Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0407-09T2
03-18-2013
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROSARIO MIRAGLIA, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
John Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Douard, of counsel and on the brief). Mary R. Juliano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Juliano, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher, Alvarez and St. John.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 05-02-0383.
John Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Douard, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary R. Juliano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Juliano, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. The victims were Julia Miraglia, his grandmother, and Leigh L. Martinez, his former girlfriend, who was also the mother of his child. Defendant confessed that, on June 8, 2004, he used knives and a meat cleaver to murder and dismember his victims, but maintained at trial, in support of an insanity defense, that he was Jesus Christ and on a mission from God when he killed his victims. In appealing, defendant argues that the trial judge erred: in finding him competent to stand trial; in denying his attorney's request for a bench trial, which defendant opposed in the trial court; and in the manner in which he instructed the jury about defendant's insanity defense. We find no error and affirm.
Defendant was indicted and charged with two counts of first-degree murder and other related offenses, namely: third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); second-degree criminal attempt to commit aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).
Over several days in September and October 2005, Judge Paul F. Chaiet conducted a competency hearing and ultimately determined defendant was competent to stand trial "despite his paranoid schizophrenia." In August 2006, defense counsel moved to reopen the record regarding his client's competency. After a second hearing over the course of three days in September 2006, Judge Chaiet ruled that defendant was not competent to stand trial and committed defendant to a secure psychiatric facility for treatment and monitoring. A third competency hearing occurred on April 10, 2007. At that time, the court heard only from a State psychiatrist and found defendant competent to stand trial.
A trial took place over nine days in August 2008. In the midst of the trial, defense counsel again raised the question of defendant's competency after defendant insisted on testifying over counsel's contrary advice. Judge Chaiet conducted a brief voir dire of defendant and found him competent to continue to stand trial.
At the trial's conclusion, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts except the attempted aggravated arson charge, as to which he was acquitted. The jury was then asked to determine the presence of aggravating factors. After further deliberation, the jury found: (1) both murders were "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault"; (2) the murder of Julia Miraglia was committed "for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement" for committing the murder of Leigh L. Martinez; and (3) the murder of Julia Miraglia was committed "while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit the murder of Leigh L. Martinez."
After appropriate mergers, the judge sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Defendant appeals, arguing:
I. THE MOTION COURT ERRED IN FINDING MR. MIRAGLIA COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, DESPITE EXHAUSTIVE HEARINGS AT WHICH AMPLE EVIDENCE OF HIS INCOMPETENCE WAS PRESENTED. U.S. CONST., amend. xiv; N.J. CONST. (1947), Art. I, Par. 10.We find no merit in these three arguments and affirm.
II. THE JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO MODIFY THE MODEL JURY CHARGE ON INSANITY, OVER DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OBJECTION, TO REFLECT THE EXISTENCE OF PROCEDURES TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE PUBLIC IF MR. MIRAGLIA WAS ACQUITTED BY REASON OF INSANITY. MR. MIRAGLIA WAS THEREBY DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, 10.
III. THE JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR A NON-JURY TRIAL.
I
In examining defendant's first argument -- that the judge erred in finding defendant competent to stand trial -- we: (a) outline the applicable legal principles; (b) discuss at length the testimony adduced during the first, second, and third competency hearings, as well as the trial itself; and (c) conclude that the judge carefully considered the testimony in finding defendant competent to stand trial.
A
The requirement that a defendant be competent to stand trial arises from the constitutional due process right to receive a fair trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 818 (1966); State v. Purnell, 394 N.J. Super. 28, 47 (App. Div. 2007). The test for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960).
"Where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competence," the trial judge has the responsibility to hold a hearing to determine the defendant's competency. Purnell, supra, 394 N.J. Super. at 47. And "the court has a continuing obligation to revisit the issue if warranted by further information as the proceedings progress." Id. at 49. Notwithstanding a prior finding of competency, if evidence elicited at trial suggests the defendant may no longer be competent, the judge must stop the trial and assess the defendant's competency. State v. Spivey, 65 N.J. 21, 40 (1974). However, absent any indicia of incapacity, a trial judge is not bound to interrupt trial proceedings to re-evaluate competency; a "'[m]ere suggestion' of incapacity is not sufficient." Id. at 36.
The Legislature has declared that a person is mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs establish two things. First, the evidence must establish that the defendant "has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things." N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(1). And second, the record must establish that the defendant's "elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends":
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;"Once the issue is raised, the State bears the burden of establishing competence by a preponderance of the evidence." Purnell, supra, 394 N.J. Super. at 47. The determination of competency is ultimately made by the judge, not the experts, but, particularly where crimes of violence are charged, the decision should be informed by a factual record. State v. Moya, 329 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 529 (2000). Our review of such a determination is highly deferential. Ibid.
(b) That there is a judge on the bench;
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he
chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)]
"[E]xpert testimony is needed where the factfinder would not be expected to have sufficient knowledge or experience and would have to speculate without the aid of expert testimony." Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419, 430 (App. Div. 2001). "Expert testimony, however, 'need not be given greater weight than other evidence nor more weight than it would otherwise deserve in light of common sense and experience.'" State v. M.J.K., 369 N.J. Super. 532, 549 (App. Div. 2004)(quoting Torres, supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 430), appeal dismissed, 187 N.J. 74 (2005). The factfinder, of course, is free to accept or reject all or part of an expert's testimony. Ibid. "Respecting expert opinions of psychiatrists or psychologists, the court, sitting as a factfinder, must use its 'common sense and ordinary experience.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 196 (1989)). "This is particularly true when, as here, the factfinder is confronted with directly divergent opinions expressed by the experts." Ibid.
In this matter, all the experts agreed that defendant met all of the competency requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b), except for N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g), which dealt with whether defendant had the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense, and as to which there was disagreement. Here, the judge heard considerable evidence at various stages regarding defendant's competency which we will now review in some detail.
B
The record reveals that Judge Chaiet considered defendant's competency to stand trial on three different occasions and continued to examine the matter throughout the trial.
(1)
In the Fall of 2005, Judge Chaiet conducted the first of three competency hearings. It took five days.
Dr. Peter David Paul, an expert in psychiatry, was ordered by the trial judge to evaluate defendant's competency to stand trial and was the first to testify. Dr. Paul testified about defendant's prior hospitalizations and other episodes. In June 1991, when he was eighteen years old, defendant was hospitalized after "repeatedly," while under the influence of drugs, driving his car into a tree because he was upset about a breakup with a girlfriend. He was then diagnosed with "polysubstance dependence, severe," and "bipolar disorder type 2, mixed moderate," which suggested "a disturbance of mood where someone cycles between phases of depressed behavior and manic behavior" but "not quite as extreme as [a] true manic individual." Dr. Paul believed this diagnosis was incorrect.
Eleven years later, in April 2002, defendant was hospitalized at Monmouth Medical Center for six days after police found him "walking nude along Route 66" while under the influence. He was then diagnosed with "psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, delirium, opiate dependence and polysubstance abuse." Dr. Paul again viewed this diagnosis as incorrect because defendant's symptoms could have been caused by a number of factors and "certain drugs could cause someone to look psychotic."
Defendant was again admitted to the same hospital on July 19, 2002. He then described himself as "the son of God," claiming "the judgment day was coming soon." Defendant also asserted he had AIDS, but later told Dr. Paul that "he was just saying that so he would get admitted to the hospital because he was interested in receiving substance abuse treatment." He was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance abuse. At the time, defendant reported a "considerable history of drug abuse," including alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, heroin and "speed balls."
Dr. Paul interviewed defendant in 2005 for purposes of the competency hearing to establish whether defendant was competent to stand trial. He found defendant to be "very conversational" and "very focused," and that he showed no hesitation in answering questions and was not distracted "by internal stimuli." Although defendant claimed not to know why Dr. Paul was there, he was "cooperative," and his attitude, according to Dr. Paul, was "upbeat, positive."
Defendant was found at that time to be "very well oriented to person, place and time," and aware of the legal charges he was facing, the name of the judge, and what occurs at a trial. Defendant advised Dr. Paul that he was "not interested" in pursuing an insanity defense because "he did not see himself as being mentally ill." After initially denying that he heard voices, defendant eventually spoke about hearing the voice of God. He asserted his belief that he was the son of God, Jesus Christ, and denied having any mental illness.
Dr. Paul found that defendant was "malingering" or "feigning" a mental impairment. He also diagnosed defendant with polysubstance dependence on heroin, cocaine and alcohol, as well as antisocial personality disorder, which was described as a "persistent and enduring pattern of behavior that is somehow self[-]defeating or self[-]destructive." He concluded, based upon a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that defendant was competent to stand trial.
Dr. Steven Eric Samuel, a psychologist and psychoanalyst, also testified for the State. He interviewed defendant and also administered intelligence and personality tests. Defendant scored an eighty-eight on the IQ test, which was at the high end of the "low average" category. His scores on the personality test revealed "a longstanding pattern of maladaptive behavior" and problems with "impulsivity and anger." The personality-test results also revealed to Dr. Samuel that: defendant was "a dramatic individual, using self[-]dramatic behavior"; had "underlying paranoid thinking"; was "suspicious and guarded"; was "manipulative[] in his personality"; and "could be dangerous when provoked."
Dr. Samuel did not diagnose defendant with paranoid schizophrenia or schizo-effective disorder. Instead, he diagnosed defendant with personality disorder with antisocial personality characteristics, which he further described as "an enduring pattern of behavior which goes contrary to cultural expectations and it ends up being deviant in various kinds of ways." According to Dr. Samuel, this condition did not affect defendant's ability to understand what was happening in the interview, the charges he was facing, or his legal rights and responsibilities. He concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. When cross-examined about defendant's claim that he was Jesus Christ and other similar delusions, Dr. Samuel asserted that defendant "wants to believe that that is true," and that defendant was either lying or delusional; he could not say whether defendant was malingering, as Dr. Paul had opined, without spending more time with defendant.
Dr. Timothy J. Michals, a physician specializing in clinical and forensic psychiatry, also testified for the State at the competency hearing. Dr. Michals found defendant "very cooperative" and responsive to questions with "no evidence of clouding of his mental state." Defendant understood his competency to stand trial was being evaluated, and Dr. Michaels believed he had "a better understanding of the criminal justice system and the competency issues than most people" he had evaluated. Dr. Michals viewed defendant as being "very articulate and fluent with his understanding" of the legal process, and found no evidence of disorientation. Defendant was able to identify the lawyers, the victims, the specific charges against him, and elements of the grand jury proceeding. Dr. Michals concluded that defendant would be able to "participate in an adequate presentation of his defense."
Dr. Michals also acknowledged that voices on tapes that defendant had listened to "were talking to him" and that "God was commanding him to kill these two people"; he observed that the timing of defendant's "self report of religious ideation" related to the "criminal charges that he's facing." Dr. Michals diagnosed defendant with personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with "both narcissistic and antisocial features to that." He found that defendant had a "history of polysubstance dependence including cocaine, heroin and alcohol." He agreed with Dr. Paul's opinion that defendant was malingering.
Dr. Kenneth J. Weiss, a psychiatrist, testified for defendant. He opined that defendant was not fit to proceed to trial because of his documented psychiatric history dating back to 2002, when he was hospitalized with "bizarre behavior, delusional ideas that he was the son of God, that he had AIDS, and that he had been infecting people." Dr. Weiss observed that defendant was around thirty years old in 2002, a fact that fit the pattern of time for schizophrenia to reach its "peak of intensity." He found that defendant suffered from "grandiose" delusions, which are "fixed and irrational ideas not shared by a subgroup of our society that is recognized, and . . . not amenable to the intrusion of reality." He also found that defendant was "excessively cheerful" and eager to proceed to trial -- which he viewed as a "platform" for him to "present himself to the world as the Messiah" -- and that defendant's belief of himself as the son of God and the jurors as apostles "does not permit [defendant] to have a rational appreciation of the proceedings."
Dr. Weiss diagnosed defendant with "schizophrenia, paranoid type" and that he suffers from "delusions of grandiosity, namely mania and delusional disorder and schizophrenia disorder." He concluded this was a "major mental illness" that rendered defendant unfit to stand trial. He also viewed defendant's significant drug history as an effort to "self-medicate" his mental illness. He rejected the assertion that defendant was malingering; he viewed defendant's condition as genuine.
Dr. Elliot Atkins, a clinical and forensic psychologist, also testified for defendant. He testified that defendant suffered from "a severe mental illness, schizophrenia, paranoid type, which is being diagnosed because of a very firmly entrenched delusion and that delusion is substantially interfering with his ability to assist in his own defense." He found "no question" that defendant "fully" met "the criteria for the statute for competency A through F." Dr. Atkins concluded that, although defendant fully understood the process and the charges lodged against him, his delusion prevented him from "fully appreciating what it is that would be happening at a trial and what it is that his attorneys would need to do at that time."
Dr. Atkins described defendant's delusions in the following way:
His delusional system is based on a belief that he is the son of God and that God has directed him to do certain things, and that God is looking out for him and that God has instructed him specifically in terms of his role in the offense, but also in terms of his role at the trial. Mr. Miraglia's perception of the trial is that it is going to be an opportunity for him to be able to present information to the world, primarily information that he is the son of God. And that he has important things that he's going to be able to say and that basically that the trial would be a platform upon which he will be able to make these statements.Dr. Atkins found defendant "very consistent" about these delusions, and he rejected the opinion of others that defendant was malingering because the psychological evaluations have "strategies or techniques, methods for determining the malingering."
His delusional system also contains his understanding that the jury is going to be in a way selected by God. That the jury, the 12 members of the jury are going to be 12 prophets and Mr. Miraglia is absolutely convinced that these 12 people will acquit him. And he's also convinced that, upon acquittal, that will confirm in the minds of all who he feels are doubting him today, it will confirm in their minds because of the fact that he's acquitted that he is in fact the son of God.
Dr. Atkins explained at great length why he believed defendant was delusional and, therefore, not competent to stand trial. He also opined that medication could help control defendant's delusional thinking.
Defendant testified, over his counsel's objection, at the competency hearing. He testified that he first believed he was Jesus Christ "around 2002." When asked if he still believed that, defendant responded: "I know. I don't believe, I know." In response to questioning as to why he told Dr. Paul that he was "pretending so that [he] could get drug treatment," defendant claimed that the "only time that [he] ever tried to fake" was when he told the Crisis Unit sometime in 2003 that he had "a problem" in order to avoid going to jail for a missed court date but that "it didn't work."
Defendant also testified that he understood the insanity defense but did not want to use it. He testified that he "[a]bsolutely" recalled the events leading up to the deaths of his grandmother and girlfriend, and that he did not have "any difficulty relating that information to anybody." When asked whether he would cooperate with his attorneys and allow them to use the insanity defense if necessary, defendant said he would "have to" listen to them.
Defendant also testified that he told police he was "on a mission from God" to kill his grandmother because she was "the descendant of a Lebanese King" and the biblical direction that "the descendants be killed was not complete." Defendant called police after the killings but did not tell them he was Jesus Christ or on a mission from God until questioned for the second time. He signed the first Miranda form with his name and also initialed it "R.M." He signed a later Miranda form with the name "Jesus Christ" and initialed it "J.C." He claimed he was Jesus Christ "absolutely, no two ways about it. From my mouth to God's ears, I am."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Defendant testified that he did not "have any problem relating to [his] attorneys the facts of what happened on" June 8, 2004, that he understood what his attorneys discussed with him and that he was able to make decisions based on what they told him. He expressed his understanding that he could participate in discussions about witnesses, questions to ask and jury selection. He also understood that the State was seeking the death penalty.
Judge Chaiet thoroughly summarized the testimony, the issues and the legal standards, and was "satisfied that the defendant is competent to stand trial despite his paranoid schizophrenia." The judge understood that defendant has "a psychiatric illness" and "suffer[s] from delusions," but he found that N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4 does not, as a result of those facts, compel a finding of incompetency. The judge also found no evidence that defendant was malingering.
(2)
In August 2006, while preparing for trial, defense counsel again sought the trial judge's consideration of defendant's competency.
The court first heard the testimony of Lois Nardone, a social worker hired by defense counsel to prepare defendant's "social history investigation" for the trial's penalty phase. She testified that, in her most recent contacts,
it's been much more difficult if not impossible to discuss anything with Mr. Miraglia aside from his beliefs, his paranoid beliefs about the CIA; about the distrust that he has for both [of his defense attorneys]; for people that are watching him; for the process in general, which he believes he is a victim of mind control and that his attorney's sole purpose is to prevent him from getting to trial so that he can enlighten the world, to, you know, what's going on. How he believes that he has been targeted because of certain DNA that he has.
Nardone felt that defendant "always" expressed what she felt were delusional beliefs, but she had been able to "listen to him and refocus him" in order to collect the necessary information. Defendant began "becoming increasingly more paranoid" in April and she felt he had greatly decompensated" in the prior year and was unable to provide any useful information. Nardone also revealed that defendant's belief he would be acquitted had interfered with "his ability to assist in the preparation of his penalty phase defense."
For example, Nardone reviewed a letter defendant had written to "Aunt Joanne" and a letter defendant wrote to the court containing "proposed questions and a vocabulary section" that defendant wanted to be used during jury selection. In the letter to his aunt, defendant wrote, among other things, that "his attorneys in the court are trying to shut him down," "he's an experiment of the CIA," the CIA "must have wired" his grandfather's house, and "she [the aunt] and the rest of the family have been targeted probably as he has been because of their DNA."
Defendant also demonstrated his "mathematical conclusions" for Nardone "at least three or four times." Nardone did not really understand what it was about except that defendant "obviously finds correlations between numbers and events" and "they have always made a lot of sense to him." The "point" of "the math" was
more indications and more support for what his delusions are telling him. That he's chosen; that he's special; that all of this makes sense. He's [sic] explained to [Nardone] that he's finally been able to break free from these frequencies that were
controlling his mind and now he understands how all these parts of his life, all these events, all these things fit together and make sense.
Nardone testified that defendant's delusions "have been clear from the start," and she had advised defendant's attorneys that "he's suffering from a mental illness." Defendant, according to Nardone, had no trouble communicating those delusions to Nardone. She agreed defendant was "articulate" but "not always willing to cooperate with regard to the information that [she] wanted to discuss."
In lieu of having one of defendant's attorneys, Carl Herman, testify about a telephone conference with defendant on July 18, 2006, the judge accepted the attorney's certification regarding his "difficult time communicating with his client."
At defense counsel's request, Dr. Atkins visited with defendant on August 2, 2006, to conduct a follow-up evaluation. He also reviewed Herman's certification, medical records from the jail, defendant's letter to the court, and the videotape and transcripts from interviews by Drs. Michals and Samuels in May 2006. Dr. Atkins spent about an hour-and-a-half to two hours with defendant and found defendant to be "far more focused" on his "delusional system" and "on his perception that his legal team could not be trusted." He also reached the same diagnosis as before:
Mr. Miraglia has a deeply entrenched fixed delusional system that guides much of his thinking. It has not interfered with his ability to take care of himself. It hasn't interfered with his ability to interact with basic conversations with people around him. Unless somebody was engaged in a meaningful conversation with him, it is very unlikely that someone would recognize the extent of his mental illness.
However, when talking about the issues related to his case, the extent of his mental illness is clear and it is evidencing a significant deterioration from the times that [Atkins] had interviewed him in the past.
Dr. Atkins again opined that defendant was not competent to stand trial, especially because of his "fixed delusion that God would intervene at his trial, implant something in the jurors' minds to make them acquit him." With that delusion, defendant's need to work with his attorneys on a defense was "undermined" and "would interfere with any attempts to use an insanity defense." Defendant's delusional system also interfered with his ability to make a rational decision to take a plea or testify or appreciate the death penalty aspect of the case.
Dr. Atkins testified he was able to get defendant to respond to questions but his responses were "rambling, they were tangential. They were animated. He was agitated." The content of defendant's delusions have changed because "now he believes that it was the devil and other agents, aliens, CIA, but particularly the devil that was responsible for him being injected with or instilled with the perception that it was God's wishes that he was following at the time of the instant offense." On cross-examination, Dr. Atkins agreed defendant was no longer sure he would be acquitted.
Dr. Atkins opined that defendant needed treatment for his "severe mental illness" and the jail medical records did not reflect "any psychiatric treatment" other than "an interview or two by the prison psychiatrist" that were "interrupted." Defendant was not given medication, and Dr. Atkins opined that without treatment or medication, defendant was "going to become increasingly more agitated and more delusional and will have a progressively more difficult time assisting in his defense."
Steven Reed, a psychologist and the Director of Mental Health Services at the Monmouth County Correctional Institute, testified for the State. Dr. Reed testified he had no personal knowledge of defendant or his mental health status but testified the records revealed defendant had "not received any form of psychiatric treatment" while in jail; he was unaware of the court order to provide treatment for defendant.
Dr. Michals conducted his third examination of defendant on August 16, 2006. He also reviewed letters written by defendant to the court, Dr. Atkins's recent report, and other recent documentation. Dr. Michals disagreed with Dr. Atkins's opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial. In the interview, which was videotaped, defendant claimed not to be aware of the competency evaluation and maintained that no evaluation was needed because he was competent.
Dr. Michals found defendant to be "marginally cooperative" with the interview and that defendant "[m]ade statements rather than answered questions." He found defendant "[w]as controlling in his behavior concerning the interview. And really tried to control and direct the interview." Defendant expressed no delusional thinking, as in the May 2006 interview, and only expressed "opinions concerning his interaction with his attorney, their conduct." On cross-examination, Dr. Michals agreed defendant did not share his delusional thinking in that interview because he refused to talk or cooperate. Dr. Michals found no evidence of the expansion or change in delusional thinking that Dr. Atkins found. He felt it was "highly unusual" and "atypical" for delusional people to make such a "dramatic change" from "good to evil directing his actions." He did see evidence of defendant's "apparent delusional thinking" in a July 17, 2006 letter to the court, in which defendant stated, "[q]uite absurd under the circumstances that a human facing the most stringent penalty under the constitution of the U.S. has to ask puppeteering aliens, permission to communicate with the implanted entities to be impaneled in what is said to be fair and impartial proceedings." In that letter, defendant also stated that his "state of mind has taken a . . . turn"; Dr. Michals opined that it was very unusual for a schizophrenic to have a radical "change in their belief system." He found that "[p]eople who have the illness of paranoid-schizophrenia basically are controlled by their thinking, their behaviors, control their moods, their thoughts, their action . . . they believe what they believe to be true and they don't see any reason for any change."
Dr. Michals was also critical of Dr. Atkins's opinion that defendant's so-called "fixed delusions" had "expanded," and he found the fact that defendant did not tell Dr. Atkins about his thoughts about the CIA to be "a significant omission." Dr. Michals also noted that the medical records from the jail indicated first "no urgent need for treatment" and then "no need for treatment evident." But, he also agreed, on cross-examination, that the records did not show that "a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation" was conducted.
In his August 24, 2006 report, Dr. Michals found "the testimony of Dr. Atkins and Ms. Nardone, the self-report by Mr. Miraglia, the expansive nature of his complaints had changed from God to the devil, to the CIA, to the correction officers, to other inmates," which was "a very atypical type of pattern in people who have this mental illness, schizophrenia." He was also influenced by the fact that there were no reports from the jail of any "behavioral manifestations" of the expanded delusions. Dr. Michals diagnosed defendant with "a personality disorder" with "narcissistic and borderline features" and opined defendant was competent to stand trial and could cooperate with his attorneys "[i]f he chose to." He still believed defendant was a malingerer and a "calculating, clever person."
The judge also heard the testimony of an operations sergeant with the Monmouth County Sheriff's Office, who testified about his observations of defendant in the prison, and Dr. Edward Samuel Hume, one of two psychiatrists with the Center for Family Guidance hired by the Monmouth County Correctional Institution to provide medical services at that facility.
Over defense counsel's objection, defendant was permitted to testify at the second hearing. When asked by the trial judge if he still felt he was Jesus Christ, defendant testified he could not answer that with a "yes-or-no answer." He explained that "[t]here can be many Christs" and he was "not sure" if he was. Defendant claimed he also "traveled time" but could not tell whether it was "forward or back."
Defendant felt he was competent to stand trial and testified he understood the role of the judge, the prosecutor and the defense attorneys. When the judge asked if defendant understood why his attorneys were saying they had difficulty "cooperating with" defendant, he responded that he had "no problem going forward with an insanity defense" and that his "point-of-view has changed drastically." He continued:
Mind you, I did what I did, I said God told me to do it. Whether I'm right or wrong, I'm not going to make myself right because it's two people who are my friends, I'm not going to make myself wrong in that situation. I say God didn't tell me to do it. I say the devil told me to do it. So, you find me competent to stand trial, when I'm assuming that God told me to do it, . . . I tell these gentlemen, [y]ou know what, [defense attorneys], you are right, that was crazy thinking. It wasn't God, it was the devil.On cross-examination by the prosecutor, defendant stated he was now committed to the insanity defense as his "only viable defense."
Defendant also disputed statements Dr. Atkins attributed to him during that interview and denied filling out a second MMPI questionnaire:
You know, I'm just in the middle of something, Judge. I really don't know what's going on here. I know I killed two people. I know I'm here. I know I'm competent to stand trial. . . . I have no problem using an insanity defense. ThisDefendant felt "they're watching [him] in the jail" and his books were being taken away for no reason; he believed his attorneys "put this motion in to open up this competency evaluation again" just because he said "[t]he devil told me to do it."
conversation with Dr. Atkins, that's not how it went down. . . . [P]eople are putting words in my mouth.
The judge asked defendant to explain how mathematics informed certain events in his life, as he told Dr. Michals. Defendant said he was "sorry [he] said anything to these people because they're taking everything out of context" and he was just "playing with some numbers and it's quite coincidental." Defendant also explained what he meant when he said strange things about the CIA and "[p]uppeteering aliens," claiming that his words were "being taken out of context."
In ruling, the judge expressed that he had been "impressed" with Dr. Atkins's testimony in 2005, and "did accept his testimony as far as concluding that the defendant was a paranoid-schizophrenic and delusional," but he "did not accept his ultimate conclusion" about defendant's competency. The judge explained that because of defendant's "keen understanding of the justice system and his demonstrated above-average intelligence," he could cooperate with his attorneys, "despite delusionary [sic] thinking."
The judge further found that defendant's testimony revealed he "knows the system," "has a strong desire to proceed to trial," and that he "down-played any delusional thinking and even his paranoia":
His testimony before this [c]ourt demonstrates how difficult the competency issue is to resolve. On the face of things, he can play the competency role. But his thinking is still so bizarre that his, that the concerns of Ms. Nardone and Mr. Krakora and Mr. Herman remain legitimate. His desire to have his stage is so strong that he even made an attempt to rehabilitate Dr. Hume. In the past, he wanted no part of a psychiatric defense; now, he has no problem with a psychiatric defense.
[Defendant] is smart and manipulative, and perhaps the [c]ourt was getting manipulated today. I had the feeling that he was calculating the weight of every answer to tip the scales towards competency. In the [c]ourt's first decision concerning [defendant's] competency . . ., the [c]ourt found that [defendant] was not malingering and accepted that he was a paranoid-schizophrenic with delusions. The reasons behind the [c]ourt not accepting that he was a malingerer were based on [defendant's] documented psychiatric history, the nature of the crime itself, and [defendant's] actions immediately after the killing. And the [c]ourt's finding that the testimony of the defendant's mental health experts were more credible on the issue of malingering and the nature of his disease.
In finding him competent following the first competency hearing, the [c]ourt relied on [defendant's] intelligence and keen understanding of the legal system, and felt that counsel would be able to work around his delusional state to prepare their defense case.
. . . .
The [c]ourt is not inclined to change its original decision that [defendant] is delusional and is suffering from paranoid-schizophrenia. The issue to be resolved is whether his delusional state has worsened to the extent that he can no longer cooperate with his attorneys.
. . . .
[Defendant's] testimony before this [c]ourt has done nothing to diminish the [c]ourt's concerns. In fact, it's served to increase the [c]ourt's concerns. We are on the eve of a capital punishment murder case in [sic] and two diligent and experienced trial attorneys take the position they cannot communicate with their client in any rational manner needed to represent him at trial.
The judge thus ruled that, "[a]lthough it remains a close call because of [defendant's] understanding of the system and his intelligence," the State failed to meet its burden of showing that defendant was competent to stand trial at the time. The judge committed defendant to hospitalization in a secure facility for treatment and appointed a psychiatrist to examine defendant for the court. The judge also ordered that defendant be medicated if treating physicians feel it appropriate.
(3)
A third competency hearing took place on April 10, 2007. The judge heard only the testimony of Dr. Mahmood Ghahramani, a psychiatrist at the Ann Klein Forensic Center. Dr. Ghahramani had treated defendant since December 2006; they met once a week during rounds "and then a few times in team meetings and individually." He diagnosed defendant with "bipolar disorder in spontaneous remission," explaining that defendant:
had some signs of what we call it, mildly hypo-manic. He had kind of elated mood. He had pressure of the speech. He had some grandiose ideas. And it was unusually spontaneous and kind of, at times, intrusive. He tried to dominate the interview. And these are the signs of hypo-manic.
Dr. Ghahramani opined that a schizophrenia diagnosis was incorrect because schizophrenia "is a very deteriorating condition" and defendant was not deteriorating but was instead "quite relevant, coherent" and "not extremely detached from reality." He also opined defendant had an "appropriate" affect.
Dr. Ghahramani did not discuss defendant's "legal situation" because defendant "was intelligent enough and knowledgeable enough" to stop him when he tried to ask whether defendant believed he was Jesus Christ. He testified defendant was "aware of the difference" between the competency evaluation and an insanity evaluation, which was "not very usual for a psychiatric patient."
During the last two examinations, Dr. Ghahramani found defendant was "well-oriented to time, place and person," his memory was "intact," concentration was "good," and he was knowledgeable of the legal proceedings. There was no evidence of hallucinations or delusions; defendant would not answer questions about whether he thought he was Jesus Christ.
Dr. Ghahramani came to the opinion in January 2007 that defendant
has been suffering from mental illness of bipolar disorder. Currently he has a kind of mild to moderate degree of hypo-manic state. His bipolar is under remission. And he is well-oriented, well-aware of his surroundings, and he's well-aware of the various rules of the officials in criminal proceedings, and he is able to assist his attorney and participate in a criminal proceeding.
On cross-examination, Dr. Ghahramani admitted he based his opinion mainly on a competency evaluation that lasted about fifty to sixty minutes on January 2, 2007. He acknowledged the rest of his visits with defendant were only maybe five to ten minutes long. Dr. Ghahramani was aware that defendant had previously expressed the belief that God would intervene with the jurors and he would be acquitted; Dr. Ghahramani agreed that "would be a delusional irrational thought." He did not ask defendant if he still held that belief.
In response to the judge's question about defendant's ability to communicate with his attorneys, Dr. Ghahramani testified defendant was "communicating very clearly" with him and "answering the questions quite relevant and coherently." Dr. Ghahramani also reported that "the staff notes actually [were] quite positive [about] his interaction with the peers and the staff" and that defendant needed psychiatric care but "will be able to function in jail."
At the conclusion of the third hearing, at which only Dr. Ghahramani testified, the judge ruled that one of the "motivating factors" in sending defendant to the psychiatric hospital was to have defendant "more closely monitored" and "to get him medicated so that his behavior and thought process would improve." As it turned out, the staff found "no basis to medicate him because he was not acting out in any way, shape or form during the particular proceeding." As a result, the main issue that concerned the judge was defendant's ability to "understand and communicate with his attorneys" and "whether he understood the ramifications of the insanity defense." Because the treating physicians at Ann Klein found no problems with communication, the judge was satisfied the State had "by a preponderance of the evidence shown that he is competent." The judge also noted that the defense failed to recall Dr. Weiss or Dr. Atkins.
(4)
Defendant also argues that his incompetency was revealed by his trial testimony. Certainly defendant is correct that the trial judge had a continuing obligation to consider defendant's competency once the trial commenced. Purnell, supra, 394 N.J. Super. at 49. There is no doubt that Judge Chaiet understood this and, in fact, continued to closely consider the matter.
During voir dire regarding defendant's desire to testify, defendant stated, in response to the judge's question, that he had a "legitimate reason" for wanting to testify:
I would like to shed some light on the situation at hand. That's all I'm trying to do is tell how I see things, because I'm considered to be delusional and insane. So, it's not like I would talk of the normal things. What I would say would be out of the parameters of what the average individual sees. So, it's a matter of opinion between [defense counsel] and my judgment call.Defendant understood that this was not his "pulpit" and that he would have to respond to questions. When defendant asked if he would be "allowed to use the mathematics," the judge declined to get into the specifics of his testimony and said he could discuss it if it was responsive to questions. At that point, the court ended the voir dire, stating
I'm satisfied that he understands that he had a right to testify, a right not to testify. I think he understands that it's his decision, and obviously he's making that decision.
I don't think it's up to the [c]ourt to determine whether it's wise or not for him to testify. I think he has the intelligence to decide whether or not he wants to testify or not in this particular case, and he understands his rights.
Before the jury, defendant testified he had an "extensive" heroin addiction from 1994 to 2004, when he entered the Carrier Clinic for thirty-three days and then went to the Mt. Carmel Guild halfway house for a couple of months. Defendant was "in the middle of fighting a DYFS case" and needed to address his heroin addiction. Besides being in prison for about two years, defendant recounted that he had been "in like 17 different rehabs through the course of [his] life."
Defendant testified he was raised a Catholic but started going to a new Christian church "a little bit" in 2002, and then again in April 2004. He considered himself a "Born Again Christian," but only "for lack of better words," and he stated "I believe in the law of God, which is the holy Bible. I believe it's the law of the universe."
Defendant testified that on the morning of the killings, he listened to "the tapes" by southern preachers:
I'm listening to the tapes, right, and in the [sic] frequency level kicks in again. I'm like, oh, no, you know what I'm saying. I already know the voice. I'm like, all right. And in the process, a revelation came to me, if you want to say via the tapes, or the tapes was just a spark to set it off again. Because after the revelation came to me, the tapes were basically obsolete, and it was just communication, and the communication told me to go to the house and kill the two people that I killed.He acknowledged the words were not on the tapes themselves but "[t]hey came out of what would be the Bible." When asked why, defendant responded "[b]ecause God told me to do it."
. . . .
The revelation is coming to me for about 30 or 40 minutes, and I'm like talking back. I'm like, dude, I'm not going to kill these people, that's a negative, you know what I'm saying, no shot. So, then as I was driving, I remember when I knew I had to do it.
In describing the killings, defendant explained how he parked his car behind a large hedge row where it could not be seen from the house. After unsuccessfully trying to open the front door, he entered his grandmother's house through a window, took a meat cleaver and a knife from the kitchen and put the cleaver in his pocket. He walked upstairs, looked in his grandmother's bedroom and noted she was sleeping, so he continued to the other bedroom where Leigh was sleeping. Defendant explained his thought processes as:
should I just run and plunge this knife in her. I'm like, dude, there's no way I'm doing this. I turned around. Now, when I turned around, there was a picture on the wall. The picture was of Jesus. So, I grabbed the picture, and I go downstairs with it, and I'm in the living room.
. . . .
I was like talking to the picture. I'm like, God, I'm not killing these people, man. There's no way I'm killing these people. This is a done deal. He's like, you're going to do it. I'm hearing his voice. I know what I'm hearing. I'm not crazy. So, anyway, in the process, the young girl comes downstairs, and when she comes downstairs, she says, what are you doing here, and she walked into the kitchen.
. . . .
I asked her, just tell me what you did. I'll get down the line, at the end, what she did and what happened to her down the line. I said, what did you do, just tell me what you did. She's like, you're nuts, you're crazy, get out of here. All right.
I got the meat cleaver in my pocket and the knife in my hand. The chick walks right past me, and I'm like frozen a little bit because I really don't want to do this, and she doesn't go out the front door, she goes upstairs.
Defendant claimed Leigh went into his grandmother's bedroom and told her: "he's nuts, he's talking about God again." Defendant then went into the bedroom, his grandmother screamed "just get out of here" and Leigh hit "three buttons" on the speakerphone, presumably calling 9-1-1. Defendant cut the cord on the phone and then thought "dude, you just signed your own death warrant." Defendant then followed Leigh back into the other bedroom, again saying "just tell me what you did." He explained what happened next:
This is what happens. She throws the cigarettes down, right, and I'm standing, I got the knife in my left hand. I'm facing the head of the bed, but I'm at the foot of the bed, . . . . Then she goes to bend down to pick a Newport up off of the ground because there was a Newport that was loose on the ground.Defendant testified that it took "anywhere from 45 seconds to a minute" for Leigh to bleed to death and then "her body fell on the bed where all that blood was."
When she bends down to pick the Newport up, the knife just moved, bang, went right into her. Boom, I thought it came out her back. Evidently it didn't from the pictures, because there was no knife wound coming out of the back. But the knife comes out. Chick starts bleeding. She says, you killed me. I said, I know, you're dying. And then I didn't stab her multiple times when I killed her. I stabbed her one time. One stab wound killed her. I don't know what happened. She never really fought me. The whole thing is taken out of context. This is exactly what happened.
Defendant testified that, because God told him to do it, after Leigh died he "pulled her down [and] chopped off her head. [He] chopped off her hands. [He] chopped off her feet." When asked if God gave him a reason to do that, defendant responded, "[f]or all intents and purposes, he doesn't owe anybody an explanation. So, that's the best I could tell you. He told me to chop them off." Defendant then picked up "the head" and said, "this one is for John the Baptist, and [he] threw the head on the ground."
While he was "[i]n the process of chopping her up," defendant saw his grandmother watching. He said "dude, just get out of here." His grandmother left for "a split second" and came back asking: "is she dead yet." When defendant said yes, she said "well, call the cops," which defendant planned to do after he killed her too, but he did not tell his grandmother that.
Defendant's grandmother then went downstairs and defendant was "just like frozen for a second" before "the voice says, you got to go get her." Defendant reached his grandmother as she was unlocking and opening the front door:
I heard, dummy, kill this lady now, I'm telling you to kill her. So, I pushed the door shut, all right. I pulled her back. I pushed her down. When she fell down, she fell on two steps. . . . . She said, Al, you broke my hip. All right. I went to stab her. I hit her in the back once with the knife. The knife bent a little bit. I hit her in the back another -- again with the knife. The knife didn't go in. So,Then defendant "killed her by cutting her neck off" with the meat cleaver.
that's when I rolled her over and cut her on the neck.
Defendant claimed he then tried to call police but his cell phone battery was dead. His "goal" had been "to go there, chop them up, and call the cops, deliver a message, that's it." When asked why he planned to call the police, defendant said "[b]ecause God told me to go to the house . . . chop them up, kill them, call the police on your cell, tell them that you're Jesus Christ, I got a message for you to deliver today" -- that he was "just a messenger."
According to defendant, after "everybody is dead about 15 minutes," his uncle "start[ed] banging on the door" and defendant thought "God delivered a cell phone to the door." During that fifteen minutes, defendant was "flustered" because he "just chopped up two people [he] didn't want to kill." He opened the door, "skip[ped] out the door," told his uncle not to go inside, and asked to borrow his cell phone. When his uncle asked about the blood, defendant said "[d]on't worry about it, just don't go in the house." Defendant dialed 9-1-1 and police arrived within four minutes; on cross-examination, defendant agreed he did not tell police how the victims were killed or that God told him to kill them during that phone call.
When the first officer arrived, defendant put his hands on his head and told the officer to arrest him. On cross-examination, defendant agreed that when one officer defendant had known for his "whole life" asked, "what's happening, Russ," defendant said, "Timmy, I killed her, I killed that fucking bitch." He testified that God told him to use those particular words, something he had never told any of the doctors who questioned him in the four years since the killings.
On direct examination, defendant denied he was "mentally ill." He explained that "[m]athematics is absolute. I speak one language, mathematics. Mathematics is nothing delusional about it. The definition of mathematics is absolutely certain, precise, exact." When asked to explain why he did not want to use the insanity defense, defendant explained there was "a fair and impartial jury without no preconceived ideas and not guilty is still on the verdict sheet. So, what's the problem?" He felt that the jury would "be a fool" not to find him not guilty because "if I'm telling the truth and God told me to kill them and they are 12 of the 16 people that are going to be in there, listen to the message that I have." Defendant then went on to explain his mathematics:
I'll give you an example. God, G-O-D, seventh letter of the alphabet, the fifteenth letter of the alphabet, and the fourth letter of the alphabet. Very simpleWhen asked what the numbers proved, defendant responded "[f]irst of all, we're speaking the English language. English equals 74, Jesus equals 74 and Lucifer equals 74," and "[m]athematically, Lucifer and my name add up to be the same."
process, a third grader can understand this. If you add it up, it equals 26. Tree, t-r-e-e. Tree equals 48. Blood, b-l-o-o-d, equals 48. Sex equals 48. Tree, blood, sex. The tree of knowledge of what is good and evil. Egyptian equals 97. Serpent equals 97. Gentile equals 72. HIV/AIDS equals 72. Your seed and her seed.
Defendant continued explaining how the mathematics proved that his
grandfather was Lucifer, and in turn, the mark of the beast is just a DNA of the chimpanzee. It blows the theory of evolution out of the water. It transposes the whole theory of the beast. It's a fallacy. They don't want to tell anybody that the only guy on the plant [sic] at the time who isn't HIV positive is this guy giving you this message. Now, you can believe it or not, but I can mathematically prove it, and God had a reason why I had to killed [sic] them two people.In response to several questions about why God wanted Leigh and his grandmother killed, defendant continued in this fashion, giving long speeches about what number he assigned to particular words, claiming it said in the Bible that "God is going to order Jesus to kill" and he had "to deliver a mathematical message for God." He maintained that he "got math that proves I'm not delusional."
When asked to explain why he signed the second Miranda form as Jesus Christ, defendant responded "[b]ecause God told me to do it" and when "God tells me to do something, I listen. I'm not a fool. I'm not going to a furnace, no shot." Defendant also claimed he did not believe the devil had tricked him into doing it, as he had told Dr. Atkins at one point, and he gave a rambling unintelligible explanation about a building company with a name similar to his and about the "clandestine intelligence agency" trying to poison him.
On cross-examination, defendant agreed he stabbed Leigh multiple times in the chest, shoulder and back and that God helped him. He said that "[t]he God of Israel" and "[t]he Invisible God" killed the two women and he was "blaming it on God." Defendant also agreed it was his hand that held the knife and meat cleaver and that "chopped them up."
C
The crux of defendant's argument at trial and on appeal is that his delusional thinking -- that he was the son of God and that God would implant the idea for acquittal in the juror's minds -- was clear evidence of his inability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. Defendant contends this was evident throughout the three competency hearings, during the voir dire when defendant decided to testify in his own defense, and throughout the course of his trial testimony. We reject this contention not because we find a lack of evidence of mental illness but because, after painstakingly examining the question on multiple occasions, Judge Chaiet determined that defendant was competent to stand trial by applying the standards contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4. That is, the judge's findings in this regard are based on evidence adduced at those hearings, which included extensive expert testimony from both sides, and on his own observation of defendant. The judge's findings command our deference.
II
Defendant also argues he was denied a fair trial because the model jury charge on insanity was not modified to explain that, if defendant were found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to a secure state psychiatric facility and would not be released until the court determined he was no longer a danger to himself or others. Defendant maintains that the added language would eliminate or reduce the possibility of a compromise verdict based on the jury's fear that an acquittal on insanity grounds would lead to defendant's release from incarceration.
At the charge conference, counsel proposed a charge that would explain to the jury that, if found insane, defendant would be committed to a secure facility, would not be entitled to be released until the court determined that he was no longer a danger to himself or others, and that the jury should not speculate as to what would or would not happen to defendant as a result of its verdict. Judge Chaiet ruled that "the model charge sets forth the law, and it makes sense," but agreed to add a sentence that would instruct the jury not to speculate as to what would or would not happen to defendant as a result of the verdict.
Defendant requested that the judge instruct the jury as follows:
As you know, the defendant Rosario Miraglia has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. If the jury returns such a verdict, he will be committed to a secure state psychiatric facility designed to house violent offenders. Although he will be entitled to periodic hearings before the [c]ourt, he will not be entitled to be released into society or any easing of restrictions imposed upon him, unless the [c]ourt determined that he is no longer a danger to himself or, more importantly, to others. Thus, procedures exist to adequately provide for the defendant and to protect the public in the event he is found not guilty by reason of insanity. You should not speculate as to what will or will not happen to the defendant, nor should that issue play any part whatsoever in your deliberations. You should only consider the evidence presented bearing on the question of defendant's mental state at the time of the crime in determining whether he has established the insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
As a result, Judge Chaiet instructed the jury using the Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Insanity" (1988), with a few additions. Just before reading that charge, he stated:
Now, as you know in this particular case, the defense has raised a defense of insanity, and it's what we call an affirmative defense. It's a justification. If you find the legal elements of a particular offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state, then the defense is saying, well, yes, those legal elements may have been proven, but I'm not guilty. I was justified because I was insane. It's an affirmative defense.The judge then gave an extended definition of the term "preponderance of the evidence" and added the following after the section of the model charge that asks the jury to determine whether defendant had sufficient mind to comprehend whether his actions were right or wrong:
So, let's talk to you about the defense of insanity at this particular time.
"Wrong," as used in the insanity defense, will generally incorporate notions of both legal and moral wrong. "Legal wrong" simply means in violation of the laws of government. "Moral wrong" means in violation of the morals of society, as judged by society's standards, not the personal moral code of the particular defendant. Thus, the distinction between legal and moral wrong in a murder case is usually not critical because murder can be
considered both legally and morally wrong. However, in some cases, the distinction between moral wrong and legal wrong can be critical. If a defendant in a criminal case contends, as does Miraglia in this case, that he knowingly killed another in obedience to a command from God, a jury could find the defendant was insane.
In other words, even if defendant knew it was legally wrong to murder under statutory law, if you are satisfied that the defendant was acting under the delusion that God commanded the victims' death, he would be insane if you found that he suffered from a mental disease or defect and he did not know it was morally wrong to kill the victims. Important to your decision is whether you accept that defendant acted under the delusion that God commanded the victims' deaths. The defense argues that Miraglia operated under this delusional state. The state counters that the defendant was not operating under a delusion, and there were other reasons to kill the victims. The state further maintains that there was no mental disease or defect, but even if the defendant did have some mental disease or defect at the time of the incident, it did not impair defendant's capacity to know that the killing was wrong.
In determining whether the defendant in this case has the capacity to know what he did was wrong, you should consider both the legal and moral components of wrong as I have explained them to you.
Thereafter, in accordance with the model charge, the judge instructed the jury:
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not necessarily mean that the defendant will be freed or that theAnd, in response to defendant's concerns about the jury's potential fear if it were to acquit a violent person because he was found to be insane, Judge Chaiet instructed the jury that it "should not speculate as to what will or will not happen to defendant, nor should that issue play any part whatsoever in your deliberations."
individual will be indefinitely committed to a mental institution. Under our law, if you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, it will then be for the Court, the judge, to conduct a further hearing and, among other matters, to determine whether or not the defendant's insanity continues to the present and whether defendant poses a danger to the community or to himself.
The resolution of those matters will ultimately determine what appropriate restrictions need to be placed on the defendant. Thus, procedures exist to adequately provide for the defendant and to protect the public in the event the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity.
In State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 265 (1975), the Court held that a trial judge "should" instruct the jury as to the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict "so that the jury does not act under the mistaken impression that defendant will necessarily be freed or be indefinitely committed to a mental institution." The Krol instruction has been incorporated into the Model Jury Charge on Insanity, and is "required" in cases where an insanity defense is asserted. Williams v. Page, 160 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 78 N.J. 395 (1978).
In this case, Judge Chaiet not only gave the model jury charge, but also further instructed the jury not to speculate on what would happen to defendant as a result of its decision. Because the judge's charge was accurate and designed to further ensure the jury would not speculate as to the consequences of the verdict, he did not err by refusing to add the additional language suggested by defense counsel at trial.
III
Defendant argues that the judge erred in denying defense counsel's motion, to which defendant objected, for a bench trial. He argues that finding defendant competent to stand trial "does not moot the question whether the defendant is competent to make the decision whether to waive a jury trial" and there was "no evidence that [defendant] had any rational basis for refusing to waive a jury trial."
Just before jury selection, defense counsel moved for a bench trial despite defendant's desire for a jury trial. Counsel claimed that even though defendant was found competent to stand trial, his reason for wanting a jury trial is "not reality based" because he believed God would intervene with the jury and he would be acquitted. Because "people don't believe in the insanity defense" and they fear releasing someone who will later commit a violent act, counsel argued that the only way for defendant to receive a fair trial was to have a bench trial. The State objected.
Judge Chaiet correctly concluded that defendant was not entitled to a nonjury trial without the waiver required by Rule 1:8-1(a), and defendant had clearly refused to waive this right. The judge noted that
Mr. Miraglia has indicated all along that he's acutely aware of the legal system, he has no difficulty understanding the legal system, and he's taken the position that he wants a jury trial. And, you know, in this particular case, it would seem to me that if he's not competent to make the decision then . . . counsel can't, on his behalf, waive that particular right, and I think that the standard is for a jury trial, and without a valid waiver, which counsel can not do, he's not entitled to obtain a nonjury trial.The judge additionally stated he would "take great pains during the voir dire process" to deal with the issue of jurors adverse to the insanity defense. The judge also considered the State's objection to a bench trial and the fact that the evidence was not "going to be particularly complex" in denying the request, as well as the fact that defendant was charged with "a severe crime," with the insanity defense implicated and a "[h]ighly charged emotional atmosphere," and that he would be required to make numerous rulings on the admissibility of evidence and deal with "particularly technical matters."
Defendant possessed the constitutional right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. amend. XI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9-10. It is a personal right that belongs to the defendant alone; a defendant may waive the right to trial by jury. State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 610 (2004); State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 312 (1991). Rule 1:8-1(a) directs that criminal actions are to be tried by a jury "unless the defendant, in writing and with the approval of the court, after notice to the prosecuting attorney and an opportunity to be heard, waives a jury trial."
While a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial, the right to insist on a bench trial is not of constitutional dimension. Dunne, supra, 124 N.J. at 316. Rather, trial by jury is the normal and "preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact" in a major criminal case. Ibid. When reviewing a request to waive a jury trial, a court should:
(1) determine whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly, and competently waived the constitutional right to jury trial with advice of counsel;The "relevant factors" include:
(2) determine whether the waiver is tendered in good faith or as a stratagem to procure an otherwise impermissible advantage; and
(3) determine, with an accompanying statement of reasons, whether, considering all relevant factors . . . it should grant
or deny the defendant's request in the circumstances of the case.
[Id. at 317.]
At one end of the scale, tilting in favor of jury trial, will be the gravity of the crime. The higher the degree of the crime, the greater the weight given to that factor. Other factors that will tip the scale will be the position of the State, the anticipated duration and complexity of the State's presentation of the evidence, the amenability of the issues to jury resolution, the existence of a highly-charged emotional atmosphere . . ., the presence of particularly-technical matters that are interwoven with fact, and the anticipated need for numerous rulings on the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence.Another consideration is public confidence in the administration of justice, which is best vindicated by a jury finding. Id. at 315.
[Ibid.]
We review the grant or denial of a request to waive a jury trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 314. An "abuse of discretion only arises on demonstration of 'manifest error or injustice[,]'" Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005)), and occurs when the trial judge's "decision [was] 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Here, the judge denied defense counsel's request for a non-jury trial because defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial and defense counsel could not waive that right for him. Moreover, Judge Chaiet reviewed the Dunne factors thoroughly, finding, among other things, that defendant was charged with a severe crime, the issues were not complex, and he would be called upon to make numerous rulings on the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence.
In this vein, defendant lastly argues that the trial judge erred in failing to address whether defendant, although found competent to stand trial, was capable of "knowingly, intelligently, and competently refusing to waive a jury trial." Citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345, 357 (2008), as "directly on point," defendant claims the judge should have taken a "realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities" in determining whether the refusal to waive his right to a jury trial was "knowing, voluntary and competent." Because defendant believed the jury would acquit him, counsel argues that defendant "was unable rationally to refuse to waive a jury trial."
The trial judge addressed this argument, noting that, in Edwards, the Court
addressed the narrow issue of whether the constitution permits a state to limit the defendant's self-representation right by insisting upon representation by counsel at trial on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented, and the Court held that the constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial . . ., but still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
And I think that's a different issue than what we have in the particular case, because our case law clearly indicates that the preferred method of trying a case is with a jury trial, especially in a case such as this when the charges are so serious and dealing with murder.
We agree with Judge Chaiet's analysis that whether someone is competent to represent themselves at trial is not the same as whether that person was competent to waive their constitutional right to trial by jury. Although defendant presented the delusional thinking that a deity would intervene on his behalf and instruct the jury to acquit him, defendant also quite rationally stated that he wanted a jury trial because "[w]ith 12 other individuals over here, [he] only need[ed] one of them in order to be -- draw a hung jury."
The trial judge did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for a bench trial over defendant's objection.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION