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State v. Rauf

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Jan 25, 2016
ID No. 1509009858 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016)

Opinion

ID No. 1509009858

01-25-2016

STATE OF DELAWARE, v. BENJAMIN RAUF, Defendant.

cc: Brian J. Robertson, Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Deputy Attorney General John R. Williams, Deputy Attorney General Cari A. Chapman, Deputy Attorney General Ross A. Flockerzie, Esquire David C. Skoranski, Esquire


Cr.A. Nos. 15-12-1177, etc. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW

This 25th day of January, 2016, the Court having found that:

(1) The nature and stage of the proceedings are as follows: Defendant Benjamin Rauf ("Rauf") was charged by indictment with a count of first-degree intentional murder, a count of first-degree felony murder, possession of firearm during those felonies, and first-degree robbery. Rauf now awaits trial, and the State has announced its intent to seek the death penalty for the murder counts.

(2) The following facts are undisputed:

(a) On December 21, 2015, a grand jury indicted Rauf for two counts of first-degree murder involving one victim. The indictment charges that Rauf, on or about August 23, 2015, in New Castle County: (i) intentionally caused the death of Shazim Uppal by shooting him; and (ii) also recklessly caused Mr. Uppal's death, while Rauf was engaged in the commission of, attempted commission of, or flight after committing or attempting first-degree robbery.

(b) Eleven Del. C. § 4209 sets forth the procedures for determining whether one convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment or death.

(c) The United States Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida recently held Florida's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional because "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death."

___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 112683, at *3 (Jan. 12, 2016).

(d) More recently, in Kansas v. Carr, the United States Supreme Court found no constitutional violation in Kansas's capital sentencing system in which "[t]he [jury] instruction makes clear that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 228342, at *9 (Jan. 20, 2016).

(3) The questions of law set forth below should be certified to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware for the following reasons:

(a) The questions of law implicate important issues regarding Delaware's capital sentencing procedures found in 11 Del. C. § 4209.

(b) Our highest federal and state courts have long and consistently recognized state capital sentencing schemes, including those of Florida and Delaware, consist of an "eligibility" or "narrowing" phase and a "selection" or "weighing" phase.

See, e.g., Kansas v. Carr, ___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 228342, at *8 (Jan. 20, 2016); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003).

(c) As found by the United States Supreme Court, "the Florida sentencing statute does not make a defendant eligible for death until 'findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.'" Those findings, made by "[t]he trial court alone," are "'the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist'" and "'[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." Of particular concern to the Court when holding Florida's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional: "Florida does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty."

Hurst v. State, ___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 112683, at *6 (Jan. 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (2010)).

Id. (second emphasis added).

Id. at *5.

(d) Before any Delaware capital sentencing hearing commences, the State provides written notice of "any aggravating circumstances," statutory or non-statutory, it alleges exist. Section 4209 of Title 11 then requires, at the narrowing or eligibility phase, that "the jury . . . first finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance." This constitutional requirement of jury fact-finding is, therefore, satisfied. But at the ultimate selection or weighing phase of a Delaware capital sentencing proceeding, the Court (i.e., sentencing judge) alone considers "all relevant evidence in aggravation" to determine which alleged aggravating circumstances, statutory or non-statutory, exist. And the Court "shall impose a sentence of death" if the Court alone "finds by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist." Post-Hurst, it is unclear, whether this second "critical finding" - which not only permits, but requires, the imposition of a death sentence - comports with constitutional requirements as "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death."

Id. at § 4209(d)(1).

See Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. 2003); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003).

Id.

Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 112683, at *3 (Jan. 12, 2016) (emphasis added).

(4) The important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination by the Supreme Court of the questions certified are:

(a) Over two dozen capital murder cases are currently pending trial in this Court. Four of those cases are scheduled to commence trial in less than 120 days. At least three of the pending death penalty cases have had motions filed after Hurst v. Florida asking the Court to declare Delaware's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional.

(b) Delaware's capital cases must proceed only under sentencing procedures that comport with federal and state constitutional requirements for the determination of a potential sentence of death.

(5) If certification is accepted, it is recommended that Defendant Benjamin Rauf, who is represented by the Public Defender's Office of the Office of Defense Services, be appellant for the purposes of the caption on any filings in the Supreme Court of Delaware and that the State of Delaware be appellee for purposes of the caption on any filings in the Supreme Court of Delaware with respect to the questions of law certified.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the following questions of law are certified to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware for disposition in accordance with Rule 41 of the Supreme Court:

While this certification is sua sponte, the Court did invite the parties to submit proposed questions for certification. The parties' submissions are attached as Exhibits A and B. --------

1. Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or Article I, Sections 4 and 7 of the Delaware Constitution, may a sentencing judge in a capital jury proceeding, independent of the jury, find the existence of "any aggravating circumstance," statutory or non-statutory, that has been alleged by the State for weighing in the selection phase of a capital sentencing proceeding?

2. If the finding of the existence of "any aggravating circumstance," statutory or non-statutory, that has been alleged by the State for weighing in the selection phase of a capital sentencing proceeding must be made by a jury, must the jury make that finding unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt to comport with federal and state constitutional standards?

3. Do the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or Article I, Sections 4 and 7 of the Delaware Constitution require a jury, not a sentencing judge, to find that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist because, under 11 Del. C. § 4209, this is the critical finding upon which the sentencing judge "shall impose a sentence of death"?
4. If the finding that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist must be made by a jury, must the jury make that finding unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt to comport with federal and state constitutional standards?

5. If any procedure in 11 Del. C. § 4209's capital sentencing scheme does not comport with federal and state constitutional standards, can the provision for such be severed from the remainder of 11 Del. C. § 4209, and the Court proceed with instructions to the jury that comport with federal and state constitutional standards?

/s/_________

PAUL R. WALLACE

Judge DATED: January 25, 2016 cc: Brian J. Robertson, Deputy Attorney General

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Deputy Attorney General

John R. Williams, Deputy Attorney General

Cari A. Chapman, Deputy Attorney General

Ross A. Flockerzie, Esquire

David C. Skoranski, Esquire

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Summaries of

State v. Rauf

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Jan 25, 2016
ID No. 1509009858 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016)
Case details for

State v. Rauf

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF DELAWARE, v. BENJAMIN RAUF, Defendant.

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Date published: Jan 25, 2016

Citations

ID No. 1509009858 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016)

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