Opinion
No. 24833-0-III.
April 26, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 05-8-00380-1, Royce H. Moe, J. Pro Tem., entered November 14, 2005.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, A.C.J., concurred in by Brown and Kulik, JJ.
A juvenile who is subject to conditions of release must be arraigned within 14 days of the date the information is filed. JuCR 7.6(a). On the date set for arraignment, the State filed an order releasing R.C., subject to conditions. But R.C. was not arraigned. He signed the release papers but he did not appear in court. The State discovered it 75 days later and scheduled his arraignment. R.C. objected. A juvenile court commissioner dismissed the case with prejudice for an untimely arraignment. The superior court affirmed the commissioner's ruling. We hold that R.C.'s arraignment was untimely and affirm.
FACTS
On March 23, 2005, R.C. was arrested on multiple charges stemming from a burglary of an unoccupied residence on Spokane's South Hill. Seventy-two hours after a detention order was entered, he was released without conditions because the State had not filed a criminal information against him.
A criminal information was filed on June 30 containing charges of residential burglary, two counts of trafficking in stolen property, third degree theft, second degree malicious mischief, and third degree possession of stolen property. The notice and summons set a hearing date of July 14. Because of the unique facts of the case — there were 11 other co-defendants in the case and they all attended Ferris High School — the prosecutor in this case, Kim Concannon, wanted R.C. to appear, and to set specific conditions for his release.
On July 14, he appeared at the juvenile courthouse and met with his attorney, Derek Reid, at the probation office. Both R.C. and Mr. Reid signed an order of release that set forth a number of conditions for his release. At some point, Ms. Concannon signed the order, as did a representative of the probation office. The order was presented to the court and filed that date.
The parties dispute the facts concerning a waiver of arraignment. Mr. Reid asserts that R.C. signed a written waiver of arraignment, a common practice between the public defender's and prosecutor's offices, and placed the document in Ms. Concannon's inbox. Ms. Concannon states that she never received the waiver. But she does agree that she stated that she would waive the in-court arraignment if R.C. signed his prerelease conditions and a waiver before July 14.
On September 27, Ms. Concannon obtained an exparte order setting an in-court arraignment for October 4. R.C. moved to continue the arraignment in order to argue a motion to dismiss for untimely arraignment.
The motion to dismiss was heard on November 4. The commissioner took the matter under advisement and later issued a letter opinion and order dismissing the case with prejudice. The commissioner ruled that if R.C. was arraigned on July 14 and the trial court did not order a continuance, the State was required to bring the matter to an adjudicatory hearing within 60 days from the date of the arraignment under JuCR 7.8(b)(2)(i). Alternatively, if R.C. was not considered arraigned on July 14, due to his technical failure to appear at his arraignment, the speedy trial clock would be re-set under JuCR 7.8(c)(2). But, the commissioner observed, the State must still comply with CrR 4.1(a)(1) and re-set the arraignment date within 14 days. Under either scenario, the commissioner concluded, the case must be dismissed.
The State sought a revision of the commissioner's ruling. The superior court found in favor of the court commissioner's alternative scenario: that R.C. did not appear for his July 14 arraignment and the State set a re-arraignment on September 27. The court concluded that R.C.'s "due process rights were denied due to the delay" and "affirm[ed] Commissioner Moe's written decision and dismissal with prejudice." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 84. The State appeals.
DISCUSSION
On a motion to revise a commissioner's ruling, the superior court conducts a de novo review on the record and of the commissioner's findings and conclusions. In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). A superior court's denial of a revision motion leaves the commissioner's action unchanged and the commissioner's findings and order become the findings and order of the superior court. RCW 2.24.050. The superior court's adoption of a court commissioner's orders and judgment may be either by express or implied rationale. In re Dependency of B.S.S., 56 Wn. App. 169, 170, 782 P.2d 1100 (1989). Here, in addition to entering its own order, the superior court adopted the commissioner's findings, both expressly and implicitly.
A superior court's decision on a motion to modify a commissioner's ruling is reviewed de novo when, as here, the material underlying facts are undisputed, the commissioner relied solely on documentary evidence, and credibility is not an issue. In re Marriage of Langham, 153 Wn.2d 553, 559, 106 P.3d 212 (2005). Facts concerning the waiver are not material since the parties agree that a waiver was not entered.
Under the juvenile speedy trial rule, a juvenile not held in custody, must be brought to trial within 60 days after the commencement date, which is the date of arraignment. JuCR 7.8(b)(2), (c)(1); State v. Hoffman, 150 Wn.2d 536, 538, 78 P.3d 1289 (2003); State v. Royster, 43 Wn. App. 613, 617, 719 P.2d 149 (1986). To determine whether the time for adjudication has passed, the court applies the rules to the particular facts. State v. Swenson, 150 Wn.2d 181, 186, 75 P.3d 513 (2003). If the time for adjudication has passed and the defendant has made a timely objection, the court has no discretion; the charges must be dismissed. Id. at 186-87; JuCR 7.8(h).
A juvenile who is detained or subject to conditions of release must be arraigned within 14 days of the date the information is filed. JuCR 7.6(a); CrR 4.1(a)(1); State v. Hovland, 34 Wn. App. 830, 834, 664 P.2d 524 (1983).
"If the 14-day arraignment time [under JuCR 7.6(a)] plus the speedy trial time under JuC[R] 7.8(b) is exceeded without bringing a defendant to trial, the charges against the defendant must be dismissed." State v. Day, 46 Wn. App. 882, 892, 734 P.2d 491 (1987); accord State v. Chandler, 143 Wn.2d 485, 487-88, 490, 21 P.3d 286 (2001).
Here, there was no arraignment until one was proposed on September 27 for October 4. A total of 75 days passed from the time of failed appearance when R.C. was released with conditions on July 14 until the date of the prosecutor's discovery. That exceeds the 74 days discussed in Day.
The superior court judge agreed with the commissioner. R.C. did not technically appear at the July 14 arraignment, which would have re-set the speedy trial clock under JuCR 7.8(b)(2)(i), but he would still have to be arraigned within 14 days. And the superior court affirmed the written decision.
In his decision, the juvenile commissioner properly held that the State was required to arraign R.C. 14 days after the conditions of release were imposed. Those conditions were imposed on July 14. The arraignment time was exceeded on July 28.
The State argues that the revised speedy trial rules amended CrR 4.1(a)(2) to provide that "[a]ny delay in bringing the defendant before the court shall not affect the allowable time for arraignment." That rule applies only to persons who are not in custody or subject to release conditions. Compare CrR 4.1(a)(1) with CrR 4.1(a)(2).
The State also argues that the revision of the speedy trial rules abolished the Striker doctrine upon which the constructive arraignment date is based in this case. And, it asserts, Day, the case upon which R.C. relies, is "defunct" under the new rules. Appellant's Br. at 5. First, the juvenile court rule cited is current. Second, the court in Day specifically held that the Striker rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. Day, 46 Wn. App. at 894. Striker does not apply because the juvenile rules provide for extensions to speedy trial times, including continuances. Day, 46 Wn. App. at 894; see State v. Harris, 130 Wn.2d 35, 45, 921 P.2d 1052 (1996).
State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870, 877, 557 P.2d 847 (1976), held that in cases of an inordinate delay between filing of an information and bringing the defendant before the court, the commencement date for speedy trial purposes is deemed to operate from the date the information was filed.
The superior court also concluded that R.C.'s "due process rights were denied due to the delay." CP at 84. The superior court's constitutional basis is superfluous. See State v. Adamski, 111 Wn.2d 574, 582, 761 P.2d 621 (1988) ("While the specific rights conferred by the [speedy trial] rule are not of constitutional magnitude, the rule emanates from state and federal constitutional guaranties" (citations omitted)).
We do not reach the constitutional question because we resolve this case on the court rule. See State v. Hall, 95 Wn.2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101 (1981) ("A reviewing court should not pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary to the determination of the case"). The court may affirm on any ground the record adequately supports. State v. Costich, 152 Wn.2d 463, 477, 98 P.3d 795 (2004).
CONCLUSION
R.C. was not arraigned pursuant to JuCR 7.8. The case was properly dismissed. We affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Schultheis, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR: Brown, J.
Kulik, J.