Opinion
No. 60918-1-I.
January 20, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 06-1-03087-1, Anita L. Farris, J., entered November 13, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Myung K. Park contends that the trial court unlawfully conditioned his misdemeanant probation on the requirement that he successfully complete any inpatient or outpatient treatment and therapy programs as directed by the community corrections officer. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Myung Park with one count of attempted fourth degree assault for intentionally assaulting J.S.P., a child. Park is the father of J.S.P. In September 2007, following a bench trial, a Snohomish County Superior Court found Park guilty. Specifically, the court found that Park had inflicted multiple bruises on J.S.P., including one bruise that was very large.
At sentencing, the State asked that Park serve 60 days in jail, pay a $250 crime victim fee and court costs, serve a suspended sentence for two years, serve two years of probation, and that he undergo parenting and anger management classes. Park's counsel made no alternative recommendation, except to tell the court that her client was eligible for work release.
The court sentenced Park to a maximum of 90 days in Snohomish County jail, with 30 days suspended if he met certain conditions. He was also sentenced to 24 months of probation. Park was ordered to not commit any violations of law. The court also indicated that Park was required to "enter and successfully complete any () inpatient () outpatient treatment and therapy programs as directed by the defendant's community corrections officer." But, the court did not check the box indicating whether Park was required to complete inpatient and/or outpatient treatment. Additionally, the court ordered Park to complete a state certified batterer's treatment program. Park was required to pay $25 per month for 24 months. At the sentencing hearing, Park did not object to any of the conditions of his sentence.
Park appeals, challenging only the conditions of his sentence.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold issue, the State argues that Park may not challenge the conditions of his sentence for the first time on appeal. Park did not object below to the conditions of the sentence. But, "`[i]n the context of sentencing, established case law holds that illegal or erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal.'" State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, ¶ 5, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 477, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). When a court lacks statutory authority to impose a sentence, an offender may challenge the sentence for the first time on appeal. State v. Anderson, 58 Wn. App. 107, 110, 791 P.2d 547 (1990). In accord with this long standing rule, we hold that Park's challenge to his sentence may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Park argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Park to enter and successfully complete any inpatient/outpatient treatment or therapy program, as directed by his community corrections officer.
We review sentencing conditions and prohibitions for abuse of discretion. State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). A trial court abuses its discretion if its "exercise of discretion was `manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" T.S. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 157 Wn.2d 416, 423, 138 P.3d 1053 (2006) (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A decision rests on untenable grounds if it was based on facts unsupported in the record or if the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. T.S., 157 Wn.2d at 423-24. A decision is unreasonable if the court, despite applying the correct law to supported facts, adopts a position that no reasonable person would take. Id. at 424.
Conditions of misdemeanant probation are not subject to the Sentencing Reform Act's (SRA) requirement that the terms of community supervision be crime related. State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687 (1999). Here, Park was convicted of violating RCW 9A.36.041, a misdemeanor. The SRA does not apply.
RCW 9.92.060(1) grants the trial court discretion to suspend sentences conditionally. Courts have interpreted this statute as authorizing the imposition of conditions that: (1) bear a relationship to the duty to make reparations to the victim, or (2) would tend to prevent the future commission of crimes. State v. Summers, 60 Wn.2d 702, 707, 375 P.2d 143 (1962) (unreasonable to require offender pay child support, which is not connected to the crime); State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687 (1999) (requiring that the offender abstain from alcohol and unlawful drugs was not unreasonable when the offender was not of legal age to consume alcohol because, "in his particular case [it was] merely an extension of the more general probationary requirement to conduct himself in a lawful manner."); County of Spokane v. Farmer, 5 Wn. App. 25, 29, 486 P.2d 296 (1971) (where the defendant was convicted of violating a zoning ordinance, it was unreasonable to require him to abandon lawful nonconforming use).
The sentencing court's order that Park undergo inpatient or outpatient treatment as directed by the community corrections officer would tend to prevent the future commission of crimes. Park was found guilty of attempted fourth degree assault for bruising his young son. The prosecutor recommended that Park attend parenting and anger management classes. Although the trial court only explicitly ordered Park to successfully complete a state certified batterer's program, it expressed concern that a Korean language program may not be available. Park does not assert that the community corrections officer has ordered him to undergo treatment. Requiring potential additional treatment under these circumstances did not exceed the court's authority and was not unreasonable.
We affirm.