Opinion
NO. 2024-K-0159
03-22-2024
STATE of Louisiana v. Jordan MITCHELL
Jason R. Williams, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals, District Attorney’s Office, Parish of Orleans, 619 South White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, THE STATE OF LOUISIANA Aaron Zagory, ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS, 2601 Tulane Avenue, 7 th Floor, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT, JORDAN MITCHELL
ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH, NO. 555-643, SECTION "SECTION E", Judge Rhonda Goode-Douglas
Jason R. Williams, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals, District Attorney’s Office, Parish of Orleans, 619 South White Street, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Aaron Zagory, ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS, 2601 Tulane Avenue, 7th Floor, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT, JORDAN MITCHELL
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Karen K. Herman)
Judge Karen K. Herman
1Relator, the State of Louisiana (the "State"), seeks expedited supervisory review of the trial court’s March 12, 2024 ruling, which granted the motion to sever defendants filed by Defendant, Jordan Mitchell ("Mitchell"). For the following reasons, we grant the writ application, reverse the trial court’s ruling, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 29, 2022, Mitchell and his co-defendants, Zakyis Bolden and Dylan Johnson, were each indicted with two counts of attempted first-degree murder; one count of first-degree rape; two counts of second-degree kidnapping; and one count of armed robbery.
On February 7, 2024, Mitchell moved to sever the trials on the grounds that he and his co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. On February 8, 2024, the State filed its objection to Mitchell’s motion to sever, claiming the defense failed to show convincing evidence of actual antagonism. On February 26, 2024, Mitchell filed a supplemental motion, claiming that counsel for co-defendant Bolden advised that his client’s defense will be to lay the blame of the charged crimes on Mitchell.
2The matter came for healing before the trial court on March 11, 2024. After oral arguments, the trial court reserved ruling until March 12, 2024, in order to review all case law and Bolden’s statements. On March 12, 2024, the trial court granted the motion for severance. Thereafter, the State noticed its intent to take supervisory writs. This timely writ application followed.
The trial court stated, in part:
[T]his court does not see how the state can try this case, wherein their -- the antagonistic defenses lie. And so at this point the Court is going to grant Mr. Zagory’s [counsel for Defendant] motion for severance as to Mr. Mitchell. I have not heard of any sort of statement on behalf of Mr. Johnson. But I do not think that Mr. -- the Court does not think that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Bolden can be tried together. So I am going to sever Mr. Mitchell out from Mr. Bolden and Mr. Johnson.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), involved the admissibility of a statement of a co-defendant in a joint trial but did not involve a motion to sever.
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
La. C.Cr.P. art. 704 provides the following regarding severance:
Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried jointly unless:
(1) The state elects to try them separately; or
(2) The court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance.
Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Craddock, 2023-01147, pp. 1-2 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So. 3d 47, 47–48, recently outlined the law on a motion to sever, as follows:
As a general matter, jointly charged defendants shall be tried jointly unless the state elects to sever or the court determines, after a contradictory hearing, that justice requires severance. La. C.Cr.P. art. 704. Article 704 does not provide precise standards to guide a trial court in exercising its discretion in ruling on a motion for severance. Consequently, this Court has jurisprudentially developed the "antagonistic defense" standard as a means of testing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. State v. Lavigne, 412 So.2d 993, 996-97 (La. 1982); State v. Thibodeaux, 315 So.2d 769, 770 (La. 1975). See also 3 State v. McGraw, 366 So.2d 1278 (La. 1978) (discussing the history and development of the "antagonistic defense" concept in Louisiana). Under the "antagonistic defense" test, it is an abuse of discretion not to grant a motion for severance when the trial judge has been made aware that a defendant intends to lay blame for the offense at the feet of a codefendant. State v. Webb, 424 So.2d 233, 236 (La. 1982) (citations omitted); Bruton v. United, States, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. at 1628, 20 L.E.2d 476 (1968) (the extrajudicial statement of a non-testifying co-defendant, which implicates the defendant and is admitted at a joint trial, violates the defendant’s constitutional right of cross-examination.).
[1, 2] On a motion to sever, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish that justice requires a severance. State v. Collins, 2010-0757, pp. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/11/11), 65 So.3d 271, 287 (citing State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729, 741 (La. 1984)); see also State v. Williams, 416 So.2d 914, 915 (La. 1982). "Furthermore, the fact that each defendant has pointed a finger at the other does not make defenses automatically antagonistic. Prejudice must be shown if defendants are to receive separate trials." Collins, 2010-0757, pp. 23, 65 So.3d at 287 (citing Williams, 416 So.2d at 916).
[3, 4] "Mere allegations by co-defendants that defenses will be antagonistic do not require the trial judge to sever." State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157, 166 (La. 1976). "Co-defendants seeking severance must present convincing evidence to the trial judge of actual antagonism." Id. (citing Thibodeaux, 315 So.2d at 771; State v. Medlock, 297 So.2d 190 (La. 1974)); see also State v. Singleton, 352 So.2d 191, 192 (La. 1977).
[5] Both Mitchell and co-defendant Bolden each made statements incriminating the other. However, the State indicated it has no intention of using these statements at trial and instead will rely on the testimony of the two victims. Additionally, neither Mitchell nor co-defendant Bolden, specifically provided what 4evidence they plan on presenting at trial which would tend to incriminate each other.
Co-defendant Johnson made no statement to the detectives.
In Craddock, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed a trial court’s ruling denying a defendant’s motion for severance based on the allegation that he and his codefendant have antagonistic defenses. The Court stated, in part:
[T]he trial court was presented with uncontroverted evidence that co-defendant, Cody Matthews, was going to blame the Defendant as the culpable perpetrator of the murder. In particular, the State intends to admit a jailhouse recording of Matthews that directly implicates the Defendant as the shooter in the murder.
Craddock, 2023-01147, p. 2, 373 So.3d at 48. Under those circumstances, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that severance was warranted.
Conversely, in the present case, the State submits that it will not introduce Mitchell or Bolden’s statement into evidence. In addition, Mitchell has raised only broad and unsupported allegations of antagonism. Therefore, because Mitchell has not put forth evidence of actual antagonism, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to sever. Accordingly, we grant the writ application and reverse the trial court’s March 12, 2024 ruling. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
1I concur with the majority’s opinion in its entirety. I also find that the defendant, Jordan Mitchell ("Mitchell"), failed to prove by "convincing evidence" that a joint trial with the two other co-defendants, Zakyis Bolden ("Bolden") and Dylan Johnson ("Johnson"), would compromise his right to a fair trial. Mitchell, Bolden, and Johnson are all charged with two counts of attempted first-degree murder, one count of first-degree rape, two counts of second-degree kidnapping, and one count of armed robbery. A joint trial prosecuting these charges together with certain safe-guards is not only proper for the prosecution, efficient for the courts, and compassionate and fair to the victims, but it is also fair and just for the defendants.
I write separately only to emphasize two important aspects of this case that the district court failed to consider but instead applied a rigid application of severance not taking into account the dynamics of the criminal justice system and the various trial strategy safeguards that have been placed to remove any barriers to fairness in the joint trial.
First, the potential for Mitchell to experience injustice and be subjected to an unfair joint trial is extremely low. Various safeguards have been put into place to protect Mitchell’s right to confront and cross examine the witness against him 2under Article 1, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; thus, justice does not requires a severance. No extrajudicial statements of a non-testifying co-defendant, which implicate Mitchell, will be admitted at the joint trial. In cases cited by the district court and dissent, a severance was warranted because the State anticipated the admission of such extrajudicial statements into evidence at the joint trial or severance was not at issue.1a In State v. Craddock, 23-01147 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So.3d 47, the State intended to admit a jailhouse recording of a codefendant that directly implicated the defendant as the shooter in the murder. The Supreme Court found that justice required a severance because a joint trial would violate the defendant’s right to confront and cross examine the witness against him. Craddock, 23-01147, p. 2, 373 So.3d at 48. No such extrajudicial statements of Bolden nor Johnson will be admitted into evidence at the joint trial. If Bolden or Johnson decides to testify at the joint trial, then Mitchell will have the right to confront and cross-examine them removing any barriers to fairness in the joint trial. The State has made clear that the two juvenile victims will testify as to the actions and culpability of all three defendants during the course of the kidnappings, rape, and attempted murders.
Second, the State has great prosecutorial discretion in forming trial strategies and adopting safeguards to maintain the integrity of joint trials while promoting judicial economy and the well-being of the victims and witnesses. The State intends to call 28 to 30 witnesses during trial, including the two victims. One of the victims is confined to a wheelchair and needs special accommodations to travel to New Orleans from another State. Severing the trials of the co-defendants would prejudice the State in its prosecution and be unnecessarily burdensome for the court. More importantly, it would be unduly traumatic to the two juvenile victims.
3The State plans to call the 14- and 15-year-old victims to testify as follows: On June 9, 2022, Mitchell, Bolden, and Johnson picked them up in Slidell and then drove to an unspecified location in New Orleans East. Mitchell asked one of the teenagers to have sex with him, and when she refused, he then pulled out a gun and forced her to perform oral sex and then vaginally raped her in the front seat of the car. Bolden and Johnson stood outside the vehicle while Mitchell raped the teenager. At the conclusion of the rape, Mitchell shot both victims with a .38-caliber firearm. The rape victim was shot once in the head, and the other was shot multiple times on her body, and once in the head. The three defendants then removed the girls from the vehicle and abandoned them on the side of the road in the 2100 block of Chef Menteur Highway. The rape victim pretended to be dead and waited for all three defendants to leave the scene in Mitchell’s car before seeking help from a resident close by. When officers arrived, the rape victim was in a state of shock and said, "Please don’t let me die." Her left eye was swollen shut, and she was bleeding from her face and left ear. She had no shirt on, her pants were unzipped, and her brassiere was saturated with blood. The other teenager was lying on her back in a pool of blood. She was unable to speak due to the severe gunshot wound to her head. The rape victim was able to give the first names of the perpetrators to the officers.
A severance would require the two juvenile victims to relive the horrors they experienced on June 9, 2022, over the course of multiple trials. This would be unduly burdensome on the court and witnesses and traumatic to the victims especially considering that the potential for an unfair joint trial is minimal. Moreover, Mitchell has post-trial remedies whereby the courts will review the trial transcripts and decide whether he received a fair joint trial. See State v. Williams, 416 So.2d 914 (La. 1982) (in reviewing a denial of a severance, the Supreme Court 4found that the trial evidence did not indicate prejudice to either defendant as a result of a joint trial).
Various safeguards and processes during pre-trial, trial, and post-trial are in place to maintain a fair joint trial as well as the well-being of the victims and witnesses. The district court failed to properly balance the concerns for efficiency and integrity of the trial process with that of asserted interests and rights. Mitchell’s right to a fair joint trial has been secured, and a joint trial would protect the rights and well-being of the victims. The district court’s ruling should be reversed and allow the joint trial to proceed on April 1, 2024.
JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
1I respectfully dissent. I would deny the writ. After a review of the trial judge’s well-reasoned per curiam, I find the trial court did not abuse its discretion granting defendant Mitchell’s motion to sever. The trial court noted in it’s per curiam that Mitchell made a statement while in police custody that he and Johnson struggled with the gun which discharged and strack the victims. However, Bolden made a statement to the police that Mitchell drove him and Johnson to New Orleans, where Mitchell pulled a gun on the victims. According to Bolden, Mitchell demanded sex from the victims, shot both the victims, removed them from the car and drove off. Johnson did not give a statement. The statements made by Bolden and Mitchell are clearly antagonistic. Mitchell suggests that the shooting was accidental. The trial court stated in it’s per curiam that "[a]s presented, it seems that Mr. Bolden places blame entirely on Mitchell, contending that he was a bystander."
The Supreme Court noted in State v. Craddock, 2023-01147, p.1 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So.3d 47, that La. C.Cr.P. article 704 "does not provide precise standards to guide a trial court in exercising its discretion in ruling on a motion for severance." As a result, the Supreme Court crafted the "antagonistic defense" standard as a means of testing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in ruling on 2a motion to sever. See State v. Lavigne, 412 So.2d 993, 996-97 (La. 1982); State v. Thibodeaux, 315 So.2d 769, 770 (La. 1975). The "antagonistic defense" test provides that a trial court abuses its discretion when it does not grant a motion to sever when the trial court has been made aware that a defendant intends to blame a co-defendant for the offense for which they have both been charged. State v. Webb, 424 So. 2d 233, 236 (La. 1982); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.E.2d 476 (1968).
In Craddock, evidence was presented that Craddock’s co-defendant, Cody Matthews, was going to blame the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever, stating that "[u]nder these circumstances, a joint trial would violate Defendant’s right to confront and cross examine the witness against him in violation of Article 1, § 16, of the Louisiana Constitu- tion, and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; thus, justice requires a severance." Craddock, 2023-01147, 373 So.3d at 48.
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Craddock on the basis that the State in Craddock intended to admit a jailhouse recording from Matthews directly implicating Craddock as the shooter. The State has indicated that it does not intend to introduce Bolden’s statement at trial. However, such a distinction does not allow for the denial of the motion to sever in the present case. A joint trial in the present matter would violate Mitchell’s right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him in violation of the Article 1, Sec. 16 of the Louisiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
For the reasons assigned, I find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant Mitchell’s motion to sever. Relator’s writ application should be denied.