Opinion
20230356
05-16-2024
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Zeferino Carlos Rangel, Defendant and Appellant
Frederick R. Fremgen, Jamestown, ND, for plaintiff and appellee. Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant an appellant.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial District, the Honorable Cherie L. Clark, Judge.
Frederick R. Fremgen, Jamestown, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant an appellant.
OPINION
BAHR, JUSTICE.
[¶1] Zeferino Rangel appeals from a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no manifest injustice existed to necessitate withdrawing his guilty plea. We affirm.
I
[¶2] In May 2023, Rangel pled guilty on an open plea to five felony counts in an amended information: count 1, patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, a class B felony; count 2, corruption or solicitation of minors, a class C felony; count 3, possession of certain prohibited materials, a class C felony; count 4, promoting or directing a sexual performance by a minor, a class B felony; and count 5, felon in possession of a firearm, a class C felony. In August 2023, the district court analyzed the sentencing factors and sentenced Rangel. The court's sentence included consecutive sentences on some counts. An amended criminal judgment was entered on August 23, 2023.
[¶3] In September 2023, Rangel moved the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting he was "taken aback" by the sentence imposed and a "manifest injustice would happen" if he was not allowed to withdraw his plea. He requested a hearing to offer testimony supporting his claim of manifest injustice. The State opposed his motion. After an October 2023 evidentiary hearing, the court entered an order denying Rangel's motion.
II
[¶4] Rangel argues "[i]t is a manifest injustice that [he] was unable to withdraw his guilty plea."
[¶5] Rule 11(d), N.D.R.Crim.P., governs a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea and provides differing standards to withdraw a plea depending on when the motion is made. State v. Watson, 2021 ND 18, ¶ 6, 954 N.W.2d 679. The withdrawal of a guilty plea after a district court has imposed a sentence is not allowed "[u]nless the defendant proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice[.]" N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2). A criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only by demonstrating a manifest injustice. See State v. Dunn, 2023 ND 24, ¶ 7, 985 N.W.2d 644; State v. Yost, 2018 ND 157, ¶ 6, 914 N.W.2d 508. Further, "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Dunn, at ¶ 7 (quoting State v. Dimmitt, 2003 ND 111, ¶ 6, 665 N.W.2d 692).
[¶6] "The [district] court has discretion in finding whether a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of a guilty plea exists, and we review the court's decision for abuse of discretion." Watson, 2021 ND 18, ¶ 7 (quoting Dodge v. State, 2020 ND 100, ¶ 13, 942 N.W.2d 478). A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; or when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's legal discretion is not exercised in the interest of justice." Id.
[¶7] Because the district court imposed consecutive sentences, Rangel asserts he was essentially sentenced to 25 years in prison followed by 3 years of supervised probation. He argues the court erred when it sentenced him to a "significantly harsh sentence." He contends he explained to the court he has a health condition that has been progressively getting worse since he was incarcerated. Due to his health condition, Rangel argues the court has "[o]stensibly" given him a sentence "that would likely result in a life sentence." He argues the court failed to take into account his health issues under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04(11) & (12). Section 12.1-32-04 provides, in relevant part:
The following factors, or the converse thereof where appropriate, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in making determinations regarding the desirability of sentencing an offender to imprisonment: . . . .
11. The imprisonment of the defendant would entail undue hardship to himself or his dependents.
12.The defendant is elderly or in poor health. . . .
[¶8] The State responds the district court correctly concluded Rangel failed to prove a manifest injustice. It argues surprise, shock, or being "taken aback" by the sentence does not qualify as manifest injustice; the sentence was within the minimum and maximum statutory limits; and sentencing a defendant with health conditions to imprisonment is not a manifest injustice.
[¶9] In denying Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court found his "reasons for withdraw[al] did not amount to manifest injustice." The court held the prison terms it imposed were within the latitude under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-01 for each count; while the parties provided separate recommendations, there was no plea agreement; and the court had the authority to order periods of incarceration to run consecutively. See State v. Larsen, 2023 ND 144, ¶ 20, 994 N.W.2d 194 ("A district court has the authority to determine whether a felony sentence runs concurrent with or consecutive to another felony sentence." (citation omitted)).
[¶10] At his sentencing hearing, the district court considered the sentencing factors under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04 before imposing the consecutive sentences. The court specifically considered subsections 11 and 12 of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04, and found these factors weighed in his favor:
[Eleven,] [t]he imprisonment of the Defendant would entail undue hardship to himself. This one does weigh in favor of the Defendant.
I believe all information he told me about his heart disease. I believe he has congestive heart failure. That does weigh[] in favor of the Defendant.
Twelve, the Defendant is elderly or in poor health, again, that weighs in favor of the Defendant.
However, the court concluded the consecutive sentences were appropriate after its consideration of the other sentencing factors.
[¶11] We note Rangel has not argued in this appeal that his sentence is illegal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a). Further, although he argues his sentence is "significantly harsh" and he "ostensibly" received a life sentence on the basis of his deteriorating health and physical condition, Rangel did not seek a reduction of his sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(b), which provides:
(1) Time for Reduction. The sentencing court may reduce a sentence:
(A) within 120 days after the court imposes sentence or revokes probation; or
(B) within 120 days after the court receives the mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal; or
© within 120 days after the Supreme Court of the United States enters any order or judgment denying review of, or having the effect of upholding a judgment of conviction or probation revocation.
(2) Motion for Reduction. On a party's motion or on its own, and with notice to the parties, the court may grant a sentence reduction. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation is a permissible sentence reduction. If the sentencing court grants a sentence reduction, it must state its reasons for the reduction in writing.
"We have said that reduction of a sentence under Rule 35(b) is not a right but an application for leniency, and is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Peterka v. State, 2015 ND 156, ¶ 18, 864 N.W.2d 745 (quoting State v. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d 183, 184 (N.D. 1994)). Nevertheless, Rangel's motion was not under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a) or 35(b), but a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d).
[¶12] On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rangel failed to show a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea. In denying Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
III
[¶13] We affirm the district court's order.
[¶14] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte Douglas A. Bahr