Opinion
A20-0417
04-12-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Daniel Edward Nixon, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn . R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Affirmed
Johnson, Judge Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-72 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A district court judge found Daniel Edward Nixon guilty of second-degree burglary of a supermarket. We conclude that the state's evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Nixon used a tool to gain access to the money that was stolen. We also conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error by admitting evidence of a prior burglary by Nixon. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of April 10, 2018, a person burglarized the Ha Tien Supermarket in the city of St. Paul. The burglar broke two floor-to-ceiling glass panes near the front door and crawled through them. The burglar then forced open an interior door to the office, where he opened cabinet doors and took money from cash-register drawers that were stored there. A surveillance video-camera captured images of the burglar wearing red-and-black gloves with the word "Hardy" in yellow lettering and carrying a blue cloth bag, which he used to carry away the money. The owner of the supermarket informed a police officer that more than $3,000 in cash was stolen.
Approximately one month later, a St. Paul police officer stopped a vehicle driven by Nixon and arrested him. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, officers found, among other things, a pair of red-and-black gloves with the word "Hardy" in yellow lettering.
In January 2019, the state charged Nixon with second-degree burglary, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4) (2016). In April 2019, the state gave notice of its intent to offer evidence of one or more other burglaries pursuant to rule 404(b) of the rules of evidence. Nixon filed a written objection. At a subsequent pre-trial hearing, the district court ruled that the state could introduce evidence of one other burglary, for which Nixon had pleaded guilty.
In May 2019, Nixon and the state agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The parties agreed that the state would deliver the stipulated evidence to the district court by the end of the month, at which time the case would be deemed fully submitted. The district court received and considered 16 exhibits consisting of, among other things, police reports, surveillance video-recordings, photographs, lab reports, and the rule 404(b) evidence that the district court had ruled was admissible.
On June 10, 2019, the district court filed a two-page order with a general finding of guilt. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(a). One week later, the district court filed a 14-page order with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(b). In July 2019, the district court sentenced Nixon to 90 months of imprisonment. Nixon appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Nixon argues that the state's evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of second-degree burglary. Specifically, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the burglar possessed a tool to gain access to the money that was stolen.
The state charged Nixon with second-degree burglary, with specific reference to section 609.582, subdivision 2(a), paragraph 4. That statute provides that a person commits second-degree burglary if the person "enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building," and, "when entering or while in the building, . . . possesses a tool to gain access to money or property." Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4). The state must prove that the person possessed a tool for the purpose of gaining access to money or property. State v. Nixon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A20-0420, 2021 WL 1165802, *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 29, 2021) (citing State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Minn. 2020)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake "a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient." State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We "carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted." State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict." State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). We will not reverse a verdict if the fact-finder, "acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense." Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100. This analysis applies in the same manner after either a jury trial or a court trial. State v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Minn. 2018).
In this case, the district court found that the burglar "gained entrance by first breaking an outer window with an object, then an inner window next to the doors at the store exit, also with an object." The district court concluded, "The Defendant possessed a tool with intent to use it to gain access to money or property when entering or while in the building."
Nixon contends that there is no evidence in the record of a tool that was possessed and used to break the glass pane through which the burglar entered the building. To the contrary, an incident report states that the investigating police officer reviewed surveillance video-recordings and saw that the burglar used a "stick-like object" to break the outer glass pane. The report further states that the officer found a black pry bar in the office. The surveillance video-recordings confirm the officer's incident report and contain additional evidence that the incident report does not include. One surveillance video-recording shows that the burglar approached an exterior floor-to-ceiling glass pane next to the front sliding-glass door, raised his right arm while holding an object, and then swung his arm down quickly, breaking the glass pane. The burglar then climbed through the broken glass pane into a foyer before breaking and entering through an interior glass pane. Another surveillance video-recording shows that the burglar then walked past the cash registers while holding a long, slender object in his right hand. Two video-recordings show that the burglar suddenly burst through an interior door into an office. The burglar wore red-and-black gloves with the word "Hardy" in yellow lettering and was holding a pry bar in his right hand. He dropped the pry bar on the floor, opened cabinet doors, removed cash-register drawers, took money from the drawers, placed the money into a blue cloth bag, and walked out of the office, leaving the pry bar behind on the office floor. All of this evidence makes clear that the burglar possessed a tool—the pry bar—and used it to break the glass panes near the front entrance, which allowed him to enter the store and gain access to the money that he stole.
Thus, the state's evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of second-degree burglary.
II. Spreigl Evidence
Nixon also argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence that he had committed a burglary of a convenience store in Minneapolis two months before the burglary at issue in this case.
Nixon's argument is governed by a rule of evidence that states, in relevant part:
(1) Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is known in Minnesota as "Spreigl evidence." State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's admission of Spreigl evidence. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 261.
(2) . . . . Such evidence shall not be admitted in a criminal prosecution unless (a) the proffered evidence is relevant to an identified material issue other than conduct conforming with a character trait; (b) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (c) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
In this case, the state sought to introduce Spreigl evidence concerning two other burglaries for the purpose of proving Nixon's identity as the burglar in this case. The district court considered the issue at a pre-trial hearing approximately one month before trial. The district court made an oral ruling that the evidence of the Minneapolis burglary, for which Nixon had pleaded guilty, would be admissible. The district court reasoned that both the burglary of the Minneapolis convenience store and the burglary of the Ha Tien Supermarket occurred during the middle of the night, that both involved the smashing of glass near a front entrance, and that the burglar in both cases wore a face mask and similar articles of black clothing. The district court also noted that, in both burglaries, the burglar wore "very distinctive black, red mechanics-style gloves." The district court stated that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice.
In determining whether Spreigl evidence is relevant and material, a district court "should consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence," and whether there is a "sufficiently close relationship" between the prior offense and the charged offense in terms of time, place, or modus operandi. State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 83 (Minn. 2005). "Spreigl evidence need not be identical in every way to the charged crime, but must instead be sufficiently or substantially similar to the charged offense—determined by time, place and modus operandi." State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 688 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Nixon contends that the district court erred in its Spreigl ruling on the ground that the prior burglary was not substantially similar to the burglary in this case and, thus, does not have sufficient probative value with respect to the issue of identity. He contends that the two burglaries were committed two months apart in different cities, thus making the two burglaries dissimilar in time and place. With respect to modus operandi, he contends that the two burglaries were different in that Nixon stole cigarettes and lottery tickets from the Minneapolis convenience store while the burglar of the Ha Tien Supermarket stole only cash. He contends further that the clothing worn in the two burglaries was typical of burglaries generally and that the district court incorrectly stated that Nixon wore red-and-black gloves during the Minneapolis burglary. In response, the state contends that the district court appropriately determined that the two burglaries are sufficiently similar. The state concedes that the district court mistakenly stated that Nixon wore red-and-black gloves during the Minneapolis burglary. In addition, the state contends that, even if the Spreigl evidence should not have been admitted, any error in its admission would be harmless on the ground that the district court would have reached the same verdict without it.
We need not determine whether the two burglaries were substantially similar. Even if they were not, the admission of the Spreigl evidence would be harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01. The relevant inquiry is "'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.'" State v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Minn. 1995)). There are several reasons to believe that the evidence of the Minneapolis burglary did not play a significant role in the district court's finding that Nixon, rather than another person, committed the burglary of the Ha Tien Supermarket on April 10, 2018.
In its second post-trial order, the district court made a detailed finding of fact about the appearance of the Ha Tien burglar: "The male [burglar] was recorded close up while inside the interior office. He was seen to be an African-American male, with little or no hair, wearing a black baseball cap, wearing a white surgical-type mask over his face, a black hooded jacket or sweatshirt, dark jeans with a patch on the right rear, black shoes, and red/black gloves with the brand name 'Hardy' clearly visible." We have confirmed that the Ha Tien burglar is easily seen on the surveillance video-recording inside the office wearing a face mask. Nixon appeared before the district court for a two-day omnibus hearing and addressed the district court frequently while representing himself, which surely provided the district court with an opportunity to become familiar with his appearance and mannerisms. Consequently, the district court was in a good position, based on its own visual observations, to find that Nixon was the Ha Tien burglar.
In addition, as the state notes in its responsive brief, there was a match between the red-and-black gloves with yellow lettering worn by the Ha Tien burglar (which are plainly visible on a surveillance video-recording) and the red-and-black gloves with yellow lettering that were found in Nixon's car when he was arrested on May 25, 2018 (which are depicted in a close-up photograph that was admitted into evidence). In its second post-trial order, the district court made findings concerning the presence of the red-and-black gloves in Nixon's car at the time of his arrest and the subsequent forensic testing of the gloves, which revealed DNA that matched Nixon's DNA. Even though Nixon did not wear the red-and-black gloves during the Minneapolis burglary, other evidence connected him to the red-and-black gloves worn during the Ha Tien burglary.
Furthermore, it is significant that Nixon's guilt was determined by the district court after a court trial. "The risk of unfair prejudice [arising from Spreigl evidence] is reduced because there is comparatively less risk that the district court judge, as compared to a jury of laypersons, would use the evidence for an improper purpose or have [her] sense of reason overcome by emotion." State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn. 2009). Accordingly, we are confident that, even if the evidence of the Minneapolis burglary had little probative value, its admission did not result in unfair prejudice.
Thus, even if the district court erred by admitting Spreigl evidence concerning Nixon's prior burglary of a Minneapolis convenience store, there is not a reasonable possibility that the evidence significantly affected the verdict. See Welle, 870 N.W.2d at 366.
Affirmed.