Opinion
No. 07-1061.
Filed March 4, 2008.
Rutherford County No. 06CRS1525.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 16 April 2007 by Judge Laura J. Bridges in Rutherford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 February 2008.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Larissa S. Ellerbee, for the State. Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, for Defendant.
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon revocation of her probation. Because Defendant admitted to at least some of the probation violations found by the court, and because the court further found that any single violation was sufficient to support revocation, we affirm.
On 9 November 2006, Defendant pled guilty to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court suspended a sentence of six to eight months' imprisonment and placed her on supervised probation for thirty months.
In a report filed 12 February 2007, Defendant's probation officer charged her with the following violations of the conditions of probation: (1) testing positive for marijuana and cocaine use on 5 December 2006; (2) failing to complete any of the 72 hours of community service required during the first 90 days of probation; (3) missing curfew on three occasions; (4) failing to pay any amount of her court costs or restitution; (5) failing to pay any amount toward her monthly supervision fee; and (6) failing to report for a TASC appointment or to attend the treatment ordered by her initial assessment.
The trial court held a revocation hearing on 26 April 2007. When asked by the court if Defendant admitted to the alleged violations, her counsel responded, "She would admit it in part. There is an issue she has done some community service." Counsel allowed the probation officer to review defendant's violations without being sworn as a witness and did not question the officer. Defendant testified that she had completed twenty-one of the required seventy-two hours of community service, and that she had resolved the "automobile problems" that had prevented her from completing this requirement. She averred that she was prepared to pay $100 toward the monetary conditions of probation, that she had been attending substance abuse treatment at Appalachian Counseling for three months, and that she was to begin a job at a rest home "[p]robably tomorrow." Defendant also informed the court that she suffered from seasonal depression.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge addressed defendant in open court as follows:
. . . [T]he Court finds that you are in willful violation of your probationary sentence in that you tested positive for marijuana and cocaine on 12/5/06, that you have not completed your 72 hours of community service within 90 days, that you missed your curfew upon three different occasions, that you are in arrearage on your monetary conditions, paying almost nothing on those, that you are assessed by TASC and entered into the CJPP program from which you are terminated. However, now you are attending Appalachian Counseling. I don't know what Appalachian Counseling is.
Based on these findings, the judge revoked Defendant's probation and activated her suspended sentence. In her written judgment, the hearing judge found that Defendant "waived a violation hearing and admitted that [she] violated each of the conditions of [her] probation as set forth" in the violation report. The judgment includes additional findings that defendant committed each of the violations willfully and without lawful excuse and that each violation was alone sufficient to support revocation.
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation, because it erroneously found that she waived her right to a hearing. She notes that her counsel admitted the violations only "in part" and expressly took "issue" with the allegation regarding her community service obligation. As a result of its erroneous finding of a waiver, defendant avers, the court violated her right to due process by failing to enter findings of fact to reflect its consideration of her testimony.
In order to revoke a Defendant's probation, "[a]ll that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation." State v. White, 129 N.C. App. 52, 58, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998), aff'd in part and disc. review improvidently allowed in part, 350 N.C. 302, 512 S.E.2d 424 (1999). In exercising its discretion, the court must allow defendant an opportunity to "present relevant information" and must "make findings to support [its] decision[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345(e) (2007). Moreover, the trial court's findings must reflect its consideration of any competent evidence of the defendant's inability to comply with the conditions of probation. State v. Hill, 132 N.C. App. 209, 213, 510 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1999). However, while we have required the court "to make findings of fact demonstrating that it considered the evidence offered at a probation revocation hearing," we have also recognized that "`it would not be reasonable to require that [the trial court] make specific findings of fact on each of [the] defendant's allegations tending to justify his breach of conditions.'" State v. Belcher, 173 N.C. App. 620, 624-25, 619 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2005) (quoting State v. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 535, 301 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1983)).
We find no abuse of discretion here. Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant did not waive a hearing on the community service condition of her probation, she offered unqualified admissions to such additional violations as testing positive for marijuana and cocaine use and missing curfew on three occasions. It is well established that a single violation of the conditions of the probation will support revocation. See Belcher, 173 N.C. App. at 625, 619 S.E.2d at 570; State v. Seay, 59 N.C. App. 667, 670-71, 298 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1982) ("It is sufficient grounds to revoke the probation if only one condition is broken."); State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 337, 196 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1973) ("The breach of any single valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended will support an order activating the sentence.").
Moreover, the court expressly found that each of defendant's violations was sufficient, "in and of itself," to support revocation. Therefore, in light of Defendant's admission to at least some of the charged violations, any deficiency in the court's findings on the community service condition of her probation was harmless. Belcher, 173 N.C. App. at 625, 619 S.E.2d at 570 (citing Braswell, 283 N.C. at 337, 196 S.E.2d at 188); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2007). We further find no merit to Defendant's assertion that she was denied the constitutional right to due process. Defendant received notice of the charges and was allowed a full opportunity to present evidence and argument at the hearing. See Williamson, 61 N.C. App. at 533-34, 301 S.E.2d at 425. Moreover, the court's written findings were sufficient to support its decision to revoke defendant's probation, insofar as they accurately reflected her admission to at least one willful violation. Id.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).