acts. The state filed a motion for argument and reconsideration of that decision claiming that the majority had addressed numerous issues that the defendant, Eduardo Santiago, had not raised and that the state had not had an opportunity to brief, which a majority of this court denied. State v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 912, 124 A.3d 496 (2015) (Santiago III ). The state also filed a motion for permission to brief these issues in Peeler, which this court granted. The state now has filed a motion requesting that this court stay the judgment in Santiago II until the court has decided the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty as a matter of first impression in Peeler.
For the following reasons, I have concluded that the state's motion to stay must be denied. The appeal in Santiago II was decided, the motion for argument and reconsideration was denied and, therefore, the decision is now final. Although I continue to believe that the majority in Santiago II unfairly denied the state an opportunity to address many of the issues on which the majority based its decision holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional under the state constitution; see Santiago III, supra, 319 Conn. at 912–13 and n. 1, 124 A.3d 496 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting from denial of state's motion for argument and reconsideration of Santiago II ); a majority of the court has spoken on that issue, and the orderly administration of justice compels me to abide by its decision. I cannot and will not ignore our ordinary policies and procedural rules governing the finality of judgments because their application in a particular instance leads to a result with which I happen to strongly disagree.1 I am compelled to follow these rules because doing otherwise would in the long term undermine the public faith in the integrity of this court, which is ultimately the sole basis of its authority.
I also briefly address the majority's latest argument in support of its claim that, contrary to the state's representations in its motion for argument and reconsideration of our decision in Santiago II and in the present motion to stay, the state was in fact on notice that this court would consider numerous issues that the defendant did not expressly raise. Procedurally, I believe that the majority's eleventh hour attempt to justify the majority opinion in Santiago II is irregular. If the majority believed that the state's brief in Santiago II demonstrates that it was on notice of the claims that the state, I and two other members of this court contend were not properly before the court, the time for it to say so was in the original majority opinion, when the issue of lack of notice to the state had been specifically raised in my dissenting opinion. Substantively, the majority points out that the state responded to the specific issues raised by the defendant in support of his claim that our state constitution's due process clauses provide greater protection from the execution of the death penalty after prospective repeal than does the eighth amendment to the United States constitution under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). It then appears to contend that this fact somehow demonstrates “[q]uite clearly” that the state must have been on notice that this court would consider any and all issues that could possibly support the defendant's state constitutional claim, even though the defendant had not expressly raised the issue, this court had expressly considered and rejected most of these issues a mere one and one-half years before oral argument in Santiago II; see State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 184–201, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011), cert. denied, ––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 133, 184 L.Ed.2d 64 (2012); and this court had just reaffirmed Rizzo and summarily rejected the defendant's state constitutional claim in this very case. See State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 306, 49 A.3d 566 (2012). For the reasons that I previously have discussed at length in my dissenting opinions in Santiago II and Santiago III, the majority's contention does not withstand scrutiny. It would serve no purpose to repeat those arguments here.
ESPINOSA, J., dissenting from the denial of the state's motion for stay of execution.
I disagree with the decision of this court to deny the state's motion for a stay of execution in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912, 124 A.3d 496 (2015), pending the resolution of the appeal in State v. Peeler, Docket No. SC 18125 (argued July 10, 2014). Because the majority in Santiago resolved this appeal on bases not raised by the defendant, Eduardo Santiago, the state was deprived of fair notice and has not yet had the opportunity to address those issues. Fundamental principles of fairness dictate that the state should have a meaningful opportunity to present argument as to those issues. Consistent with basic principles of justice, the people of the state of Connecticut—whose interests are represented by the state—have a right to be heard after receiving proper notice of the issues that are in play, and without prejudice. This court has ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs in Peeler on the very issues that the state did not have the opportunity to address in Santiago. That order alone, however, does not guarantee the state a meaningful opportunity to present its arguments. Granting the stay in Santiago would ensure that the state could advance its arguments without being hampered by any suggestion that the issues have been rendered moot by the likelihood that the offenders currently on death row will have had their sentences vacated and commuted to sentences of life without the possibility of release prior to a decision in Peeler. Denying the state's motion for a stay, therefore, creates an unreasonable risk of a “deleterious effect ... on the public's perception of the procedural fairness of the criminal justice system.” State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 740, 91 A.3d 862 (2014).
In light of the prejudice that would be suffered by the state by the likelihood that its claims will be rendered moot following the resentencing of the offenders on death row absent an appeal by the state, strict adherence to the rules of practice will work injustice. Therefore, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60–1 and 60–2, I would grant the state's motion to stay the execution of the judgment in Santiago, pending the resolution of the appeal in Peeler. I recognize that § 60–2(4) ordinarily authorizes only the stay of ancillary proceedings, and I do not agree with the state that the appeal in Santiago constitutes a proceeding that is ancillary to the appeal in Peeler. Because in the present matter, “strict adherence” to the rules of practice would work an injustice, however, § 60–1 not only authorizes, but requires this court to interpret the rules liberally to grant the stay. Denying the people of this state the opportunity to present argument on an issue as important as the one presented in these appeals, however, is inconsistent with fundamental principles of fairness.
It is ironic that the majority anchors its decision denying the stay on the insinuation that the state has engaged in panel shopping. The very reason that the state cannot present its arguments to the Santiago panel is because the majority in that panel denied the state's motion for argument and reconsideration filed in that case. First, I observe that the state's willingness to submit these issues to the Santiago panel in and of itself should silence any speculation that the state's aim is to shop for a panel “more to its liking.” Second, I note that the term panel shopping implies that a party chooses one panel over another—the Santiago majority took any such choice away from the state and now has the audacity to accuse the state of panel shopping.
Finally, I observe that it would be improper for the court to rely on this order declining to stay the execution of the judgment in Santiago as a shield to avoid addressing the substance of the arguments of the people of this state on the important issue of whether the death penalty violates our state constitution. The people of this state have not yet been heard on this issue, and justice demands that this court address their arguments.
Accordingly, I dissent.