Opinion
No. COA12–263.
2013-02-5
STATE of North Carolina v. Tony MEMIJE.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donald W. Laton, for the State. Anne Bleyman for Defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 September 2011 by Judge Richard W. Stone in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donald W. Laton, for the State. Anne Bleyman for Defendant-appellant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Tony Memije appeals from a judgment entered based upon his plea of guilty to felonious breaking or entering and larceny and his admission that he had attained the status of an habitual felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that the indictment purporting to charge him with felonious larceny fails to adequately describe the property he is alleged to have stolen and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained by investigating officers in the course of his arrest. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should remain undisturbed.
I. Background
A. Substantive Facts
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on 11 March 2011, Officer David Doby of the Kernersville Police Department was dispatched to Lot 53 in a mobile home park located at 216 Bost Street “in reference to a house break-in in progress.” The instructions provided to Officer Doby stemmed from an anonymous 911 call to the effect that “two Hispanic males or two black males had broken into the front door of Lot 53,” that “they were still in the residence[,] and [that] a black vehicle was parked outside the residence.”
Bost Street is a one-block cul-de-sac with mobile homes on both sides of the roadway. As a result of the fact that he was “right around the corner” from Bost Street when he received the call, Officer Doby arrived at the designated location within thirty seconds after learning of the need to do so. As Officer Doby drove down Bost Street, he saw Defendant, who was carrying a woman's purple purse, and another Hispanic man, who was later identified as a Mr. Rodriguez, running from a trailer. Defendant's car, which was an older black Mercedes, had been backed into the driveway of the trailer and was parked approximately 15 or 20 feet from the front door. Defendant ran to the car, threw the purse on the front seat, then jumped into the front seat, while the other man got into the rear seat.
On direct examination, Officer Doby testified that he saw Defendant running from the trailer at Lot 53, the location at which the break-in was allegedly occurring. On cross-examination, however, Officer Doby acknowledged that he did not confirm the lot number of the trailer from which Defendant and his compatriot were fleeing before placing them under arrest.
Upon observing the men running from the trailer, Officer Doby “blocked [their] vehicle in[, and] jumped out at gunpoint.” After ordering the two men out of the car, Officer Doby handcuffed the men and took them into custody. Although Officer Doby searched both men, he found nothing incriminating on their persons. Office Doby put Mr. Rodriguez in the back seat of his car while another officer, who had arrived on the scene after Officer Doby, placed Defendant in his patrol vehicle.
On cross-examination, Officer Doby testified that, “at the time [he] arrested [Defendant,]” he acted on the basis of the fact that Defendant “was coming out of a trailer that had been broken into with a pocketbook in his hands.” On redirect examination, Officer Doby testified that he had been told that “two Hispanic males or two black males had broken into the front door of Lot 53” and that they were “still parked outside the residence, black vehicle parked outside the residence.” In addition, Officer Doby testified that:
Q. Would you go through for us in your mindset, what were the factors in your mind that established probable cause to place Mr. Memije and Mr. Rodriguez under arrest at that time?
A. As I was pulling up, I was looking both sides ... for Lot 53, looking both sides, looking for a black vehicle, looking for two Hispanic males in the area, black males in the area ... or leaving the area. As I was pulling in looking, at the point I saw them, I saw them running out of the front door.... I accelerated the vehicle, pulled up alongside their car, jumped out at gunpoint as they was running out the door, down the porch—onto the porch, down the porch with the purple pocketbook in the hand and throwing it into the passenger seat of the vehicle.
According to Officer Doby, there were no reports of other break-ins on Bost Street and no other mobile homes outside of which a black car was parked or from which people were running.
After Defendant and Mr. Rodriguez were taken into custody, Officer Doby searched the automobile that was parked in the driveway and found “the purple pocketbook with jewelry belonging to the victim in it, a pair of latex gloves, [and] some other items[.]” According to Officer Doby, the purse discovered in the black Mercedes was “the pocketbook that was seen in [Defendant's] hands as he was running out” of the trailer. After investigating officers determined that the victim of the break-in was Irma Gallegos and made contact with her, Ms. Gallegos came to the scene and identified the items taken from the black Mercedes as belonging to her. After being taken to the Kernersville Police station, Defendant was interviewed by Detective J.R. Tilley of the Kernersville Police Department, waived his Miranda rights, and made an inculpatory statement.
B. Procedural History
On 11 March 2011, a Magistrate's Order was issued charging Defendant with felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. On 2 May 2011, the Forsyth County grand jury returned indictments charging Defendant with felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, and having attained the status of an habitual felon. A superseding indictment bearing a different file number was returned on 6 June 2011 for the purpose of charging Defendant with felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny.
On 1 September 2011, Defendant filed a motion seeking to suppress have all property that was seized at the time of his arrest and the statement that he made to investigating officers after his arrest on the grounds that this evidence had been “unlawfully seized and searched” in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 19 and 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. After holding a hearing on 8 September 2011 to address the issues raised by Defendant's suppression motion, the trial court orally denied Defendant's suppression motion and dictated findings of fact into the record.
On the same date, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, and having attained habitual felon status while reserving his right to seek appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion. Based upon Defendant's guilty pleas, the trial court entered a judgment consolidating Defendant's convictions for judgment and sentencing him to a term of sixty-six to eighty-nine months imprisonment. During the proceedings held in conjunction with the entry of Defendant's guilty plea, his trial counsel gave oral notice of appeal to this Court from the denial of his suppression motion. On 26 October 2011, a hearing was held for the purpose of formally entering a written order denying Defendant's suppression motion. During the course of that proceeding, Defendant orally noted an appeal from the order denying his suppression motion.
As a result of the fact that the record on appeal presented for this Court's review did not contain any indication that Defendant had noted an appeal from the trial court's judgment, Defendant's appeal was subject to dismissal. See e.g., State v. Hughes, 210 N.C. App 482, 707 S.E.2d 777, 778–79 (2011) (dismissing an appeal on the grounds that the defendant had failed to note an appeal from the judgment entered against him). In apparent recognition of the defective manner in which he had attempted to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, Defendant filed a petition on 20 September 2012 seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of his challenge to the trial court's judgment on the merits. “While this Court cannot hear defendant's direct appeal, it does have the discretion to consider the matter by granting a petition for writ of certiorari.” State v. McCoy, 171 N.C.App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320,appeal dismissed,360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E .2d 626 (2005). “The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]” N.C. R.App. P. 21(a). As a result, in the exercise of our discretion, we elect to grant Defendant's certiorari petition in order to reach his claims on the merits.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Adequacy of the Felonious Larceny Indictment
In his first challenge to the trial court's judgment, Defendant argues that the indictment purporting to charge him with felonious larceny “is fatally defective because it does not sufficiently allege the essential elements of the offense.” More specifically, Defendant contends that the felonious larceny indictment was facially invalid on the grounds that it failed to sufficiently describe the property he was alleged to have stolen. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
1. Standard of Review
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–924(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that an indictment must include:
[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation....
“North Carolina law has long provided that ‘[t]here can be no trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. In the absence of an accusation the court acquires no jurisdiction whatever, and if it assumes jurisdiction a trial and conviction are a nullity.’ “ State v. Neville, 108 N .C.App. 330, 332, 423 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1992) (quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17–18 (1966)). As a result, if “an indictment is alleged to be invalid on its face, thereby depriving the trial court of [subject matter] jurisdiction, a challenge to that indictment may be made at any time, even if it was not contested in the trial court.” State v. Wallace, 351 N .C. 481, 503, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341,cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 121 S.Ct. 581, 148 L.Ed.2d 498 (2000). We “review[challenges to] the sufficiency of an indictment de novo.” State v. McKoy, 196 N.C.App. 650, 652, 675 S.E.2d 406, 409,disc. review denied,363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 215 (2009).
According to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–72(b)(2), larceny of any property, regardless of its value, is a felony if the larceny is “[c]ommitted pursuant to a violation of ... [N.C. Gen.Stat. § ] 14–54[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–54 provides that any person “who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H felon.” Although the “ ‘general rule in this State and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent words [,]’ “ State v. Harris, ––– N.C. App ––––, ––––, 724 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2012) (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953)), larceny is a common law, rather than a statutorily-defined, offense.
“ ‘The essential elements of larceny are that [the] defendant (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner's consent; and (4) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property.’ “ State v. Justice, ––– N.C. App ––––, ––––, 723 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2012) (quoting State v. Coats, 74 N.C.App. 110, 112, 327 S.E.2d 298, 300,cert. denied, 314 N.C. 118, 332 S.E.2d 492 (1985)). “[O]ur case law on larceny indictments makes clear that the property alleged to have been taken must be identified ‘with certainty sufficient to enable the jury to say that the article proved to be stolen is the same, and to enable the court to see that it is the subject of larceny and also to protect the defendant ... in the event of future prosecution for the offense.’ “ Justice, ––– N.C. App at –––, 723 S.E.2d at 801 (quoting State v. Ingram, 271 N.C. 538, 542, 157 S.E.2d 119, 122 (1967)) (internal citation omitted).
2. Sufficiency of the Description of the Stolen Property
On appeal, Defendant argues that the felonious larceny indictment returned against him did not sufficiently describe the property he was alleged to have stolen. In attempting to persuade us of the validity of this argument, Defendant cites several cases holding that particular property descriptions in indictments were inadequate. In each of these cases, however, the stolen property was identified only in the most general terms.
For example, in Ingram, 271 N.C. at 543, 157 S.E.2d at 123, the Supreme Court held that a “description of [stolen] property by the general and broadly comprehensive words, ‘merchandise, chattels, money, valuable securities and other personal property’ [wa]s not sufficient.” Similarly, in Justice, we held, in reliance upon Ingram, that an indictment charging the defendant with having removed anti-theft devices from items which were offered for sale in an effort to steal “merchandise” was fatally defective. Justice, ––– N.C. App at ––––, 723 S.E.2d at 801. In Justice, we compared the allegations before us in that case with the indictment discussed in State v. Monk, 36 N.C.App. 337, 340–41, 244 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1978), which charged the defendant “with stealing ‘assorted items of clothing, having a value of $504.99 the property of Payne's, Inc.” In upholding the conviction at issue in Monk, we held that the quoted language “was sufficiently descriptive to fulfill the purposes of an indictment.” Monk, 36 N.C.App. at 341, 244 S.E.2d at 189. As a result, our cases establish that describing stolen property as “merchandise” is insufficient, while alleging that the defendant stole “assorted items of clothing” that were the property of a named victim adequately supports a criminal conviction.
The felonious larceny indictment returned against Defendant in this case alleged that he “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away various items of jewelry, the personal property of Irma Patricia Gallegos” on 11 March 2011. Simply put, the indictment at issue in this case specifies the date upon which the alleged larceny occurred, the type of property stolen, and the owner of the property alleged to have been taken. The present indictment, like the one before the Court in Monk, “was sufficiently descriptive to fulfill the purposes of an indictment.” Id.
In concluding that the felonious larceny indictment returned against Defendant adequately described the property that Defendant is alleged to have stolen, we note our decision in State v. Smith, 43 N.C.App. 376, 258 S.E.2d 847 (1979), in which we upheld the validity of an indictment similar to the one at issue here. In Smith, the defendant argued that an indictment which charged her with stealing “ ‘4 L.P. Stereo Record Albums,’ with no reference to the names of the albums, their producers, etc.[,]” “did not sufficiently identify the goods stolen.” Smith, 43 N.C. App at 378, 258 S.E.2d at 849. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that, in State v. Nugent, 243 N.C. 100, 89 S.E.2d 781 (1955), the Supreme Court had held that, while “meat” did not constitute an adequate description of the goods stolen, “a description such as ‘pork’ or ‘bacon’ would have been acceptable.” Smith at 378, 43 S.E.2d at 849. Based upon that logic, we concluded that:
[T]he description “4 L.P. Stereo Record Albums” is analogous to “pork” or “bacon.” Where, as here, the issue is not which of a number of stolen records defendant may have taken, but whether she stole any at all, we find that the description in the warrant is sufficiently specific to allow defendant to prepare her defense and to plead a conviction or acquittal as a bar to subsequent prosecution.
Smith at 378–79, 258 S.E.2d at 849. Similarly, the issue before us in this case is not “which of a number of stolen [pieces of jewelry] defendant may have taken, but whether [he] stole any at all[.]” Smith at 379, 258 S.E.2d at 849. As a result, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief from his felonious larceny conviction based upon his challenge to the validity of the indictment purporting to charge him with the commission of that offense.
B. Defendant's Suppression Motion
Secondly, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement officers during and after his arrest, including the items of stolen property found in his car and his statement to Detective Tilley, on the grounds that he “was arrested without probable cause and [that] all the evidence obtained was the fruits of that unlawful arrest in violation of [Defendant's] rights.” We do not find Defendant's argument persuasive.
1. Standard of Review
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. However, when, as here, the trial court's findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167–68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140–41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994), and State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001)) (other citations omitted). As a result, “ ‘[a]lthough the trial court's findings of fact are generally deemed conclusive where supported by competent evidence, a trial court's conclusions of law regarding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain a defendant [are] reviewable de novo.’ “ State v. Bowman, 193 N.C.App. 104, 108, 666 S.E.2d 831, 834 (2008) (quoting State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 466, 559 S.E.2d 814, 818 (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted), appeal dismissed, 355 N.C. 500, 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002)), cert. denied,363 N.C. 657, 685 S.E.2d 509 (2009).
“Assuming arguendo that [a] trial court's reasoning for denying defendant's motion to suppress was incorrect, we are not required on this basis alone to determine that the ruling was erroneous. A correct decision of a lower court will not be disturbed on review simply because an insufficient or superfluous reason is assigned. The question for review is whether the ruling of the trial court was correct and not whether the reason given therefor is sound or tenable. The crucial inquiry for this Court is admissibility and whether the ultimate ruling was supported by the evidence.”
State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 290, 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (citing State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 608–09, 342 S.E.2d 872, 875 (1986), and quoting State v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 644, 99 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1957)), cert. denied,484 U.S. 916, 108 S.Ct. 267, 98 L.Ed.2d 224 (1987). We will now apply this standard of review in evaluating Defendant's challenge to the denial of his suppression motion.
2. Validity of the Trial Court's Ruling
a. Description of the Trial Court's Decision
In denying Defendant's suppression motion, the trial court determined, in pertinent part, that (1) Officer Doby lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant; (2) Officer Doby had the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative detention of Defendant; (3), although Defendant was ordered out of his car and instructed to get on the ground, handcuffed, and placed in the back seat of a patrol vehicle, these measures did not transform an investigative detention into a formal arrest, for which probable cause was required; and (4) the purse taken from Defendant's car was admissible on the basis of the inevitable discovery doctrine. In challenging the trial court's ruling, Defendant argues that Officer Doby arrested him rather than subjecting him to an investigative detention, that investigating officers lacked the probable cause needed to support a valid arrest, that the investigating officers would not have inevitably discovered the purple purse, and that the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that, at the time that Officer Doby ordered Defendant to get out of his car, he had probable cause to place Defendant under arrest, that the search of Defendant's car was a valid search incident to arrest, and that Defendant's statement was not procured as the result of an unlawful arrest, so that the trial court did not err by admitting the challenged evidence.
Defendant has not challenged the adequacy of the evidentiary support for any of the trial court's findings of fact. As a result, given that those findings are deemed to have sufficient record support for purposes of appellate review, State v. Price, 170 N.C.App. 57, 65, 611 S.E.2d 891, 896 (2005) (stating that, “[i]f error is not assigned to any of the trial court's particular findings of fact, those findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are therefore binding on appeal”), the only issue raised by Defendant's challenge to the denial of his suppression motion is the extent to which the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law, based on its findings, that his motion should be denied.
In view of our determination that Officer Doby had probable cause to arrest Defendant, we need not address Defendant's contentions that he was arrested rather than subjected to a brief investigative detention and that the items seized from his car would not have inevitably been discovered had he not been unlawfully placed under arrest by Officer Doby.
b. Validity of Defendant's Arrest
“Probable cause for an arrest has been defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.... To establish probable cause the evidence need not amount to proof of guilt, or even to prima facie evidence of guilt, but it must be such as would actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith.” Probable cause “deal[s] with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”
State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 10, 550 S.E.2d 482, 488 (2001) (quoting State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 311, 182 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1971) (internal citation omitted), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002). In other words:
“Probable cause” is defined as “those facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information which are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” The Supreme Court has explained that probable cause “does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.” A probability of illegal activity, rather than a prima facie showing of illegal activity or proof of guilt, is sufficient.
Biber, 365 N.C. at 168–69, 712 S.E.2d at 879 (2011) (quoting State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 343, 333 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1985), Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 514 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), and citing Bone, 354 N.C. at 10, 550 S.E.2d at 488 (other citations omitted).
The uncontradicted evidence offered by the State at the suppression hearing and reflected in the trial court's factual findings established that Officer Doby was dispatched to a residence located at 216 Bost Street, Lot 53, as the result of an anonymous report to the effect that there was a “house break-in in progress” at that address; that “two Hispanic males or two black males had broken into the front door[;]” and that the perpetrators, who were still inside the home, had left a black vehicle parked outside the residence. Officer Doby immediately drove to Bost Street, arriving within thirty seconds after receiving information concerning the break-in. A videotape of the events that occurred on the occasion in question, which was introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit No. 3, shows that Bost Street was a short, one-block dead-end street with mobile homes lining each side. As Officer Doby drove into the area, he saw Defendant and another Hispanic man running out of a trailer toward a black Mercedes that had been backed into the driveway and was parked about fifteen or twenty feet from the front door of the mobile home from which the two men had been running. According to Officer Doby, Defendant was carrying a woman's purple purse as he emerged from the mobile home. As Defendant ran to the black automobile, he threw the purse in the front seat and jumped into the car. Simultaneously, the other man entered the vehicle's rear seat. We conclude that the “facts and circumstances” revealed in the record developed at the suppression hearing were “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [Defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.” Id.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that Officer Doby was dispatched on the basis of an anonymous report; that the description of the alleged perpetrators and the vehicle that they were utilizing was relatively general; and that Officer Doby did not, prior to arresting Defendant, verify that the two men had exited from the trailer located on “Lot 53.” Even so, one should not lose track of the fact that Officer Doby arrived at the area of the alleged break-in within seconds and immediately observed Defendant and another man leaving a trailer outside of which a black vehicle was parked. As Officer Doby arrived, the two men were running and Defendant was carrying a woman's purse. In view of the ongoing nature of the conduct described in the anonymous call, the suspicious nature of Defendant's behavior, the fact that Bost Street was a one block cul-de-sac, the fact that Officer Doby did not see a black car parked in front of any other home, and the fact that Defendant and his companion matched the general description provided by the dispatcher, we hold that Officer Doby had ample justification for placing Defendant under arrest, particularly given that “[r]easonable law enforcement officers are not required to exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a suspect's guilt before probable cause is established.” Wadkins v.. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 993, 121 S.Ct. 485, 148 L.Ed.2d 458 (2000). See also, e.g., State v. Wrenn, 316 N.C. 141, 147, 340 S .E.2d 443, 447 (1986) (holding that the probable cause needed to support an arrest existed when the defendant “was apprehended almost immediately after the reported felony had been committed as he exited victim's apartment complex at an early morning hour” given that “there was no other vehicular or pedestrian traffic in the area” and that “[d]efendant's appearance at the time of the arrest fit [the] victim's general description of her assailant, i.e., white male wearing dark clothing”). As a result, we conclude that Officer Doby had probable cause for placing Defendant under arrest at the time that he took Defendant into custody.
Even though Officer Doby had probable cause to arrest Defendant for felonious breaking or entering, the black Mercedes could be searched incident to arrest “ ‘only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search’ or ‘when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ “ State v. Mbacke, ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 721 S.E.2d 218, 221 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1719, 173 L.Ed.2d 485, 496 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 2137, 158 L.Ed.2d 905, 920 (2004) (Scalia and Ginsburg, concurring in the result), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 224, 184 L.Ed.2d 116 (2012). As the Supreme Court has held, “the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard ... parallels the objective ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard sufficient to justify a Terry stop.” Mbacke, ––– N.C. at ––––, 721 S.E.2d at 222 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. 906 (1968). Thus, “when investigators have a reasonable and articulable basis to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in a suspect's vehicle after the occupants have been removed and secured, the investigators are permitted to conduct a search of that vehicle.” Mbacke, ––– N.C. ––––, 721 S.E.2d at 222. In view of the fact that Officer Doby had witnessed Defendant place the purple handbag that he had carried from Ms. Gallegos' residence into the front seat of the black Mercedes, investigating officers had a basis for reasonable suspicion that “evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in” that vehicle. As a result, given that Defendant was lawfully taken into custody and given that investigating officers had a reasonable suspicion for believing that the black Mercedes contained evidence relating to the crime for which Defendant had been placed under arrest, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car and his post-arrest statements.
We express no opinion about the extent, if any, to which the black Mercedes might have been subject to a lawful search on any basis other than that discussed in the text of this opinion.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that neither of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgment have merit. As a result, the trial court's judgment should, and hereby does, remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR. Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).