Opinion
No. 08-15-00261-CR
01-27-2016
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. ARTURO RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.
Appeal from Municipal Court of Appeals of El Paso County, Texas (TC # 14-MCA-3761) OPINION
The State of Texas is appealing an opinion of the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the El Paso Municipal Court. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On June 28, 2011, a police officer cited Arturo Rodriguez for speeding and failure to maintain financial responsibility (FTMFR). This appeal concerns only the latter offense. Rodriguez executed a cash bail bond in the amount of $325 in connection with the FTMFR. The cash bond provided as follows:
The traffic citations are found on ticket number 18-441-565. The speeding offense was filed in the municipal court as case number 18441565.1 and the failure to maintain financial responsibility was filed as case number 18441565.2.
The cash bond of $325 is the total of the fine ($211), state fees ($59), warrant fees ($50), and other fees ($5).
If I, the undersigned, fail to appear at the date and time stated in the cash bond which I posted with the court or at any time the court requires my personal appearance, I waive my right to a jury trial and plea nolo contendere (meaning 'no contest') to the said offense as charged. I understand that the bond will be forfeited to satisfy the fine and costs that the judge assesses and that my plea may result in a conviction appearing on either a criminal or driver's license record.Rodriguez was given the option of requesting a hearing, but chose not to do so. Rodriguez did not appear on July 26, 2011 and the arraignment docket sheet reflects that the Municipal Court ordered that a warrant be issued. The docket sheet also reflects that the fine and court costs for the FTMFR offense were $211 and $64, respectively, but the Municipal Court did not enter a written judgment as that term is normally understood.
The document is titled "Arraignment Docket for 07/26/11 book 003437."
On November 8, 2011, the Municipal Court created what appears to be a computerized report reflecting the non-trial cases in which the court had accepted payment of fines and court costs for the week ending on October 22, 2011. The report reflects that the Municipal Court accepted payment of a fine and court costs in numerous cases, including Rodriguez's FTMFR offense. At the conclusion of the report, the following statement is made:
Rodriguez stated in a brief filed in the Municipal Court of Appeals that this report contains approximately 1500 names.
The Defendants named on the foregoing list, having made payments at the Traffic Violations Bureau for the week ending 10/22/2011 the amounts indicated for the charges entered opposite their names, and not having requested court hearings within ten (10) days after such payments; therefore, the aforementioned payment amounts are hereby accepted by the court from each of the said defendants as disposition for each of the respective charges heretofore entered.The document is signed by the "Presiding Judge" of the Municipal Court and dated November 8, 2011. It is undisputed that Rodriguez did not receive any further communications about the case from the Municipal Court or the clerk of the municipal court.
On March 21, 2013, Rodriguez filed several pleadings with the Municipal Court, including a motion which requested a trial setting, or alternatively, he requested a new trial in the event a judgment of conviction had been entered. The State took the position that the Municipal Court had entered a final and appealable judgment on November 8, 2011 when it signed the computerized payments report, and Rodriguez's motion for new trial was untimely. The Municipal Court agreed with the State that a judgment of conviction had been entered and Rodriguez's motion for new trial was untimely, and it entered an order which granted the State's "plea to the jurisdiction" and denied Rodriguez's motion for new trial. Rodriguez appealed to the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals.
Rodriguez argued in the Municipal Court of Appeals that the Municipal Court did not enter a final judgment or one which complied with the requirements of Article 45.044 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. On July 1, 2015, the Municipal Court of Appeals issued its opinion reversing the Municipal Court's order and remanding the cause for further proceedings. The opinion expressly provides that Rodriguez is "entitled to relief provided for by Article 45.044 and remands this case to the Trial Court to proceed accordingly, either by notifying Appellant as required by that Article of his rights or granting him a new trial." The State has appealed that decision.
JURISDICTION
We first address whether we have jurisdiction of this appeal. Municipal courts of record are generally governed by the Uniform Municipal Courts of Record Act (UMCRA). See TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 30.00001-30.00027 (West 2004 & West Supp. 2015). Additionally, the El Paso Courts Act establishes procedures unique to the City of El Paso's municipal court system. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 30.00121.-30.00164 (West 2004 & West Supp. 2015); Roman v. State, No. 08-13-00019-CR, 2014 WL 886877 (Tex.App.--El Paso, March 5, 2014, no pet.). Rodriguez appealed the decision of the Municipal Court, which is a municipal court of record, to the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals as authorized by Section 30.00145(a) of the Texas Government Code. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00145(a)(West 2004)(authorizing an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of conviction and by the state as permitted by Article 44.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).
The El Paso Courts Act does not address the right of appeal from a decision of the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals to the court of appeals. Consequently, this right is governed by the UMCRA and other law. Section 30.00027 of the UMCRA provides an appellant with a limited right of appeal to the court of appeals if the fine assessed against the defendant exceeds $100 and the judgment is affirmed by the appellate court, or if the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which a conviction is based. See TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00027(a)(West Supp. 2015). In contrast with Section 30.00145(a), it does not grant the State the right to appeal a decision as permitted by Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 30.00027 states that "[t]he provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to direct appeals from a county or district court to the court of appeals apply to the appeal" except for certain provisions related to the record and briefs. See TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00027(b)(West Supp. 2015). Presumably, this would include Article 44.01.
Section 30.00162 addresses disposition of the appeal to the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals, rehearing, and issuance of the mandate among other procedural matters. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00162 (West Supp. 2015). It also addresses procedures to be following after the court of appeals issues its mandate. Id.
The State is entitled to appeal in criminal cases, as authorized by general law. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26; State v. Evans, 843 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); State v. Morse, 903 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no pet.). Thus, the State's right to appeal is statutorily created and limited. Morse, 903 S.W.2d at 102, citing State v. Sellers, 790 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the State a limited right to appeal an order of a court in criminal cases. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 44.01 (West Supp. 2015). In State v. Morse, we determined that a county court exercising criminal appellate jurisdiction of a municipal conviction is a court within the meaning of Article 44.01, and we held that the State had the right to appeal under that statute. See Morse, 903 S.W.2d at 103-04 (holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over state's appeal from county court's reversal of municipal court conviction). Similarly, the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals is a statutorily-created court which exercises criminal appellate jurisdiction over a municipal conviction. We conclude that the State has the right to appeal a decision of the El Paso Municipal Court of Appeals as permitted by Article 44.01. The only remaining question is whether this appeal is authorized by Article 44.01.
Under Article 44.01, the State is entitled to appeal an order in a criminal case if the order:
(1) dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any portion of an indictment, information, or complaint;
(2) arrests or modifies a judgment;Additionally, the State is entitled to appeal a sentence in a case on the ground that the sentence is illegal. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 44.01(b). It can also appeal a ruling on a question of law if the defendant is convicted in the case and appeals the judgment. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 44.01(c).
(3) grants a new trial;
(4) sustains a claim of former jeopardy;
(5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, if jeopardy has not attached in the case and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the case; or
(6) is issued under Chapter 64.
The only provision which even arguably applies to this appeal is subsection (a)(3) which permits the State to appeal if a court grants the defendant a new trial. Rule 21.2 defines "new trial" as "the rehearing of a criminal action after the trial court has, on the defendant's motion, set aside a finding or verdict of guilt." TEX.R.APP.P. 21.1(a). The Municipal Court of Appeals' opinion cannot be construed as setting aside the municipal court's finding of guilt. To the contrary, it determined that the municipal court has not yet entered a final judgment, and even if it had attempted to enter a final judgment, it did not comply with the notice requirements of Article 45.044. Based on these conclusions, the Municipal Court of Appeals reversed the municipal court's order and remanded the case with instructions to comply with Article 45.044. While the Municipal Court of Appeals' ruling authorizes the municipal court to consider motions filed by Rodriguez, including his motion to withdraw his no contest plea and any timely-filed motion for new trial, the Municipal Court of Appeals did not set aside a finding of guilt. We conclude that this appeal is not authorized by Article 44.01(a)(3) or any other provision in that statute. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. January 27, 2016
ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ. (Do Not Publish)