Opinion
2023-CA-00011
08-09-2023
STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. AMY N. ROBERTS Defendant-Appellant
For Plaintiff-Appellee JENNY WELLS Prosecuting Attorney BY: KENNETH OSWALT Assistant Prosecutor For Defendant-Appellant BRADLEY P. KOFFELL PAUL GIORGIANNI
Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 22-CR-104
For Plaintiff-Appellee JENNY WELLS Prosecuting Attorney BY: KENNETH OSWALT Assistant Prosecutor
For Defendant-Appellant BRADLEY P. KOFFELL PAUL GIORGIANNI
JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
OPINION
GWIN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Amy Roberts ["Roberts"] appeals from the February 1, 2023 judgment entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas overruling her motion to suppress.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On February 5, 2021, Roberts was operating her mother's Honda Accord westbound on State Route 161 near the Franklin County line when she was stopped by Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper John Bowman for driving 75 mph in a 65-mph zone and not wearing her seatbelt. T. at 16-17. The encounter was audio/video-recorded by a camera mounted on the dashboard of the trooper's cruiser. State's Exhibit 1.
{¶3} The trooper exited his cruiser and began speaking with Roberts through the passenger-side window. T. at 13; State's Exhibit 1 at 2:02. Roberts reached into the glovebox to retrieve the vehicle's registration and insurance information which, together with her driver's license, she presented to Trooper Bowman. T. at 14. Trooper Bowman was able to see into the car where he noticed a backpack on the passenger seat. Id. He was able to discern two metal cases resembling poker chip cases in the backpack. Id. The trooper testified that he has seen similar containers in the past that contained drugs. Id. The trooper further testified that it was concerning and unusual that Roberts did not keep her hands on the steering wheel and ask permission to open the glove box. Id. at 15.
{¶4} At approximately 4:58 in the video the trooper can be seen walking back to his cruiser. Id. at 15. He testified that Roberts seem nervous. He began his check of her driver's license at this time. Id. at 16. During this time, Roberts can be seen reaching into the passenger and glove box area. T. at 18. She remains motionless behind the wheel for the majority of the next three minutes that the trooper is away.
{¶5} At approximately 7:33 into the stop, Trooper Bowman approaches the driver side of Roberts' car. He asked Roberts to step out of the car, and she consents to the trooper patting her down. T. at 20. At 8:26 Roberts can be seen emptying her jacket pockets for the trooper. The two talk during which Trooper Bowman informs Roberts that he is going to conduct a Field Sobriety Test to determine drug impairment. T. at 22. The test is designed to disclose a "lack of convergence." Id. Trooper Bowman instructs Roberts how to perform the test at 9:15 into the stop. The actual test begins at 9:25 and ends at 9:46. The test was negative for lack of convergence. Trooper Bowman detected no signs of impairment or indicia of intoxication or drug usage. T. at 27.
{¶6} At 10:20 into the stop the trooper asks Roberts if she minds if he opens the lockboxes in the backpack. T. at 21. Roberts looks visibly upset and does not answer. When trooper Bowman inquires into whether there are drugs, methamphetamine in the boxes, Roberts admits the boxes contained methamphetamine at 10:30 into the stop.
{¶7} Trooper Bowman then ordered Roberts to his cruiser and informed her of the Miranda rights. The trooper searched the metal boxes inside the backpack and found 75 grams of methamphetamine.
{¶8} Trooper Bowman testified that it normally takes anywhere from 8 to 15 minutes to write a speeding ticket. Id. at 22-23.
{¶9} On February 10, 2022, an indictment was filed charging one count of Aggravated Possession of methamphetamine a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), and one count of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d).
{¶10} On June 10, 2022, Roberts filed a motion to suppress. [Docket Entry No. 20]. The state filed a response on July 28, 2022. [Docket Entry No. 26]. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion on August 4, 2022. By Judgment Entry filed September 13, 2022, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. [Docket Entry No. 33]. The trial court found Roberts' movements of the backpack and packages which the trooper suspected contained drugs, and her movements while in the car provided the trooper with a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify any extension of the traffic stop.
{¶ 11} By Judgment Entry filed February 1, 2023, the trial court accepted Roberts' plea of no contest, merged the counts for sentencing and sentenced Roberts to an indeterminate mandatory prison term of two to three years and a $7,500 fine.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 12} Roberts raises one Assignment of Error, {¶ 13} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING AMY ROBERTS'S JUNE 10, 2022 MOTION TO SUPPRESS."
Law and Analysis
{¶14} In her sole Assignment of Error, Roberts argues that Trooper Bowman impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to issue the speeding ticket without a reasonable, articulable basis to support the continued detention.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶15} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given "to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.
Issue for Appellate Review:
Whether the lawful detention for the traffic infraction became an unlawful detention when the trooper decided to investigate the contents of the metal boxes inside the backpack in Roberts' car
{¶16} "When detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning." State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282. This "includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates." Id. Further, "in determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation." Id. An officer "may not expand the investigative scope of the detention beyond that which is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the initial stop unless any new or expanded investigation is supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that some further criminal activity is afoot." State v. Woodson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00151, 2008-Ohio-670, ¶12 quoting Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d at ¶34.
{¶17} "Reasonable suspicion is "* * * something more than an inchoate or un-particularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause." State v. Shepherd, 122 Ohio App.3d 358, 364, 701 N.E.2d 778 (2nd Dist. 1997). "A court will analyze the reasonableness of the request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold." State v. Farey, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00137, 2018-Ohio-1466, ¶ 23, citing Village of Kirtland Hills v. Strogin, 6th Dist. Lake App. No. 2005-L-073, 2006-Ohio-1450, ¶ 13 (internal citation omitted).
{¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court has identified certain specific and articulable facts that would justify an investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion, factors that fall into four general categories: (1) location; (2) the officer's experience, training, or knowledge; (3) the suspect's conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding circumstances. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1998); State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271(1991). No single factor is dispositive; the decision must be viewed based on the totality of the circumstances. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. White, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, ¶ 16. We believe that these factors would be helpful when analyzing whether a stop was unconstitutionally prolonged.
{¶19} Even without a reasonable, articulable suspicion, a police officer may, in limited circumstances, briefly detain an individual to ask questions. In State v. Robinette, the Ohio Supreme Court observed,
In sum, Royer and Brown set out a standard whereby police officers, under certain circumstances, may briefly detain an individual without reasonably articulable facts giving rise to suspicion of criminal activity, if the detention promotes a legitimate public concern, e.g., removing drunk drivers from public roadways or reducing drug trade.
In the case at bar, we find that, pursuant to Royer and Brown, Officer Newsome was justified in briefly detaining Robinette in order to ask him whether he was carrying any illegal drugs or weapons pursuant to the drug interdiction policy, because such a policy promotes the public interest in quelling the drug trade.80 Ohio St.3d 234, 241, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). Accord, State v. Johns, 5th Dist. Licking No. 19-CA-5, 2019-Ohio-4269, 146 N.E.3d 1286.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)
{¶20} Roberts agrees that the traffic stop was lawful. She further agrees that Trooper Bowman lawfully asked her to step out of the car. Roberts concedes that she agreed to allow Trooper Bowman to conduct a pat-down search. The pat down search concluded at 8:49 of the traffic stop. Thus, Roberts must concede that the first 8:49 of the traffic stop was not impermissible.
{¶21} The Field Sobriety Test to determ ine lack of convergence began at 9:15 and concluded at 9:46. Roberts was not cited for any OVI offenses. Roberts admitted that the locked metal boxes contained methamphetamine at 10:30, approximately two minutes after the conclusion of the pat down search.
{¶22} The issue in the case at bar becomes whether the permissible limit of a seizure for a traffic stop had been reached at the conclusion of the pat down search and before the field sobriety test began at 9:15 into the stop.
{¶23} We find that Trooper Bowman had articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity which justified an extension of the detention. Trooper Bowman testified that based upon his experience the metal boxes inside the backpack on the passenger seat of Roberts' car were a type associated with the drug trade. He further testified that Roberts moved the backpack while Trooper Bowman returned to his cruiser to check Roberts' driving status. Trooper Bowman testified that Roberts was reaching into the area of the passenger seat and glove box while he was away from her vehicle. Trooper Bowman testified that it normally takes anywhere from 8 to 15 minutes to write a speeding ticket.
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, we find that Trooper Bowman's continued detention of Roberts was based on articulable facts giving rise to suspicion of some separate criminal activity. We find that when the factors set forth above are considered, their probative weight is sufficient to warrant a reasonable suspicion that Roberts was engaged in criminal activity separate from any traffic violation. Therefore, even if Trooper Bowman continued to detain Roberts for purposes other than traffic violations, such seizure continued to be legal because the trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to continue the detention.
{¶25} Therefore, we find the trial court's decision overruling Roberts' motion to suppress evidence is based upon competent, credible, evidence. We further find that, because Trooper Bowman had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to continue her detention, no violation of Roberts' Fourth Amendment rights has been demonstrated.
{¶26} Roberts First Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶27} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J., Hoffman, J., and King, J., concur.