Opinion
A20-0231
02-08-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Chris A. Mrozinski, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn . R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-17-347 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant was convicted of the crime of threats of violence for making threats against four individuals in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror or serious public inconvenience. Appellant asserts on this appeal that the district court erred in denying her pretrial challenge to the constitutionality of the threats-of-violence statute. Specifically, appellant contends that the reckless-disregard prong of the statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, and violates her right to due process because it is void for vagueness and interferes with her ability to put on a complete defense. Because the reckless-disregard prong does not criminalize a "substantial amount of protected speech," uses terms that are defined or commonly understood, and did not prevent appellant from asserting any applicable defenses, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2017, appellant Chris Mrozinski slid an envelope under the door to the Initial Intervention Unit of St. Louis County Children's Protection Services. On the outside of the envelope she had handwritten in large letters, "MISS ME YET?" The envelope contained a letter and four "toe tags," that also were in her handwriting. The letter said:
JUST A LITTLE NOTE FOR ALL OF MY FRIENDS @ CPS...The toe tags were of the type used in morgues to identify bodies. Each toe tag was personalized with the names of three social workers and one assistant county attorney, all of whom had been involved in a prior child-protection proceeding that resulted in Mrozinski losing custody of her children. In the space on the tags labeled "case number," were handwritten numbers starting with "#1 of 9" up to "#4 of 9." Each toe tag also had individualized dates filled in for "date of birth," and "TBD" for the date of death, presumably meaning the date of death was "to be determined." In the box for "place of death," were various residential addresses, complete with cities and zip codes. The envelope was turned over to the police for investigation.
DID YOU REALLY THINK YOUR LAME-A-S THREATS TO CONTINUE YOUR ILLEGAL COURTHOUSE BULLSH-T WOULD SCARE ME, YOU F-CKING C-NTS?!
MY CHILDREN WILL BE 16 SOMEDAY, AND YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO DO SH-T ABOUT IT.
CHILDHOOD IS NOT FOREVER. DEATH, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS.
SLEEP TIGHT, B-TCHES!
(PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY. . . SLEEP WITH ONE EYE OPEN?)
Some of the birthdays and addresses were accurate, and some were not. One address was the home address of one of the four individuals until the person moved only two months before the communication.
Law enforcement interviewed the four individuals named on the toe tags. All four confirmed that they had been involved in the child-protection proceeding and stated that Mrozinski had blamed them for her children being taken from her. They all took some type of action, such as a change to their daily routine, as a safety precaution based on the materials contained in the envelope, and three of the individuals said they believed that Mrozinski was capable of carrying out the threats. In addition, the individuals reported having previously received threatening emails and messages from Mrozinski, and one reported that she had found suspicious mail near her house that contained the name of a fifth individual involved in the child-protection case and believed Mrozinksi was responsible.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Mrozinski with four counts of threats of violence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016), one for each of the individuals identified on the toe tags. Mrozinski moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the threats-of-violence statute (the statute) was unconstitutionally overbroad, void for vagueness, and violated her right to put on a complete defense. The district court denied the motion. Mrozinski waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case to the district court based on stipulated facts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, in order to preserve her right to appeal the district court's pretrial ruling. The district court found Mrozinski guilty on all counts, stayed execution of a one-year jail sentence, and placed Mrozinski on unsupervised probation for one year. Mrozinski now appeals.
DECISION
Mrozinski's appeal challenges the constitutionality of the statute for overbreadth in violation of the First Amendment, and for violating her due-process rights on the grounds that the statute is void for vagueness and interfered with her right to put on a complete defense. The statute contains two prongs: one requiring that the individual act with the specific intent to terrorize another with a threat to commit a crime of violence, and the other requiring only that the individual act with "reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror." Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1; see also State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009). Mrozinksi limits her challenge to the reckless-disregard prong of the statute.
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. 2017).
I. The threats-of-violence statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
"Generally, Minnesota Statutes are presumed constitutional, but statutes allegedly restricting First Amendment rights are not so presumed." State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2020). Statutes that regulate speech "must not be overly broad." State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Minn. 2012). But a statute is not substantially overbroad simply because "one can conceive of some impermissible applications." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1844 (2008) (quotation omitted). Additionally, statutes that are narrowly tailored to regulate unprotected categories of speech do not implicate the First Amendment and may not be invalidated as overbroad. Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 565 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
We analyze constitutional challenges on the grounds of overbreadth utilizing a four-step framework that requires us to determine: (1) what is covered by the statute; (2) "whether the statute's 'reach is limited to unprotected categories of speech or expressive conduct'"; (3) if it extends beyond unprotected speech, whether "'a substantial amount' of protected speech is criminalized"; and (4) "whether the court is able to narrow the statute's construction or sever specific language to cure constitutional defects." Peterson, 936 N.W.2d at 917 (quoting In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 847-48 (Minn. 2019)).
The statute provides, in relevant part:
Whoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, vehicle or facility
of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. As used in this subdivision, "crime of violence" has the meaning given "violent crime" in section 609.1095, subdivision 1, paragraph (d).Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1.
With regard to the first step, the statute by its terms covers actions that directly or indirectly convey a threat to commit a crime of violence for the purpose of causing terror or serious public inconvenience. The Supreme Court has observed that statutes prohibiting threats of violence generally do so to protect individuals "from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003) (quotations omitted). The statute at issue here is consistent with this purpose.
Turning to the second step, Mrozinski argues that the statute criminalizes protected speech and that the district court thus erred in concluding that the statute covers only "true threats," which do not qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment. Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 565. A "true threat" is made when an individual "means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." Black, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S. Ct. at 1548. We need not resolve this issue, however, because even if there could be examples of unprotected speech covered by the statute, it does not criminalize a "substantial amount" of unprotected speech under the third step of the analysis.
Turning to the third step, Mrozinski contends that the reckless-disregard prong of the statute sweeps up within its ambit substantial amounts of protected speech because it does not require the defendant to have acted with the specific intent to cause terror or serious public inconvenience. Indeed, this court has previously concluded that this prong of the statute is a general-intent crime that does not require proof that the defendant acted with the specific purpose to terrorize. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d at 57. This does not mean, however, that the statute seeks to criminalize broad categories of protected expression. To satisfy the reckless-disregard standard, there must be proof of "deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk" that the threat will cause extreme fear. Id. Accordingly, as correctly noted by the district court, the reckless-disregard prong of the statute only criminalizes speech "if the person uttering the communication is at least aware of the threatening nature of the communication[,]" and nevertheless proceeds with reckless disregard of the substantial risk that the statement will be perceived as a threat and cause extreme fear or terror.
The jury instruction for the reckless-disregard prong of the statute quoted in Bjergum, similarly provides: "'In reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror' means that the defendant . . . recklessly risks the danger that the statements would be a taken as threats by another and that they would cause extreme fear." Id. (quoting 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.107 (2006)); see also 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.107 (2020) (providing the same instruction).
In addition, the analysis of whether a threat violates the statute requires the communication to be viewed "in its context." State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. 1975) (quotation omitted). This further limits the scope of the statute's coverage and helps sort out "true threats" from otherwise protected speech. We thus conclude that the reckless-disregard prong of the statute contains adequate safeguards such that it does not criminalize a "substantial amount" of protected speech, if any. Williams, 553 U.S. at 303, 128 S. Ct. at 1844; A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847-48.
Mrozinski also contends that the statute is overly broad because it criminalizes constitutionally protected political speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632 (1976) ("The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." (quotation omitted)). Despite her acknowledgment that an overbreadth challenge is a facial challenge, the only example of political speech Mrozinski provides relates to her own case. She asserts that the envelope and its contents are protected political speech "challenging the legitimacy of Child Protective Services and the government actors involved in that system." We are not convinced.
In a facial challenge, the burden is on the person making the challenge to show that "a substantial number of a statute's applications are unconstitutional." Hensel, 901 N.W.2d at 170 (quotation omitted).
While Mrozinski's letter was addressed to her "friends @ CPS" and delivered to a government building, the charges against her were based on her statement that death is forever; the warning that the county employees should sleep with one eye open; and the four toe tags of the type used for bodies in morgues, each one personalized with the name of a different county employee who had been involved in her child-protection case and "TBD" for date of death with a different residential address in the "place of death" box on each toe tag. We agree with the district court that the communications at issue appear to be targeted threats directed to specific individuals as opposed to a more general challenge to the system or even to the handling of her specific case.
That this is outside the realm of protected political speech is further supported by the context. As noted in the district court's findings, Mrozinski had previously made threats directed to at least two of the four county employees. Given the nature of the communications and the context, it does not appear to be speech geared to bring attention to issues with the child-protection system, but rather to communicate threats to specific individuals. Mrozinski had many avenues to express her dissatisfaction with the county, and the statute does not impose unconstitutional limits on her free-speech rights.
This is in contrast to the case of State v. Olson, 887 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. App. 2016), cited by Mrozinski as support for her argument that her communication should be treated not as a threat but as protected speech. The Olson case dealt not with a constitutional challenge to the statute but a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and, as such, is not apposite. Furthermore, in concluding that the defendant's statements in Olson did not constitute threats in violation of the statute, this court pointed to the fact that the threats, when viewed in context, were "unaccompanied by additional surrounding statements or conduct demonstrating that future serious crimes of violence could follow." 887 N.W.2d at 699. The alleged threats at issue in Olson were directed at a state trooper who arrested the defendant for driving while under the influence. The statements were all made during the course of the arrest and there was no history of any prior interactions between the defendant and the state trooper. Id. This is starkly different from the context in this case of a lengthy child-protection proceeding and history of prior communications from Mrozinski to the county employees.
The threats-of-violence statute also stands in contrast to the stalking statutes recently struck down as being unconstitutionally overbroad. For example, in A.J.B., the supreme court held that the stalking-by-mail statute, which "criminalizes the delivery of letters, telegrams, or packages with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause distress," prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech. 929 N.W.2d at 862. The supreme court explained that because the statute used "broad" terms, it could be interpreted to prohibit conduct such as
[d]elivering a letter that tells an elected official that the sender will take action to defeat him in the next election if he does not take action on gun control or a letter that threatens a boycott if a baker does not change his policy of refusing to sell wedding cakes to gay couples.Id.
In Peterson, this court similarly concluded that the stalking-by-telephone statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it could be interpreted to prohibit conduct such as an individual "repeatedly telephoning a business to complain about pollution and to announce a social media campaign boycotting their products" or even "a worried parent who repeatedly telephones or sends text messages to his child" if the child felt oppressed as a result. 936 N.W.2d at 921.
The threats-of-violence statute has a far narrower reach than either the stalking-by-mail or stalking-by-telephone statutes. Unlike the stalking statutes, the threats-of-violence statute does not prohibit Mrozinski from strongly and repeatedly expressing her dissatisfaction with the county, expressing her belief that the county is in the wrong and acting outside its authority, or campaigning for the replacement of county officials. Rather, the reckless-disregard portion of the statute only prohibits her from making threats of violence that involve a known substantial risk of causing extreme fear that she will commit a crime of violence.
Finally, we note that our decision is consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered and rejected overbreadth challenges to similar statutes. See People in Interest of R.D., 464 P.3d 717, 721 (Colo. 2020) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect statements that the recipient would "reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence"); State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 19 (Conn. 2018) (holding that a statute that prohibits statements made "in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror to another" does not violate the First Amendment (quotation omitted)); Major v. State, 800 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga. 2017) (holding that the inclusion of a reckless mens rea did not render the threats-of-violence statute unconstitutionally overbroad); but see State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805, 819 (Kan. 2019) (holding that the "reckless criminal threat provision" was unconstitutionally overbroad).
We therefore conclude that the threats-of-violence statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad and we do not need to reach the fourth step of the analysis, whether we must narrow the construction or sever any language to cure constitutional defects.
II. The threats-of-violence statute is not void for vagueness.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a person shall not be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7 ("No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law . . . ."). "Vague penal statutes are prohibited as a violation of due process." Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 567. Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, an ordinary person must be able to understand what is prohibited by the statute in such a way that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2008).
Mrozinski argues that the reckless-disregard portion of the statute is void for vagueness because it fails to give an ordinary person notice of what is prohibited. She argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court had found the term "reckless" to be ambiguous and therefore an individual cannot know what is prohibited by the reckless-disregard portion of the statute. Mrozinski is correct that the Minnesota Supreme Court found the term "reckless" to be ambiguous in State v. Engle. 743 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Minn. 2008). But the supreme court went on to provide an appropriate definition, holding that, in the context of a conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm, an individual "acts recklessly by creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk that one is aware of and disregards." Id. at 595. The supreme court then remanded for the district court to determine if the defendant's conduct satisfied this definition. Id. at 596.
In Bjergum, this court analyzed whether the reckless-disregard prong of the statute created a specific-intent crime and, in concluding that it did not, explained that "[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk." 771 N.W.2d at 57. The court noted that "[b]ecause threats are context specific, a person who might lack a specific intent to threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement recklessly, committing a [threats-of-violence] crime" and that "[b]y acting without regard to a known, substantial risk, a person's threats, however intended, may violate the statute." Id. Accordingly, Bjergum set out a clear explanation of the proof required to establish "recklessness" under the statute. The term "reckless" in the context of the threats-of-violence statute therefore has a settled legal meaning and is not void for vagueness. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306, 128 S. Ct. at 1846 (explaining that criminal statutes have been struck down as vague if they depend on terms that involve "wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings").
Mrozinski also argues that the reckless-disregard prong "encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it allows for the prosecution of conduct not based on the defendant's intent or the reaction of the victim" and therefore "whether to prosecute rests squarely on the prosecutor's whim." We disagree.
The conduct prohibited by the statute is limited to threats to "commit any crime of violence." Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. The statute specifies that "'crime of violence' has the meaning given 'violent crime' in [Minnesota Statutes] section 609.1095, subdivision 1, paragraph (d)." Id. And as discussed above, Bjergum explained what it means for an individual to act in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror—the individual is aware the actions carry a substantial risk of being perceived as a threat to commit a crime of violence and the individual acts in conscious disregard of that risk. These limitations, including that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant acted with disregard to a known and substantial risk, prevent enforcement of the statute based "squarely on the prosecutor's whim." We therefore conclude that the reckless-disregard portion of the threats-of-violence statute is not void for vagueness.
III. The threats-of-violence statute does not violate the right to present a complete defense.
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to present a complete defense. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010). Mrozinski argues that the statute deprives her of the right to present a complete defense because the state is not required to disclose whether it is prosecuting the crime under the first portion of the statute, which is a specific-intent crime, or the reckless-disregard portion, which is a general-intent crime. See Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d at 57. She notes that the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication is available for charges based on the specific-intent prong of the statute, but not for charges based on the reckless-disregard prong. See id. at 57-58. She also notes that under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02 a defendant is required to provide the state with notice of an affirmative defense, and that the obligation to notify the state is adversely impacted by the availability of the defense to certain charges under the statute but not others.
We conclude, however, that the statutory scheme does not prevent Mrozinski from notifying the state that she intends to raise the defense, presenting it at trial, and requesting a jury instruction on the defense. If the charge is based on a specific-intent prong, she is entitled to the instruction, if it is based on the reckless-disregard prong, she is not. Id. She is therefore not deprived of her right to present a complete defense by the existence of both specific-intent and general-intent threats-of-violence crimes.
Affirmed.