Opinion
HHBCR160281393T
11-15-2018
STATE of Connecticut v. Daimor L. PALMER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hon. Vernon D. Oliver
The defendant moves to exclude the admission into evidence of his statements made to law enforcement, based on claimed constitutional violations pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
The defendant claims that on October 18, 2015, he was in the custody of the New Britain Police Department and was subject to custodial interrogation when certain potentially inculpatory statements were made. The defendant claims that, based on the circumstances of the alleged custodial interrogation, the statements were not made voluntarily.
Additionally, the defendant claims that any statements made to law enforcement at that time were not voluntary as they "were not the product of a rational intellect and free will." This claim relates to his wounds at the time of the interviews, the amount of pain he was suffering during the interviews, the medications he was administered during his course of treatment and the effect of those medications on his mental status at the time of the interviews with law enforcement.
On October 18 and 19, 2018, the court took testimony and exhibits during a hearing on the Motion.
Suppression Under the Fifth Amendment
"The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361 (2008).
"[T]he Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 525, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 271 (2008). "The purpose of Miranda warnings is to assure that a confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, 82 Conn.App. 802, 811, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 915, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1025 (2004). Miranda is concerned with counteracting an inherently coercive, police-dominated atmosphere. State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 581 (1994).
Admissibility of Statements
As the defendants’ statements were alleged to have been made before Miranda warnings were given, the defendant must prove that he or she was subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 393 (2006). "Custodial interrogation occurs when questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 76 (1993).
Custody
As the claim of custody related to a location other than a police station, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 (2014), wrote: "[T]he ‘ultimate inquiry’ is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that there was a ‘restraint on [his or] her freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 194. See also State v. Hasfal, 106 Conn.App. 199, 207 (2008) (questioning in defendant’s motel room). In those situations, the principal inquiry is whether the defendant’s interrogation was custodial. State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 394-95 (2006) (defendant consented to police entering his residence and cooperated with their investigation); State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 719-20 (1997) (interview of suspect in kitchen of father’s house); State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 581 (1994) (police questioning of suspect in a hospital emergency room, in the presence of others, was not custodial, even though medical personnel were restraining him for the purposes of treatment); State v. Williams, 227 Conn. 101, 114 (1993) (police questioning of individuals in a public place); State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47, 54 n.5 (1986) (Miranda warnings not required before questioning during a Terry-type stop).
The defendant has the burden of proving that he or she was in custody when the statement was made. State v. Brown, 118 Conn.App. 418, 433 (2009).
Interrogation
"[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980). "The test as to whether a particular question is likely to elicit an incriminating response is objective; the subjective intent of the police officer is relevant but not conclusive and the relationship of the questions asked to the crime committed is highly relevant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 226 (1987).
Whether a defendant in custody is subject to interrogation necessarily involves determining: the factual circumstances of the police conduct in question, and whether such conduct is normally attendant to arrest and custody or whether the police should know that such conduct is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 362 (2008); see State v. Gonzalez, 302 Conn. 287, 298-99 (2011) (officer’s statement to defendant that it was the defendant’s opportunity to tell his side of the story is the functional equivalent of interrogation).
"[I]nterrogation, as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walters, 94 Conn.App. 297, 304, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 908 (2006) (bringing victim to identify defendant in the back of the police cruiser was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement); State v. Early, 152 Conn.App. 466, 484-85, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 939 (2014) (officer’s statement, en route to the station after arresting the defendant, that "I told you we were going to continue to work on this" was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement).
Voluntariness
"Irrespective of Miranda, any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law. In order to be voluntary a confession must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by the maker. The test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 289-90 (2006).
Under the federal constitution, evidence of coercive police conduct is a necessary predicate to a finding of involuntariness. "Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment ... in order for a confession to be deemed involuntary and thus inadmissible at trial, there must be police conduct, or official coercion, causally related to the confession ... Because of this essential link between coercive activity of the state, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other ... mere examination of the defendant’s state of mind although relevant to an assessment of the defendant’s susceptibility to police coercion can never conclude the due process inquiry." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 54 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 (2004); State v. Bjorklund, 79 Conn.App. 535, 557 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920 (2004). "Voluntary statements made to police during post-Miranda interrogations are admissible as long as the record contains no evidence of threats, promises or coercive or deceptive measures by the police." State v. Fluker, 123 Conn.App. 355, 365, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 931 (2010).
When there is no evidence of threats, promises or coercive or deceptive measures by the police, it is reasonable to conclude that the statements were made voluntarily. State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 107, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901 (2008). There must be evidence of improper police tactics. State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn.App. 591, 598, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 (2007) (merely threatening to arrest defendant’s wife was not sufficiently coercive to overcome the defendant’s free will); State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 423 (1999) (false representations by the police about the status of the investigation "are common investigative techniques and would rarely, if ever, be sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will and to bring about a confession to a serious crime that is not freely self-determined"); State v. Bjorklund, supra, 79 Conn.App. 552-53 (tactics used by the police in questioning did not render the defendant’s waiver of his rights involuntary).
Voluntariness: Factors to Consider
The determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be based on a consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding it ... including both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation ... Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; the lack of any advice as to constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food and sleep. State v. Pinder, supra, 250 Conn. 419; State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 328 (1997). The use of drugs by the suspect is only one factor to be considered; by itself, it does not render a confession involuntary. State v. Ortiz, 101 Conn.App. 411, 426 (2007).
Voluntariness: Burden of Proof
The state must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant voluntarily made the statement. State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 158-77 (2007); State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 410-26 (1996).
Dr. David Buono
Dr. Buono was the head of emergency medicine at the Hospital of Central Connecticut in New Britain when the defendant was admitted on October 18, 2015. At the time, the witness was the chief of the emergency department and had been practicing emergency medicine for 25 years at the time of the defendant’s admission. The parties agreed that Dr. Buono was qualified to testify as an expert in emergency medicine.
Dr. Buono testified that the defendant was treated at the hospital for serious injuries: gunshot wounds and a one-inch laceration to his head. (Ex B.) Exhibit B details the defendant suffering three penetrating wounds to the left side of his body. The defendant entered the emergency department with a collapsed lung, requiring the insertion of a chest tube. Exhibit B describes the defendant as "awake and mentating throughout" the course of treatment in New Britain. Exhibit B described the defendant’s behavioral status as "alert, oriented, calm & cooperative" with "[n]o communication barriers." According to Exhibit B, the defendant reported to hospital staff that he was "walking the street, got hit in the head and was shot multiple times." Elsewhere in Exhibit B, the "place of incident" was also described as "street." Dr. Buono testified that, although initially the defendant was admitted in stable condition, he was bleeding from his wounds, resulting in a loss of blood pressure, requiring a transfusion of blood and other medical intervention. Due to the subsequent instability of his medical condition, the defendant was not provided with any pain medications.
Although the witness answered general questions about the effect of certain medical conditions on an individual’s ability to focus, recall and answer questions, the testimony and medical records specific to this defendant are most relevant to this court’s inquiry.
The evidence adduced at the instant hearing supports a finding that the defendant, after having suffered his wounds, drove the 2-3 miles from the scene to the hospital in New Britain. Dr. Buono testified from the medical records that the defendant walked into the emergency department under his own power, where he was treated by the emergency department staff. The defendant was stabilized with an I.V., blood products and a chest tube.
Dr. Buono testified credibly on both direct and cross examination that, despite his initial precarious medical status, after emergency department staff intervention, the defendant’s mental status was "alert and oriented with normal neurological functioning." Each of the four times his mental status was tested at the Hospital of Central Connecticut using the Glasgow Coma Scale, described by the witness as a measure of neurological alertness and a means to assess the mental status of the patient, the defendant was scored a 15, the highest possible score. Dr. Buono opined that, mentally, the defendant was "neurologically intact" after being stabilized at the hospital in New Britain.
Separate from the Glasgow Scale, independent observations of the nursing staff found "no communication barriers" with the defendant, describing him as "alert and oriented."
Detective Paul O’Connor
Detective O’Connor of the New Britain Police Department testified that he was called in to assist patrol officers after the shooting on October 18, 2015. He indicated that he was informed of three victims suffering from gunshot wounds. He testified that he was directed to the Hospital of Central Connecticut to re-interview the defendant after his initial written statement was taken by Officer Diaz at Hartford Hospital. (Ex. 1.) The Detective testified that while he considered certain omissions in the initial written statement to be "suspect," he approached the defendant for a second interview describing these omissions "slight discrepancies" when addressing the defendant.
The Detective’s first contact with the defendant occurred hours earlier at Hartford Hospital, after the defendant’s treatment by hospital trauma staff, when the witness administered a "Gun Shot Residue Kit" to the defendant at approximately 9:40 a.m. Shortly thereafter, approximately 10 a.m., the Detective also displayed a photo array for the defendant’s review in an attempt to identify the individual who shot him. At that time, according to the witness, the defendant was not yet a suspect subject to arrest. The Detective testified that the defendant was a "victim" and his initial version of the shooting "sounded like self-defense." The witness testified credibly that, during their morning interactions, the defendant was "articulate," "speaking freely" and appeared able to communicate. The witness testified he had no difficulty communicating with the defendant and that he appeared "alert" and "cognizant."
The witness further testified that the defendant made no complaints of pain to him during the interview process and that he agreed to talk about the shooting and at no point indicated an unwillingness to continue to discuss the incident. Although the witness was accompanied by at least one other plainclothes officer at Hartford Hospital, the witness testified credibly that he was the primary, if not sole, interviewer of the defendant in the hospital. The witness testified that, although armed, neither his firearm nor his badge were visible beneath his civilian clothing. The interview was neither audio nor video recorded.
Detective Connor testified that the defendant was not Mirandized nor was he placed under arrest. The witness’ description of the interview and statement taking process indicates that the defendant was able to take part in a collaborative process necessary for a complete statement, including the defendant making any changes he deemed necessary. During the back-and-forth statement taking process, the witness testified that the defendant’s mental status appeared to be "very sharp," and "very descriptive," with a "good memory." Further, the witness testified that the defendant was able to create a sketch of the shooting scene that the witness, after a subsequent opportunity to compare the sketch to the actual scene, the witness testified that the defendant’s hospital sketch was a "pretty good diagram," was accurate, and was "pretty reflective of the scene." The Detective arrived at approximately 2:30 p.m. with his Lieutenant for the interview.
The Detective testified credibly that there was no officer or hospital security stationed outside of the defendant’s hospital room at the Intensive Care Unit. He testified that he was not prevented by hospital staff from speaking with the defendant, nor was he informed that the defendant was not medically fit for an interview.
Officer Eduardo Diaz
Officer Diaz testified to the circumstances under which he obtained verbal and a written statement from the defendant. The defendant’s initial version of the shooting was obtained verbally by Officer Diaz at the Hospital of Central Connecticut after he was tasked by his superiors with obtaining a statement from the defendant. Officer Diaz testified that, after the medical personnel in New Britain were finished actively treating the defendant, he received permission from the staff to approach the defendant to inquire as to his willingness to provide a written statement. The witness testified that the defendant was not initially viewed as a suspect, but as the victim of a shooting. At no point during these interactions was the defendant placed under arrest by Officer Diaz.
Officer Diaz testified that he was only able to obtain a verbal statement from the defendant while in New Britain before the defendant was transferred via ambulance to Hartford Hospital. The witness testified that he waited outside of the defendant’s hospital room while the defendant was being treated. The witness followed the ambulance to Hartford where the defendant indicated his willingness to provide a voluntary statement. Officer Diaz described a statement-taking process similar to that testified to by Detective O’Connor.
Officer Diaz testified that the defendant was able to speak clearly to him and answer questions. The witness testified that the defendant was eager to speak with him, allowing him to take several photographs of his injuries. The officer testified that he was in full uniform when speaking with the defendant. He further testified that three other officers later came to Hartford Hospital.
Dr. Kevin O’Toole
Dr. O’Toole is an Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine and Medical Toxicology ay Hartford Hospital. He was one of the defendant’s treating physicians on October 18, 2015 after the shooting and was qualified as an expert in emergency medicine by agreement of the parties. The witness testified to no independent recollection of treating the defendant and served to explain and expand on the defendant’s medical records subpoenaed for the instant hearing.
The records that the defendant, admitted as a trauma patient, suffered two penetrating wounds to his chest: two gunshot wounds; and an abrasion to his forehead. The gunshot wound to the defendant’s neck was described by the surgical critical care staff as "superficial." (Ex. G.) On arrival, the defendant’s vital signs were stable and he was alert and oriented, receiving a score of 15 on the Glasgow Coma Scale. The witness testified that the Glasgow scale also assesses a patient’s ability to have a clear, accurate verbal conversation without confusion.
The Hartford Hospital nursing admission note details a different version of the shooting than related to staff at the Hospital of Central Connecticut: "[Patient] entered a club [and] was pistol whipped [and] shot by an unknown person. [Patient] returned fire [and] then ran to the car [and] drove self to [The Hospital of Central Connecticut]." (Ex. H.) According to the records, although in some pain, the defendant’s mental status was normal. Exhibit C indicates that the defendant reported no loss of consciousness (LOC) over the course of the morning’s events. The same exhibit details the medical staff’s neurological assessment of the defendant: "NEURO: (+) headache, (-) change in LOC, (-) loss of function, (-) mental status alteration, (-) memory impairment ..." (Ex. B.) This record further reflects that, neurologically, the defendant was "alert, [with] grossly intact sensation and motor (function]" (Ex. B.) The "primary survey" done at Hartford Hospital details a similar assessment of the defendant’s mental status. (Ex. F.)
Exhibit E, the discharge summary from Hartford Hospital dated October 23, 2015, reflects that the defendant, on his October 18, 2015 arrival, was "alert and oriented x3 with memory intact ... he is not amnestic to the event of the night."
The defendant was administered several injections of potent synthetic opioid pain medications throughout the course of his treatment on October 18, 2015. Although the witness testified that such medications, including the hydromorphone and fentanyl given to the defendant, can impact a patient’s ability to focus, concentrate, recall and communicate, there is no indication in the Hartford Hospital records of such an effect on the defendant. Further, the records don’t reflect a diminution in the defendant’s faculties at any point in the course of his treatment subsequent to his initial stabilization at the Hospital of Central Connecticut.
Dr. O’Toole testified to his hospital’s informal practice to separate law enforcement personnel during a patient’s primary physical examination. The witness further testified that the medical professionals at the hospital ask the patient whether or not they would agree to speak to law enforcement before any interaction is allowed. Additionally, Dr. O’Toole testified that, if a patient displays normal mental status and a normal "sensorium" (defined as the parts of the brain that receive, process and interpret sensory stimuli ... the faculties, or entire sensory apparatus), then the patient would be "allowed" to speak with law enforcement. Finally, as to the defendant, the witness interpreted the records and they do reflect that, based on a "normal" Glasgow score, his alert and oriented mental status his agreement to speak with law enforcement, Hartford Hospital Staff allowed the interactions. Dr. O’Toole testified that the records reflect "no observable calculated deficit" in the defendant’s central nervous system at Hartford Hospital.
The Defendant
There was no credible evidence adduced during the testimony of the defendant upon which this court could conclude either that he was in custody or that the information he provided to law enforcement, included his written statements, were obtained involuntarily.
Conclusion
In the instant matter, the defendant has failed to establish from all of the surrounding circumstances, that he was in custody at the time his statements were made to law enforcement. The court finds that the facts demonstrate a reasonable person in the defendant’s position in New Britain and Hartford would not believe that there was a restraint on his freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
The instant matter is readily distinguishable from State v. Mangual and its progeny, in that there was nothing in the nature, extent or duration of the questioning or the location of the interviews that was coercive. Additionally, the number and proximity of the officers and their lack of displaying weapons did not overbear the defendant’s will. Further, there was no credible evidence that the defendant was isolated from friends, family or the public. Id.
Additionally, the court finds that the state has met its burden to show that the defendant’s statements were made voluntarily, in terms of both making the statement freely and not as a product of an overborne will and in terms of making the statements with a sufficiently clear mind, despite having been administered medications during the course of his medical treatment. There is no credible evidence of threats, promises or coercive or deceptive measures by the police during the interview process with the defendant.
Further, there is no credible evidence of any diminished mental capacity of the defendant during the course of the initial investigation and interviews by Officer Diaz and Detective O’Connor. The court also considers the thoroughness and accuracy of the substance of the statements and sketch in its evaluation.
The instant matter is readily distinguishable from the facts of Mincey v. Arizona, in terms of the extent of the injuries suffered by this defendant, the overbearing nature of the police conduct, the clear and unequivocal request of Mr. Mincey not to discuss the matter at all with law enforcement, the invocation by Mr. Mincey of his right to counsel, the intercession on law enforcement’s behalf by the medical staff and the nature in which this statement was taken. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion is DENIED.