Opinion
No. 5-855 / 04-2063
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, John Bauercamper, Judge.
A defendant appeals his judgment and conviction for kidnapping in the first degree. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Ann E. Brenden, and A. Patricia Houlihan, Assistant Attorneys General, and William J. Shafer, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Justin Meyer appeals from his judgment and conviction following a jury trial for kidnapping in the first degree, a class A felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1(3) and 710.2 (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Justin Meyer and Brittany West had a tumultuous relationship beginning in February 2002. A son, Cody, was born of the relationship in February 2003. The couple separated a final time in the fall of 2003, and West began dating Mark Sullivan. Throughout the day of December 7, 2003, Justin Meyer attempted to call West approximately one hundred times prompting West to turn off the ringer on her phone. Meyer then traveled from his parent's residence in New Albin, Iowa, to West's home in Caledonia, Minnesota three times during the evening of December 7th and the early morning hours of December 8th. On the first trip, while peering through a window, he observed West with Sullivan on the couch in the living room. On the second trip, he poured sugar in the gas tanks of both West's and Sullivan's vehicles. On the final trip to West's home around 3:30 a.m. on December 8th, Meyer cut the home's telephone line, broke into and entered the house through a basement window, carrying with him a loaded 16-gauge shotgun. Meyer then went to an upstairs bedroom where West was asleep with Sullivan in the bed. Ten-month old Cody lay sleeping on the floor beside the bed. Meyer turned on the light and said, "Rise and shine." After initially pointing the gun at West, he then pointed it at Sullivan and shot Sullivan in the head, killing him. West jumped out of bed, grabbed the baby, and with the gun again pointed at her, began pleading for her life. West tried to escape from the room, but Meyer blocked her path. The gun remained pointed at her, at times with the barrel touching her body. In an effort to calm Meyer down and save her life, West began to assure Meyer that she still loved him and that they could once again be together as a family. Meyer continued to yell at West, upset because she had a sexual relationship with Sullivan. He exclaimed how he "was not going to prison." Eventually, Meyer moved West, who was still holding Cody, to the kitchen. Meyer then ordered West to go with him to her car to retrieve her cell phone. West attempted to escape twice during the forty-five minutes while they remained at her house after Sullivan's death, but was prevented from doing so. At some point, Meyer ordered West to put Cody down and go with him to the basement where he threatened to kill her then himself. West refused.
After further mulling over the situation, Meyer decided West should drive Sullivan's vehicle back to Sullivan's residence while Meyer kept Cody in his truck with him. West heeded Meyer's instructions. The three then headed in Meyer's truck to his parents' home in New Albin, Iowa. They returned to Caledonia long enough for Meyer to try and put the telephone line leading to West's home back in place so as not to raise immediate suspicion. En route to New Albin, Meyer kept the loaded shotgun between him and West, with the barrel touching her leg and the stock and trigger readily accessible to his right hand. Meyer discussed how he could hide Sullivan's body by burning down West's home or submerging the body in water. West begged him not to burn down her house. Arriving in New Albin around 5:00 a.m. to an empty house, Meyer fed Cody a bottle, then took him to an upstairs bedroom. West followed. Meyer asked West to have sexual intercourse with him "one last time," which West refused. However, afraid of again enraging Meyer, West eventually lay down on the bed, where Meyer partially disrobed her and had intercourse with her against her will. Sometime later, Meyer's younger brother came home, and Meyer admitted to him that he killed Sullivan. While Meyer and his brother were in the garage smoking, West was able to retrieve her cell phone and whisper a 911 call. When the police arrived, Meyer surrendered to their authority. Meyer was charged in Iowa by trial information with first-degree kidnapping, of which he was convicted following a jury trial in November 2004. Meyer now appeals, claiming various errors by the district court.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Although not raised as an issue in their briefs on appeal, at oral argument the parties referenced the propriety of Iowa's jurisdiction over Meyer as to the kidnapping charge. Iowa Code section 803.1 provides:
1. A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which the person commits within or outside this state, by the person's own conduct or that of another for which the person is legally accountable, if:
a. The offense is committed either wholly or partly within this state.
Iowa Code § 803.1 (2003) (emphasis added). That section further specifically addresses a kidnapping crime occurring partly in Iowa, declaring that if a kidnapping victim is found in the state "the confinement or removal of the victim from one place to another is presumed to have occurred within the state." Id. § 803.1(2).
Meyer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the specific intent requirement of the first-degree kidnapping conviction, and more specifically, submission to the jury of four alternate theories upon which specific intent could have been found. While the trial information only cited code sections 710.1(3) and 710.2 on first degree kidnapping, it also explicitly detailed the specific intent grounds of sections 710.1(4) (intent to secretly confine) and 710.1(5) (intent to interfere with the performance of any government function) in the allegation of Meyer's criminal acts. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict for correction of errors at law. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Iowa 2002). A verdict of guilty is binding on appeal unless no substantial evidence exists to support it, or it is clearly against the weight of the evidence. State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The question before us is not whether the evidence in the record unequivocally mandates a conviction, but whether the entire record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Iowa 2001).
A. Affirmative Defense.
West testified that she knew she must comply with Meyer's minute by minute demands and chosen course of action or she would not have survived the ordeal. In his appeal, Meyer concedes that West was held in her home, transported to Iowa, and forced to have sex with him, all against her will. However, Meyer presented a diminished responsibility defense at trial with diagnoses of paranoid personality disorder, dependent personality disorder, and depression. He now contends that because of his mental problems there was not sufficient evidence supporting the jury's verdict that he formed the specific intent required by first degree kidnapping. Diminished responsibility is a common law doctrine which may arise when a defendant has a mental condition which prevents him from forming a specific intent to commit a crime. See State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000).
The State's expert witness, Dr. Michael Taylor, testified that Meyer was not psychotic, had the capacity to know the difference between right and wrong, and was absolutely capable of forming specific intent. Dr. Taylor also stated that no personality disorder such as Meyer claimed to have could be severe enough to negate one's ability to form specific intent. To counter the State's position, Meyer relies heavily on the differing testimony and opinions of his expert witness, Dr. Thomas Sannito, as well as challenging West's credibility. Dr. Sannito testified that while Meyer knew the difference between right and wrong and that he knew what he was doing on December 8th, he lacked the specific intent under the kidnapping statute to support Meyer's conviction. He explained that because West appeared to be going along with Meyer's demands, her actions led Meyer to believe she was a willing participant. The jury was free to accept or reject any of the evidence, State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001), and we defer to the jury's credibility assessments. State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Iowa 2001). We conclude that substantial evidence exists to support Meyer's capability to form the necessary specific intent and the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense.
B. Various Grounds for Specific Intent in First Degree Kidnapping.
Meyer also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to all of the different grounds submitted for specific intent on the kidnapping charge. Instruction number 22 submitted to the jury alleged Meyer confined or removed West from one place to another with the specific intent to do one or more of the following:
(1) inflict serious injury upon Brittany West,
(2) subject Brittany West to sexual abuse,
(3) secretly confine Brittany West, or
(4) interfere with the performance of any governmental function.
A trial court must instruct on all material issues raised by the evidence, where there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. State v. Broughton, 425 N.W.2d 48, 51-52 (Iowa 1988) (citations omitted). Specific intent is "seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence, and is usually established by inference." State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted); see also State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001) (noting direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative so long as they give rise to a fair inference of guilt).
1. Inflict Serious Injury.
The first ground submitted on specific intent for the kidnapping charge was Meyer's intent to inflict serious injury on Brittany West. Substantial evidence demonstrated that Meyer intended to seriously injure West. After stealthily entering West's home at night, Meyer shot and killed Sullivan in extremely close proximity to West. Meyer then held West captive before taking her to Iowa, armed with a loaded shotgun and repeatedly making verbal threats to kill West. We conclude substantial evidence supported submitting specific intent to inflict serious injury to the jury.
2. Subject to Sexual Abuse.
Meyer did not object to the submission of this ground as an element to the first degree kidnapping charge, thereby failing to preserve it for our review. Any error that the defendant raises after trial is limited by the exceptions taken at trial. State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1992). Any ground not asserted at trial is not preserved for appellate review. State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996). Therefore we deem the issue waived and do not reach the merits.
3. Secretly Confine.
The third ground submitted on specific intent to kidnap was Meyer's intent to secretly confine West. The following actions by Meyer provided substantial evidence supporting this ground: (1) removing West's means of escape by putting sugar in her gas tank; (2) cutting the phone line at West's home and securing her cell phone so West could not call for help; (3) physically blocking West's several attempts to escape; (4) covering up any external sign that a crime had occurred by attempting to conceal the cut phone line; and (5) taking West at gunpoint from her home to Meyer's parents' residence in Iowa. Once in Iowa, Meyer continued to confine West by refusing to give her keys to any vehicles or allowing her to call for assistance. Only after Meyer was otherwise occupied in the garage with his brother was West able to make a hurried and whispered 911 call. The district court did not err in submitting specific intent to secretly confine, as substantial evidence supported its submission to the jury.
4. Interfere with the Performance of any Government Function.
The final ground for specific intent submitted to the jury, intent to interfere with the performance of any government function, was also supported by substantial evidence. While there is no case law in Iowa construing this basis for a specific intent finding, we conclude from a plain reading of the statute that the legislature intended this to include any kidnapping undertaken to evade apprehension, destroy evidence, or prevent discovery of a crime. After killing Mark Sullivan in bed next to West, Meyer compelled West to assist him to dispel immediate suspicion of the crime by driving Sullivan's truck back to his residence and replacing the cut telephone line in its box. He removed any means West had of alerting the authorities of Sullivan's murder or her predicament, taking her cell phone, and blocking West's various escape attempts by direct or implied threats of violence or death. Meyer repeatedly stated that he was "not going to prison" and essentially took control over the only person who could directly identify him as the perpetrator. He plotted to cover-up the evidence of the murder, by either burning down West's house or submerging Sullivan's body in water. These acts all demonstrate Meyer's intent to interfere with the government's function, including the detection of his crimes, discovery of evidence implicating him, and securing his apprehension. We likewise conclude that this ground for specific intent was properly submitted to the jury as supported by substantial evidence at trial. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence exists to find that Meyer harbored the requisite specific intent under first-degree kidnapping as instructed by the district court, and affirm Meyer's judgment and conviction as to this issue.
C. General Verdict Issue.
Meyer also seeks to invalidate his conviction on the inability to determine from the general verdict form which of the grounds for specific intent the jury relied. Since we find no error in Instruction No. 22 as there was sufficient evidence to submit all of the different grounds for specific intent, Meyer's contention is without merit. Compare State v. Williams , 674 N.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Iowa 2004) (stating that if an instruction allows the jury to consider multiple theories of culpability as to one charge, only some of which are supported by the evidence, and a general verdict of guilty is returned, a reversal is required because "we have no way of determining which theory the jury accepted.") (citation omitted), with State v. Martens, 569 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing that a case with "legal errors and [violations of] constitutional protections" based on an alleged misinterpretation of a statutory term by the jury requires reversal), and Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371, 383 (1991) (distinguishing between "legal error" where a particular theory of conviction submitted is defective as a matter of law (e.g., "fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime") requiring reversal for new trial and "factual inadequacy" as to the charges submitted to the jury, which does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction).
IV. Evidentiary Issues on Appeal.
Meyer makes several challenges on appeal to the district court's ruling on admission of certain evidence during the trial. A trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence are discretionary. State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Iowa 1992) (citations omitted). We will reverse an evidentiary ruling only when a trial court is shown to have abused its discretion in balancing the probative force of the challenged evidence against the danger of undue prejudice or influence. Id. A. Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence.
Meyer asserts that the court erred when it admitted evidence concerning prior acts of domestic violence by Meyer against West. Much of this testimony came through Meyer's own expert witness, Dr. Sannito, as well as through West's descriptions of past severe physical abuse. In general, relevant evidence is admissible. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. Relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. Even when evidence is relevant, it "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Rule 5.404( b) sets forth a specific rule governing the admissibility of a person's other crimes, wrongs, or acts. It provides in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( b). Thus, when a prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct, the evidence must be probative of "some fact or element in issue other than the defendant's criminal disposition." State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 123 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001)). Prior incidents of domestic abuse between persons with a close emotional attachment are relevant under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404( b) to show intent at the time of the crime. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 125-30. "[T]he defendant's prior conduct directed to the victim of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship between the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the defendant's probable motivation and intent in subsequent situations." Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
Considered in isolation, a defendant's outward conduct may be ambiguous or entirely lawful. Only by showing that history can the state establish the justifiable inference that a defendant's charged conduct was in fact intended to engender fear on the part of the victim and that [the] defendant knew that it was likely to do so.
Id. at 128 (quoting State v. Andrich, 943 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Mo.Ct.App. 1997)).
Meyer strongly contested the element of specific intent supporting the first-degree kidnapping charge, as he claimed West voluntarily went along with his manipulative demands following the murder of Sullivan. Meyer and West's versions of the events were squarely incompatible. The State argued that the prior acts were relevant to prove both Meyer's specific intent and to support West's testimony. It was important for the State's case to show that West was familiar with Meyer's past abusive treatment of her so that the jury could understand she went along with Meyer's demands only as attempting to survive the ordeal.
If a court determines prior bad acts evidence "is relevant to a legitimate factual issue in dispute, the court must then decide if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant." State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004) (citing Iowa R. Evid. 5.403). Unfair prejudice arises when the evidence would cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the proven facts and applicable law, such as sympathy for one party or a desire to punish a party. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124 (citations omitted). In determining whether unfair prejudice generated by evidence of a defendant's other misconduct substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, the court should consider the need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear proof the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the strength or weakness of the evidence on the relevant issue, and the degree to which the fact finder will be prompted to decide the case on an improper basis. Id. In weighing the possible unfair prejudice from admission of such evidence, we look to the actual need for the evidence in light of the issues and other evidence available. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 129.
The need for the prior acts evidence to show Meyer's intent was especially strong in this case. As noted above, Meyer strongly disputed his specific intent to kidnap West. He presented a diminished responsibility defense through the testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Sannito, along with assertions that West freely accompanied him to Iowa and later engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with him. It boiled down to whether the jury accepted Meyer's version of the events of December 8, 2003. When specific intent is hotly contested and witnesses' accounts of the events are remarkably at odds, the need for admitting such evidence is very high. Id. (citations omitted). While other evidence was available as to specific intent, it was circumstantial and each party presented conflicting evidence on Meyer's intent. As in Taylor, West had a no contact order against Meyer due to her allegations of his prior domestic abuse. The limited evidence presented in this trial as to the prior domestic abuse is sufficiently corroborative of West's testimony as to her fear of Meyer and what he may do to her if she did not cooperate with him "to prevent the jury from engaging in speculation [about the prior misconduct] or drawing inferences based on mere suspicion." Id. (citing State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 1997)). We conclude the prior acts were not unduly prejudicial when gauged against the need for such evidence in this case. We agree with the district court that the probative relevance value of Meyer's prior domestic assaults on West was not outweighed by any resulting prejudice, and affirm admission of the acts into evidence as to Meyer's intent.
B. Past Sexual Contact with the Victim.
Meyer also claims on appeal that the district court erred by prohibiting him from introducing evidence of his past sexual contact with Brittany West "in the weeks leading up to December 8, 2003." While Meyer did file a notice and offer of proof as required by Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.412, his offer was limited to testimony by either himself or his mother Gail Meyer and encompassed only events on December 4 and 5. The district court granted Meyer's request to present such evidence, limiting it only by the dates presented in the offer of proof and rejecting one hearsay statement between Gail Meyer and Meyer's sister Jessie Melbe. Meyer did not change or expand his request as to his and West's prior sexual contacts, nor did Meyer or his mother testify at trial. The district court never addressed acts beyond the dates and facts in the offer of proof, and Meyer did not otherwise object or offer any evidence at trial as to the prior sexual relationship. We conclude that this issue as to sexual contact with West beyond the offer of proof was not preserved for appeal because of his failure to present the evidence at trial for ruling by the district court. See State v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108, 114 (Iowa 1995). We therefore deem this issue waived and do not address the merits.
C. Photographs of Mark Sullivan.
Meyer's final issue on appeal is that the district court erred by admitting into evidence two photographs depicting Mark Sullivan's body, particularly a close-up shot of Sullivan's mortal head wound. The admission or exclusion of photographs or other visual evidence lies in the discretion of the trial court, and we will not interfere in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 196-97 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). The test for admission of such evidence is two-fold: (1) the evidence must be relevant and (2) if the evidence is relevant, the trial court must determine whether the probative value of the exhibits outweighs the prejudice which would be caused by their admission into evidence. Id.
The State offered the photographs in question (1) to refute the defense's claims that Brittany West voluntarily accompanied Meyer to Iowa and later consented to sexual intercourse, and (2) to further demonstrate Meyer's specific intent with regard to the kidnapping. Upon objection by Meyer to the admission of these photographs, the district court ruled that the photographs were "relevant in view of the defense that the victim, Brittany West, voluntarily accompanied the Defendant to Iowa and related issues and that the need to establish those facts permits them to be admitted despite their gruesome nature." Meyer claimed that the shotgun accidentally discharged, killing Sullivan and that West voluntarily went to Iowa and later engaged in consensual sex with him. We agree with the district court that the photographs depicting the murder scene were relevant to refute Meyer's claim that he lacked specific intent to kidnap West. There was only one photograph admitted that depicted the horrific murder scene which arguably prompted West to comply with any demand made by Meyer. West testified that she believed that unless she complied with Meyer's demands, her fate would be the same as Sullivan's. Although gruesome, we also agree with the district court that the photographs were relevant and more probative than prejudicial. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs.
V. Conclusion.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to both find Meyer had the specific intent required by the instruction on first degree kidnapping and submit the three contested bases for specific intent. We also agree with the district court's admission of evidence concerning Meyer's prior acts of domestic violence against Brittany West and the two photographs of Mark Sullivan's corpse. We do not address the merits of Meyer's claim as to sexual contact with West beyond his rule 5.412 offer of proof, as we deem it waived for failure to preserve error in the district court. We therefore affirm Meyer's judgment and conviction on all issues on appeal.