Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4441-13T2
09-25-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KRYSTAL RIORDAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Karen Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lillian Kayed, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges St. John and Guadagno. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 07-03-0410. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Karen Ann Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lillian Kayed, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Krystal Riordan appeals from the May 10, 2013 order of the Law Division denying her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without a hearing.
On July 25, 2006, defendant assisted Draymond Coleman in transporting Jennifer Moore from New York City to a hotel in Weehawken, New Jersey. Defendant helped Coleman confine Moore in the hotel room for approximately twelve hours, while Coleman beat, raped, and strangled Moore in defendant's presence. Moore died from this ordeal and defendant assisted Coleman in attempting to hide Moore's body by removing it from the hotel.
In February 2007, a grand jury sitting in Hudson County returned an indictment charging defendant and Coleman with murder, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, weapons charges, hindering apprehension, and tampering with physical evidence. On May 6, 2010, defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b), and second-degree hindering her own apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:2 9-3(b). On June 24, 2010, defendant was sentenced on the kidnapping charge to a term of twenty-five years with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA) N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A consecutive five-year term was imposed for the hindering charge.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. Because she only challenged her sentence, we heard the appeal at an excessive sentence oral argument panel on April 17, 2012. See R. 2:9-11. We determined that defendant's sentence was not excessive and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Riordan, No. A-3421-10 (App. Div. Apr. 17, 2012).
On May 30, 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. Defendant sought a modification of her sentence based on her "expectation" that she would receive a fifteen-year sentence. She did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel. After counsel was appointed, a brief was submitted claiming ineffective assistance of plea counsel and seeking withdrawal of her plea.
On May 2, 2013, Judge Joseph V. Isabella heard oral argument on defendant's petition. He issued a written decision on May 10, 2013, denying the petition.
On appeal defendant raises one point:
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE HER PLEA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ADVISING HER THAT SHE WOULD RECEIVE AN AGGREGATE FIFTEEN-YEAR SENTENCE.
After a careful review of the record we are unpersuaded by this argument and we affirm the order denying PCR substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Isabella in his thorough written decision. We add only the following brief comments.
We consider defendant's claim that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, defendant first must show that her attorney's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Defendant also must show that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. Our Supreme Court has adopted the Strickland test for consideration of claims of ineffective assistance raised under the New Jersey Constitution. See State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
Here, defendant claims her plea counsel was ineffective as he advised her that she would receive a fifteen-year sentence. Defendant's claim is flatly contradicted by her responses to questions during the plea colloquy. She acknowledged her understanding that the sentence on the kidnapping charge could be as little as fifteen years or as much as thirty years; that she would be ineligible for parole for eighty-five percent of the kidnapping sentence; that the hindering sentence could run between five and ten years; and that the hindering sentence could, in the court's discretion, run consecutively to the kidnapping sentence. The plea agreement, which defendant signed, clearly indicates that the State will recommend a thirty-year sentence on the kidnapping and a ten-year sentence on the hindering, and that defendant was subject to a maximum sentence of forty years.
In support of her petition, defendant provided a report from an interview with her plea counsel where he indicated that "he was expecting or hoping that the Judge would give the defendant a total sentence of between 20-25 years and was shocked when the judge sentenced the defendant to 30 years." Nowhere in the interview does plea counsel provide any support for defendant's claim that he told her she would receive a fifteen-year sentence.
We are satisfied that the record fully supports Judge Isabella's determination that defendant failed to show she had been denied her constitutionally-guaranteed right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. Judge Isabella also correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required. There was no genuine issue of material fact relative to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and defendant failed to provide any factual support for her claim other than her self-serving allegations. See State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (vague, conclusory, or speculative allegations do not warrant an evidentiary hearing).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION