No. 05-08-01511-CR
Opinion Filed July 29, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 004-81465-08.
Before Justices MOSELEY, O'NEILL, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice MURPHY.
This is an appeal of the trial court's order granting Gina Cave Salazar's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence relating to her arrest for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. The evidence was obtained after Wylie police officer Anthony Turano and his partner, patrolling on a dark two-way road during the early morning hours, observed Salazar's car parked on a grassy area to the side of the road. The officers drove up behind Salazar with the emergency lights on and approached her to see if she needed help. This interaction led to further questioning, which led to the arrest. Characterizing the approach as a "traffic stop" and investigative detention requiring justification under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, Salazar argued the evidence should be suppressed because Turano lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. The State did not dispute Salazar's characterization of the approach as a stop, but argued at the suppression hearing that Turano lawfully detained her because he believed she was illegally parked. Because the State accepted Salazar's characterization of the officers' approach as a traffic stop, we do not decide whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the interaction between Turano and Salazar was indeed a detention or simply an encounter requiring no legal justification. See State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 238 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Instead, we determine whether the trial court properly concluded the State's proffered reason did not justify the stop. We affirm the court's order.
Background
The hearing on Salazar's motion was short and consisted of Turano's testimony and the video recording of the approach. Turano testified he was driving southbound when he noticed Salazar's car on the northbound side. The road did not have a shoulder area but was adjacent to a grassy area; a curb separated the two. According to Turano, Salazar's car was pulled over in a manner which "was not normal" or "legal," with three tires "off of the road over the curb into the grass" and the fourth tire-the driver's side rear tire-"still on the roadway" next to the curb. Turano documented his contact with Salazar and her arrest in a written report. In the report, Turano noted that when he first saw Salazar's car, it appeared "as if [she] was beginning to drive away." Turano also noted in the report that he approached Salazar out of concern that she might have been in an accident and her car might be disabled. Upon the prosecutor's questioning, Turano testified "there wasn't a considerable amount of change" in the position of Salazar's car from the time he first saw her to the point in time when he pulled behind her. He further testified he approached Salazar not only because of his concern for her but also because she was parked "more than [eighteen] inches off of the curb," in violation of section 545.303 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Tex. Trans. Code Ann. § 545.303(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (stopping or parking on two-way road lawful provided that right hand wheels of car are parallel to and within eighteen inches of right hand curb or edge of roadway). Turano's testimony concerning the position of Salazar's car was corroborated by the video recording. Arguing Turano's reliance on section 545.303 was an afterthought and his real reason for stopping her-to see if she needed assistance-"was refuted by the [car] starting to drive away," Salazar urged the trial court to grant her motion. In response, the State argued that although Turano's report did not specifically mention section 545.303, the report reflected Salazar was parked illegally and her parking provided Turano the reasonable suspicion to make contact with her. Without specifying any findings or the grounds, the trial court granted the motion. Discussion
We review de novo a ruling on a suppression motion based on the legality of the detention. State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 286-87 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). In conducting our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and will sustain the ruling if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Under both the United States and Texas constitutions, a traffic stop is an investigative detention and must be reasonable to be lawful. Wehring v. State, 276 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9). A stop is reasonable if it is justified. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). It is justified when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. See Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 715-16 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The State bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the stop. See id. at 716. The State satisfies its burden upon a showing of an objective basis for the stop. See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In assessing reasonableness, we look at the totality of the circumstances. See Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). We must ask whether a person of reasonable caution, looking at the facts available to the officer at the moment of the investigation, would believe that a traffic violation occurred. Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. As long as a traffic violation that would have objectively justified the stop occurred, the fact that the officer made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic violation is irrelevant. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). An officer's mistaken, though honest, misunderstanding of the traffic law, however, will not justify a stop. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999); Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. The facts here leading to Turano's approach of Salazar's car are undisputed: Salazar's car was stopped on a grassy area to the side of the road, with three tires off the road over the curb and the fourth tire "still on the roadway." The State argues in its appellate brief that this established Salazar was parked illegally and justified the stop, even though Turano did not specifically state in his report that Salazar was parked illegally and did not testify the parking violation was the primary reason he approached Salazar. We agree that the parking violation did not need to be mentioned in Turano's report and that it did not need to be Turano's primary basis for approaching Salazar for it to supply the justification for the stop. In assessing whether a stop was justified, we look at the facts objectively; the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (concluding defendant's parking on two-way roadway with left wheels next to curb and right wheels more than eighteen inches from curb in violation of section 545.303(a)'s predecessor justified stop, despite officer's testimony that he stopped defendant because of suspected drug transaction); Singleton v. State, 91 S.W.3d 342, 347-48 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (not limiting review of reasonableness of stop to violations officer cited; though officer testified stop was due to prohibition against "exhibition of acceleration," stop was justified on basis of unsafe driving). We disagree, however, that a parking violation occurred and that section 545.303 of the transportation code objectively justified the stop. Section 545.303 provides a "roadway" is that "portion of a highway, other than the berm or shoulder, that is improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.302 (11) (Vernon 1999). As Salazar argues in her brief, she was not stopped or parked on the roadway; she was to the side of the road on the grassy area and was not obstructing traffic. Although Turano may have believed Salazar was parked illegally in violation of section 545.303 because her left rear tire was on the road next to the curb and her right tires were off the road and more than eighteen inches from the curb, his mistaken understanding of the law cannot provide justification for the stop. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 288; Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716. Because Turano failed to articulate facts supporting reasonable suspicion that Salazar had violated section 545.303 of the transportation code, we conclude the stop was not justified, and the trial court did not err in granting Salazar's motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's order granting Salazar's motion to suppress.