Opinion
No. COA04-379
Filed 3 May 2005 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 October 2003 by Judge Gary L. Locklear in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2005.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Susan K. Nichols, for the State. Brannon Strickland, P.L.L.C., by Anthony M. Brannon, for defendant-appellant.
Robeson County No. 01 CRS 54907.
Defendant Shawn Michael Maynor appeals from his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant argues on appeal only that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim fails to amount to substantial evidence sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. We disagree and, therefore, find the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. On 30 September 2001, Locklear Roosevelt returned home from a night at the racetrack. When Roosevelt opened the door, he was assaulted by two individuals wielding small aluminum baseball bats. He recognized the men as Nathaniel Mullins and defendant, the son of Roosevelt's live-in girlfriend, Mary Ann Maynor Chavis. The beating stopped when Chavis placed herself between defendant and Roosevelt.
After Chavis intervened, Mullins said: "Let's get the money, Shawn." Defendant then told Roosevelt, "Give us the damn money or we're going to kill you." Roosevelt, who had $780.00 in his shirt pocket, took the money and threw it on the hood of his car. Defendant and Mullins picked up the money and left the scene. As a result of the attack, both of Roosevelt's arms were broken.
Defendant was indicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon. At trial, defendant admitted beating Roosevelt, but denied robbing him. Defendant and his mother testified that defendant assaulted Roosevelt because Roosevelt had recently been physically abusing Chavis. They both testified that defendant neither demanded nor took money from Roosevelt in connection with the assault. The jury convicted defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 70 to 93 months imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts a single error: that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of evidence. To survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidence of each essential element of the charged offense. State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997). "`Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. at 717, 483 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "[t]he trial court must consider such evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom." State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 450, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994).
The essential elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon are: "(1) an unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from the person or in the presence of another, (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened." State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 417, 508 S.E.2d 496, 518 (1998). Roosevelt's testimony established each of these elements. He testified that defendant and Mullins beat him with aluminum baseball bats, breaking both of his arms, and then threatened to kill him if he refused to give them his money. Roosevelt testified that he gave them the $780.00 because he believed his life was in danger.
Defendant argues that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim — such as the testimony of Roosevelt — is insufficient to prove a criminal offense. The general rule is, however, that "`the testimony of a single witness will legally suffice as evidence upon which the jury may found a verdict.'" State v. Vehaun, 34 N.C. App. 700, 704, 239 S.E.2d 705, 709 (1977) (quoting Henry P. Brandis, Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence § 21 at 51 (1st Rev. Ed., 1973)), disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 445, 241 S.E.2d 846 (1978). Further, "[t]here is no requirement in North Carolina that the testimony of a complaining witness . . . be corroborated before a defendant may be convicted." Id. at 704-05, 239 S.E.2d at 709.
Moreover, upon a motion to dismiss, "`The trial court must . . . resolve any contradictions in the evidence in the State's favor. The trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness' credibility.'" State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561 S.E.2d 245, 256 (quoting State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 278, 553 S.E.2d 885, 894 (2001)) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404, 123 S. Ct. 488 (2002). If accepted, defendant's argument would, in violation of this principle, require this Court to assess the credibility of Roosevelt's testimony and weigh his testimony against that offered by defendant. Since Roosevelt's testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant committed the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss.
No error.
Judges WYNN and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).