Opinion
I.D. No. 88000107DI
Submitted: March 7, 2001
Decided: June 29, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief — Denied
Ronald D. Payne, a.k.a. Tayari Makau Uhuru, Pro Se
Opinion
Having received Defendant Ronald Payne's motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant to Super Ct. Crim. R. 61 (Rule 61), it appears and the Court concludes as follows:
1. Defendant has filed a second Rule 61 motion seeking relief from his convictions and sentence for Assault in a Detention Facility and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. As grounds for relief, Defendant argues that this Court erred in declaring him a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).
2. When ruling on a motion for postconviction relief, this Court must address the procedural bars before considering the merits of the motion. Consideration of the issue raised in the instant motion is procedurally barred for the following reasons. First, Defendants s convictions and sentence became final more than three years ago. Second, the motion is repetitive. Third, the issue which Defendant now raises was resolved against him in the first postconviction relief motion.
Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552 (1990).
See Rule 61(i)(1).
See Rule 61(i)(2).
See Rule 61(i)(4). See also State v. Payne, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 88000107, Babiarz, J. (Dec. 1, 1993) (Opinion and Order).
3. Defendant attempts to evade the procedural bars by asserting "a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment is final." Specifically, Defendant argues that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, this Court abused its discretion in relying on evidence of his prior convictions to declare him a habitual offender. However, Apprendi holds that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Rule 61(i)(1).
120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
Id. at 2362-63 (emphasis added).
4. In other words, Apprendi is inapplicable to the case at bar, where the State presented evidence that Defendant had been convicted of four prior felonies, each stemming from a different incident and each conviction having occurred after the sentencing decision for the previous conviction had been completed. The Court concludes that Defendant's argument has no merit and that he has not succeeded in triggering the exception to the procedural bars.
See Hall v. State, Del. Supr., 473 A.2d 352, 357 (1984); Buckingham v. State, Del. Supr., 482 A.2d 327, 330 (1984).
For all these reasons, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is hereby DENIED.
It Is So ORDERED.