Summary
finding a guilty plea lacking the requisite rule 2.8(b) language, no indication the district court accepted the plea, and no indication the rule 2.8(b) requirements were satisfied in any other fashion, was not in compliance with rule 2.8(b) and counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment
Summary of this case from State v. DentOpinion
No. 4-157 / 03-1136
April 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, John Nahra, Judge (plea), and James A. Weaver, District Associate Judge (sentencing).
MacGregor appeals from her conviction of driving while barred. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The trial information filed in this case on May 11, 2003, charged Debra MacGregor with one count of Driving While Barred in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561 (2003). On May 20, 2003, MacGregor completed and submitted a signed, written, guilty plea form to the district court judge presiding in Muscatine County that day. That form included MacGregor's acknowledgment that she was charged with the foregoing offense as well as the following provision:
1. I understand that I have the right to be personally addressed by the Court with respect to the matters set forth in this document. I have discussed this right with my attorney. I have decided to plead guilty and file this written guilty plea with the Court instead of discussing these matters in open court.
The next matter of record below is the following order entered by the same judge:
Defendant's sentencing and request for deferred judgment hearing is set for the 10th day of June, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.
On June 10, 2003, MacGregor appeared with counsel for the scheduled sentencing hearing. At the beginning of that proceeding the following exchange occurred between the presiding judge and MacGregor's attorney:
THE COURT: Mr. Robertson, do you or Miss MacGregor know of any reason why judgment could not be entered on the guilty plea?
MR. ROBERTSON: No, sir.
At the conclusion of the hearing the sentencing judge entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced MacGregor to a term in the county jail. MacGregor was also fined and ordered to pay court costs and restitution for her court-appointed attorney fees.
On direct appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence, MacGregor raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A CONVICTION UPON DEFENDANT'S PLEA, AS THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED OF HER RIGHTS NOR THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE, AND THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER HER PLEA WAS ENTERED VOLUNTARILY, AND TEHRE WAS AN INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS?
II. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE BARRED, IN FAILING TO MAKE SURE HER PLEA WAS MADE KNOWINGLY, AND VOLUNTARILY, AND IN FAILING TO FILE A MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT?II. Standard of Review.
Generally, we review a claim of error in a guilty plea proceeding for legal error. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. However, "when we consider a challenge to a guilty plea proceeding involving constitutional safeguards, we make an independent evaluation of the circumstances as shown by the entire record, which we review de novo." State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997) (citation omitted). We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999).
III. The Merits.
We initially note the trial court's failure to inform MacGregor of the necessity of filing a timely motion in arrest of judgment if she wished to challenge the validity of her guilty plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( d) (requiring the court to inform the defendant about the necessity of challenging a guilty plea for alleged defects in plea proceedings through a motion in arrest of judgment); see also State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003) (finding the court must inform the defendant of the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)( b)). Under these circumstances, MacGregor's failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment does not preclude a challenge to the validity of her guilty plea on direct appeal. Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 150.
A trial court shall not accept a defendant's guilty plea without " first determining that the defendant's plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b) (emphasis added); see also State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Iowa 1990). If the defendant tenders a guilty plea to a felony, the court must personally address the defendant in open court to make the determinations enumerated by rule. State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Iowa 2001) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 2002). If the offense is an aggravated or serious misdemeanor, the court, with the defendant's consent, may waive the personal in-court colloquy required by the rule. Id.; see also State v. Meron, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2004).
In State v. Meron, the court made the following observations concerning the waiver provision of rule 2.8(2)( b).
We recognize that the waiver language of rule 2.8(2)( b) was a codification of our holding in Kirchoff. Hook, 623 N.W.2d at 809. Thus, while the rule embraces the use of written waiver forms, neither Kirchoff nor the waiver language of rule 2.8(2)(b) diminishes the importance and necessity of the court's role to ensure each plea is voluntary, intelligent, and supported by facts. Instead, they simply recognize that the court, in making its required determination in misdemeanor cases, can use a defendant's written acknowledgement. The language of the waiver portion of the rule adopted after Kirchoff tracks with this approach and explains why it is written to permit the court to waive the procedures, subject to the approval of the defendant. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b). It allows the court, upon examination of a written plea, to waive the necessity of a full in-court colloquy. It does not give the defendant the right to waive the means for the court to determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered.
Meron, ____ N.W.2d at ____ (emphasis added).
As noted earlier, the plea record in this case discloses no more than MacGregor's submission of a written guilty plea form and a resulting order setting the time for a sentencing hearing. There is nothing in the record indicating the trial judge exercised his waiver discretion or otherwise discharged his duty to ensure MacGregor's plea was made "voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis" by making any of the required determinations set forth in rule 2.8(2)( b). We expressly reject the State's invitation to affirm based on the trial judge's implicit rather than express discharge of his duties under the rule. To hold otherwise conflicts with rather than advances the well-established public policy codified in rule 2.8(2)( b) and compromises the integrity of the misdemeanor plea-taking process authorized therein.
The trial court's judgment of conviction and resulting sentence are reversed and MacGregor's case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in conformity with rule 2.8(2)( b). See, e.g., State v. Randall, 258 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Iowa 1977) (vacating the judgment and remanding for a hearing to make the determinations required under rule 2.8(2)( b)).
The remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim is controlled by the foregoing and need not be addressed on appeal.