Opinion
No. 6-080 / 05-0685
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, Gary L. McMinimee, Judge.
Calvin Eugene Owen appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense. AFFIRMED.
Aaron D. Hamrock of McCarthy Hamrock, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney General, and Nicola J. Martino, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Calvin Eugene Owen appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (Supp. 2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On March 12, 2004, Owen was involved in a car accident near Jefferson, Iowa. The State charged Owen with OWI, third offense, in violation of section 321J.2. Owen filed a motion to suppress the results of a blood test taken while he was in the hospital following the accident. He argued the blood test result should be suppressed because the blood specimen was "improperly drawn" and the chain of custody and the condition of the blood sample could not be established. At the suppression hearing, Owen also contended the State failed to comply with the written certification requirement of Iowa Code section 321J.7 (2003).
At the suppression hearing, a deputy sheriff testified he began to invoke implied consent, see Iowa Code § 321J.6, at the hospital after he noticed Owen's breath smelled like alcohol. While the deputy was reading the implied consent advisory, Owen lapsed into unconsciousness. The deputy asked the attending physician to certify Owen was unconscious and incapable of consenting or refusing medical testing. See Iowa Code § 321J.7. The deputy and a lab technician testified that the doctor so certified orally and in writing. A copy of the written certification was not produced at the hearing.
The lab technician testified she withdrew a sample of Owen's blood from a standard kit provided by the deputy. The kit contained everything she needed to withdraw the blood and had not been tampered with prior to its use. According to the deputy, he typed up a laboratory receipt, sealed the test kit, and gave it to the chief deputy who mailed it via certified mail to the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation lab for analysis.
The district court overruled Owen's motion to suppress, concluding that any issues related to tampering with the blood sample would affect the weight of the evidence at trial, not its admissibility. The court further concluded that even though the actual written certification had not been introduced at the suppression hearing, "from all the circumstances, it's reasonable to believe that the form the doctor signed" complied with the requirements of section 321J.7.
Following the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, Owen agreed to a stipulated bench trial on the minutes of testimony. At the bench trial, the district court granted the State's motion to amend the information to OWI, second offense. The district court found Owen guilty.
Owen appeals, arguing the district court's denial of the motion to suppress should be reversed because (1) the State failed to lay proper foundation in admitting the blood test results into evidence and (2) the doctor did not provide certification to withdraw blood from Owen. The State contends Owen failed to preserve error.
II. Preservation of Error
At the bench trial, Owen stipulated that the witnesses would testify as per their respective minutes of testimony and specifically stipulated that blood alcohol test results would be admissible. Owen's stipulation to the admission of this testimony and evidence at trial constitutes a waiver of any objections raised in his motion to suppress. State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 2003). Owen failed to preserve error on the issues he raises in his appeal.
Although we can affirm Owen's conviction solely on error-preservation grounds, we will address the issues he raises on appeal because we conclude they are without merit.
III. Standard of Review
When the admission of evidence depends on the interpretation of a statute, we review for correction of errors of law. State v. Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1996). Thus, we review the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied chapter 321J. State v. Demaray, 704 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 2005).
IV. Merits
The underlying purpose of the implied consent law is to prevent highway deaths due to intoxicated drivers. State v. Green, 470 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1991). The implied consent law, a remedial statute, "should be liberally construed consistent with its statutory purpose." Id.
In determining whether to suppress the result of Owen's blood test, the district court was required to apply "the unique foundation requirements" for admission of the blood test imposed by chapter 321J, not "extra-321[J] requirements." State v. Mary, 368 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Iowa 1985). The district court also was required to make a determination, based on the preponderance of the evidence, of the facts upon which the admissibility of the evidence was to depend. State v. Laughridge, 437 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1989). We will uphold the district court's findings of fact on preliminary evidentiary issues if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Weidner, 418 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1988). The State has the burden of showing compliance with the foundational requirements of chapter 321J. State v. Zell, 491 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992).
The foundational requirement the State had to prove in relation to the blood test is found at Iowa Code section 321J.11, which requires "[o]nly new equipment kept under strictly sanitary and sterile conditions shall be used for drawing blood." Owen attempts to impose additional factors on the State to prove compliance with the statutory requirements, such as proof the blood was kept under refrigeration and details of the methods and procedures used in transporting the blood. The district court was not required to apply these "extra-321J" requirements in determining whether to suppress the blood test results. Based on testimony from the lab technician and deputy that the standard kit used contained everything necessary to withdraw Owen's blood and had not been tampered with prior to its use, we conclude substantial evidence supports a finding that the State met its burden of proving compliance with section 321J.11.
Iowa Code section 321J.7 requires a physician to certify that a person suspected of drunk driving is dead, unconscious, or otherwise unable to consent to withdrawal of a bodily specimen. If the physician provides an oral certification, "a written certification shall be completed by the physician within a reasonable time of the test." Iowa Code § 321J.7. To meet the foundational requirement imposed by this section, the State need only prove "the conditions authorizing withdrawal of blood under Iowa Code section 321J.7 . . . exist[ed]." Laughridge, 437 N.W.2d at 572. Contrary to Owen's assertions, the statute does not require the State to produce the written certification at trial. The certificate is "strong evidence" that the person was unable to consent, but "it is not conclusive evidence." Weidner, 418 N.W.2d at 48.
In this case, the deputy testified Owen was unconscious and unable to consent. The lab technician testified Owen was "incoherent." Both testified the doctor provided the required written certification that Owen was incapable of consenting to the blood test. Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the requirements of section 321J.7 were met.