Opinion
Case No. 20070883-CA.
Filed November 14, 2008. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, 064402702, The Honorable Steven L. Hansen.
Dennis Neils Madsen, West Bountiful, Appellant Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Nancy L. Kemp, and Marian H. Ito, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Dennis Neils Madsen appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services (ORS). We affirm.
Madsen first asserts that he was denied equal protection of the law because he is being forced to support a child he does not want while women have choices that allow them to completely absolve themselves of parental responsibility. Such argument is not a valid defense to ORS's petition and subsequent motion for summary judgment. ORS's petition sought to register and enforce an administrative order entitled "Stipulation, and Judgment, and Order of Child Support Based on Stipulation," which Madsen voluntarily stipulated to in 1996. Thus, Madsen's argument does not go to the validity of the administrative order to which he stipulated or to any other defense recognized by the law. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-501(3) (Supp. 2008) (setting forth statutory defenses to action to enforce an agency order). Instead, the argument is an attempt to relitigate the issue of whether Madsen has an obligation to support his child. As such, Madsen's argument is barred by res judicata.
Res judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion bars the same parties or their privies from re-litigating the same cause of action asserted in the initial action, as well as those claims that could have been brought in the initial action. See Macris Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1214. Claim preclusion will bar a subsequent action if three requirements are met:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. ¶ 20 (citation omitted).
In this case, all three elements of claim preclusion are met. First, this action involves the same parties as the original administrative action. Specifically, ORS, Madsen, and the mother of the child were all parties to both actions. Second, the argument presented by Madsen goes to whether he has any obligation to support his child. As such, it is an issue that should have been raised in the first action, which was specifically held to determine whether Madsen had such an obligation. Finally, the first action resulted in a stipulated judgment. In so stipulating, Madsen gave up the right to contest the administrative decision in a court of law. Accordingly, the first action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a "stipulated, voluntary dismissal of [the plaintiff's] first suit, approved by the court with prejudice, was a judgment on the merits" for res judicata purposes). Therefore, because all the elements of claim preclusion are met, Madsen is barred from raising the issue in the current action.
Madsen also asserts in just one sentence that his stipulation to the 1996 Judgment was not based upon informed consent. However, Madsen failed to raise this argument with the district court. Accordingly, it was waived. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60, ¶ 7, 975 P.2d 505 (stating that "[a]s a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal").
ORS's request for attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is denied.
Affirmed.
William A. Thorne Jr., Associate Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge