Opinion
No. 3-274 / 02-0053
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, David H. Sivright, Jr., (motion to suppress) and C. H. Pelton (trial), Judges.
George Prentiss, III, appeals from his convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Thomas H. Preacher, Bettendorf, for appellant, and George Prentiss, III, Anamosa, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, James Kivi and Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorneys General, and Michael L. Wolf, County Attorney for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
George Prentiss, III, appeals from his convictions for first-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1, 707.2(1), and 707.2(2) (2001) and first- degree robbery in violation of sections 711.1 and 711.2. He contends the trial court committed error in at least two respects. First, he claims the court should not have upheld the prosecutor's peremptory strike of the only African-American seated on the jury panel. Second, he claims all the statements he made to police should have been suppressed. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Based on the record before us, a reasonable jury could have found the following facts from the evidence presented at trial.
Pam Wiedner worked as a bartender at the River City Brewing Company in Clinton. At about 5:00 p.m. on January 21, 2001, customers Michelle Latimer and Terry Greve entered the bar but found no bartender. Soon after they arrived, a man later identified as the defendant's uncle, Robert Jackson, emerged from the kitchen area. The man stated, "She'll be alright" and exited the front door. Unable to obtain service, Latimer and Greve left the establishment and went to a nearby tavern. Once there, they became concerned about the missing bartender at the River City Brewing Company. As a result, Greve returned to the bar with an acquaintance. Once inside, Greve and his companion observed one other customer present, but still no bartender. Greve, his companion, and the other customer began looking for the bartender. They found Ms. Wiedner's body in the kitchen area. She had been stabbed to death. Cash was missing from the bar's cash register.
During the morning of January 16, 2001, a Clinton Police officer and a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent went to an apartment building in Clinton to conduct interviews as part of their investigation into Weidner's death. While at the apartment building, they spoke with the defendant. Prentiss informed them he was in his apartment all day on January 15. He claimed he had not seen Robert Jackson that day.
Later on January 16, Prentiss was taken into custody on an Illinois warrant for a probation violation. A DCI agent interviewed him from approximately 5:00 p.m. until 10:34 p.m. at the Clinton Police Department. During the interview, Prentiss admitted he was with Robert Jackson on January 15, but denied he ever went to the River City Brewing Company. At the conclusion of the interview, an officer booked Prentiss on the probation violation.
During the booking process, Prentiss asked to speak with Officer Ann Bormann, who was present in the booking area. Bormann agreed to speak with Prentiss. She informed him of his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview which began at approximately 11:35 p.m. During the interview, Prentiss admitted he was at the bar with Jackson, but claimed he left before Ms. Wiedner was killed. During the interview, Bormann obtained a DNA sample from Prentiss with his written permission.
Bormann interviewed Prentiss on three more occasions over the course of the following three days. During these videotaped interviews, Prentiss admitted that he was at the tavern on January 15 with Jackson, that he grabbed Wiedner so Jackson could steal from the cash register, and that he forced Wiedner into the back room where Jackson stabbed her to death. Law enforcement authorities also recovered physical evidence linking the defendant and his uncle to the murder and robbery.
On January 23, 2001, the State filed a complaint charging Prentiss with first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he had given to authorities over the period of January 16-19. The district court granted the motion with respect to the defendant's initial interview on January 16 because his interrogator had failed to stop questioning Prentiss after he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The court denied the motion with respect to the statements Prentiss made in the subsequent interviews because it found Prentiss had initiated the later discussions, and his statements were voluntary.
Following a change of venue, trial commenced on December 3, 2001. During jury selection, the State used a peremptory strike against the only African-American seated on the jury panel because of his strong "religious viewpoints." The defendant made a Batson challenge to the strike, which the court denied. Following trial, the jury found Prentiss guilty of both first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. The court sentenced Prentiss to life in prison on the murder conviction and a concurrent term of twenty-five years for the robbery conviction. Prentiss appeals.
The defendant has filed a pro se brief to supplement the brief filed by his appellate attorney. The issues addressed in his pro se filing are either not part of the record, already addressed by his appellate counsel, or without merit.
II. Peremptory Strike.
Prentiss is an African-American. Relying on both the state and federal constitutions, he contends the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of the only African-American seated on the jury panel. We review this issue de novo. State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 806 (Iowa 1997).
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a three-part analysis under the Equal Protection Clause for determining whether peremptory challenges or strikes have been exercised impermissibly on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-89 (1986); accord Veal, 564 N.W.2d at 806-807. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to remove a prospective juror of the defendant's race, raising an inference that such exclusion is discriminatory. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. Second, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for challenging the juror. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89. Essentially, the trial court must decide whether to believe the prosecutor's explanation for the peremptory strike. United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994). The trial court's decision is accorded great deference on appeal. Id.
Prentiss urges us to adopt a more restrictive test under the Iowa Constitution than has been applied under the United States Constitution. We find no reason to depart from the Batson analysis our courts have applied on more than one occasion. See, e.g., Veal, 564 N.W.2d at 806-807 (upholding the peremptory challenge employing the three-part Batson analysis); see also State v. Keys, 535 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (refusing to impose a more stringent rule than that in Batson holding, " Batson . . . require[s] only that the State's reasons be racially neutral.").
In response to defendant's challenge to the State's peremptory strike, the prosecutor explained that the black prospective juror, and at least two other white prospective jurors, were stricken because of their strong religious viewpoints. Although voir dire was not reported, the trial court confirmed the black juror's answers to questions posed to him during voir dire "were unusually religious-based." The trial court concluded the State carried its burden of "articulating a clear, reasonably specific, and race neutral explanation" for the strike based on the venireman's "unusual religious views."
Based on our de novo review, we find nothing in the record which suggests the State's peremptory strike of the "seated" African-American juror was exercised in a discriminatory manner. Prentiss does not claim that the prosecutor used racially loaded questions during voir dire, or that he had a pattern of striking black jury panel members. The record reveals the prosecutor struck one black prospective juror, and at least two other white prospective jurors, because of concern regarding their unusually strong religious views.
The record reveals there were three or four African-Americans on the entire jury panel. The African-American struck by the prosecutor was the only "seated" African-American.
We find no constitutional error here and conclude the court did not err in allowing the State's peremptory strike to stand. Accordingly, we reject this assignment of error.
III. Motion to Suppress Issues.
Prentiss made statements during five separate interviews with police. As we have already mentioned, the district court partially granted his motion to suppress. The court suppressed all statements Prentiss made during the first interview after he invoked his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The court denied his motion to suppress the statements he made during the four subsequent interviews. Prentiss contends the trial court erred by failing to suppress all the statements he made during interviews with law enforcement authorities over the time period of January 16-19, 2001. He maintains his statements were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. He also contends his Miranda rights' waiver was involuntary. Finally, he argues that he never validly reinitiated questioning after invoking his right to remain silent during his first interview.
A. Scope of Review. Because Prentiss's claims implicate a potential deprivation of his constitutional guarantees, our review is de novo. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). We "make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record." State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993). We give deference to the findings of fact by the district court due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V. This right against self-incrimination is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492-95, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658-61 (1964).
B. Voluntariness of Statements. Prentiss contends the State has failed to prove that his statements were voluntary. The State must prove the voluntariness of a defendant's confession by a preponderance of the evidence, as a prerequisite to its admission in evidence. State v. Reid, 394 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Iowa 1986). Where the State fails to meet this burden, the defendant's inculpatory statements and confession must be suppressed and may not be admitted into evidence. Id. The test of voluntariness of an inculpatory statement or confession is "whether the defendant's will was overborne by the police officers," considering "the totality of the circumstances." Id. (quoting State v. Coburn, 315 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Iowa 1982)). Factors relevant to this assessment include:
[T]he defendant's knowledge and waiver of his Miranda rights; the defendant's age, experience, prior record, level of education and intelligence; the length of time defendant is detained and interrogated; whether physical punishment was used, including the deprivation of food or sleep; defendant's ability to understand the questions; the defendant's physical and emotional condition and his reaction to the interrogation; whether any deceit or improper promises were used in gaining the admissions; any mental weakness the defendant may possess.
Reid, 394 N.W.2d at 404 (citations omitted).
Prentiss suggests his statements were involuntary because he was suicidal, depressed, alcohol and drug dependant, and had consumed a substantial quantity of beer and wine prior to his first interview. The record reveals Prentiss was thirty-seven years old at the time of the interviews and had an eleventh grade education. Prentiss had significant experience with the criminal justice system as evidenced by his long criminal history. In fact, he had been advised of his Miranda rights on at least two prior occasions. The record reveals Prentiss was given breaks and refreshments. When he was interrogated for the first time on January 16, his interrogators were unable to smell or detect any sign that defendant had actually imbibed alcohol or taken drugs prior to his arrest. Defendant's own expert testified that he was competent to stand trial and had no basis for an insanity or diminished responsibility defense. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical pressure, abusive interrogation tactics, threats, promises, or deceit. We agree with the district court's conclusion that Prentiss's statements were voluntary.
C. Waiver of Miranda Rights. Prentiss also contends the State has failed to satisfy its burden to show that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights over the course of his interviews with the police. His claim rests on the same grounds relied upon to support his claim that his statements to police were involuntary.
The State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights. State v. Vincik, 398 N.W.2d 788, 789 (Iowa 1987). A Miranda waiver is involuntary only when it is the product of police misconduct or overreaching. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559. An express waiver is not required. State v. Davis, 304 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1981). Rather, the validity of the waiver is based on particular facts and circumstances surrounding the giving of the Miranda warnings. State v. King, 492 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
We find this assignment of error without merit. Before each interview over the four-day period began, Prentiss was read or reminded of his Miranda rights. The record reveals that Prentiss fully understood and appreciated the consequences of abandoning his Miranda guarantees throughout the course of the interviews he gave January 16-19. At one point during his conversation with Officer Bormann on January 18, defendant stated, "I know I can put myself in a big ass jam by telling you this stuff." The State proved by a preponderance of evidence that Prentiss intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. We affirm the trial court on this issue.
D. Reinitiation of Questioning. Prentiss contends statements he gave during his second interview, which began late in the evening on January 16; and the statements he made during his January 17 interview should have been suppressed because they were made after he invoked his right to counsel and right to remain silent. He contends the statements he gave January 18-19, merely explored the details of the accounts given on January 16-17 and should therefore be excluded as exploitation of the primary illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 454 (1963).
If a person invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination either before or during questioning, the questioning must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 (1966). This right to cut off questioning must be scrupulously honored. State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Iowa 1976). The same holds true for the invocation of the right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981).
Further questioning after a defendant has invoked his rights cannot occur unless the suspect initiates the contact. State v. Newsom, 414 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1987). Even if the suspect initiates further conversation with police, he must make a valid waiver of the previously invoked rights to counsel and to silence for any statements to be admissible. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412-13 (1983). Not every inquiry by a defendant amounts to an initiation for these purposes. Id.
There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally "initiate" a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards.
Id. at 1045.
After the initial interview with DCI agents concluded on January 16 at 10:34 p.m., Officer Raaymakers booked Prentiss into custody at 11:00 p.m. During the booking process, Prentiss turned to Officer Bormann and asked to speak with her. Bormann initially stated that she would set up a time for them to meet later, but it became clear that Prentiss wanted to meet with her that night rather than at some point in the future. Prentiss entered Bormann's office where she informed or reminded him of his Miranda rights. Absent from the record is any indication that Prentiss was making a routine inquiry regarding the custodial relationship. Instead, the record shows Prentiss initiated a conversation with Bormann for purposes of discussing the homicide and that Bormann informed him of his Miranda rights before the interview progressed.
On January 17, Bormann received a message that Prentiss wanted to speak with her again. Bormann went to the jail and advised Prentiss of his Miranda rights prior to talking with him. Prentiss began the interview by discussing the remorse he felt and the remorse his uncle could have been feeling. Continuing, he expressed his fear of Jackson and requested to be kept away from him. Over the course of the interview, Prentiss admitted to pulling Wiedner to the kitchen area while Jackson stole from the cash register. After robbing the register, Jackson came to the kitchen where he stabbed Wiedner.
Prentiss asserts his request to be sequestered from Jackson indicates the initiation of the January 17 interview was nothing more than a routine inquiry regarding the custodial relationship. We disagree. The interview was not merely a request to change jail cells. The record reveals Prentiss reinitiated a discussion of the facts surrounding the crime and validly waived his right to counsel. We reject this assignment of error.
We affirm the judgment of the district court finding Prentiss guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery.