Opinion
No. COA10-461
Filed 16 August 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 4 September 2009 by Judge R. Allen Baddour in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November 2010.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Joseph E. Herrin, for the State. Mills Economos, L.L.P., by Larry C. Economos, for the Defendant.
Durham County Nos. 06 CRS 59049; 59110; 59115.
Defendant Eric Lamont Perry appeals from judgments sentencing him to three consecutive terms of a minimum of 20 months and a maximum of 24 months imprisonment in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction based on his convictions for two counts of felonious breaking or entering, one count of felonious larceny, and two counts of felonious possession of stolen property. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the admission of evidence that Defendant describes as inadmissible hearsay or not based upon the witness' personal knowledge. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court's judgments.
I. Factual Background A. Substantive Facts
On 13 December 2006, McDonald Vick placed a 911 call for the purpose of reporting the presence of a black Dodge Magnum parked in the driveway of his neighbor, Jay Smith, who lived at 3 White Ash Drive in Durham, North Carolina. Mr. Vick told the 911 operator that the vehicle was occupied by two black males and that one of the men had exited the car, pried the rear door of Mr. Smith's residence open, briefly entered the residence, and returned to the vehicle, which then departed the scene. Mr. Vick identified Defendant as the man he saw pry open the door and enter Mr. Smith's residence. Mr. Vick also provided the 911 operator with information concerning the general direction in which the Dodge Magnum was traveling at the time that it left 3 White Ash Drive.
In response to Mr. Vick's call, law enforcement officers were alerted that a black Dodge Magnum containing suspects in a breaking or entering had been observed in the vicinity of 3 White Ash Drive. As a result, Officer Tracy Fox of the Durham Police Department stopped a black Dodge Magnum matching the description provided by Mr. Vick. Although the black Dodge Magnum pulled over to the side of the road in response to Officer Fox's signal, its occupants fled the scene on foot after the vehicle came to a halt.
Officers O.D. Gooch and Robert Gaddy of the Durham Police Department came to the scene of the traffic stop for the purpose of aiding in the search for the suspect. Officer Gooch's canine, "Kimbo," was able to locate and track the suspect's scent, resulting in the discovery of Defendant hiding underneath a nearby home.
After his apprehension, Defendant was transported, along with the Dodge Magnum, to a district police station located at the Northgate Mall. At the station, investigating officers searched the Dodge Magnum and recovered various items later discovered to have been stolen from Daniel and Judy Pearson, who lived at 15 Chippers Way; from Christine Goss, who lived at 5301 Dover Ridge Lane; and from Walter Young, who lived at 1610 Cheshire Bridge Road.
Although the relevant documents do not appear in the record on appeal, the transcript appears to reflect that the jury acquitted Defendant of breaking or entering a motor vehicle owned by Robert Goss and Ms. Goss.
B. Procedural Facts
On 13 December 2006, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant with feloniously breaking into or entering Mr. Smith's residence was issued. On 15 December 2006, warrants for arrest charging Defendant with felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny in connection with a theft from Mr. Pearson and felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny in connection with a theft from Mr. Young were issued. On 15 September 2008, the Durham County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with feloniously breaking into or entering Mr. Smith's residence; with felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, felonious possession of stolen property, and financial transaction card theft associated with a theft from Mr. and Mrs. Pearson; and with felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, felonious possession of stolen property, larceny of a firearm, and two counts of financial transaction card theft associated with a theft from Mr. Young. On 1 June 2009, the Durham County grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Defendant with feloniously breaking into or entering Mr. Smith's residence.
The State voluntarily dismissed the larceny of a firearm charge prior to trial.
At the close of the State's evidence, the trial court dismissed the count of financial transaction card theft related to Mr. Young's MasterCard, "having heard no evidence regarding" such.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 1 September 2009 criminal session of the Durham County Superior Court. On 4 September 2009, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of felonious breaking or entering in connection with the break-in at Mr. Smith's residence; guilty of felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, and felonious possession of stolen property in connection with the theft from Mr. and Ms. Pearson; and guilty of felonious possession of stolen property in connection with the theft from Mr. Young. At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded that Defendant had accumulated 24 prior record points and should be sentenced as a Level VI offender. Based upon these determinations, the trial court entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a minimum term of 20 months and maximum term of 24 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for breaking into or entering the residence of Mr. Smith; a minimum term of 20 months and a maximum term of 24 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for breaking into or entering the residence of Mr. and Ms. Pearson; and a minimum term of 20 months and a maximum term of 24 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for feloniously possessing property that had been stolen from Mr. Young, with each of these sentences to be served consecutively in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgments.
The jury acquitted Defendant of financial transaction card theft in connection the theft from Mr. and Ms. Pearson.
The jury acquitted Defendant of breaking or entering, larceny, and the remaining count of financial transaction card theft in connection with the alleged theft from Mr. Young.
The record does not reflect any disposition of Defendant's conviction for felonious larceny in connection with the theft from Mr. and Ms. Pearson.
The trial court arrested judgment in the case in which Defendant was convicted of feloniously possessing property stolen from Mr. and Ms. Pearson.
II. Legal Analysis A. Standard of Review
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of certain evidence elicited at trial by the State. As Defendant candidly concedes, he did not object to the admission of any of the challenged evidence at trial.
"In criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error." N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). Plain error is error "so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise would have reached." State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L. Ed. 2d 912, 108 S. Ct. 1598 (1988).
State v. Walston, 193 N.C. App. 134, 140, 666 S.E.2d 872, 876 (2008). As a result, we will review Defendant's challenges to the admission of the evidence in question utilizing a plain error standard of review. State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997).
B. Substantive Legal Issues 1. Traffic Stop of the Dodge Magnum
In his first challenge to the trial court's judgments, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officers Robert Gaddy and James Carnevale of the Durham Police Department to testify concerning the details of the stop of the black Dodge Magnum effectuated by Officer Fox, including the fact that she observed an individual fleeing from the vehicle, on the grounds that these officers lacked personal knowledge of the information to which they testified. In essence, Defendant's argument amounts to a claim that the challenged testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
At trial, Officer Gaddy testified that:
Q . . . Officer Gaddy, do you remember actually going to a scene and chasing the pursuit of a suspect?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Back on December 13, 2006?
A Yes, ma'am. One of my — one, the call from dispatch was burglary in progress, and the vehicle description was provided and Officer Fox, at the time, located a vehicle matching the description.
Q Do you know the description of that vehicle that was actually, in fact, given?
A I don't. Do not remember. I do not remember. But Officer Fox stopped the vehicle, and as soon as she stopped it, she saw a person run from the area — run from, flee from the passenger side of the vehicle down into the woods over towards Shockery Drive. Which, if you're at 85 and Cole Mill, Shockery will be to your right. She pulled just probably about a hundred, maybe a hundred yards above the on-ramp from Cole Mill to 85.
According to well-established North Carolina law:
[h]earsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. When evidence of such statements by one other than the witness testifying is offered for a proper purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay and is admissible. Specifically, statements of one person to another are admissible to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was made.
State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 282, 389 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Immediately following the portion of his testimony about which Defendant now complains, Officer Gaddy explained that, upon arriving at the scene, he worked with other officers to "set[] up a perimeter" in an effort contain the suspect and facilitate his apprehension. As Officer Gaddy testified when questioned concerning Defendant's apprehension:
Q And were those efforts successful on December 13th, 2006 and, in fact, detaining a suspect?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Okay. And were you present when that suspect was, in fact, identified?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And was that the suspect that was, in fact, underneath [a] house with his back turned?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Officer [Gaddy], do you see that person in the courtroom today?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you point that individual out?
A Mr. Eric Lamont Perry.
Officer Gaddy's testimony concerning the statements to the effect that Officer Fox had stopped a vehicle matching the description of a car reported to have been involved in the break-in at Mr. Smith's residence and that Officer Fox had observed an individual flee from that vehicle served to explain Officer Gaddy's actions at the time that he arrived at the scene of the vehicle stop. As a result, the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, by permitting Officer Gaddy to testify concerning the statements in question since they explained Officer Gaddy's subsequent actions and observations. Id.; State v. Wiggins, 185 N.C. App. 376, 383-84, 648 S.E.2d 865, 871 (holding that the trial court did not err by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify concerning statements made to him by an informant because "the [informant's] statements were not offered for their truth[, but rather,] were offered to explain how the investigation of [the d]efendants unfolded, why [d]efendants were under surveillance at [a particular location], and why [the officer] followed the [defendants'] vehicle"), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 703, 653 S.E.2d 160 (2007); State v. Cardenas, 169 N.C. App. 404, 407, 610 S.E.2d 240, 243 (2005) (stating that "[e]vidence admitted `to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was directed' is [] not hearsay") (quoting State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 87, 558 S.E.2d 463, 473, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 896, 154 L. Ed. 2d 165, 123 S. Ct. 182 (2002)).
Similarly, Officer Carnevale testified that:
Q Now, in fact, pursuant to your investigation, was there, in fact, a traffic stop initiated by Tracy Fox?
A From what I understand, yes.
Q Do you know the time that that traffic stop was initiated?
A Well, I know it was sometime between 2:00 and 2:30 in the afternoon.
Q And do you know the vehicle that was, in fact, stopped at the traffic stop?
A It was a black Dodge [Magnum] station wagon.
Q And do you know that location in which that traffic stop occurred?
A Yes. I do. Interstate 85 headed towards Burlington near the Cole Mill Road intersection.
After providing this information, Officer Carnevale described his actions in the aftermath of the vehicle stop effectuated by Officer Fox. More particularly, Officer Carnevale testified that he interviewed Defendant, inventoried the contents of the black Dodge Magnum, concluded that much of the property seized from the black Dodge Magnum had been reported stolen, returned the recovered property to the owners, and interviewed several of Defendant's alleged victims. As a result, for the reasons set forth in more detail in connection with our discussion of the admissibility of the challenged portion of Officer Gaddy's testimony, we conclude that the challenged portion of Officer Carnevale's testimony was properly admitted for the purpose of explaining Officer Carnevale's actions following the stopping of the black Dodge Magnum. Thus, Defendant's challenge to the admission of the challenged portion of Officer Carnevale's testimony lacks merit as well.
2. Testimony of Officer Werner
Secondly, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officer Jacquelyn Werner of the Durham Police Department to testify concerning a report that persons suspected of involvement in a break-in were headed toward Cole Mill Road in a black Dodge Magnum. According to Defendant, Officer Werner's testimony "clearly amount[ed] to impermissible hearsay in that this testimony [was] an out-of-court statement offered by an unidentified `witness' for the truth of the matter asserted." Once again, we disagree.
Officer Werner testified that she was on "uniform patrol" duty on 13 December 2006, with her primary responsibilities on that date including being available "to patrol the area [and] respond to calls [and] traffic stops." At approximately 2:01 p.m., Officer Werner received a call instructing her to respond to an ongoing break-in at 3 White Ash Drive. Before describing her actions following her arrival at 3 White Ash Drive, Officer Werner testified that:
Q Now, once you, in fact, responded to this location, what happened next Officer Werner?
A As I was responding to the call, we were updated, saying that the witness that had called stated that the suspects were leaving, headed toward Cole Mill Road in a black Dodge Magnum.
Defendant's challenge to the admission of this portion of Officer Werner's testimony suffers from the same flaw that undermined his challenge to the admission of the testimony of Officers Gaddy and Carnevale discussed above. The challenged testimony, which consisted of updated information that Officer Werner received while en route to 3 White Ash Drive, involved an important change in circumstances that led her to deviate from her original plan of action. In light of the receipt of this information, Officer Werner was no longer responding to an ongoing break-in. Instead, Officer Werner arrived at 3 White Ash Drive for the primary purpose of investigating a recent break-in. As a result, the challenged portion of Officer Werner's testimony was admissible for the purpose of explaining her actions following her arrival at Mr. Smith's residence. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 282, 389 S.E.2d at 56 (holding that "`statements of one person to another are admissible to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was made'") (quotation omitted; Wiggins, 185 N.C. App. at 383-84, 648 S.E.2d at 871 (holding that the trial court did not err by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify concerning statements made to him by an informant because "the [informant's] statements were not offered for their truth[, but rather,] were offered to explain how the investigation of [the d]efendants unfolded, why [d]efendants were under surveillance at [a particular location], and why [the officer] followed the [defendants'] vehicle"). Thus, Defendant's challenge to the admission of Officer Werner's testimony lacks merit as well.
3. Testimony of Officer Bradford
Thirdly, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officer John Bradford of the Durham Police Department to testify concerning statements made by an unidentified crime scene technician. Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court's judgments based upon this argument.
On 13 December 2006, Officer Bradford was employed as a crime scene technician by the Durham Police Department. As a member of the "Forensic Unit," Officer Bradford's primary responsibilities included "respond[ing] to crime scenes and provid[ing] documentation [and] sketches if necessary[,] [s]earch[ing] for latent prints[,]" and taking photographs and making video recordings of crime scenes. Officer Bradford was dispatched to 3 White Ash Drive on 13 December 2006 for the purpose of collecting evidence related to a break-in that had allegedly occurred at that location. At trial, Officer Bradford provided a detailed account of his actions upon arriving at 3 White Ash Drive, including the fact that he lifted a latent fingerprint from a phone discovered on the garage floor. In the course of his testimony, Officer Bradford stated that:
Q After you, in fact, retrieved the latent print, Mr. Bradford, what do you, in fact, do with that latent print that you've actually collected from a crime scene?
A Well, latent prints, in that they have sufficient quality or sufficient ridge detail, they're used in comparison against either a known suspect or entered into an AFIS system, which is a database for fingerprints, and try to come up with a match.
Q And do you — do you have any knowledge as to the results of that partial print that was, in fact, retrieved, in fact, that you retrieved from the phone that was actually lying on the floor in the garage?
A Yes. Another crime scene technician advised it was not a sufficient ridge detail for comparison.
According to Defendant, this portion of Officer Bradford's testimony constituted impermissible hearsay that significantly prejudiced him by "turn[ing] a clear exculpatory fact into a fact of little relevance."
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the challenged portion of Officer Bradford's testimony did, in fact, constitute inadmissible hearsay, any error that the trial court might have committed in allowing the admission of this evidence did not prejudice Defendant given the fact that the evidence in question did not tend to incriminate Defendant and given the existence of substantial additional evidence placing Defendant at 3 White Ash Drive on 13 December 2006. For example, Mr. Vick, a retired law enforcement officer who resided next door to Mr. Smith, testified that:
I was upstairs in the upstairs master bedroom and I was changing clothes, getting ready to take a shower, and I had just turned the shower on and I heard some voice outside — well, I heard some doors slam. And so I went to the bedroom window on the west side of my house and I looked out to see who was there, because during the day, most of the time, no one is at [3 White Ash Drive] and I saw a black Dodge Magnum sitting in the driveway with a black male at the steering wheel.
At that time, Mr. Vick observed a second black male exit the black Dodge Magnum and pry open a door leading into 3 White Ash Drive. Mr. Vick identified the individual who entered Mr. Smith's residence as Defendant. In addition, Defendant was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of the Dodge Magnum after that vehicle was stopped by Officer Fox. As a result of the existence of substantial additional evidence tending to show that Defendant broke into Mr. Smith's residence and the fact that the challenged portion of Officer Bradford's testimony did not in any way tend to incriminate Defendant, we conclude that any error that the trial court might have committed by admitting the challenged portion of this testimony did not prejudice Defendant's chance for a more favorable outcome at trial.
4. Testimony of Officer Carnevale
The majority of Defendant's remaining arguments focus on the testimony of Officer Carnevale, a criminal investigator with the Durham Police Department. In his brief, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officer Carnevale to testify that certain property was seized by investigating officers from the black Dodge Magnum on 13 December 2006. We disagree.
At trial, Officer Carnevale testified that he is required to conduct an inventory of all property seized during the course of any investigation to which he is assigned. In conducting the required inventory, Officer Carnevale "document[s the] property seized or taken and itemize[s the property] either by name, brand name, make, model and serial numbers." After documenting all relevant information concerning the seized property, Officer Carnevale transfers the property to the property room for "safekeeping or as evidence."
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on 13 December 2006, Officer Carnevale was working in his office at the Northgate Mall station when he was assigned to investigate several break-ins that had recently occurred at 1620 Cheshire Bridge Road, 5301 Delta Ridge Lane, 15 Chippers Way, and 3 White Ash Drive. By that time, Defendant, along with a second suspect believed to have acted as Defendant's accomplice, had been apprehended and taken to the Northgate Mall station as well. As a result, Officer Carnevale initially attempted to identify and interview Defendant for the purpose of obtaining relevant background information.
While Officer Carnevale engaged in these activities, a group of "uniformed officers" went through the black Dodge Magnum which was, at that time, parked directly outside the Northgate Mall station. As part of that process, the "uniformed officers" took photographs depicting several items as they were positioned inside the vehicle. After taking these photographs, the "uniformed officers" transferred the contents of the vehicle to a conference room located in the Northgate Mall station. According to Officer Carnevale, a uniformed officer stood guard over the items that had been removed from the black Dodge Magnum. Subsequently, Officer Carnevale inventoried the items transferred to the conference room by the "uniformed officers" from that vehicle. A number of items allegedly taken during the course of the various thefts with which Defendant was charged were authenticated during Officer Carnevale's testimony and admitted into evidence.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officer Carnevale to testify that certain items of property were seized from the black Dodge Magnum on 13 December 2006 and allowing the admission of those items (or photographs of those items). According to Defendant, since "[Officer Carnevale] had no personal knowledge whatsoever of the processing, removal, viewing, inspection, or photographing of any items located in [the] Dodge Magnum[,]" the challenged portion of Officer Carnevale's testimony should have been excluded based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (stating that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter"). For that reason, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting Officer Carnevale to testify that "[Mr.] Young's briefcase, laptop, digital camera, checkbook, credit card, and [] gun[;]" "[Ms.] Goss' pur[se], wallet, driver's license, personal checks and credit cards[;]" (DB20) "[Ms.] Pearson's IMAC computer, jewelry, and digital camera[;]"and "a black metal pry bar[]" were found in the black Dodge Magnum.
A careful review of the record reveals the presence of a number of discrepancies between certain of the assertions contained in Defendant's brief concerning the items seized from the black Dodge Magnum and the record evidence. For example, although Defendant claims that Officer Carnevale merely testified that Mr. Young's laptop and briefcase were found inside the Dodge Magnum, he actually stated that none of the other items that Mr. Young reported to have been stolen — "the [] firearm or any other checks or credit cards" — were recovered during the course of his investigation. Additionally, we are entirely unable to identify any reference in Officer Carnevale's testimony to the seizure of a "digital camera" linked to Mr. Young. Although Defendant correctly asserts that Ms. Pearson reported that an "Olympus digital camera" had been stolen from her residence, Officer Carnevale actually testified that "the computer, [a portion of Ms. Pearson's] jewelry and a Home Depot credit card with the name of [Ms. Pearson's husband] inscribed on the front of the card" were found in the Dodge Magnum. Finally, Officer Carnevale did not, contrary to the assertions contained in Defendant's brief, testify that Ms. Goss' credit cards were recovered from the Dodge Magnum.
At bottom, Defendant's argument amounts to a challenge to the sufficiency of the chain of custody associated with the items described in the challenged portions of Officer Carnevale's testimony. In State v. Stinnett, 129 N.C. App. 192, 198, 497 S.E.2d 696, 700-01, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 508, 510 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1008, 142 L. Ed. 2d 436, 119 S. Ct. 526 (1998), this Court found no error in the admission of an officer's testimony concerning the identity of various items confiscated from a defendant's person at the time of arrest despite the fact that the officer in question had not personally searched the defendant. The officer whose testimony was at issue in Stinnett only came into contact with the defendant in the course of transporting him to the Sheriff's Department after the initial search of the defendant's person had been completed. Id. As a result, the officer's testimony rested entirely upon statements made to him by the arresting officer. Id. On appeal, we held that the officer's testimony, along with the items taken from the defendant's person, was properly admitted as "any arguably weak links in the chain of custody go [only] to the weight of the evidence and not to the issue of whether the evidence should be admitted." Id. Similarly, given the absence of any objection to the challenged portion of Officer Carnevale's testimony at trial, the fact that Officer Carnevale promptly inventoried these items after their removal from the black Dodge Magnum, and the fact that weaknesses in the chain of custody associated with particular items of physical evidence affect the credibility of that evidence rather than its admissibility, we conclude that the trial court did not err by allowing the admission of Officer Carnivale's testimony concerning the items discovered in and seized from the black Dodge Magnum. See State v. Campbell, 311 N.C. 386, 388-89, 317 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1984) (explaining that the trial court enjoys discretion in determining the "standard of certainty that is required to show that an object offered is the same as the object involved in the incident and is in an unchanged condition[;]" that "[a] detailed chain of custody need be established only when the evidence offered is not readily identifiable or is susceptible to alteration and there is reason to believe that it may have been altered[;]" [and that] any weak links in a chain of custody relate only to the weight to be given evidence and not to its admissibility"); State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 88, 235 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1977) (stating that identification of evidence for the purpose of admission need not be unequivocal). As a result, we conclude that Defendant's final challenge to the trial court's judgments lacks merit.
In two related arguments, Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by admitting State's Exhibits Nos. 21 and 23, which consisted of a photograph of a laptop computer found in and a pry bar seized from the black Dodge Magnum. According to Defendant, the State failed to properly authenticate either exhibit. In light of our determination that the trial court did not err by allowing Officer Carnevale to testify concerning the discovery of various items in the Dodge Magnum on 13 December 2006, including a black metal pry bar and a laptop computer, we conclude that any error that may have occurred in connection with the admission of these exhibits into evidence was harmless.
We are not persuaded by Defendant's argument that he is entitled to appellate relief based on the cumulative impact of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court. We reach this conclusion because the majority of the evidence that Defendant has challenged on appeal was actually admissible and because we do not believe that any evidence that the trial court might have admitted in error, considered either separately or together, prejudiced Defendant's chances for a more favorable outcome at trial.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error in connection with the admission of evidence during the course of Defendant's trial. As a result, we further conclude that Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court's judgments on appeal.
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge MCGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).