Opinion
22-KH-38
02-15-2022
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARVAL LEDET
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, DIVISION "F", NUMBER 18-7394.
Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy, Jude G. Gravois, and Marc E. Johnson
WRIT DENIED
Relator, Darval Ledet, seeks review of the district court's December 21, 2021 ruling denying his application for post-conviction relief ("APCR"). In his writ application, relator re-urges his post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, finding no error in the trial court's ruling, we deny the writ.
On September 12, 2019, relator pled guilty to attempted armed robbery with a firearm (count one); attempted second degree murder (count two); attempted armed robbery with a firearm (count three); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (La. R.S. 14:95.1) (count five). On the same date, in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement, the district court sentenced relator to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, with an additional five-year consecutive sentence each on counts one and three; twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count two; and twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count five. In addition, the district court assessed fees in the amount of $1,250. The district court further ordered all of the sentences to run concurrently with each other. Relator's convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on January 27, 2021. State v. Ledet, 20-258 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/21), 310 So.3d 810. Relator did not seek supervisory review by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In connection with a negotiated plea agreement, the State amended the bill of information to enter a nolle prosequi on a charge of attempted second degree murder (count four).
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to file a habitual offender bill of information.
Relator filed his APCR with the district court on April 15, 2021, challenging his convictions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. On July 23, 2021, relator filed a motion requesting to supplement his APCR with a supplemental memorandum, which the district court granted. In his APCR, relator argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas. Specifically, relator claimed that his counsel spent an insufficient amount of time in consultation with him concerning the case, that his counsel failed to file motions challenging the State's case, that his counsel failed to challenge the procedures for obtaining DNA evidence, that his counsel failed to challenge the chain of custody regarding the firearm and DNA evidence, and that his counsel urged him to plead guilty despite his objections.
Relator originally filed an APCR on May 11, 2020, raising several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court denied relator's APCR on June 1, 2020, as premature, dismissed it without prejudice, and granted him an out-of-time appeal.
In order to provide a more meaningful review, the district ordered the State to file a response to address relator's claims. On November 29, 2021, the State filed its response, arguing that relator's allegations of counsel's ineffective assistance were unsupported by the record. On December 6, 2021, the district court denied relief, stating:
On all of his claims, the petitioner fails to meet his heavy burden under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 or the two prongs of Strickland. His claims are vague and conclusory. The petitioner fails to show any deficiency by his criminal defense attorney or that he would have insisted on going to trial, absent errors of counsel. There is nothing submitted to the court entitling the petitioner to further review.
The official record shows that relator filed a notice of intent with the district court on December 28, 2021. On January 5, 2022, the district court set a return date for March 4, 2022, finding good cause for an extension. Relator timely filed the instant writ application on January 27, 2022.
In his writ application, relator argues, as he did in the district court, that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically, relator maintains that counsel advised him to plead guilty despite the weakness of the State's case. In relator's view, counsel should have investigated the chain of custody related to the DNA evidence. Relator also points to the pretrial motions concerning the defense's request for the State's impeachment evidence and jury instructions as proof of relator's willingness to have his case tried before a jury rather than pleading guilty.
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution, a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Casimer, 12-678 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/13), 113 So.3d 1129, 1141. Under the well-known standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and State v. Washington, a conviction must be reversed if the petitioner proves (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, that is, that the performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. State ex rel. Sparkman v. State, 15-1726 (La. 10/17/16), 202 So.3d 488, 491. To be successful in arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must prove deficient performance to the point that counsel is not functioning as counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Id. A petitioner must also prove actual prejudice to the point that the result of the trial cannot be trusted. It is absolutely essential that both prongs of the Strickland test must be established before relief will be granted by a reviewing court. Id.
When a defendant claims that counsel's ineffective assistance rendered a guilty plea invalid, the Strickland analysis under the first deficiency prong remains the same, whereas under the second prong, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Johnson, 18-294 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So.3d 593, 598. Furthermore, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of effective representation. State v. Ott, 12-111 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12), 102 So.3d 944, 953. Therefore, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered "sound trial strategy." State v. Dabney, 05-53 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/28/05), 908 So.2d 60, 63 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). Moreover, effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel and the reviewing court does not judge counsel's performance with the distorting benefits of hindsight, but rather determines whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance. State v. Soler, 93-1042 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/94), 636 So.2d 1069, 1075.
In his writ application, relator claims that the only evidence linking him to the instant offenses was "marred by an insufficient chain of custody," which counsel failed to challenge before advising him to plead guilty. In support of his claim, relator maintains that the chain of custody report states that the DNA swabs taken from a handgun were labeled 11-A, but a lab report indicates that the fired cartridge cases were also labeled 11-A. However, despite relator's claim to the contrary, in addition to the DNA evidence-which the State supported by signed search warrants, chain of custody documents from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, and reports from the crime lab-the State had other evidence connecting him to the instant offenses. Specifically, one victim identified relator as having the same facial features from the nose down and the same beard as relator. Both victims also made a photographic identification of the vehicle and the firearm used during the armed robbery.
Additionally, in response to relator's contention that his counsel was deficient because he failed to file motions challenging the State's case and/or challenging the procedures for obtaining DNA evidence and the chain of custody, the filing of pre-trial motions is squarely within the ambit of trial strategy. State v. Jones, 09-688 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 33 So.3d 306, 325 (citing State v. Hollins, 99-278 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 671, 681, writ denied, 99-278 (La. 1/5/01), 778 So.2d 587). Defense counsel's decision as to which motions to file form a part of trial strategy. State v. Griffin, 14-450 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 31, 49. Hindsight is not the proper perspective for judging the competence of counsel's trial decisions and an attorney's level of representation may not be determined by whether a particular strategy is successful. Jones, 33 So.3d at 325; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Here, even assuming that the labels of the DNA swabs and the fired cartridge cases shared the same label number, we find relator's attack on the integrity of the chain of custody speculative and conclusory at best. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. Consequently, we find that counsel did not commit an unprofessional error by failing to file a motion to suppress on those grounds.
La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2 states, "The petitioner in an application for post-conviction relief shall have the burden of proving that relief should be granted."
With respect to relator's claim that the outstanding motion for the State's impeachment evidence and the defense request for jury instructions, suggesting that relator desired a jury trial rather than a guilty plea, relator has failed to include a copy of his guilty plea transcript in the instant application for this Court's review. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. As this Court noted on direct review of relator's guilty plea, "during the plea colloquy, defendant indicated that no one was forcing or threatening him to plead guilty, [and] that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation." Ledet, 310 So.3d at 818. This Court further noted that "defendant received a great benefit from pleading guilty in that the State agreed not to multiple bill him, and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently." Id. at 821.
On appeal, relator raised a pro se assignment of error challenging the validity of his guilty plea. See Ledet, 310 So.3d at 820.
Based on our review of the writ application, we find that relator has failed to carry his burden of showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Accordingly, we find relator's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit and deny the writ application.
SMC
JGG
MEJ