Opinion
C.A. W2-2018-0004A
02-19-2019
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. JEFFREY ROBINSON
For Plaintiff: Jonathan E. Burke, Esq. For Defendant: John M. Cicilline, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Jonathan E. Burke, Esq.
For Defendant: John M. Cicilline, Esq.
DECISION
McGUIRL, J.
Before this Court is a Motion to Suppress evidence, which was obtained following a vehicle stop. The Defendant, Jeffrey Robinson (Defendant), alleges that the Rhode Island State Police exceeded the scope of an inventory search when a trooper peeled back the trunk liner of the vehicle operated by Defendant exposing alleged evidence of drugs. The State objects, arguing the Defendant lacks standing to contest said search because he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Alternatively, the State maintains that if the Defendant has proper standing, the trooper acted in accordance with standard inventory search procedure triggering an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-15.
I
Facts and Travel
On the afternoon of May 11, 2017, at approximately 4:15 p.m., Trooper Evan Shaw (Trooper Shaw) of the Rhode Island State Police was on patrol on Route 95 North in the Town of Richmond, Rhode Island. (Narrative for Trooper Evan T Shaw at 1.) Trooper Shaw observed a blue Chevrolet bearing MA 1MF247 traveling at an extremely slow rate of speed in the first lane. Id. Upon further observation, Trooper Shaw noticed the driver positioned at a close distance to the steering wheel and the vehicle's stop lamps flash twice quickly when no other vehicles were within close proximity. Id. Subsequently, Trooper Shaw observed an inoperable high mount stop lamp and initiated a motor vehicle stop. Id.
Trooper Shaw then made contact with the Defendant, who was the operator and sole individual in the vehicle. Id. Initially, the Defendant identified himself as Mark Robinson and informed Trooper Shaw that he did not have an operator's license on his person. Id. In addition, Trooper Shaw observed that the Defendant appeared unsure of his answers regarding his date of birth and the street address on his license. Id. Further questioning by Trooper Shaw revealed that Defendant was not the owner of the vehicle. Id. Defendant stated that his friend, "Buddha," owned the vehicle but the Defendant was unsure of his friend's first or last name. Id. Defendant then produced the vehicle's registration, which listed the 2010 Chevrolet Malibu registered to Joyce E. Ridley, of 74 Kilmer Avenue, Taunton, Massachusetts. Id.
Trooper Shaw then conducted checks of the Defendant with the alias provided, which provided no information for any operator's license in any New England state. Id. Next, Trooper Shaw ordered the Defendant from the vehicle and received consent to frisk the Defendant for weapons, finding none. Id. Trooper Shaw again questioned the Defendant regarding his identity at which point the Defendant admitted he provided an alias and that his license was suspended. Id. Trooper Shaw then conducted a check with the new information provided and learned that the Defendant possessed a revoked Massachusetts's operator's license. Id. As a result, Trooper Shaw requested a tow truck respond to the scene to retrieve the vehicle. Id.
While awaiting the tow truck, Trooper Shaw conducted an inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to Department policy. Id. at 1, 2. In the course of the inventory, Trooper Shaw opened the trunk of the subject vehicle and noticed that the "four to six" plastic securements, meant to secure the trunk liner to the trunk frame, were missing from the left side of the trunk. (Hr'g Tr. 33, Nov. 27, 2018.) As a result, Trooper Shaw testified that the liner remained "standing up," but "pulled apart" from the frame because of the missing securements which were distanced "four to six inches apart." Id. at 12, 33. Trooper Shaw subsequently peeled back the "pulled apart" lining approximately six inches and shone his flashlight into the opening. (Narrative for Trooper Evan T Shaw at 2.) Trooper Shaw observed tinfoil cupped in a manner associated with drug packaging. Id. Subsequently, Trooper Shaw peeled back the lining an additional six to twelve and observed blue pills protruding from the cupped foil, which he suspected to be 30 milligram oxycodone pills. (Hr'g Tr. 23, Nov. 27, 2018; Narrative for Trooper Evan T Shaw at 2.) Upon the initial discovery of the suspected pills, Trooper Shaw discontinued his inventory, closed the trunk door, and requested a K-9 unit for further investigation. (Narrative for Trooper Evan T Shaw at 2.)
Upon arrival and investigation by the K-9 unit, a black plastic bag tied to the vehicle's frame was located behind the front driver's side head light. Id. Based on training and experience, as well as a strong chemical odor emanating from the bag, Troopers suspected the bag contained cocaine but were unable to safely remove the bag at the time. Id. Subsequently, Trooper Shaw followed the vehicle as it was towed back to the State Police, Hope Valley Barracks. Id. At the barracks, troopers removed approximately 550 oxycodone pills and approximately 428 grams of cocaine, which were field tested yielding positive results and later transported to the Forensic Service Unit at the State Police Headquarters for further processing. Id.
The State has charged Defendant with five counts: (1) unlawful possession and intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine); (2) unlawful possession and intent to deliver a controlled substance (oxycodone); (3) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in excess of one ounce, but less than one kilogram; (4) obstruction of a police officer; and (5) operating a vehicle with a revoked license. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress evidence, and a Decision is herein rendered.
II
Standard of Review
Defendant brings the instant motion pursuant to Super. R. Crim. P. 41(f); therefore, at a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that the evidence is admissible "by a fair preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14 (1974)); see also State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 279 (R.I. 1990).
III
Analysis
In support of his Motion to Suppress, Defendant argues that Trooper Shaw violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the Trooper conducted an illegal search of the vehicle the Defendant was operating on the date in question. The State maintains that the Defendant lacks standing to challenge the search because he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the borrowed vehicle. Alternatively, the State argues, if the Court finds that the Defendant has the necessary standing to contest the search, the Trooper's search was lawful because the officer had probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. In the alternative, the State argues that Trooper Shaw conducted a lawful inventory search in accordance with standard department procedures.
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of items or places in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Patino, 93 A.3d 40, 50 (R.I. 2014); (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). This protection requires that law enforcement officers obtain a search warrant based on probable cause from a neutral magistrate or judge before they conduct a search. State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1162 (R.I. 2016) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). Searches conducted without obtaining a warrant are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall within one of the narrow exceptions to the search warrant requirement. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
The Fourth Amendment, which is substantively the same as article I, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution, provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Traditionally, Rhode Island law has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement, including plain view and inventory searches. See State v. Portes, 840 A.2d 1131, 1136 (R.I. 2004); State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 550 (R.I. 2004). Thus, in the present case, the finding of oxycodone pills as a result of the search of the trunk of the vehicle is a violation of the Fourth Amendment if the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and the search fell within no acknowledged exception.
A
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A threshold issue is whether the Defendant had the requisite standing to contest the legality of the search of the subject vehicle. "It is well settled that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights' and cannot be 'asserted vicariously by a defendant merely because he or she may be aggrieved by the introduction of damaging evidence.'" Patino, 93 A.3d at 51-52 (quoting State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 109 (R.I. 2007)). Moreover, to invoke Fourth Amendment protections, a '"defendant bears the burden of establishing the requisite standing to challenge the legality of the search.'" State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Patino, 93 A.3d at 52). A party has standing '"when he or she is found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the thing seized."' Ditren, 126 A.3d at 418 (quoting Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109).
A defendant may establish a legitimate expectation of privacy by proving his or her own '"subjective expectation of privacy"' and that the expectation is '"one that society accepts as objectively reasonable."' Ditren, 126 A.3d at 419 (citing Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109) (quoting State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 19 (R.I. 1991)). In examining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, '"no single factor invariably will be determinative."' Patino, 93 A.3d at 52 (quoting Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109). Rather, the Court considers a number of factors to evaluate the reasonableness of a privacy expectation including '"whether the suspect possessed or owned the area searched or the property seized; his or her prior use of the area searched or the property seized; the person's ability to control or exclude others' use of the property; and the person's legitimate presence in the area searched.'" Ditren, 126 A.3d at 419 (quoting State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1130 (R.I. 2006)).
The burden is on the Defendant to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy by showing a "sufficiently close connection" to the subject vehicle to have standing to claim that it was searched illegally. State v. Milette, 702 A.2d 1165, 1167 (R.I. 1997). With respect to Defendants driving an automobile at the time of the search, our Supreme Court has examined the relationship with the vehicle's owner, whether Defendant had permission to use the vehicle, and the pattern of use of the vehicle by the Defendant. See Id. at 1167 (holding Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in borrowed vehicle because he had permission of the owner, kept belongings in the vehicle, and had used the vehicle three or four times in a nine day period).
Here, it is undisputed that the Defendant was not the owner of the subject vehicle; however, he demonstrated possession and control over the car. On the date in question, the Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle when Trooper Shaw initiated the vehicle stop. Cf. Bertram, 591 A.2d at 19 (finding that the defendant was only a passenger in the vehicle of the car when the driver was stopped for speeding and thus did not demonstrate possession or control over subject vehicle); see also Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109 (holding that vehicle passenger with no possessory interest in vehicle did not have an expectation of privacy in the vehicle).
In addition to the possession and control of the vehicle at the time of the stop, the Defendant testified that he had permission to use the vehicle from his friend, "Buddha." Admittedly, the Defendant was unable to provide either the first or last name of "Buddha" to Trooper Shaw at the time of the stop or at subsequent hearings. Moreover, the Defendant testified that "Buddha" would grant permission to use the car but that Buddha's mother, Joyce Ridley, was the registered owner of the vehicle. Furthermore, the Defendant testified that he was unsure if Buddha's mother knew of his continued use of the vehicle.
In the instant matter, it appears the Defendant acquired permission to use the vehicle from a separate approved operator, Buddha, rather than the registered owner. The factual scenario in the present case is comparable to United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1991), a case in which the First Circuit found that the sole non-owner operator of a vehicle lacked standing to challenge a search by police. In Sanchez, the Court noted that the Defendant "gained possession [of the vehicle] from a friend about whom he knew very little-not even his last name," and "did not have direct authority from the owner to use the vehicle." Id. The Court took particular interest in the lack of evidence of any prior use or possession of the vehicle in question by the defendant. Id. Notably, the Court quipped "[h]ad [the defendant] demonstrated a more intimate relationship with the car's owner or a history of regular use . . . -from which a presumption of permission could be drawn-we would have been likely to conclude that the totality of circumstances established a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.
Here, Defendant demonstrated a history of regular use when he testified that he had used the car approximately twice per week over the past three to four months to go shopping or run errands. See Milette, 702 A.2d at 1167 (use of borrowed vehicle three of four times in nine day period constituted history of regular use). This "pattern of permission" resulting in regular, continued use, over the span of three or four months allows a presumption of permission to be drawn indirectly from the registered owner. See Sanchez, 943 F.2d at 114. Additionally, the Defendant testified that he primarily used the car within the city of Taunton, but the only restriction placed upon his use of the vehicle was time related; i.e., have the vehicle home by a certain day, indicating a more intimate relationship than seen in Sanchez. Moreover, on the date in question, the Defendant indicated to Trooper Shaw he was returning to Taunton from Foxwoods Casino. See Sanchez, 943 A.2d at 114 (finding a pattern of permission together with sole control on a long trip would have minimized the informal and temporary nature of the specific acquisition of the car).
On the date in question, the Defendant indicated to Trooper Shaw that he was returning from Foxwoods Casino. However, Trooper Shaw did locate a New York City DOT - Bureau of Parking stub dated 5/11/17 on the driver's side dash board of the subject vehicle. (Narrative for Trooper Evan T Shaw at 1.)
Admittedly unsure about specifics regarding his friend Buddha, the Defendant has nonetheless demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject vehicle. Accordingly, the Court now directs its attention to the validity of Trooper Shaw's search of the vehicle.
B
Impermissible Search of Vehicle
Having found that the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject vehicle, the Court now must determine whether Trooper Shaw conducted a lawful inventory search of the subject vehicle. "Inventory searches have long been recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the search-warrant requirement." State v. Bonin, 591 A.2d 38, 39 (R.I. 1991). "Inventory searches serve three purposes: (1) to protect the owner's property while it remains in police custody; (2) to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) to protect the police or others from potential danger." Grant, 840 A.2d at 550 (citing State v. Beaucage, 424 A.2d 642, 644 (R.I. 1981)).
Moreover, in order to be found valid, "the inventory search must be conducted pursuant to standardized criteria, or as part of an established routine; it may not serve as a pretext for a 'general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."' Grant, 840 A.2d at 550 (emphasis in original) (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4). Notably, an officer conducting an inventory search is allowed limited discretion or latitude, based on concerns related to the purposes of the search, while conducting the search pursuant to standardized criteria of the department. Bonin, 591 A.2d at 39 (citing Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
Here, Trooper Shaw testified that the Rhode Island State Police have a routine policy of conducting inventory searches on motor vehicles "whenever a vehicle is towed off of a highway." (Hr'g Tr. 5, Nov. 27, 2018.) In addition, it is evident that the Rhode Island State Police have a standardized criteria and routine which Troopers must following while conducting a vehicle inventory. During his testimony, Trooper Shaw indicated that "[troopers] are required to document the owner, the driver . . . dangerous instrumentalities in the vehicle, valuables." Id. Furthermore, Trooper Shaw testified that he would "open something like that to check for dangerous instrumentalities" when questioned about closed containers located within a compartment or trunk of the subject vehicle during the traffic stop. Id. at 6. When specifically questioned regarding his inventory search, Trooper Shaw indicated that he "almost always start[s] at the front passenger door" and would document "dangerous instrumentalities, [such as] syringes, [and] razorblades." Id. at 5.
Rhode Island State Police General Order - 54D details the purpose, process, and scope of the Department's Motor Vehicle Inventory. Specifically, Section VIII. SCOPE OF THE INVENTORY, provides in pertinent part:
"1.2.4 The inventory of personal items and valuables shall extend to all storage areas and compartments that are accessible to the operator and/or occupants of the vehicle and shall include:
"A. [omitted]
"B. The trunk of the vehicle and any containers found therein for any valuable property or dangerous instrumentalities.
"C. Any other location within the vehicle where it is reasonable to believe that it may contain valuable property or dangerous instrumentalities."
In the instant case, Trooper Shaw's search of the "pulled apart" lining falls within noted purposes of an inventory search, to protect the police or others from potential danger and to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property. At the suppression hearing, when questioned about the purpose of his search behind the liner, Trooper Shaw indicated that based on his experience and training, "things get hidden back there, yes." Id. at 23. In addition, Trooper Shaw previously testified that an additional purpose of the inventory search of the liner was to "examin[e] it for damage to the car" to prevent possible later claims that more extensive damage to the vehicle was caused by the search. See Bonin, 591 A.2d at 39. Furthermore, Trooper Shaw indicated that based on his experience and training, contraband, valuables, or weapons are often hidden behind the lining of vehicles. See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding officer's removal of vehicle air filter permitted during inventory search when officer safety a concern and past experience led officer to believe weapons or contraband may be concealed behind the filter).
This Court believes that Trooper Shaw's initial peel back of the previously disturbed trunk liner is analogous to a cursory inspection of an unlocked container in furtherance of officer safety. See Bonin, 591 A.2d at 39-40 (holding that officer validly exercised discretion when he opened an unlocked container located in vehicle trunk during inventory search). Similar to a container in a trunk, it is entirely reasonable-and in accordance with State Police policy-to allow an officer following inventory protocols the latitude to inspect areas which are accessible to the operator and may contain dangerous instrumentalities. See Torres, 828 F.3d at 1121; cf. United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that officer exceeded scope of inventory search when he pulled inside door panel away from right front door).
It is the Court's belief that a trunk liner, missing multiple securements and clearly pulled from the frame, creates a possible void that is accessible to the vehicle operator and reasonably may contain dangerous instrumentalities, valuables, or conceal damage. See Bonin, 591 A.2d at 39. Accordingly, Trooper Shaw was able to easily pull back the disturbed lining and shine his flashlight into the void. Upon his initial observation, Trooper Shaw observed evidence of dangerous instrumentalities, namely, the tinfoil cupped in a manner associated with drug packaging. Based on this information, Trooper Shaw secured the trunk, requested a K-9 unit, and later developed the necessary probable cause to seize the pills in question. See State v. Storey, 8 A.3d 454, 461-62 (R.I. 2010) (finding that the "probable cause, totality-of-the-circumstances test looks to the entire mosaic of presented information").
IV
Conclusion
With respect to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the Court finds that the Defendant has standing to contest the search of the subject vehicle. Moreover, the Court has determined that Trooper Shaw conducted a permissible inventory search of the subject vehicle. Thus, the Court finds that the seizure of the contraband was lawful and denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Counsel shall submit the appropriate Order for entry.