Opinion
No. 36463-8-II.
February 20, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 07-8-00261-7, Daniel J. Berschauer, J. Pro Tem., entered May 24, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Bridgewater, J.
R.P., a juvenile, appeals his bench trial adjudication that he committed custodial assault. He argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence that he intended to assault the victim. We affirm.
Facts I. Custodial Assault
R.P., a minor, resided at Maple Lane School, a juvenile rehabilitation facility. While at dinner on February 19, 2007, R.P. took his food off his tray and put it on the table, for which Maple Lane staff member Ms. Hill2 docked R.P.'s "level," a merit-based system for awarding privileges to residents for good behavior.
R.P. approached Roger Gluth, a Juvenile Rehabilitation Supervisor at Maple Lane, to talk about the incident. Because R.P. seemed angry and agitated, Gluth twice asked R.P. to return to his (R.P.'s) room. R.P. went to his room and punched the door. Gluth then called for the residents to clear the floor and to return to their rooms. R.P. did not comply.
Instead, R.P. removed his shirt and walked away from his room and down a corridor. Gluth then called a "code 2" to request security staff assistance. According to Gluth and Maple Lane security officer Shannon Yakovich, R.P. continued to walk down the corridor towards Hill. Two staff members took R.P. to the ground and attempted to restrain him, while R.P. resisted?squirming, moving his arms, and kicking his legs. Staff managed to restrain R.P.'s wrists, but when Gluth tried to restrain R.P.'s legs, R.P. kicked him in the head. After R.P.'s kick, Gluth's head was sore and red.
II. Procedure
The State charged R.P. with custodial assault in juvenile court.
Gluth testified at trial to the above facts. In addition, staff member Scott Pettit testified that he saw R.P. kick Gluth in the head.
R.P. took the stand and denied having walked down the hall toward Hill. R.P. testified that (1) he took off his shirt so that staff members could not grab him; (2) he intended to wrestle staff to work out his anger over what he saw as an unfair punishment by Hill; (3) he did not intend to kick anyone; and (4) he did not realize at the time that he had kicked Gluth.
The trial court found that R.P. had intentionally assaulted Gluth, a Maple Lane employee performing his official duties when R.P. assaulted him. The court adjudicated R.P. guilty of custodial assault, for which it imposed 15-36 weeks detention.
Analysis
R.P. challenges the trial court's finding of fact 1.4, that he intentionally kicked Gluth, and conclusion of law 2.2, that he committed custodial assault. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his custodial assault conviction because the State did not prove that he intended to kick Gluth. This argument fails.
I. Standard of Review
We review findings of fact in a juvenile matter for substantial evidence. State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007); State v. Alvarez, 105 Wn. App. 215, 220, 19 P.3d 485 (2001). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 733, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). Findings of fact must support conclusions of law. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. at 97.
"In determining whether the requisite quantum of proof exists, the reviewing court need not be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that substantial evidence supports the State's case." State v. Jones, 93 Wn. App. 166, 176, 968 P.2d 888 (1998), review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1003 (1999). Substantial evidence is "evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding." Levy, 156 Wn.2d at 733 (citation omitted).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). An appellant claiming insufficiency of the evidence "admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Id. at 874 (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). We view both circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable, and we defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75.
II. Custodial Assault
A person is guilty of custodial assault if, in circumstances not amounting to first or second degree assault, the person assaults a full or part-time staff member "at any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facilit[y] who was performing official duties at the time of the assault." RCW 9A.36.100(1)(a).
The criminal code does not define "assault," so Washington courts rely on a common law definition. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994) (citing State v. Aumick, 73 Wn. App. 379, 382, 869 P.2d 421 (1994)). Washington recognizes three definitions of "assault": (1) assault by actual battery, (2) assault by attempting to inflict bodily injury upon another, and (3) putting another in apprehension of harm. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d at 218. Assault by battery does not require proof of specific intent to cause apprehension or to inflict substantial bodily harm. State v. Stevens, 158 Wn.2d 304, 314, 143 P.3d 817 (2006) (citing State v. Daniels, 87 Wn. App. 149, 155, 940 P.2d 690 (1997), review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1031 (1998)). Instead, battery requires intent to do the physical act constituting assault. Stevens, 158 Wn.2d at 314 (citing State v. Hall, 104 Wn. App. 56, 62, 14 P.3d 884 (2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1023 (2001)).
Here, the State provided sufficient evidence that R.P. intended to and did, in fact, kick his feet while Maple Lane staff tried to restrain him. Maple Lane staff members testified that R.P. fought them as they took him to the ground and tried to restrain him. Gluth testified, and Pettit confirmed, that R.P. kicked Gluth in the head. Although claiming he did not intend to kick Gluth, R.P. testified that he did intend to resist efforts to restrain him and to "wrestle" the staff as a way to work out his anger. Regardless of whether R.P. intended to kick Gluth, R.P. did intend to kick and to resist the Maple Lane staff who were attempting to restrain him. That R.P.'s kick connected with Gluth's head constitutes the battery mode of assault. We hold, therefore that (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding of fact that R.P. intentionally kicked Gluth, who was at the time acting in his official custodial capacity; and (2) this finding, in turn, supports the trial court's conclusion of law that R.P. committed custodial assault.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, CJ., BRIDGEWATER, J., concur.