Opinion
18571
November 3, 1966.
Thomas K. Johnstone, Jr., Esq., of Greenville, for Appellant, cites: As to admission into evidence of the summary of the Defendant's statement without a proper foundation violating his right to equal protection and due process of law guaranteed by both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions: 86 S.Ct. 1602; 86 S.Ct. 1772; 378 U.S. 478; 342 F.2d 684. As to failure of the trial Judge to determine that the defendant's statement was made voluntarily and his failure to subsequently submit that question to the jury violating the constitutional rights of the defendant: 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E.2d 657; 117 S.C. 470, 109 S.E. 119; 378 U.S. 368; 13 S.C. 464; 88 S.C. 395, 70 S.E. 309; 318 U.S. 332. As to trial judge committing prejudicial error in admitting statements to the effect that the defendant had been incarcerated for a long period of time and had not been released from jail until approximately two weeks prior to the alleged shooting: McCormick, Evidence 327; 125 S.C. 416, 118 S.E. 807.
B.O. Thomason, Jr., Esq., Solicitor, of Greenville, for Respondent, cites: As to appellant's constitutional rights not being violated: 86 S.Ct. 1772; 227 S.C. 1, 86 S.E.2d 598; 247 S.C. 214, 149 S.E.2d 709. As to failure of the trial judge to determine that the defendant's statement was made voluntarily and his failure to subsequently submit that question to the jury not violating the constitutional rights of the defendant: 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23; 247 S.C. 214, 149 S.E.2d 709; 207 S.C. 126, 35 S.E.2d 38; 230 S.C. 195, 95 S.E.2d 160; 238 S.C. 234, 119 S.E.2d 735.
November 3, 1966.
The defendant, represented in the lower court and here by capable, court appointed counsel, has appealed from his conviction of the offense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, alleging that his conviction should be set aside and a new trial granted because of the introduction at the trial of testimony concerning (1) a prior confinement in jail, when his character had not been placed in evidence; and (2) an alleged statement made by him to the officers shortly after his arrest, without a preliminary showing that it was voluntarily made. He contends that the admission of such testimony was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial.
The defendant was tried under an indictment charging him with having shot one Mary Singleton with a pistol. Testimony was introduced by the State, without objection, that the defendant made a statement to the officers shortly after his arrest to the effect that he shot the prosecutrix in self-defense. The defendant subsequently testified in his own behalf. He admitted that he made the statement to the officers and that he was not forced or coerced to do so. His testimony on the witness stand as to how the shooting took place was substantially the same version as previously given to the officers in his statement to them.
Also, the fact that defendant had been previously in jail was mentioned in the testimony on three or four occasions during the trial. These references were for the most part not responsive to the questions asked and in each instance were made without objection being interposed.
It is conceded that all of the alleged prejudicial testimony was introduced in evidence without objection, or any question being raised in connection therewith in the lower court. Under the present facts, since the evidence in question was introduced without objection, any objection that defendant might have had was thereby waived. State v. Cokley, 83 S.C. 197, 65 S.E. 174; McCreight v. MacDougall, S.C. 149 S.E.2d 621.
Affirmed.
MOSS, C.J., BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD, JJ., and LIONEL K. LEGGE, Acting J., concur.