Opinion
Defendant ID# 1408007610
03-22-2016
RE: State of Delaware v. Frederick H. Mitchell
Frederick H. Mitchell SBI No.: 00394292 Sussex Correctional Institute Rt. 3, Box 500 Georgetown, DE 19947
RICHARD F. STOKES JUDGE Frederick H. Mitchell
SBI No.: 00394292
Sussex Correctional Institute
Rt. 3, Box 500
Georgetown, DE 19947 Dear Mr. Mitchell:
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Postconviction Relief ("Rule 61 Motion") which Defendant Frederick H. Mitchell ("Defendant") has filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61").
On January 21, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to Aggravated Possession of Heroin (Tier 4) and Conspiracy in the Second Degree. He was sentenced as follows: for Aggravated Possession of Heroin (Tier 4), fifteen years of Level V incarceration, suspended after eight years for eighteen months of Level III probation; and for Conspiracy in the Second Degree, two years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level III probation. On April 9, 2015, Defendant filed a motion for reduction of sentence that was denied. Defendant appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court and argued that his sentence exceeded the guidelines in the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission Benchbook; the sentence did not refer to the aggravating factors the Superior Court relied upon or the mitigating factors presented at the hearing, and the Superior Court sentenced Defendant without considering all of the applicable mitigating factors and weighing these factors against the aggravating factors. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's appeal was without merit.
Mitchell v. State, 2015 WL 7575022, at *1 (Del. Nov. 24, 2015) (TABLE).
Defendant filed a Rule 61 Motion on January 25, 2016. In the Motion, Defendant raises two arguments. First, Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he advised Defendant to accept a plea without having critical, evidentiary information. Therefore, Defendant was incapable of making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision with respect to his plea agreement. Second, Defendant argues that the he should have been provided with a forensic analysis report on the drugs in his possession at the time of the arrest. Defendant contends that without this report, his ability to negotiate an intelligent plea agreement was hampered. Defendant's second argument is, at its core, an extension of his argument for ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Court will address both arguments together.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must meet the two-prong test set forth by the United States Supreme Court. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, a defendant must show the following: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel's actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. When setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal. "Furthermore, the defendant must rebut a "strong presumption" that trial counsel's representation fell within the 'wide range of reasonable professional assistance,' and this Court must eliminate from its consideration the 'distorting effects of hindsight when viewing that representation.' "
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997).
State v. Coleman, 2003 WL 22092724, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 19, 2003).
Id.
The Court now will address Defendant's arguments.
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he advised Defendant to accept the State's plea offer before receiving a forensic analysis report of the drugs found in his vehicle. Whether Defendant received this report is insignificant for the purposes of this Motion because Defendant pled guilty. If the State, as the Defendant alleges, failed to provide a forensic analysis report, Defendant could have waited before accepting the State's plea offer. Since Defendant knew that the drugs had not been tested when he took the plea, Defendant has failed to show that, but for the counsel's errors, he would have insisted on going to trial. I conclude trial counsel was not ineffective.
See State v. Matthews, 2016 WL 354875, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan, 27, 2016) (concluding that since the defendant knew that the drugs had not been tested when he pleaded guilty, his representation was not deficient).
The Court also has reviewed the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the plea colloquy. Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must engage the defendant in a series of questions in open court to determine the voluntariness of the plea. This plea colloquy must be preserved on the record and the judge must determine that the defendant realizes and understands the nature of the charges and the various penalties provided for that offense. "The record must reflect that a defendant understands that the guilty plea constitutes a waiver of trial on the charges and the various constitutional rights to which he would have been entitled had he gone to trial. Statements made by a defendant to the Superior Court during the plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful.
Weeks v. State, 653 A.2d 266, 269 (Del. 1995).
Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937 (Del. 1994).
Id.
Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.
The record demonstrates that Defendant understood the rights he waived and did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. This is demonstrated by Defendant's answers to the questions on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the plea colloquy.
The following is an excerpt from Defendant's plea colloquy:
THE COURT: I am you showing you a plea agreement and a truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form. Did you read and sign those forms?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain the information in these forms to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The truth-in-sentencing guilty plea form, there are questions. Did your lawyer read all of those questions to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And did you provide honest answers to the questions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And did you review the checkmarks?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And they represent your honest answers?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Nobody can force you to plead guilty because when you do that, you incriminate yourself and you lose your valuable trial and appeal rights and expose yourself to the penalties of law; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to do this?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: And your lawyer did explain to you, as he indicated and I am sure he did, your valuable trial and appeal rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to a lawyer today and at trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you are presumed innocent and the State is required to prove the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
* * *
THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain the charges to which you are pleading guilty; that is, Count 1 aggravated possession Tier 4 heroin, did he review that charge with you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
* * *
THE COURT: With respect to the events of August 9, 2014, do you admit you committed the offense of aggravated possession Tier 4 heroin?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Transcript of January 21, 2015 proceedings at 3-8.
One of the rights Defendant waived was the right to challenge the State's evidence. As mentioned, Defendant could have waited for the forensic analysis report of the drugs before accepting the State's plea offer. Since Defendant chose to forego waiting and accepted the State's plea offer, he is barred from attacking the sufficiency of the State's evidence after the fact. Defendant waived this right when he entered his guilty plea, which was voluntary.
Foote v. State, 2012 WL 562791, at *1 (Del. Super. Feb. 21, 2012) (TABLE) (holding that a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the guilty plea).
See Matthews, 2016 WL 354875, at *2.
In light of the foregoing, Defendant will not be appointed counsel. Pursuant to Rule 61(e)(2), the judge may, in his discretion, appoint counsel for a movant's first timely postconviction motion that resulted from a plea of guilty. To make this determination, the motion must set forth a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of counsel or special circumstances exist that warrant the appointment of counsel. In the instant Rule 61 Motion, Defendant has neither set forth a substantial claim nor presented special circumstances to warrant the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, counsel will not be appointed.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(ii).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2)(iv). --------
The Court is satisfied that Defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive his rights and plead guilty. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Richard F. Stokes
Richard F. Stokes cc: Prothonotary
Caroline Brittingham, Esquire
Jerome Capone, Esquire