Opinion
NO. COA12-740
01-15-2013
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CYDE JAYE LOGAN
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General J. Rick Brown, for the State. Brock, Payne, & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for defendant-appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Guilford County
Nos. 09 CRS 84805-06
09 CRS 84808-09
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 March 2010 by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 December 2012.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General J. Rick Brown, for the State.
Brock, Payne, & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER JR., Robert N., Judge.
Cyde Jaye Logan ("Defendant") appeals following a jury verdict convicting him of Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver Heroin, Sale or Delivery of Heroin, Trafficking in Heroin, and Conspiracy to Traffic in Heroin. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence Defendant claims was unconstitutionally seized. We disagree.
I. Factual & Procedural History
On 8 September 2009 Defendant was indicted on one count each of Trafficking Heroin by Possession, Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver Heroin, Conspiracy to Traffick in Heroin, as well as two counts of Trafficking in Heroin by Sale or Delivery. Before trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, arguing that his arrest was not supported by probable cause, and thus any evidence seized as a result of that unlawful arrest was inadmissible.
The trial court's findings of fact following the suppression hearing are as follows. On 27 June 2009, Detective Brian Williamson of the Greensboro Police Department received information from a confidential informant that a person named Charity was selling heroin out of her home on Lindell Road in Greensboro. The informant claimed he had previously purchased heroin from Charity at that location, and additionally explained that a woman named Heather also bought heroin from Charity for the purposes of resale. The informant further stated that Charity's roommate, Crystal, drove a red Mitsubishi Eclipse. Surveillance at the Lindell Road residence revealed the presence of a Cadillac Escalade belonging to Heather.
Defendant does not argue on appeal that the court's findings of fact were unsupported by competent evidence.
The Greensboro Police Department had also received an anonymous tip two days earlier on its Crime Stoppers Hotline that Charity and her roommate Crystal lived on Lindell Road, and that they and another resident named Jonathan were involved in drug activity.
On 29 June 2009 officers arranged a successful controlled purchase of 10 bags of heroin by the informant from Charity at the Lindell Road home. On 2 July 2009 Detective Williamson met with the informant, who indicated that Charity intended to "re-up" her supply of heroin. The informant said that he had talked to her at her house, and that she said that "the more money she could put in, the cheaper she could . . . re-up" her supply of heroin. Charity asked the informant to contribute $200 so that she could buy more heroin from her supplier. Upon receiving this information, police provided the informant with $200 in marked bills, which were photocopied. The informant then went back to Lindell Road under police observation. The informant indicated that he would either call or text Detective Williamson from time to time to let him know what was going on. Detective Williamson requested additional surveillance and back-up officers from vice and narcotics to assist in the surveillance effort.
The informant indicated that he would be riding with Heather in a beige Escalade to meet the supplier. At some point during the investigation, Detective Williamson received a text from the informant who said that Heather and Charity had gotten into a verbal altercation and that Heather left, and as a result, they would have to wait for another ride to meet the supplier. At approximately 5:28 p.m. that same day, officers observed a person later identified as "David" drive up to the home on Lindell Road. The officers observed him go inside and then leave approximately three minutes later. David returned in the same car a little while after 7:00 p.m. that evening. Then, the informant, Charity, and David got into David's car and left the home. Officers followed the car from Lindell Road towards Wendover Avenue, when Detective Williamson received another text from the informant indicating that they were going to a nearby Wal-Mart. When they reached the Wal-Mart, officers observed the informant, David, and Charity exit the car and enter the store. Once inside, the informant texted Detective Williamson and indicated that the three were going to wait inside the store for the supplier to arrive outside.
At approximately 7:50 p.m., the informant texted Detective Williamson that the supplier had arrived. At this time officers who were conducting surveillance of the lot observed Charity come out of the store, where she met with Defendant in the parking lot. Defendant was driving a silver Nissan Maxima. Detective Gavin Naquin of the Greensboro Police Department, who was 10 to 15 feet away, saw Charity open the door to the Maxima and get into the passenger seat of the car. The car then traveled a short distance, eventually stopping in a driveway behind where Detective Naquin was parked. Detective Naquin could see inside of the car, and testified that the only people inside were Defendant, whose identity was unknown at the time, and Charity.
Detective Naquin then saw Charity briefly turn her back and indicate to Defendant that she had something in her hand, at which time he saw her give Defendant some money. Defendant then handed Charity something back that was small enough to fit in her hand. Detective Naquin testified that this was consistent with his training and experience regarding drug transactions and hand-to-hand buys, particularly when coupled with all of the information he had received through other officers, radio traffic, and through the information provided by the informant. Detective Naquin indicated that about 10 seconds elapsed from the time Defendant parked until the transaction took place. Charity then immediately exited the car. She put the small object in a bag that she was carrying. As the car door opened, Detective Naquin saw in plain view Defendant placing the money he had received from Charity in the console between the two front seats. Detective Naquin then observed Charity walk back into the Wal-Mart.
Detective Naquin was instructed to follow the Maxima a short distance away from the store and stop it. While the car was stopped at an intersection, Detective Naquin and another officer exited their cars, came up and opened the door of the Maxima, immediately handcuffed Defendant, and placed him under arrest. Defendant was told that he was under arrest for the drug sale, at which time he was escorted to and seated on a nearby curb. Defendant was asked if they could look inside of his vehicle, at which point Defendant said, "Sure. It's not my vehicle, but you can search it." Detective Naquin immediately saw a large sum of money in the cup holder, which included the $200 in marked bills Detective Williamson had given the informant. Upon further search, officers found a ball of aluminum foil inside a shoe box which appeared to contain heroin. At this time Defendant said, "That is what you're looking for. I ain't going to swallow no heroin."
Simultaneously, vice and narcotics officers at the Wal-Mart stopped David's car as it was leaving the parking lot. David gave consent to search the car, where officers found a tin containing four small ziplock bags having some sort of residue, syringes, marijuana residue, and a spoon. During this process Charity began crying and gave consent to search her purse, in which officers found two plastic bags containing heroin.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress, concluding that officers were "justified to search the passenger area of the vehicle and containers therein pursuant to the search incident to the arrest." At the conclusion of Defendant's trial, the jury found him guilty of all indicted offenses with the exception of the Trafficking by Possession charge. The Court consolidated judgments and sentenced Defendant to 70-84 months imprisonment for the Trafficking and Conspiracy to Traffick charges, followed by a consecutive consolidated sentence of 12-15 months for the charges of Sale or Delivery of Heroin and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
As Defendant appeals from the final judgment of a superior court, an appeal lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2011).
"When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court determines whether the challenged findings of fact are supported by (1) competent evidence and (2) whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law." State v. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. 259, 262, 693 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2010). "Where no exceptions have been taken to the findings of fact, such findings are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." State v. Phillips, 151 N.C. App. 185, 190, 565 S.E.2d 697, 701 (2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. at 262, 693 S.E.2d at 714. Accordingly, we review de novo Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in concluding probable cause to arrest existed under these facts.
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the officers who arrested him lacked probable cause to do so. Defendant contends that as a result, any search incident to his arrest was unconstitutional, and therefore the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress. We disagree.
As a general rule, "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search which occurs incident to a lawful arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). "An arrest is constitutionally valid when the officers have probable cause to make it." State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 559, 196 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1973). "[W]hen a defendant is arrested, the defendant's car can be searched 'only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search' or 'when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.'" State v. Mbacke, __ N.C. __, __, 721 S.E.2d 218, 221 (2012) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009)).
Under North Carolina law, "[a]n officer may arrest without a warrant any person who the officer has probable cause to believe has committed a criminal offense . . . in the officer's presence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401(b)(1) (2011).
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Defendant does not argue on appeal that the holding of Arizona v. Gant precluded police from lawfully searching the car incident to his arrest, nor does Defendant challenge the trial court's findings of fact. Rather, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding police possessed probable cause to arrest him. This contention is without merit.
"Probable cause refers to those facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information which are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 343, 333 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1985). In evaluating whether an officer possessed probable cause, North Carolina has adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach. See State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260-61 (1984). "The court must view the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable and cautious police officer." State v. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. 364, 367, 462 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1995).
In arguing Detective Naquin lacked probable cause to arrest him, Defendant relies solely on State v. Williams, 32 N.C. App. 204, 231 S.E.2d 282 (1977). In Williams, this Court held that an officer's observation of a defendant and another man joining hands in "an area of substantial drug traffic," standing alone, was insufficient to produce probable cause. Id. at 206-07, 231 S.E.2d at 283-84. However, Defendant's reliance on Williams is misplaced. A review of the trial court's findings in this case reveals that Detective Naquin had far more information than the arresting officer in Williams.
In the case sub judice, Greensboro Police received over a period of several days accurate and reliable information from an informant, culminating in a successful controlled purchase by this informant from Charity. When police were given information about Charity "re-upping" from her supplier, they arranged a stakeout in order to identify and apprehend Charity's source. Detective Naquin, in possession of this information given to him from other officers, witnessed what appeared to be a drug sale during the stakeout. This provided him probable cause to pull over and arrest Defendant.
In short, the police in this case monitored a crime from its inception through its completion. This was not a case, like Williams, where police mistook reasonable suspicion for probable cause. Rather, the Greensboro Police Department possessed probable cause to arrest Defendant upon witnessing, on the basis of reliable and predictive information, what they correctly believed to be a drug transaction.
Accordingly, we find
NO ERROR.
Judges STROUD and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).