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State v. Martin

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Mar 12, 2019
ID No. 1702005493 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2019)

Opinion

ID No. 1702005493 Cr. A. Nos. IN17-02-1754 & 55.

03-12-2019

STATE OF DELAWARE, v. DARNELL D. MARTIN, Defendant.

cc: Timothy G. Maguire, Deputy Attorney General Patrick J. Collins, Esquire Mr. Darnell Martin, pro se


ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

This 12th day of March, 2019, upon consideration of the Defendant Darnell D. Martin's pro se Motion for Sentence Reduction (D.I. 46) and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On January 9, 2018, following a bench trial, Darnell Martin was convicted of drug dealing and another related charge. He was immediately sentenced to serve, inter alia, a 25-year term of imprisonment suspended after two years for 18 months of supervised probation. The two years of unsuspended imprisonment comprise a minimum term of incarceration that must be imposed and cannot be suspended.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752(2) (2016) (drug dealing a tier 2 quantity of marijuana with an aggravating factor is a class B felony); id. at tit. 11, §§ 4205(b)(2) & (d) (sentence "[f]or a class B felony [is] not less than 2 years . . . [and any] minimum, mandatory, mandatory minimum or minimum mandatory sentence [ ] required by subsection (b) of [§ 4205] . . . shall not be subject to suspension by the court").

(2) Martin filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. His convictions and sentence were recently affirmed. And so, now Martin is pursuing postconviction relief via a separate application.

Martin v. State, 2018 WL 4959037 (Del. Oct. 12, 2018).

D.I. 39-44.

(3) Martin has filed the present motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) requesting reduction of the incarcerative term of his sentence for the drug dealing charge. In short, Martin requests that six months be cleaved from the end of his two-year imprisonment term and that the Court substitute house arrest for that period of imprisonment. This relief is appropriate, he claims, because if released he can: (1) if he finds work, help his family financially; (2) "better prepare himself for postconviction"; (3) and "begin putting his life back together, be productive in society as a tax paying citizen instead of putting a burden on the states [sic] alread[y] packed Department of Corrections [sic]."

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (providing that, under certain conditions, the Court may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on an inmate's motion). While Martin styles his a "Motion for Restructuring of Sentence," he seeks to have the Court reduce his Level V term. And any authority for the Court to grant Martin that relief must derive from its Criminal Rule 35(b). Jones v. State, 2003 WL 21210348, at *1 (Del. May 22, 2003) ("There is no separate procedure, other than that which is provided under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, to reduce or modify a sentence.").

Def. Rule 35(b) Mot. at 1. ("Defendant . . . is requesting, pro se, that the 6 months left on his level V sentence be restructured and he be allowed to complete his obligation at level IV House Arrest through the Department of Probation & Parole.").

Id. at 2 .

(4) The Court may consider Martin's motion "without presentation, hearing or argument." The Court will decide his motion on the papers filed and the complete sentencing record in Martin's case.

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).

(5) When considering a Rule 35(b) motion, this Court must address any applicable procedural bars before turning to its merits.

State v. Redden, 111 A. 3d 602, 606 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing State v. Reed, 2014 WL 7148921, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014)).

(6) Rule 35(b) requires that a motion to reduce imprisonment be filed promptly—that is, within 90 days of the sentence's imposition— "otherwise, the Court loses jurisdiction" to act thereon. An exception to this bar exists: to overcome the 90-day time limitation, an inmate seeking to reduce a sentence of imprisonment on his or her own motion must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances." The term "extraordinary circumstances" is generally defined as "[a] highly unusual set of facts that are not commonly associated with a particular thing or event." And in the Rule 35(b) context, "extraordinary circumstances" are those which "specifically justify the delay;" are "entirely beyond a petitioner's control;" and "have prevented the applicant from seeking the remedy on a timely basis." A heavy burden is placed on the inmate to establish "extraordinary circumstances" in order to "uphold the finality of sentences."

In re Nichols, 2004 WL 1790142, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 20, 2004); see also State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1205 (Del. 2002) (Steele, J., dissenting) ("after 90 days . . . the judiciary may not consider [an inmate's plea for leniency] except where 'extraordinary circumstances' may have prevented the applicant from seeking the remedy on a timely basis").

Sample v. State, 2012 WL 193761, at *1 (Del. Jan. 23, 2012) ("Under Rule 35(b), the Superior Court only has discretion to reduce a sentence upon motion made within 90 days of the imposition of sentence, unless 'extraordinary circumstances' are shown.") (emphasis added).

State v. Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).

Id.; State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 332 (Del. Super. Ct. 2014).

State v. Johnson, 2006 WL 3872849, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2006); Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 ("Our precedent supports this definition [of extraordinary circumstances], and illustrates the high burden a defendant must satisfy in order for an untimely Rule 35 motion to be considered by the court.").

(7) Martin overlooks this requirement and his burden to demonstrate that it is met. But the Court cannot. And the Court does not find that Martin has demonstrated the existence of any potential "extraordinary circumstance" as that has been defined or recognized by Delaware's courts.

See State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144-47 (Del. 2016) (this Court abuses its discretion when it ignores Rule 35(b)'s bars on untimely or repetitive requests); Diaz, 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (this Court erred granting inmate's motion without addressing Rule 35's timeliness requirement and its extraordinary circumstances exception).

E.g., Jones v. State, 2003 WL 356788 (Del. Feb. 14, 2003) (holding that financial and familial hardships, without more, did not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Boyer v. State, 2003 WL 21810824, at *5 (Del. Aug. 4, 2003) (this Court acted within its discretion when it found that, even with other issues raised, defendant's familial hardships did not amount to extraordinary circumstances); State v. Newsome, 2009 WL 3327231, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009) (defendant's alleged need to care for his elderly mother was not an extraordinary circumstance).

(8) Even if Martin's application were not procedurally barred, it still could not be granted. Because, even when the Court has wide discretion to reduce a sentence (i.e., upon a timely Rule 35 application), the Court has no authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any substantive statutory minimum sentence.

See Hewett v. State, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 2014) ("When . . . a motion for reduction of sentence is filed within ninety days of sentencing, the Superior Court has broad discretion to decide whether to alter its judgment.").

State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2008) ("Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) provides no authority for a reduction or suspension of the mandatory portion of a substantive statutory minimum sentence.") (emphasis in original).

(9) As noted above, the two years of imprisonment for Martin's drug dealing conviction (IN17-02-1754), because that offense is a class B felony, is a minimum term of incarceration that must be imposed and cannot be suspended or reduced. Martin's requested reduction would plainly violate the two-year minimum required by 11 Del. C. § 4205(b). The Court simply cannot enter an order under Rule 35(b) that does so.

See n.1, supra.

Sturgis, 947 A.2d at 1092. --------

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Darnell D. Martin's motion for reduction of sentence must be DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 12th day of March, 2019.

/s/ _________

Paul R. Wallace, Judge Original to Prothonotary cc: Timothy G. Maguire, Deputy Attorney General

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire

Mr. Darnell Martin, pro se


Summaries of

State v. Martin

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Mar 12, 2019
ID No. 1702005493 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2019)
Case details for

State v. Martin

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF DELAWARE, v. DARNELL D. MARTIN, Defendant.

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Date published: Mar 12, 2019

Citations

ID No. 1702005493 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2019)