Opinion
No. 4-169 / 03-1700
Filed March 24, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell, District Associate Judge.
Jill Miller appeals from her conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). AFFIRMED.
David Kuehner of Laird Luhring Law Office, Waverly, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Kasey Wadding, County Attorney, and Bryan Barker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Jill Miller appeals from her conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003). Miller contends the district court erred when it overruled her motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On May 21, 2003, Jill Miller filed a motion to suppress evidence stemming from a stop by Officer Troy Schneider on April 14, 2003. A hearing was conducted on June 23, 2003. In it's order denying the motion to suppress the district court found the following facts:
Officer Schneider testified that on the evening of April 14, 2003, at approximately 11:30 p.m. he was on duty patrolling in Waverly. Officer Schneider testified that he observed the front end of the Defendant's vehicle dip. He testified that he commonly sees this motion on a vehicle that has come to an abrupt or sudden stop. Officer Schneider testified that he decided to follow the vehicle.
Officer Schneider testified that the Defendant's vehicle came to a stop at a stop light. He testified that the vehicle stopped approximately fifteen feet away from the stop line. Officer Schneider testified that he pulled up beside the vehicle and could observe the driver's profile. He testified that the driver of the vehicle did not make eye contact with him. Officer Schneider testified that in Waverly, most people wave or make eye contact with him. Officer Schneider testified that in his experience, people who avoid eye contact generally are having some kind of problem such as drunk driving or being in possession of controlled substances or having a suspended driver's license.
Officer Schneider testified that when the light turned green, this vehicle made an extremely slow left turn. He testified that this turn was executed so slowly that by the time he was able to turn to follow it, he had to wait for a car that was traveling in the opposite direction to go through the intersection.
Officer Schneider testified that as he followed the Defendant's vehicle, he clocked the vehicle traveling at 13 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. Officer Schneider testified that the vehicle also followed the curb which is where the vehicle traveled immediately next to the curb of the road and where there was a parked vehicle on the right hand side of the road, the Defendant's vehicle slowly moved away around the parked car and then immediately returned back to the curb. Officer Schneider testified that this is not the usual method of travel for individuals in Waverly. Officer Schneider testified that the Defendant's vehicle went around two vehicles in this manner.
Officer Schneider testified that the vehicle traveled across a one-lane green bridge. Officer Schneider testified that the posted speed limit on this bridge is fifteen miles per hour. He testified that the vehicle traveled across the green bridge at eight miles per hour.
Officer Schneider then stopped this vehicle. Officer Schneider testified that he stopped the vehicle because he believed that the driver was either intoxicated or there was something medically wrong with the driver.
Officer Schneider testified that he is not aware of any traffic violations that the driver of this vehicle had committed. He testified that he was not certain whether or not there was a requirement that a vehicle stop at the white line of a marked intersection or not.II. Standard of Review.
We review de novo the ultimate conclusion reached by the district court on a motion to suppress. State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001). In doing so, we independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances shown by the entire record. Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606. "We give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but the Court is not bound by those findings." Id. III. Investigatory Stop of Miller's Vehicle.
The issue presented before this court is whether the circumstances in this case provided Officer Schneider with reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow an investigatory stop of Miller's vehicle. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. Evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is inadmissible, regardless of its relevancy or probative value. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 357.
Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997) (citations omitted). An exception to the warrant requirement exists when the totality of the circumstances provide an officer with specific and articulable facts, which taken together with a rational inference from those facts, warrants the intrusion of a stop. State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). Such circumstances will allow an officer to stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes. Id. Law enforcement officers are allowed to stop a vehicle if the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including the officer's observations and experiences, give rise to a specific, articulable, and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 749-50 (2002) ("This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.").
The evidence justifying the stop need not rise to the level of probable cause. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642. Yet, circumstances raising a mere suspicion or curiosity are not enough. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at 358. However, officers may conduct stops with "considerably less than proof of wrongdoing." State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 496-97 (Iowa 1993) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)).
An officer's reasonable suspicion leading to an investigatory stop need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. at 753, 151 L. Ed.2d at 752. A number of factors that could be considered innocent could collectively amount to reasonable suspicion. Id.; see also United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2000) ("A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may be formed by observing exclusively legal activity.").
In its order the district court noted, "A good test of such a founded suspicion is the possibility of criminal conduct was strong enough that upon an objective appraisal of the situation, we would be critical of the officers had they let the event pass without investigation." Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642. Miller was first observed when she made an abrupt stop. She then stopped fifteen feet short of a stop line. She did not acknowledge the officer when he pulled up beside her. Then, she made an extremely slow left turn. She was clocked traveling at about half of the posted speed limit. She was also driving very close to the right-hand curb and driving deliberately around parked cars, only to return to the curb. Upon considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court found Officer Schneider was more than justified in stopping Miller's vehicle. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to deny Miller's motion to suppress.