Opinion
Case No. P2-2013-1656A
08-29-2018
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. ETHAN ROBINSON
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Katelyn M. Revens, Esq. For Defendant: Thomas G. Briody, Esq.
DECISION MCGUIRL , J. Before this Court is Defendant Ethan Robinson's (Defendant) Motion to Dismiss in which Defendant argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The State of Rhode Island (State) objects to the instant motion. For the reasons stated herein, this Court denies Defendant's motion. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14.
I
Facts and Travel
Defendant was arrested by the Rhode Island State Police on September 28, 2011 and charged with one count of possessing child pornography. The police seized evidence from Defendant's home, questioned Defendant, and recorded statements from Defendant and a witness. Defendant was presented in District Court on the same day and released on $10,000 personal recognizance with special conditions that prohibited him from contacting children under eighteen years old and using the internet, except for employment purposes. On August 6, 2012, approximately ten months after the presentment, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of prosecution. The District Court granted Defendant's motion on August 17, 2012.
The complaint was file number 62-2011-013498.
On June 17, 2013—approximately twenty-one months after Defendant was first arrested—the Attorney General filed the above-captioned information in Superior Court, charging Defendant with possession and distribution of child pornography. A pre-arraignment conference was scheduled on July 23, 2013, but Defendant failed to appear. Records indicate that on June 18, 2013, the Superior Court Case Scheduling Office at the Licht Judicial Complex mailed a Notice of Court Appearance for the July 23, 2013 court date to Defendant at an Erie Street, Providence address. At some time after mailing the notice to that address, the letter was returned to the Case Scheduling Office at the Licht Judicial Complex and a sticker on the envelope stated "RETURN TO SENDER NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED UNABLE TO FORWARD." Defendant also failed to appear for his arraignment on July 30, 2013, and a bench warrant was issued. It is unclear whether the State attempted to notify Defendant about the July 30, 2013 court date or that a warrant had been issued.
On October 13, 2016, a little under thirty-nine months after the warrant was issued, Defendant turned himself in and the warrant was cancelled. Defendant was arraigned at that time and released on the same conditions as he was following his previous presentment—$10,000 personal recognizance, a prohibition on contact with children under eighteen years old, and using the internet except for employment purposes. A pretrial conference was scheduled for November 7, 2016, but Defendant requested and was granted a continuance of that date. On November 21, 2016, Defendant moved for supervised contact with his minor nephew, which this Court granted. The pretrial conference was rescheduled for January 18, 2017; however, Defendant again requested and was granted a continuance. On February 15, 2017, the pretrial conference was continued again at the request of Defendant. The matter was conferenced for the first time on March 6, 2017, during which Defendant provided the State with a Psychological Evaluation/Sexual Risk Assessment. During that hearing, Defendant also argued for an amendment to the offense that would not require him to register as a sex offender.
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss almost six months after his arraignment in Superior Court on April 4, 2017. The State requested and was granted a continuance so that it could respond on April 13, 2017. The State filed its objection and memorandum in support of its objection on May 4, 2017. A pretrial conference was held on June 1, 2017. The State and Defendant provided supplemental memoranda relating to the instant motion to dismiss on July 3, 2017 and July 21, 2017, respectively.
II
Parties' Arguments
Defendant claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the period of approximately five years between his presentment on the initial complaint (September 28, 2011) and his arraignment on the instant complaint (October 13, 2016). He asserts that the reason for the delay was entirely the State's fault because he did not receive notice of either the pre-arraignment conference date or that a warrant was issued, and that the State made no effort to find him during that period. Defendant states that he was unaware of the charges against him for most of that time. Finally, Defendant suggests that he was prejudiced by the delay itself and that he does not need to prove actual prejudice. To the extent he does need to show specific instances of prejudice, he submits that a witness who could assist in his defense is now unwilling to cooperate and resides out of the state, and that the other witnesses' memories have faded.
The State in turn argues that Defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. The State contends that the period between the dismissal of the initial complaint on August 17, 2012 and Defendant's arraignment in the instant matter on October 13, 2016 may not be used to calculate the length of delay. The State reasons that there were no criminal charges pending against Defendant and that the previous personal recognizance and accompanying restrictive orders were no longer in effect during that time. The State also argues that there is no evidence that the delay was due to the government's deliberate actions and that some of the delay is attributable to Defendant himself. Further, the State advances that any government negligence in executing the warrant is not dispositive and that Defendant needs to prove specific prejudice caused by the delay.
III
Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Rhode Island Constitution similarly guarantees this right. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10 (declaring that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"); State v. Zmayefski, 836 A.2d 191, 194 (R.I. 2003). The United States Supreme Court has noted that:
"The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges." United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986); see also Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 111 (R.I. 2012).Rhode Island utilizes a four-part test to determine whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial. State v. Crocker, 767 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I. 2001) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). The Court will examine "'(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his [or her] rights, and (4) the prejudice to the accused.'" Id. at 93 (quoting State v. Austin, 731 A.2d 678, 683 (R.I. 1999)). The Court must weigh each factor and none of the factors is dispositive on its own. Austin, 731 A.2d at 683. A delay of longer than one year is considered "presumptively prejudicial" to the Defendant and triggers consideration of the remaining factors. State v. Tarvis, 465 A.2d 164, 175 (R.I. 1983); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-92.
IV
Analysis
A
Length of the Delay
This Court begins its analysis with the first Barker factor, the length of the delay. The parties agree that the delay exceeds one year and is presumptively prejudicial. However, the parties disagree about the actual length of the delay. Defendant contends that the State delayed five years in prosecuting him, referring to the time between his initial arrest and presentment on September 28, 2011 in District Court and his subsequent arraignment on October 13, 2016 with the instant complaint. The State argues that the period is approximately seventeen months, and is focused on the period in which the charges were pending on the initial complaint (September 2011 to August 2012) and the period between Defendant's arraignment and the filing of the present motion (October 2016 to April 2017). In so doing, the State posits that the time between the District Court's grant of the motion to dismiss on the initial complaint and Defendant's arraignment (August 2012 to October 2016) does not count towards the speedy trial clock. This Court must, therefore, address when Defendant's right to a speedy trial is implicated.
"[I]t is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971); see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992). "Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer." Marion, 404 U.S. at 321. The right to a speedy trial "has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. Therefore, "when defendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court should not weigh that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause." Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312.
During the ten month period when charges were pending on the initial complaint in District Court (September 28, 2011 to August 17, 2012), Defendant was subject to restrictions on his liberty in the form of bail and a prohibition on using the internet for non-employment related purposes and on contacting minors. Both parties agree that Defendant's right to a speedy trial was implicated during that time period. See, e.g., State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 317 (R.I. 2008) (finding a twenty-five month delay between the filing of charges in District Court and the commencement of trial in Superior Court).
There was no case pending against Defendant between the dismissal of the initial complaint on August 17, 2012 and the filing of the instant information on June 17, 2013. Defendant was not incarcerated, indicted, or subject to bail or other restrictions on his liberty, and therefore, his right to a speedy trial is not implicated during that time period. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) ("Once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable."); State v. Macaskill, 523 A.2d 883, 885 (R.I. 1987) (finding that the period between the dismissal of the first indictment and the issuance of the second indictment cannot be used to determine a speedy trial violation because neither defendant was incarcerated, under indictment, or subject to bail during that time); Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 311 ("We find that after the District Court dismissed the indictment against respondents and after respondents were freed without restraint, they were in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, the ten months between the dismissal of the initial complaint and the filing of the information should not be considered to determine whether there was a violation of the right to a speedy trial.
The forty month period between June 17, 2013 and October 13, 2016 must be viewed differently, however. During that time, an information was filed with this Court, charging Defendant with various crimes. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was not arraigned until October 13, 2016, at which point he was subjected to restrictions on his liberty in the form of bail and special conditions. Doggett addressed a factually similar issue, in which the defendant was arrested eight and a half years after his indictment. 505 U.S. at 650. The Court found that the speedy trial clock began at the defendant's indictment because the Sixth Amendment is "triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation" and rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause controlled the issue. Id. at 652, 652 n.1, 655, 655 n.2. As in Doggett, Defendant in the instant matter became "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment at the time the formal accusation, in the form of an information, was filed with Superior Court on June 17, 2013. See id. While it is certainly true that Defendant was not subject to restrictions on his liberty in the form of bail and special conditions until his arraignment on October 13, 2016, he was the subject of unresolved criminal charges as a formally accused person as of the filing of the information. Further, a warrant was issued for his arrest. See also Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (finding that the indictment "transformed the appellees into 'accused' defendants who are subject to the speedy trial protections of the Sixth Amendment" where the appellees were not "arrested, charged, or otherwise subjected to formal restraint prior to indictment").
For purposes of the speedy trial clock, the delay is approximately four years and eight months, including ten months on the initial complaint between 2011 and 2012, three years and four months between the 2013 information and 2016 arraignment, and six months between the 2016 arraignment and the instant motion. This Court now considers the remaining Barker factors and assigns culpability for portions of the delay.
B
Reason for the Delay
To analyze this factor, the Court must "balance the culpability of the parties in causing the delay." Bido, 56 A.3d at 112 (quoting Austin, 731 A.2d at 684). "'Generally each party is likely to bear at least some responsibility in contributing'" to the delay. Austin, 731 A.2d at 684 (quoting State v. Powers, 643 A.2d 827, 831 (R.I. 1994)). The Court also must assess the reasons for each delay, because "'[d]ifferent reasons for delay are assigned different weights.'" Bido, 56 A.3d at 112 (quoting Austin, 731 A.2d at 683). As our Supreme Court explained in State v. Powers,
"'A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.'" 643 A.2d at 831 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)."'[O]fficial negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the middle ground.'" Bido, 56 A.3d at 112 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-57). "'Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.'" Id. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657).
For discussion purposes, the delay may be analyzed as four separate time periods: between Defendant's arrest and prior to dismissal of the initial complaint (September 2011 to August 2012); following the dismissal of the initial complaint in District Court and before the information was filed in Superior Court (August 2012 to June 2013); after the filing of the information and prior to Defendant's arraignment (June 2013 to October 2016); and, the period between Defendant's arraignment and the present motion to dismiss (October 2016 to April 2017). See Zmayefski, 836 A.2d at 194.
From September 2011 to August 2012, Defendant was the subject of unresolved charges and was released on his personal recognizance with special conditions. There is no allegation that the State deliberately delayed the initial case. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Defendant sought the delay. We agree with the State that the ten month delay in District Court "is likely attributed to a high volume of cases" and "strained resources" which allowed for the case to "temporarily fall through the cracks." The State's negligence during this time is a "more neutral reason," although it weighs against the State. See Austin, 731 A.2d at 684.
The period between the dismissal of the initial complaint and the filing of the new information (August 2012 and June 2013), as previously discussed, does not count towards the speedy trial clock because there were no unresolved charges and Defendant was not subject to any restrictions on his liberty. See, e.g., Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312.
The time period between when the information was filed in Court on June 17, 2013 and Defendant's ultimate arraignment in October 2016 concerns this Court. During that time, a Notice of Court Appearance was mailed to the address Defendant resided at when he was initially arrested in 2011. This address was provided to the Court by the Attorney General's Office, which had taken it from the address given to the District Court by Defendant. The Notice was returned as undeliverable, and Defendant contends that he never received notice of the charges against him. The record in this case indicates that Defendant learned of the warrant in October 2016 when he was applying for new employment, and that he secured an attorney, turned himself in, and was arraigned shortly thereafter on October 13, 2016. Nothing in the record contradicts Defendant's assertion.
In this case, the State had the ability to find Defendant's correct address at the time the information was filed on June 17, 2013. The record shows that Defendant moved twice following his initial arrest on September 28, 2011, once in 2012 and again in 2015. During each of those moves, Defendant properly notified both the United States Post Office and the Registry of Motor Vehicles of his new address. Clearly, the State could have checked Defendant's address through any of those avenues. It could have done so prior to filing the information on June 17, 2013. Similarly, the State could have checked on Defendant's address after the Notice of Court Appearance was returned to them as undeliverable to that address. When that letter was returned, the State became aware that Defendant lacked notice of his impending arraignment date and the very existence of the charges against him. Yet, there is no evidence—nor does the State assert—that any effort was made to locate Defendant.
Address searches, certainly within the public record, are easier with the internet, and it does not appear to place an undue burden on the State to obtain an accurate address. The representations by the Attorney General's Office indicate that there was no policy within the office on fugitive arrests or any follow up on a lack of sufficient address. These matters are handled on a case by case basis, based on resources and priority of the case as determined by the State. This Court is concerned by the State's actions, or rather inaction, in this case. The Court requires actual service of a defendant in civil cases, see Super. R. Civ. P. 5; yet, in a criminal case, the State issues a warrant without any attempt to find the defendant. Defendant was unaware of the information, and the State failed to take any steps to prosecute this case. Having expressed this concern, the Court recognizes the limitation of resources of the Attorney General's Office and the lack of any further notification requirements imposed by statue or rule of court or decision. The Court considers the delay only as a factor against the State. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653 (finding government negligence as to the second Barker factor because they did not attempt to locate him when "they could have found him within minutes" where the defendant did not know of his indictment years before he was arrested); cf. Crocker, 767 A.2d at 93 (explaining that the defendant was responsible for the delay because he knew of his indictment, unlike the defendant in Doggett).
Finally, the period between Defendant's arraignment on October 13, 2016 and the filing of the instant motion to dismiss is attributable to Defendant. During this period, Defendant's counsel requested three continuances for the client's benefit, including for the purpose of evaluating Defendant for a risk assessment to provide mitigation, and filed another motion in this matter. Due to these continuances requested by Defendant and Defendant's motion to have contact with his minor nephew, the case was not conferenced until March 6, 2017. Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss one month later. Defendant is wholly responsible for this period of time because the continuances he requested and the motion he filed caused the delay. See Zmayefski, 836 A.2d at 195.
While both the State and Defendant contributed to the delay in this case, the State bears the most responsibility because of its negligence in failing to prosecute this matter. We reiterate, however, that this negligence is a more neutral cause and carries less weight than a deliberate attempt to delay the case. See Austin, 731 A.2d at 684.
C
Defendant's Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
This third factor examines how "aggressive[ly]" Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. See Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 885. A defendant's assertion of this right must rise to the level of "figuratively banging on the courthouse doors asking that he be heard." Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 296 A.2d 19, 27 (1972); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 94. The Rhode Island Supreme Court "has always emphasized the importance of the defendant's vigorous and timely assertion of that right." Id. at 94. "The lack of aggressive demand for a speedy trial does not alone constitute a waiver, but it is an important factor that militates against defendant's position, particularly when defendant is at least partially responsible for the delay." State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 363 (R.I. 1983).
Defendant was unaware that he was being charged between August 2012 and October 2016, and therefore cannot be expected to have asserted his right to a speedy trial during that time. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54 (explaining that the defendant "is not to be taxed" for invoking his right to a speedy trial through a motion to dismiss after his arrest because he was unaware of the charges for eight and a half years between the indictment and arrest). However, the time period during which charges were pending in District Court (September 2011 to August 2012), is different. Defendant did file a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in District Court, and the case was dismissed on those grounds after ten months pending in District Court. Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial at all until approximately six months following his October 2016 arraignment. In fact, Defendant never filed a motion in either District Court or this Court. Defendant first mentioned the right to a speedy trial when he filed the motion to dismiss on April 4, 2017.
Overall, Defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial for a period of seventeen months between September 2011 and August 2012, and October 2016 and April 2017. This delay and his assertion through the instant motion hardly constitute a vigorous and timely assertion of the right to a speedy trial or figurative banging on the courthouse doors. See State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d 744, 750 (R.I. 1982) (finding that the defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial for approximately two years "hardly demonstrates an active pursuit of this right"); Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 318 (noting that although the defendant "alluded to what he considered unnecessary delay of trial," this factor weighs "heavily" against him because he failed to assert his right until two years after the indictment); Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 884 (holding that the defendants did not sufficiently assert their right to a speedy trial where neither defendant moved for a speedy trial within a year and a half of the first indictment and filed motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, but did not move for a speedy trial after the second indictment). This is important in light of the fact that some portion of the delay is attributable to Defendant himself. See Anthony, 448 A.2d at 750. Defendant's seventeen month delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial heavily weighs against him as to the third Barker factor.
One defendant, Macaskill, filed a motion for a speedy trial approximately seventeen months after he was arraigned on the first indictment. Id. The other defendant, Lanoue, did not file a motion for a speedy trial on the first indictment. Id. The indictment was dismissed against both defendants on other grounds. Id. The government later filed a second indictment. Neither defendant moved for a speedy trial on the second indictment, but both filed motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Id. The Court ruled that "[i]t cannot be said that Macaskill and Lanoue showed the same aggressive assertion of their right to a speedy trial" as "'figuratively banging on the courthouse doors asking that he be heard.'" Id. at 885 (quoting Tate, 110 R.I. at 656, 296 A.2d at 27).
D
Prejudice to Defendant
The fourth and final Barker factor is whether the delay caused prejudice to Defendant. As discussed previously, a delay of more than twelve months is presumptively prejudicial. See Tarvis, 465 A.2d at 175; Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-92. The United States Supreme Court and the Rhode Island Supreme Court have recognized that "affirmative proof of prejudice is not essential to every speedy-trial claim because 'excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.'" Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 319 (quoting State v. DeAngelis, 658 A.2d 7, 12 (R.I. 1995)); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655)). This Court is mindful, however, that this presumption of prejudice "cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria." Crocker, 767 A.2d at 96 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655).
The Courts have "identified three types of prejudice that the right to a speedy trial was designed to prevent: oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the defendant, and impairment of the ability to present a defense." Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 319; see also Bido, 56 A.3d at 115. The impairment of the ability to present a defense is the most important concern "'because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.'" Oliveira, 961 A.2d at 319 (quoting DeAngelis, 658 A.2d at 12); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654.
Here, Defendant posits that he "cannot and should not be expected to elaborate as to specific forms of prejudice that have affected him in this case" and advances in his memoranda that the presumption of prejudice due to the passage of time and its impact on memories is sufficient. Defendant cites Doggett for this proposition. The State in turn argues that Defendant must show prejudice and argues against this Court's reliance on Doggett because of factual differences in the case.
Defendant's reliance on Doggett is misplaced. The Rhode Island Supreme Court "has rejected the argument that the inherent prejudice a defendant endures while awaiting trial is sufficient to satisfy the fourth Barker factor." Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 886 (noting that the defendants did not suffer "tangible prejudice" other than "'inherent natural prejudice that comes to a defendant waiting for a trial to take place'"). Id. at 885. Here, the facts alleged are not as egregious and otherwise differ from in Doggett. The length of the delay is much shorter in this case than that in Doggett, especially when taking into account the delay attributable to Defendant and that he failed to make a timely assertion of his right. While Defendant could not be expected to demand a speedy trial while he was unaware of the charges against him, he did not assert his speedy trial at any point prior to the filing of the instant motion to dismiss for lack thereof. This "failure to demand a speedy trial . . . is relevant in deciding whether he has been prejudiced." See State v. Charette, 434 A.2d 280, 285 (R.I. 1981). In light of the other Barker factors, Defendant must show more than a mere presumption of prejudice to succeed on this motion.
In his supplemental memorandum, Defendant solely invokes the third type of prejudice and details a couple of specific examples of alleged prejudice. Specifically, Defendant argues that his primary defense relates to his alleged invocation of his right to counsel prior to making a recorded statement to the police and provides a brief recitation of the events that day for explanatory purposes. In relevant part, Defendant explains that two individuals—whom he identifies by their first and last names and describes as his companion (Christopher), who made a statement to the police, and his companion's mother (Carol)—were present during this alleged invocation. He also states that he spoke with his parents regarding legal counsel while the police were in his apartment that day. Defendant argues in his memorandum that he has been prejudiced because Christopher and Carol now live outside Rhode Island and that Christopher "indicated to counsel that Carol is not willing to be interviewed regarding this matter, has no interest in cooperating, and wishes to have nothing to do with either defendant or the State." Defendant further contends that the delay caused him prejudice because "none of the other individuals identified herein is able to recall precisely what was said now."
This Court disagrees. It does not find that Carol's purported desire not to discuss the case evidences prejudice sufficient to justify dismissing the case. First, Defendant states that Christopher was present at the same time as Carol and makes no mention that Christopher himself is unwilling to cooperate. Christopher, therefore, can aid in Defendant's defense to the same extent that Carol could. Moreover, both Carol and Christopher can be subpoenaed to testify. Further, Defendant does not allege that his parents are unwilling to cooperate. Therefore, the potential that Carol may be uncooperative does not sufficiently prejudice Defendant's defense.
This Court similarly finds unpersuasive Defendant's claim that the passage of time has caused sufficient prejudice. The witnesses appear to remember a good portion of the events that day based on Defendant's recitation of facts. Importantly, the possibility that witness' memories have faded impacts possible prosecution witnesses as well. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315 (referring to the delay as a "two-edged sword" because the passage of time makes it difficult for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt). Further, the Court emphasizes that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations." MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8. Rather, the Court explained that "[t]he speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges." Id.
Defendant's primary defense is aimed solely at the statements Defendant made to the police after he waived his Miranda rights. Regardless of those statements, the State has direct evidence to support the charges leveled against Defendant. Specifically, the State has additional evidence that Defendant was the subscriber of an IP address that was sharing images of child pornography on a peer-to-peer network. The State also has evidence seized by police inside Defendant's home, pursuant to a search warrant—the validity of which Defendant does not question—in the form of an electronic device that contained images of child pornography.
Having analyzed the specific instances of prejudice proffered by Defendant, this Court finds that the delay has not caused Defendant serious prejudice.
V
Conclusion
After careful consideration of each Barker factor, this Court finds that the facts of this case do not warrant the "unsatisfactorily severe remedy" of dismissal for lack of a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Katelyn M. Revens, Esq. For Defendant: Thomas G. Briody, Esq.