Opinion
A criminal sentence, if within the limits fixed by statute for the crime charged, will not be upset on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than four nor more than six years upon conviction of indecent assault. Under all the circumstances, held that the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence. The defendant had first pleaded not guilty, then changed his plea to guilty. Following imposition of the sentence he moved, through new counsel, to open the judgment and vacate the sentence. Although the claim on appeal was that the trial court had refused to hear evidence on the motion, the finding did not disclose that such was the fact. The conclusion that the plea of guilty was the free and understanding expression of the defendant's wishes furnished ample reason for denying the motion.
Argued December 2, 1953
Decided February 2, 1954
Information charging the defendant with the crime of indecent assault, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and presented to the court, Alcorn, J., on a plea of guilty; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed after his motion to open the judgment and vacate the sentence had been denied. No error.
Nathan Rubin, with whom was Frederick S. Moss, for the appellant (defendant).
Abraham S. Ullman, state's attorney, with whom was Arthur T. Gorman, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant was presented in the Superior Court on April 7, 1953, upon an information charging him with the crime of indecent assault. He was represented by the attorney who had appeared for him when he was arraigned in the City Court of New Haven. He entered a plea of not guilty and elected a jury trial. On April 22, 1953, he was again presented in court, his attorney having informed the state's attorney that he desired to change his plea. At this time the court accepted a change of plea to guilty. Thereupon the state's attorney stated to the court the facts and circumstances of the offense with which the defendant was charged, and counsel for the defendant was fully heard. At the conclusion of the statements the court imposed a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for the term of not less than four years and not more than six years. On April 28, 1953, through new counsel, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment and vacate the sentence. This was taken under advisement by the court and on May 7, 1953, was denied.
Aside from the assignments of error directed at the finding, there are only two issues raised. They are (1) whether the judgment was erroneous in that the sentence was excessive and (2) whether the court erred in denying the motion to open the judgment. In connection with the latter, the defendant claims that the court refused to hear evidence on the motion, but the finding, to which we must look, does not disclose that such was the fact.
The sentence imposed was within the limits fixed by statute for the offense charged. General Statutes 8359. We have no discretionary power in such a case except where a trial court appears to have abused its discretion. State v. Van Allen, 140 Conn. 39, 44, 97 A.2d 890. Here it would not appear that there was any abuse of discretion. State v. Chuchelow, 128 Conn. 323, 324, 22 A.2d 780. There is a wide field open to the trial judge in obtaining information bearing upon mitigation or aggravation of the seriousness of the offense. Ibid. The court had before it the details of the offense charged. It also had before it the serious consideration of the protection of society from similar offenses in the future. The proper limits of a court's responsibility have been repeatedly defined. State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138, 148, 130 A. 96; State v. Mele, 125 Conn. 210, 214, 4 A.2d 336; State v. Horton, 132 Conn. 276, 278, 43 A.2d 744.
The finding of the court presents everything necessary for a determination of the final question raised on appeal. Nothing would be gained in making the corrections sought. The situation would not be changed in any material way. The court's conclusion in the finding is that the defendant's plea of guilty was the free and understanding expression of his own wishes. This was ample reason to deny the motion to open the judgment.