Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 10-0828
02-07-2012
In the Matter of: NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY DOLLARS ($19,880.00) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY. STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. CORRINA MACIAS, Claimant/Appellant.
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney Phoenix By Peter S. Spaw, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Appellee Law Offices of William D. Shostak, PLLC Chandler By William D. Shostak Attorneys for Appellant
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
DEPARTMENT A
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication -Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CV2008-002020
The Honorable Gary E. Donahoe, Judge
AFFIRMED
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney Phoenix
By Peter S. Spaw, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee
Law Offices of William D. Shostak, PLLC Chandler
By William D. Shostak
Attorneys for Appellant
GOULD , Judge
¶1 This appeal arises from the State's attempt to seize nineteen thousand eight hundred eighty dollars ("the currency") from Corrina Macias. Macias appeals, challenging the trial court's finding that there was reasonable cause for the initial seizure and denying her motion to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 On January 4, 2008, Officers Haddad and Hahn were working package interdictions at the FedEx facility at 4475 N. 43d Avenue. As part of a random selection, they discovered a package that had a handwritten label that was paid for by cash or credit card to ship overnight via FedEx Priority. The package had been shipped from Milwaukee, WI to Phoenix. Officer Hahn called the telephone numbers on the label to verify the identities of the sender and recipient; he spoke with Macias, Macias's husband, and Macias's husband's attorney and learned the package contained $20,000. Further investigation revealed that both Macias and her husband had been involved in prior interdiction and forfeiture proceedings. In light of this information, the officers detained the package for further investigation.
¶3 The officers took the package to the Buckeye Police Department to obtain a narcotics canine search. After the narcotics detector dog positively alerted to the package, the officers prepared and submitted an affidavit for search warrant to open the package. When the officers opened the package they found a "small pak" FedEx envelope containing $19,880.00 in U.S. currency. While counting the currency, one of the officers saw what appeared to be a speck, an unusable amount, of marijuana fall from the bills.
¶4 The State filed a notice of seizure seeking to forfeit the currency alleging it was subject to forfeiture because of connection to racketeering offenses involving illegal drugs and money laundering pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-2314(G)(3) (2010). Macias filed a verified response claiming an interest in the currency. From August 30, 2010 through September 7, 2010, the trial court held a hearing regarding the petition for forfeiture. On September 6, Macias filed an amended motion to suppress evidence arguing the search and seizure of the package was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After the hearing, the trial court found the State failed to carry its burden of proving the currency was subject to forfeiture and ordered the currency returned to Macias. However, the court found there was reasonable cause for the seizure for forfeiture, thus precluding Macias from seeking costs and damages and protecting the State from liability arising out of the forfeiture. As part of its ruling
determining the currency was not subject to forfeiture, the court denied Macias's amended motion to suppress evidence as moot. Macias appealed.
Discussion
¶5 Although Macias prevailed at the forfeiture hearing and the trial court ordered the currency returned to her, she challenges the court's finding that initial seizure of the package was supported by reasonable cause. Macias argues the court's finding of reasonable cause precludes her from seeking costs or damages and protects the state from "suit or judgment on account of [the] seizure." A.R.S. § 13-4314(E) (2010). The State argues that Macias's appeal is moot because the court never made a finding of reasonable cause under § 13-4314(E), and thus, Macias is not aggrieved by the ruling.
¶6 The State's position lacks merit. The record shows that the court made a finding of reasonable cause pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4314(E). At the hearing, the State asked the court to make a finding of reasonable cause under A.R.S. § 13-4314(E). It argued that the probable cause determination that was made in obtaining the search warrant should support a finding of reasonable cause. After the State made this motion, the court ruled "that reasonable cause for the initial seizure of the package was found by the judicial officer who issued the search warrant." It is clear the court made this finding pursuant to § 13-4314(E), and in accordance with the State's request. A.R.S. § 13-4314(E).
In its answering brief, and in a prior motion to dismiss this appeal, the State attempts to distinguish between the statutory language "reasonable cause for seizure for forfeiture," and the court's language, "reasonable cause for the initial seizure." See A.R.S. § 13-4314(E). This court denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal, and we now reject the proposition that § 13-4314 requires word-for-word adherence. The minor deviation in wording does not defeat the record's indication that the court found there was reasonable cause for the seizure for forfeiture.
¶7 The State also argues the trial court did not find reasonable cause under A.R.S. § 13-4314(E) because Macias requested and received taxable costs in the amount of $5,331.30. The State reasons that if the finding had been made pursuant to § 13-4314(E), Macias would not have been entitled to such costs. See A.R.S. § 13-4314(E) ("If it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure for forfeiture or for the filing of the notice of pending forfeiture, . . . the court shall cause a finding to be entered, and the claimant is not, in such case, entitled to costs or damages. . . .").
¶8 The State has not cited, and we have not found, any case law indicating that a reasonable cause finding under § 13-4314(E) bars a claimant from receiving costs. In addition, the procedural anomaly that led to Macias receiving her costs does not alter the court's finding of reasonable cause. Macias requested costs and the State failed to object when the trial court awarded them to her; the failure of the State to object does not change the legal effect of the court's reasonable cause finding. Furthermore, whether or not this award of costs was proper has not been appealed and is not subject to our review.
¶9 The fact that Macias did not receive attorneys' fees or damages in the proceedings below further supports the conclusion that the court found reasonable cause for the seizure. Macias requested costs, attorneys' fees, and damages in her pleadings. Specifically, she prayed for damages under A.R.S. § 12-349, which provides for damages for unjustified civil actions. Because the State failed to carry its burden, absent the court ruling that it had acted with reasonable cause, the State would have been liable to Macias for her damages.
¶10 Having concluded the court found there was reasonable cause for the seizure, we now examine whether that finding was proper. We review the trial court's finding of reasonable cause de novo. See In re $24,000 in U.S. Currency, 217 Ariz. 199, 202, ¶¶ 11-12, 171 P.3d 1240, 1243 (App. 2007) (stating that determinations that involve questions of law, such as probable cause determinations, are reviewed de novo); In re U.S. Currency in the Amount of $315,900.00, 183 Ariz. 208, 211, 902 P.2d 351, 354 (App. 1995) ("In forfeiture cases . . . a trial court's finding of probable cause is subject to plenary, de novo review because it involves a question of law."). We do not reweigh the evidence, and we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings absent clear error. In re $315,900.00, 183 Ariz. at 211, 902 P.2d at 354.
¶11 The trial court concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that the currency were proceeds of racketeering and subject to forfeiture. Exactly what is required to satisfy reasonable cause under § 13-4314(E) is not specifically defined. See A.R.S. § 13-4314(E); State v. Rodriguez, 186 Ariz. 240, 248, 921 P.2d 643, 651 (1996) (noting that probable cause is a higher standard than reasonable cause); State v. Wedding, 171 Ariz. 399, 404, 831 P.2d 398, 403 (App. 1992) (same). However, as with determinations of probable cause, we consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether there was reasonable cause to believe the currency was proceeds of racketeering. See In re $24,000, 217 Ariz. at 203, ¶ 16, 171 P.3d at 1244.
¶12 The totality of the circumstances supports a finding of reasonable cause. Officers Haddad and Hahn testified that the package appeared suspicious because of the following: it had a handwritten label, the sender's address was incorrect, the source and destination cities were known drug supply and demand cities, and the sender and recipient had previously been involved in forfeiture cases. A drug detection dog gave a positive alert to the package; the State acquired a search warrant, opened the package, and found $19,880.00 in U.S. currency. While counting the currency, the officers found what they believed to be a speck of marijuana amidst the bills. When considered together, these circumstances establish probable cause to seize and search the package; therefore, we agree with the court's ruling that the lower standard of reasonable cause, as required by A.R.S. § 13-4314(E), was satisfied. See State v. Weinstein, 190 Ariz. 306, 310 947 P.2d 880, 884 (App. 1997) (stating that dog alert provided probable cause to search); U.S. v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 977-78 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that suspicious package characteristics and a positive dog alert establish probable cause).
¶13 Macias also appeals from the trial court's ruling denying her motion to suppress evidence as moot. Macias filed her amended motion to suppress evidence on September 6, 2010, a week after the hearing began. When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, "we view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling." State v. Wyman, 197 Ariz. 10, 12, ¶ 2, 3 P.3d 392, 394 (App. 2000). Generally, we will not overturn a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 110, 700 P.2d 488, 497 (1985).
¶14 The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Macias's motion as moot. Throughout the hearing, Macias raised the same objections to the evidence that she urges in her motion to suppress. By the time the court received the motion, it had heard and ruled on the admissibility of the same evidence Macias was challenging in the motion. In addition, at the end of the hearing the trial court addressed many of the objections Macias raised in her motion to suppress. For example, at both the hearing and in the motion Macias alleged there was police misconduct during the search. In its ruling the court found that Macias's claims of police misconduct were "unsupported by the evidence." The court's ruling also addressed the issue raised in Macias's motion concerning the dog alert. The court found that in considering "the lack of evidence regarding what the dog alerted to and how the item was contaminated, the Court [found] that the dog alert ha[d] very little weight."
Conclusion
¶15 For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court's finding of reasonable cause and the denial of Macias's amended motion to suppress as moot.
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ANDREW W. GOULD, Judge
CONCURRING:
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MAURICE PORTLEY, Presiding Judge
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ANN A. SCOTT TIMMER, Judge