Opinion
No. A05-D-CR09-0140110S
February 25, 2010
THE COURT: The defendant, Keith Maynard, has made application for the Family Violence Education Program pursuant to Connecticut General Statute section 46b-38c(g). This pretrial diversion program was established in 1986 as part of the Family Violence Prevention and Response Act, and if granted to the defendant will give him an opportunity to avoid trial and possible conviction. The Family Violence Education Program, which is discretionary with the Court, may be granted if the Court finds 1) that the defendant has not previously been convicted of a family violence crime, which occurred on or after October 1, 1986. 2) that the defendant has not previously used the Family Violence Education Program. 3) that the defendant has not previously invoked Accelerated Rehabilitation for a family violence crime, which occurred on or after October 1, 1986, and 4) that the defendant is not charged with a class A, class B, or class C felony, an unclassified felony carrying a term of imprisonment of more than ten years or unless good cause is shown, a class D felony or an unclassified offense carrying a term of imprisonment of more than five years.
Here, Family Relations has determined that the defendant has in fact met the first three requirements, and the Court accepts that determination. As Mr. Maynard is charged with two D felonies in addition to one A misdemeanor, the Court must find that the defendant has established good cause in order to allow the defendant into the program.
In this matter, the victim has retained counsel, and has exercised her statutory and constitutional right to be heard. Here, she's done that through counsel. Both the victim and the state object to the granting of the program for this defendant, and while the Court certainly takes these objections into consideration, at the end of the day it is ultimately up to the Court to exercise its discretion and determine whether the program should be granted.
Unlike the Accelerated Rehabilitation statute, which requires that the Court make a finding that the defendant is not likely to offend in the future in order to grant Accelerated Rehabilitation, 46b-38c(g) has no such requirement. The statute merely sets forth the four requirements that I've indicated. Furthermore, there are no reported or unreported cases in Connecticut discussing the requirements or standards for the Family Violence Education Program. A review of the legislative history for the statute is not enlightening. In discussions in the house, then representative Wollenberg likens the proposed program to Accelerated Rehabilitation where he indicates "It's not a serious felony." In discussions before the judiciary committee, a member of the task force, Mr. Jeff Daniels suggests that it's appropriate for Part B misdemeanor cases, not for a case that "is of such a serious nature that it is in Part A of the court" and that it is for the judge to determine whether prosecution is the way to go.
Similarly, there is very little reported or unreported case law discussing the concept of good cause in the context of an Accelerated Rehabilitation case. In State v. Tucker, 219 Conn. 752 (1991) the state appealed from the trial court's finding of good cause in granting of AR where the defendant there was charged with sale of narcotics in violation of section 21a-278. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the defendant was a first time offender, there was no evidence that the sale had been accompanied by violence or harm to another, and the defendant had enlisted in the Navy, and the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting Accelerated Rehabilitation. I would note that the lack of allegations of violence was a factor that the Court had considered. It is not a requirement to a good cause finding that there be a lack of violence, and as defense counsel points out, by its nature domestic crimes usually involve some form of violence or threatened violence. In State v. Vetter, a 1998 trial court decision by Judge Walsh, Judge Walsh found good cause and granted Accelerated Rehabilitation to the defendant who was charged with manslaughter in the 2nd degree, where the defendant was engaged to the victim at the time of her death, and the victim's family did not object to the granting of the program.
Defense counsel in this case advances the good cause argument by inter alia, arguing that the defendant, who is 43 years old, has never been arrested, that the defendant at the time of his arrest had been an alderman in Ansonia for approximately ten years, and had been an employee of the Connecticut Department of Transportation for 22 years, and a supervisor at the department's Westport garage for approximately five years, subsequently resigning as an alderman and being terminated by DOT.
Additionally, counsel has submitted in excess of 50 letters supporting the defendant's application. Defense counsel has gone to great lengths, and has made every possible effort in furtherance of the Family Violence Education Program for this defendant, and I have read every letter. In addition to letters from family members, such as his mother and brother, letters from close family friends, letters were also submitted from former classmates, his former coach, a former teacher, a tenant, another alderman, a former fiance, a former girlfriend, a state parole officer, former classmates, an accountant, subordinates at the Department of Transportation, the personnel director for the City of Ansonia, and friends, some of which were lifelong friends. Many letters were written on letterhead from the City of Ansonia, the Boy's and Girl's Club, the NAACP, Ansonia High School, Ansonia Middle School, Amistad Academy, and the West Haven Black Coalition. The letters describe the defendant as, among other things, dependable, passionate, fair, loyal, humble, devoted to his family, generous, an involved member of the community, as well as law abiding. I acknowledge the defendant's contributions to his community and society, as well as the sentiments of the letter writers, but I would point out that the person described in those letters is an entirely different person than that person described in the arrest warrant.
Turning to the arrest warrant, and I point out that these are allegations only at this point, the warrant describes a situation where the defendant in disguise attacked the victim as she entered her home, tackling her to the ground, covering her with a blanket and stuffing it in her mouth, pinching her nose shut, grabbing a bat, and hitting her in the back of the head as she fought to get away, repeatedly hitting her with the bat, and preventing her escape as she fought back and struggled to get away. Allegedly four days after the attack the defendant then married the victim.
The allegations, and again I emphasize that these are allegations, suggest a cold, premeditated, unprovoked, deliberate and calculated attack on a defenseless victim. The allegations are disturbing on many levels. The allegations reflect a defendant who is a danger to society. They reflect a defendant who, shortly after the disguised attack married the victim — allegations that are unfathomable and shocking. Marriage is so fundamental and basic to the human experience that the allegations go far beyond what is acceptable or tolerable in our society.
I will note that I am not considering any possible police investigation that was mentioned by the state involving any violation of protective order. That is not something that I am considering in this decision.
However, I do find that the allegations in this matter suggest a situation where the defendant did not exercise merely a lack of judgment, but rather reflect very serious and egregious allegations. The community has an important interest in the prosecution of those who violate our laws and the Court finds that there is no good cause in this matter to grant the application and avoid that prosecution. So the Court therefore denies the application.