Opinion
CR-22-312
09-29-2022
STATE OF MAINE v. KAYLA PURCELL
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Brent Davis Chief Judge
Pending before the court is Defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered by the State of Maine after a traffic stop. Defendant is charged with Criminal OUI (Alcohol) (Class D) with 1 prior offense within the past ten years in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 241J (1-A)(B)(1), operating while license was suspended or revoked in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A)(l-4), and violating a condition of release pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A). The traffic stop occurred on February 20, 2022. Defendant's motion to suppress was filed on March 7, 2022 and came before the court on September 22, 2022 for an evidentiary hearing. Deputy District Attorney Tarpinian represented the State and Attorney Morgan represented Defendant, Kayla Purcell, who was not present at the hearing.
Facts
The following facts are derived from Sergeant Desmond Nutter's testimony. Sgt. Nutter is a patrol sergeant with the Augusta police department, where he has worked for the past eight years. The late evening of February 19, 2022 into the early morning of February 20, 2022, he was on the night shift patrol in an unmarked truck parked on Vaughn Street near Sewall Street in Augusta, Maine. On patrol, he used a LTI speed gun (the "laser") by pointing it so the signal locked onto the license plate area of a vehicle when the vehicle was in motion. The laser is a precision instrument that displays the targeted vehicle's speed. Just before 1 a.m., Sgt. Nutter witnessed a traffic violation when he used the laser on a green Subaru operated by the Defendant to display the vehicle's speed. The posted speed limit was 25 miles per hour, and the laser read that the vehicle was travelling at 35 miles per hour.
On February 20, 2022, the laser formed Sgt. Nutter's belief that Defendant's vehicle was operating in excess of 25 miles per hour. The laser's manual suggests the user perform multiple tests to ensure its accuracy. On the night of February 19, 2022, Sgt. Nutter performed a "fixed distance test" and a "delta test" inside the police department hallway to determine that the laser was reading accurately and determined that the laser was functioning properly. These tests are completed by the officer every time prior to using the laser.
However, the calibration certificate for the laser used on February 20, 2022, had expired on October 31, 2021, which was unknown to Sgt. Nutter at the time. The laser manual does not mention calibration, but the Augusta police department engages TMDE Calibration Labs, Inc., of Richmond, ME, to calibrate the lasers on an annual basis. Sgt. Nutter had no indication that the laser was not working properly and he relied on the laser because the accuracy tests mentioned in the manual were performed.
Discussion
At issue is whether Defendant was unreasonably stopped by police in violaton of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 5 of the Maine Constitution. See State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 8, 43 A.3d 961. For a traffic stop to be constitutional, "a police officer must have an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 7, 143 A.3d 124 (quoting State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 984). Whether Sgt. Nutter's subjective suspicion that Defendant was speeding was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances is a question of law. See State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 9.
Defendant contends Sgt. Nutter lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop because the laser used was not calibrated. While the overdue calibration certification weighs against the accuracy of the laser, the court does not need to determine whether the reading was exact. See State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (finding reasonable articulable suspicion for a traffic stop when the officer believed Defendant's vehicle failed to display a license plate but upon approaching the vehicle, noticed the license plate in the rear window). At issue is only whether the totality of the circumstances support that Sgt. Nutter's stop was based on an objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant was committing a traffic violation.
Sgt. Nutter suspected a violation based on his belief that the laser would detect when a vehicle was travelling faster than the posted speed limit. Reasonable articulable suspicion must "be based on more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch." State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117, ¶ 8, 776 A.2d 1223 (quoting State v. Eklund, 2000 ME 175, ¶ 6, 760 A.2d 622). Sgt. Nutter's reliance on the laser to determine a vehicle's speed was objectively reasonable because he performed accuracy tests as suggested by the laser's manual and believed the laser was working properly to detect the speed of a passing vehicle. See State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634, 635-36 (Me. 1994) ("The court may infer the necessary suspicion from the officer's testimony, and the police officer need not explicitly testify that he had the requisite suspicion.") (internal citation omitted). Sgt. Nutter acted on more than speculation, as his use of a laser to detect speeding, even if the laser's calibration was overdue, could reasonably warrant the minimal intrusion of a traffic stop.
The court notes that very little testimony establishing whether it was reasonable for Sgt. Nutter to rely solely on a laser for detection of speed was elicited. However, because the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard is a low bar and the court may infer the suspicion was reasonable, here the court infers reliance on a laser believed to be working properly to initiate a traffic stop meets the required suspicion standard.
Conclusion of Law
Based on the foregoing, the officer did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by initiating the traffic stop. The officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was committing a traffic violation. Therefore, Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.