Opinion
P1/2021-0527AG
09-11-2024
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. RASHAAN MANGUM
For Plaintiff: Alison L. Bittl, Esq. Edward G. Mullaney, Esq. For Defendant: Stefanie A. Murphy, Esq. Kara H. Manosh, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Alison L. Bittl, Esq. Edward G. Mullaney, Esq.
For Defendant: Stefanie A. Murphy, Esq. Kara H. Manosh, Esq.
DECISION
KRAUSE, J.
Defendant Rashaan Mangum seeks shelter from several counts in a multiple-defendant indictment which charges him with several conspiracies and unlawfully possessing and illicitly transferring firearms. He claims that much of the State's evidence should be excluded because it is unalterably infected by an impermissible seizure and subsequent search of one of his cellular telephones by the Providence police in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court disagrees.
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the Court finds that their respective contentions and the relevant facts are adequately presented and that neither an evidentiary hearing nor oral argument would aid the decisional process. Accordingly, the Court has decided the matter based upon those submissions and pertinent parts of the record.
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This case has followed a prolonged and contentious track, with different defense attorneys in both the Superior and Supreme Courts. Mangum's initial trial counsel has withdrawn; appellate counsel has also withdrawn; and, in May of 2023, he engaged two additional trial attorneys to represent him. The Court has already ruled on Mangum's prior suppression motions, granting and denying parts of them.
In a May 9, 2022 bench decision, the Court agreed with Mangum that the Providence police had unlawfully seized and searched two of his cell phones which, although he was not in custody, they took from him while he was at the police station on August 12, 2020. The State lodged an appeal from that ruling but voluntarily withdrew it on December 15, 2022, and the case was returned to this Court. (No. SU-2022-0191-CA.)
Additional motions followed, including Mangum's demand to suppress his August 12 and 25, 2020 statements to Providence detectives. After a hearing, the Court issued a written Order on February 21, 2024, denying suppression of the August 12, 2020 statements because Mangum was not in custody, and Miranda's admonitions were not required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 579 (R.I. 1987). Mangum's motion to suppress his August 25, 2020 custodial statements was granted in part. The Court allowed admission of the first 180 transcribed pages of the statement but suppressed the following pages because Mangum's request for counsel at that point of the conversation was not honored.
In his current motion, Mangum references the Court's May 9, 2022 ruling and seeks exclusion of a wide range of evidence that he says was derived from the unlawful seizure and warrantless search of one of his cell phones and is fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See May 9, 2022 Order, Tr. 23-24. Mangum seeks to exclude, e.g., text messages, photographs, videos, and other content found in his cellular phone if the State learned of the material as a result of its impermissible search. He additionally seeks to bar the State from using portions of the 180 pages from the August 25, 2020 statement as well as other items, including firearm-related evidence, found by the police in his residence at 15 Hawkins Street, even though the seizures resulted from a judicially authorized search warrant.
Only one cellular phone is the subject of Mangum's motion. The State has expressed no interest in anything extracted from the other one.
Mangum additionally says that the State should be precluded from presenting seventeen potential witnesses at trial because their identities were also derived from the cell phone search. The State, however, says the witnesses may only include Gregory Abellard (not indicted); Jerry Jackson, a juvenile at the time who has resolved his case; along with Brady Robinson, Yovaniell Sostre, Anthony Jaiman, Wascar Rivas, and Trayquan Mitchell, all of whom pled guilty and agreed to accept prison terms ranging from one to five years at the Adult Correctional Institutions.
Mangum is the principal defendant in the indictment and is charged in thirty of the thirty-eight counts. Apart from the conspiracy charges, codefendants Robinson, Sostre, Jaiman, and Rivas were separately named in only one or, at most, three counts each. Mitchell pled guilty in a separate information.
The parties have conferred in an effort to identify material which is subject to the exclusionary rule as well as Wong Sun and its issue. The State has prepared a timeline and has edited the transcript of the August 25, 2020 dialogue to reflect what it believes are clear demarcations at either end of the admissibility spectrum (green font designating admissible evidence and red for its exclusion). Yellow highlighted areas, which the State has annotated with record citations and other explanatory references, relate to material which the defense resists.
Because the colored portions of the timeline cannot be reproduced when electronically filed, the State shall create and file a copy in a form which otherwise identifies or differentiates the three highlighted portions.
Having examined the record, along with the references in the timeline - and there is no need to recapitulate all of those explications here, as they are readily available for any subsequent review - the Court finds that Mangum's request to block the State from using the evidence which is the subject of his motion is unavailing. As outlined below, none of the material, save for that which the State has acknowledged is incurably contaminated by the search and otherwise disallowed by the exclusionary rule, shall be ruled out. Additionally, the August 25, 2020 transcript, as edited by the State, is also available for use at trial.
The Exclusionary Rule - Its Limits and Exceptions
"The exclusionary rule bars from introduction at trial evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights." State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1983). Its "sole purpose * * * is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations." Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (noting that "the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct").
The exclusionary rule is not absolute, and the Supreme Court has rejected a reflexive "but-for" test which is dispositive or controls the application of the exclusionary rule that "would render inadmissible any evidence that came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has likewise held that not all statements or evidence derived from an illegal arrest or search must be automatically excluded in every case. Jennings, 461 A.2d at 368. The Fourth Amendment "has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). "In other words, exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a 'but-for' cause of obtaining evidence." Hudson v. Michigan. 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006). There, the Court said:
"Rather, but-for cause, or 'causation in the logical sense alone,' United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), can be too attenuated to justify exclusion, id., at 274-275, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Even in the early days of the exclusionary rule, we declined to 'hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light
but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (quoting J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959); emphasis added)." Id. at 592 (italics in original).
Exclusion of evidence, the Evans Court said, is an issue "separate from whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated," and "exclusion is appropriate only if the remedial objectives of the rule are thought most efficaciously served." Evans, 514 U.S. at 13-14, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). The rule exacts "substantial social costs," Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 90 6), and an "unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
Because suppression of relevant and incriminating evidence '"will often have the effect of allowing criminals to go unpunished, [the rule] is justified only as a means of deterring the police from violating constitutional and statutory rights."' State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 998-99 (R.I. 2008) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir. 1986)). "Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-91.
Accordingly, if application of the rule does not result in "appreciable deterrence," its use is unwarranted. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). Accord, Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 235 (2016) (noting that "even when there is a Fourth Amendment violation, th[e] exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits").
In Strieff, the Court recognized three exceptions involving the causal relationship between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence. First, the independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence which the police acquired from a separate provenance. Secondly, the inevitable discovery exception allows admission of evidence which would have been discovered apart from the unconstitutional event. Thirdly, under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible when the connection between the original illegality and the offered evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 235.
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The exclusionary rule does not apply where law enforcement investigators acquire evidence from a source which is independent of and untainted by the initial constitutional violation. State v. Gonzalez, 254 A.3d 813, 817 (R.I. 2021), State v. Ducharme, 601 A.2d 937, 942 (R.I. 1991). Before Mangum's cell phones were taken, the investigation had already identified Jaiman and Rivas, and Mangum himself offered Brady Robinson's name during the August 25, 2020 interview. When the police interviewed Jaiman on September 10, 2020, the conversation was unrelated to material extracted from Mangum's phone.
Furthermore, as referenced in this Court's February 21, 2024 Order, without any prompting from the detectives, and in a rancorous effusion, Mangum persistently complained about all of his cohorts who had abandoned the code of the street and were now snitching on him, and whom he blamed for his predicament. As noted in the February 21 Order, finger-pointing and blame-shifting demonstrates that a defendant is "calculated, cunning, and understands the gravity of his position, [which] weighs in favor of finding voluntariness." February 21, 2022 Order at 8 (citing State v. Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 657 (R.I. 2008) (citing State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 754, 791 (R.I. 2004)).
The detectives most assuredly did not induce Mangum to speak with them. He insisted on continuing the dialogue, exclaiming, "Hear me. Let me make this statement." February 21, 2024 Order at 8.
That the police were able to confirm the identity of the targets of Mangum's incessant lamentations about his confederates is far removed from the search of his cell phone, and excluding that evidence would in no way result in "appreciable deterrence," Davis, 564 U.S. at 237, which is, after all, the only purpose of the exclusionary rule. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 911 ("We also have held that a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity was discovered in an unconstitutional search.") (citing United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)). This Court is well satisfied from its review of the record citations and explications in the timeline, and from Mangum's self-inflicted voluntary statements of August 12 and 25, 2020, that the State may justifiably rely upon the independent source doctrine to admit the material which Mangum seeks to exclude.
Apart from that collateral source exception, the attenuation doctrine also supports admission of the evidence. Where the State can show that any nexus between the original illegality and the use of the subject evidence has become so attenuated that the taint has sufficiently dissipated, the evidence may be admitted. State v. Robinson, 658 A.2d 518, 521 (R.I. 1995), State v. Burns, 431 A.2d 1199, 1205 (R.I. 1981). "Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.'" Strieff, 579 U.S. at 238 (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593).
The "dissipation of the taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Brown, 422 U.S at 609 (Powell, J, concurring in part). The Strieff Court, 579 U.S. at 239, citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, noted three factors when considering the attenuation equation. They are not of equal importance. The first, and likely the least weighty of the three, is "temporal proximity" between the initial illegality and the search. A longer interval appears to favor the State. Id. at 239; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979).
The second factor, "the presence of intervening circumstances," is present here. The Court noted, for example, also referencing the independent source doctrine, that "the existence of a valid warrant favors finding that the connection between unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence is 'sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint.'" Strieff, 579 U.S. at 240 (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)). The search at 15 Hawkins Street was facilitated by a search warrant. There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to any affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant. State v. Verrecchia, 880 A.2d 89, 99 (R.I. 2005).
Although Det. Matthew McGloin's eighteen-page supporting affidavit mentions some of the cell phone material, elimination of those references leaves more than ample probable cause to support the warrant. Notably, Mangum has never claimed that Det. McGloin's affidavit suffers any deficiency pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978), aimed at an affiant's knowing or reckless falsity in the affidavit.
With respect to the collateral source and attenuation doctrines, it is also notable that witnesses whom Mangum demands be excluded have opted to plead guilty. Each was represented by experienced counsel, and each of them knowingly and voluntarily surrendered their constitutional and other consequential rights, and all of them agreed to go to prison. Quite frankly, this Court is hard pressed to envision any circumstances spawned by the cell phone breach which directly or indirectly induced or caused Mangum's confederates to admit their criminal complicity. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279, Gonzalez, 254 A.3d at 817, Ducharme, 601 A.2d at 941-42; Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361, 373 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814.
The third factor, "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," has been characterized as "particularly significant." Strieff, 579 U.S. at 239 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604). The Court finds no such arrant behavior here. Det. Otrando's retrieval of Mangum's cell phone was an error, as was its subsequent search, but, at most, it constituted a mistake and simply an erroneous appreciation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It did not, however, amount to flagrant misconduct, nor was it motivated by bad purpose. The Court finds that this third factor is not in play here. See Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (officer's objectively reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the scope of a statutory rule of the road did not spoil his stop of a vehicle); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (isolated negligence by the police, as opposed to deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, does not invite use of the exclusionary rule, as its application would not support the goal of deterring police misconduct). See also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (admitting evidence seized during a warrantless administrative search made in reliance on a statute later held invalid).
These exceptions and the host of decisions rejecting an inflexible application of the exclusionary rule clearly favor the introduction of the subject evidence and override Mangum's demand to exclude it.
The Good Faith Exception
Having unreservedly concluded that application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted, the Court nonetheless believes that if, but only arguendo, a different conclusion might obtain upon later review, recourse should be had to Leon's modification of the exclusionary rule, permitting the introduction of evidence if a police officer's misstep reflects that the officer's actions were taken in reasonable good faith, and not generated by deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard of Fourth Amendment rights.
Although Leon's good faith exception has previously been referenced several times in appellate proceedings, our Supreme Court has not yet fully considered its merits or utility, usually because there has been no need to gauge its application in a given case. The Court has, however, signaled that in an appropriate case, it may appraise Leon's usefulness. In State v. Reisner, 253 A.3d 1273, 1283 (R.I. 2021), the Court declined to address the good faith exception "absent both a factual predicate and a meaningful discussion of the issue[.]" Most recently, in State v. Pires, 316 A.3d 701, 733 (R.I. 2024), Leon's core principles were emphasized in an opinion apart from the majority's view. Id. at 733, 735-36 (McKenna, J., joined by Robinson, J., dissenting). Given the sharply divided views of the parties in this case, Leon's emendations to the exclusionary rule offer useful recommendations.
E.g., State v. Storey, 8 A.3d 454, 459 n.5 (R.I. 2010); State v. Hudgen, 272 A.3d 1069, 1085 (R.I. 2022); State v. Cosme, 57 A.3d 295, 300 n.7 (R.I. 2012); State v. Gomes, 881 A.2d 97, 105 n.13 (R.I. 2005); State v. Rose, 748 A.2d 1283, 1285 (R.I. 2000); State v. Nunez, 634 A.2d 1167, 1171 (R.I. 1993).
For example, Det. Otrando's retrieval of Mangum's cell phone was error but not flagrant or egregious overreaching, nor was it knowingly intended to circumvent Mangum's Fourth Amendment rights. And Det. McGloin's lengthy affidavit also was not prompted by such untoward motivations. And, as noted earlier, Mangum has never asserted a Franks criticism of McGloin's affidavit. Should a reviewing court disagree, application of Leon's good faith exception will not have prevented the jury from considering what the State says is essential evidence recovered from the Hawkins Street premises. "[O]ur evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution's case in chief." Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
Mangum's residence was a repository for, among other items, gun boxes, firearm magazines, a ledger, an accumulation of firearm accessories, relevant paperwork, and badges from different police departments.
In any case, the Court finds no evidence of deliberate or reckless overreaching by Det. McGloin to secure the Hawkins Street search warrant. Wholly to the contrary, Det. McGloin did precisely what is expected of an investigating officer who believes that there is evidence of criminal activity within an individual's residence: he obtained a search warrant from a detached judicial official, and, in good faith, he thereafter relied and acted upon that judge's authorization.
Notably, the Supreme Court has observed that "searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 267 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment), because "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer has "acted in good faith in conducting the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, n.32, (1982), Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
Withal, exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have no deterrent effect on a police officer, because '"once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (quoting, Stone, 428 U.S. at 498 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
Further, the United States and the Rhode Island Supreme Courts have consistently held that close or marginal circumstances should be resolved in favor of upholding the issuing magistrate's conclusions. "[W]e firmly acknowledge the postulate that 'the resolution of doubtful or marginal [probable-cause] cases . . . [is] largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.'" State v. Storey, 8 A.3d 454, 461 and n.8 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Byrne, 972 A.2d at 639 and quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)); Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 ("[W]e have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.") (internal quotation omitted).
In short, Leon has approved a sensible safety net to avoid the severe step of excluding relevant evidence if a law enforcement officer errs but has exercised reasonable and objective good faith in the investigative effort.
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Having reviewed the record and carefully considered the parties' submissions, the Court finds that Mangum's demand to exclude evidence is without substantial weight or compelling force. The State has satisfactorily carried its burden and demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that, on balance, withholding relevant and probative material from the factfinders by applying the exclusionary rule, where its use would not result in "appreciable deterrence," the rule's remedial objective would not be "most efficaciously served." Evans, 514 U.S. at 13-14; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Simply put, use of the rule in this case is unwarranted, as "the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits." Strieff, 579 U.S. at 235; Janis, 428 U.S. at 454. And where, as in this case, the rule would have no substantial deterrent effect, "it cannot pay its way." Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6.
Absent appreciably deterring police misconduct, and because of its significant costs to society, the Supreme Court has designated the exclusionary rule an "extreme sanction," Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, and a "bitter pill," relegating its use to a "last resort," because its application "almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence. And its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth[.]" Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (citing Herring and Hudson, supra). See State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I. 1990) (observing that the "exclusionary rule is strong medicine indeed since it deprives the trier of fact in many instances of highly relevant and reliable evidence").
This Court renews Justice Scalia's observations in Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591:
"Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates 'substantial social costs,' United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984), which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been 'cautio[us] against expanding' it, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986), and 'have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application,' Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364-365 (1998). We have rejected '[i]ndiscriminate application' of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908, and have held it to be applicable only 'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) - that is, 'where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs,' Scott, supra, at 363 (quoting Leon, supra, at 907."
Those balanced sentiments apply here. Mangum's motion to exclude evidence is denied.