Opinion
No. 107,874.
2013-05-24
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael C. PRINGLE, Appellant.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; Sally D. Pokorny, Judge. Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; Sally D. Pokorny, Judge.
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., GREEN and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Michael C. Pringle appeals following his conviction for one count of aggravated battery. He argues his conviction should be reversed on two grounds: (1) the district court erred in denying both of his requests for a mistrial based on juror misconduct and (2) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We find no merit to either of these arguments and therefore affirm.
Facts
On July 11, 2011, Pringle and his estranged wife, Michelle, were at the Holcolm Recreational Center in Lawrence watching their youngest son play baseball. At some point, the couple began arguing near the bleachers but moved the argument to the parking lot of the recreation center. They were accompanied by their 11–year–old son, Weston. According to Michelle, Pringle told her that she should leave before he hurt her. Michelle refused to leave the game, so Pringle got into his car and told Weston that he was leaving because Michelle was being a “bitch.” Relieved that Pringle was leaving, Michelle started to walk back to the game. When she turned around to make sure Weston was following her, she saw that the front bumper of Pringle's car was 6 inches behind her. Michelle put her hands on the hood of the car to brace herself and ran backwards to try to get out of the way, but Pringle accelerated the car, striking Michelle and knocking her to the ground. Pringle drove out of the parking lot. Weston, who had observed the incident, came to Michelle's aid, along with two women who were nearby. One of the women called the police.
Lawrence Police Officer Jamie Emerson responded to the scene. Michelle advised the officer that Pringle had hit her with his car and pointed out her injuries, which included an abrasion and a bruise on her left elbow, bruising on her left buttock/upper left hip, and a sore right hip. Emerson later made contact with Pringle, who denied that he had struck Michelle with his car.
Pringle subsequently was charged with one count of aggravated battery. At trial, Pringle testified that when he drove out of the parking lot, he did not see or hear anything out of the ordinary. Pringle denied hitting Michelle with his car.
A jury convicted Pringle as charged and found that Pringle had committed a domestic violence offense. The district court sentenced Pringle to a 24–month term of probation, with an underlying prison sentence of 12 months.
Analysis
Pringle raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims the district court erred in denying his two requests for a mistrial based on juror misconduct. Second, he claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his aggravated battery conviction. We address each of these claims in turn.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Pringle's requests for a mistrial?
Pringle argues the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial on two occasions during trial. Pringle claims that he suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant a mistrial when: (1) two jurors had contact with Officer Emerson outside the courtroom and (2) a juror saw brief television news coverage of the trial.
“[T]he right to a jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.” State v. Cady, 248 Kan. 743, 754, 811 P.2d 1130 (1991). Under K.S.A. 22–3423(1)(c), a district court may order a mistrial at any time if prejudicial conduct, inside or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed without injustice to either party. Juror misconduct will not be a ground for mistrial, however, unless the party claiming error shows that such error substantially prejudiced his or her rights. State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 852, 26 P.3d 657 (2001).
On appeal, we review a district court's decision denying a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Judicial discretion is abused if the judicial decision is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801, cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1594 (2012). The party alleging the abuse bears the burden of proving that his or her rights to a fair trial were prejudiced. State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 329, 202 P.3d 658 (2009).
“A high degree of appellate deference is allowed a trial judge's exercise of discretion in assessing the texture and feel of the trial, the credibility of witnesses, and the perceived impact of an allegedly prejudicial event. In these circumstances, appellate decisions often recognize a presumption of validity in the exercise of discretion because of the superior vantage point of the trial judge.” Saucedo v. Winger, 252 Kan. 718, 731, 850 P.2d 908 (1993).
First motion for mistrial
During a trial recess, the prosecutor observed Officer Emerson, the State's next witness to testify, talking to two male jurors in the smoking area outside of the courthouse. Upon seeing this interaction, the prosecutor told Emerson that he could not talk to the jurors and notified the district court and defense counsel of the incident. Thereafter, the district court and the parties questioned Emerson and both jurors about the nature of their conversation.
Emerson stated that he had spoken to the two men about the nice weather, jobs, snowstorms, power outages, and population growth. He claimed that it was not a lengthy conversation. Emerson advised that he did not know that the men were jurors, did not notice their juror badges, did not talk to the men about Pringle's case, did not tell them he was a witness in the case, and did not ask them why they were at the courthouse.
Juror E.K. stated that he spoke with Emerson about the nice weather, E.K.'s motorcycle, and population growth. He stated they did not discuss Pringle's case. E.K. did not tell Emerson that he was a juror, and he did not know whether Emerson could see his juror badge. E.K. did not know that Emerson was a witness in the case and thought that Emerson was merely having a cigarette at the end of his shift. E.K. claimed that the conversation had not led to any type of friendship or rapport that would cause him to look at Emerson's testimony in a different light than any other witness.
Juror S.E. told the court that he talked to Emerson about general topics like the weather, the United States, population growth, and snowstorms. S.E. stated that they did not discuss Pringle's case, and he was unaware that Emerson was a witness in the case. S.E. said he was wearing his juror badge but did not know whether Emerson saw the badge. S.E. stated that he had an open mind and denied that he had developed a special rapport with Emerson or that his conversation with Emerson would make it difficult or impossible for him to be a fair and impartial juror.
Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the interaction had tainted the jurors. The district court denied the motion, holding that the conversations between Emerson and the jurors were “truly innocuous” and had nothing to do with Pringle's case. The court determined that the jurors indicated that they could still have an open mind in deciding Pringle's case and did not suggest that the conversation with Emerson would cause them to give more credibility to the State's case.
Pringle contends the district court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because it appeared that the jurors had established a relationship and good rapport with Officer Emerson. He alleges that the conversation between Emerson and the jurors consisted of numerous topics and contained more than mere pleasantries, claiming that because Emerson was the only police officer to testify for the State, any additional weight the jurors may have given his testimony would have influenced the jury. Pringle further suggests that Emerson should have been aware that the men were jurors, as they were wearing their juror badges, were only standing a short distance away from Emerson, and were taking a break at the same time that the Pringle trial was in recess.
Communication between a juror and a witness is not grounds for reversal unless the communication is shown by the defendant to have substantially prejudiced his or her rights. State v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 286, 13 P.3d 887 (2000).
“In determining whether a particular instance of improper communication between a juror and a witness amounts to prejudicial misconduct which will prevent a fair trial the nature of the communication is of considerable significance. When the communication is entirely unrelated to defendant's case courts generally find insufficient prejudice to require a mistrial. [Citations omitted.] When the communication is related to the defendant's case the trial court may find prejudice and then a mistrial will be declared. [Citations omitted.]” State v. Jakeway, 221 Kan. 142, 148, 558 P.2d 113 (1976).
See State v. Hobbs, 276 Kan. 44, 50, 71 P.3d 1140 (2003) (no prejudice sufficient to warrant mistrial where contact between officer witness and juror was unrelated to prosecution); State v. Henson, 221 Kan. 635, 648, 562 P.2d 51 (1977) (no mistrial warranted where State's expert witness only discussed pleasantries with juror before testifying); State v. Rhodes, 219 Kan. 281, 283–84, 546 P.2d 1396 (1976) (no prejudice where juror and complaining witness did not discuss defendant's case). Another important consideration is whether the juror thinks that he or she can be impartial. State v. Turner, 2 Kan.App.2d 645, 647, 586 P.2d 279 (1978).
The jurors in this case spoke with Emerson about topics such as the weather, snowstorms, jobs, power outages, and population growth. Pringle does not claim, and there is no indication in the record, that the conversation related to Pringle's case in any way. Indeed, prior to moving for mistrial, defense counsel conceded that Pringle's case was not discussed. Nor does it appear that Emerson was aware that the men were jurors in Pringle's case or that the jurors were aware that Emerson was a witness in the case. Finally, both jurors specifically stated that their conversation with Emerson would not make it difficult or impossible for them to be fair and impartial in deciding Pringle's case. The district court thoroughly investigated the matter and correctly determined that the conversation constituted innocent contact that was unrelated to Pringle's prosecution. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Pringle's request for a mistrial.
Second motion for mistrial
On the second day of trial, Juror S.E. advised the district court that he had inadvertently seen a “couple seconds” of the local television news coverage of Pringle's trial the previous evening. S .E. stated that he turned off the television right after hearing Pringle's name and did not hear anything further about the case. S.E. claimed that the brief coverage he saw would not impact his ability to judge the case or hear the evidence fairly. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, stating:
“This is the second time we've had some issue with this particular juror. I don't know what's going on, but it seems that this juror is having some issues in terms of understanding that he has to follow certain rules.
“I understand before there was contact with the police officer. Now, obviously he's watching the news, and it's the local news as opposed to CNN, so it's—you would believe that someone would think if this is a trial that that's possible to show up on Channel 6. So I know he turned the channel, but I mean, we just make this motion for procedural reasons and for the record. That's my motion.”
The district court judge denied the motion, stating:
“Well, I do think the juror actually followed the instructions to a T. And I think even some jurors might not even think to report that that had happened because it seems to have been so minor, but he seems to be very conscientious about wanting to follow the Court rules, and for that reason did report that he had some contact.
“And it may have been my fault because when I released the jurors last night I said I hadn't seen the media in here, I didn't think anything was gonna be on TV. And he may have thought I was smarter than I am about what's gonna happen on TV. So we can't totally blame [Juror S.E.] for that. And I—based on his answers and based upon the very short bit of—what was on TV, and it seemed to be just more—I think just Mr. Pringle's name, but no substance to the story, I can't find that there is any prejudice or that the juror's been tainted in any way. So I'll deny your motion for mistrial.”
Pringle argues that the district court's inquiry into the potential prejudice caused by S.E.'s conduct was insufficient, claiming that the court did not consider the impact the news coverage had on S.E. or whether S.E. had tainted the other members of the jury by telling them that he had seen the news coverage. Pringle also suggests that S.E.'s repeated misconduct constituted misconduct of the entire jury.
Pringle's argument is without merit. The mere fact that S.E. saw a “couple seconds” of news coverage does not, standing alone, warrant a mistrial. See State v. Baker, 227 Kan. 377, 382–83, 607 P.2d 61 (1980) (a juror's reading of newspaper articles pertaining to the trial are not grounds for mistrial “unless the articles are of such a character that they might have resulted in prejudice to the losing party”); Roy v. State, 213 Kan. 30, Syl. ¶ 2, 514 P.2d 832 (1973) (the fact that a juror has read a newspaper article does not automatically constitute grounds for a mistrial); but see State v. Yurk, 230 Kan. 516, 523–24, 638 P.2d 921 (1982) (mistrial warranted where juror who read newspaper article detailing defendant's prior charges and convictions stated that the prior convictions bothered him and might affect his judgment).
The district court in this case admonished the jury to avoid news media coverage of the trial. In response to questioning by the court, S.E. stated that he only heard Pringle's name on the news and heard nothing material about the case. He further stated that this brief exposure to the news coverage would not impact his ability to remain fair and impartial in deciding Pringle's case. There is nothing in the record to suggest that S.E. was influenced by this incident, that he had told the other jurors about the news coverage, or that he could have tainted the jury as a whole. Unlike Yurk, there is no indication that S.E. even saw any coverage of substance, and certainly no indication that he was bothered by anything he did see or that it would in any way affect his ability to remain impartial.
Pringle has failed to meet his burden demonstrating that he was prejudiced as a result of any of the alleged misconduct. See Wimbley, 271 Kan. at 852. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either of Pringle's requests for mistrial.
Is the evidence sufficient to support Pringle's aggravated battery conviction?
Pringle argues the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his aggravated battery conviction. Specifically, he contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence proving that he struck Michelle with his car.
When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, an appellate court reviews such claims by looking at all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374–75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the appellate court generally will not reweigh the evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses. State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011).
The State charged Pringle with knowingly causing bodily harm to Michelle with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death could be inflicted. See K.S.A.2012 Supp. 21–5413(b)(1)(B). The State presented the following evidence at trial: Michelle testified that she put her hands on the hood of Pringle's car to brace herself and ran backwards to try to get out of the way, but Pringle accelerated the car, striking her, and knocking her to the ground. Weston testified that he saw Michelle put her hands on the hood of Pringle's car and run backwards to avoid getting hit, but she was unable to do so and the car knocked her down. Brooke Bailey and her mother, Jill Wilkinson, were returning from the restrooms at the recreation center when they observed the Pringles arguing loudly in the parking lot. Bailey saw Pringle get into his car and drive towards Michelle at a “medium speed,” and then saw Michelle fall to the ground as Pringle's tires squealed and he quickly drove out of the parking lot. While Bailey's view was blocked by other cars and she did not actually see Pringle hit Michelle, Bailey testified that it looked like his car hit Michelle at about knee level and then she saw Michelle “kind of do like a summersault.” Wilkinson observed Pringle get into his car and drive towards Michelle. Wilkinson then saw something hit Michelle at her knees and saw Michelle hit the ground while Pringle drove off in his car. Officer Emerson testified that Michelle's injuries and clothing that had transfer marks from the blacktop were consistent with her version of events.
Pringle alleges that although Michelle and Weston testified that his car struck Michelle and knocked her to the ground, their testimony also indicated that Michelle had reached out to brace herself on the hood of the car and ran backwards, causing her to fall and incur injuries. Pringle further notes that neither Bailey nor Wilkinson actually saw the car hit Michelle.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial clearly supports a finding that Pringle struck Michelle with his car and that the jury therefore could have found that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery.
Affirmed.