Opinion
No. 5-533 / 04-1606
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David H. Sivright, Jr., Judge.
Christopher Allen Langley appeals following his convictions and sentences on charges of murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, theft in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, Scott County Attorney, and Joseph A. Grubisich, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
Christopher Allen Langley appeals following his convictions and sentences on charges of murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, theft in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for kidnapping in the first degree. He also contends his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm his convictions for murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and theft in the first degree. We reverse Langley's conviction for kidnapping in the first degree.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
After more than ten years of never missing a day of work, Mark Willis failed to report for work on the evening of February 20, 2004. Willis was last seen around 4:30 p.m. on that date when he stopped in at Jack's Brake Alignment to visit with his friends, Terry and Cheryl Weipert. He left Jack's Brake Alignment sometime after 5 p.m. in his maroon Jeep Grand Cherokee. He was on his way home to take a nap and eat before beginning his 10 p.m. work shift at FBG, a janitorial service in Davenport. Willis did not show up for his work shift that evening. Cheryl Weipert called the police to report him missing on February 23, 2004.
Days later, Willis's body was discovered lying face down in a creek at the bottom of a steep incline near a gravel road in a rural area of Scott County. He had been beaten and stabbed repeatedly. The medical examiner opined that Willis died from drowning. His Jeep was found abandoned on Interstate 74 near Bloomington, Illinois, with stolen license plates. The interior of the Jeep, which Willis had kept in pristine condition, was littered with food, clothing, cigarettes, garbage, and a citation issued to the defendant, Christopher Allen Langley, for possession of drug paraphernalia.
The Weiperts testified that Willis and Langley first became acquainted in the late nineties through the Weiperts and their auto shop business. Langley would often stop by the Weiperts' business before or after school because of his interest in cars. Willis was also a frequent visitor at the Weiperts' shop. He befriended Langley and attempted to be "sort of a big brother" to him. He took Langley to the movies, gave him money on occasion, and taught him how to drive.
On the evening of February 20, 2004, Langley's friends, Kyle Bahnsen, Kyle Long, and Lance Brady, met at Brady's house to plan their activities for the night. Bahnsen, Long and Brady testified that Langley arrived at Brady's house sometime between six and seven o'clock. Langley and Brady left for a short period of time to "go get some weed." The teens smoked marijuana and decided to go play pool at a local club, Miller Time. Bahnsen, Long, Brady, and Langley left the house and got into a "dark colored" Jeep parked outside. Inside the Jeep were two of Langley's other friends, Michael Cargill and Trenton Howard. When Bahnsen, Long, or Brady asked where the Jeep had come from, they were told by the other three they had "killed someone for it." Right after they said that, they stated, "no, don't worry about it, we got it from a relative." Brady testified that at one point, Langley referred to himself, Cargill, and Howard as "thieves and murderers."
After leaving Brady's house, the group did not immediately go to Miller Time as they had planned. Instead, they drove to a secluded area on a gravel road. Langley and Cargill got out of the Jeep and said they were going to check on a body. The two went down a steep incline and "disappeared." When they returned, they told the others in the Jeep the man was dead and "still lying face down in a creek." The group then headed to Miller Time to play pool. On the way there, they stopped at the mall where Langley used an ATM machine and bought a hat. Langley told Long he was using the debit card of the man they killed.
The six teens stayed at Miller Time until 11 p.m. or midnight. Before leaving the parking lot of Miller Time, they drove to the rear of the building and stopped. Howard got out of the Jeep and retrieved a white bag from the back of the vehicle. He threw the bag into the wooded area behind Miller Time. Langley, Howard, or Cargill told the others the bag contained bloodstained clothing from the man they killed. Davenport police later recovered a white bag containing bloody clothing, a boot and a sweatshirt from the wooded area behind Miller Time. Willis's DNA was found on the bloody clothes in the bag. A hair discovered in the bag was found to be genetically consistent with Langley.
After their night at Miller Time, Langley, Cargill, and Howard embarked on a trip to Florida. Testimony presented at trial revealed that Willis's debit card was used in Iowa, Illinois, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Georgia, and Kentucky. Langley told an acquaintance he traveled to Florida in Cargill's grandmother's Jeep and they had an accident on their return trip. Evidence offered at trial showed Langley hired a limousine driver in Bloomington, Illinois, where Willis's Jeep was found abandoned on the side of the road, to drive them to the Quad Cities area.
On March 25, 2004, the State charged Langley with the offenses of murder in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2003); robbery in the first degree in violation of sections 711.1 and 711.2; theft in the first degree in violation of sections 714.2(1), 714.2(1)(2); willful injury with serious injury in violation of section 708.4(1); conspiracy to commit a felony in violation of section 706.1; and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of sections 710.1 and 710.2. Jury trial commenced on August 30, 2004. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges on September 2, 2004. The district court merged Langley's willful injury conviction with the murder conviction and vacated his conviction for conspiracy. Langley was sentenced to a life term for the first-degree murder conviction, twenty-five years in prison for the first-degree robbery conviction, ten years in prison for the theft conviction, and a second life term for the first-degree kidnapping conviction. All sentences were imposed consecutively.
Langley appeals. He claims the district court erred in finding sufficient evidence to sustain the charge of kidnapping in the first degree. He further claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his counsel's failure to object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence involving narcotics.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). We look for substantial evidence, including any inferences arising from the evidence, to support the jury's verdict. State v. Terry, 544 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1996). If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it is binding on this court. State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996). Evidence that could convince a trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt is substantial evidence. Id.
In deciding whether there is substantial evidence, we view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993). All of the evidence must be considered when determining evidentiary sufficiency. State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1980). Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999); Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(p). A verdict can rest on circumstantial evidence alone. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d at 334. "However, the evidence must at least raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime. Evidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation or conjecture is insufficient." Id. (citations omitted).
Iowa Code section 710.1 defines kidnapping in the following manner:
A person commits kidnapping when the person either confines a person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that the person who confines or removes the other person has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of the following:
. . . .
3. The intent to inflict serious injury upon such person . . .
One essential element of the offense of kidnapping is the removal or confinement of the victim by the defendant. State v. Osborn, 455 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). Removal is sufficient to constitute kidnapping when the acts alleged substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessen the risk of detection, or facilitate escape. State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981). Removal need not be substantial or forcible. State v. Ramsey, 444 N.W.2d 493, 494 (Iowa 1989). It can be achieved by deception rather than by force or threat. Id.
Langley argues the State's evidence supporting his conviction for kidnapping in the first degree is insufficient because there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that Willis was confined or removed. As a result, he contends the district court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal. The State argues there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish Willis was removed by force or fraud to the remote location where he was killed. We conclude Langley's argument has merit.
In other cases where we have found there was substantial evidence of removal, we have had the benefit of testimony from witnesses or the victim describing the circumstances surrounding the incident. For example, in Osborn, and Ramsey, substantial evidence of removal was found where the victim survived the defendants' murder attempt and was able to testify that the defendants tricked him into driving them to a remote location where they shot him and stole his vehicle. Osborn, 455 N.W.2d at 294; Ramsey, 444 N.W.2d at 494; see also State v. Hoeck, 547 N.W.2d 852, 859-60 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (finding there was substantial evidence of removal where the defendant's accomplices testified about the kidnapping and murder and their testimony was corroborated by other witnesses' testimony and physical evidence).
Osborn and Ramsey arise out of the same set of facts involving the same victim but different defendants. Osborn, 455 N.W.2d at 292; Ramsey, 444 N.W.2d at 494.
In this case we do not have the benefit of any testimony which reveals how the victim came to the scene of his death. The State concedes there is no direct evidence regarding this issue, but argues there is substantial circumstantial evidence to establish that Willis was removed or confined. Upon careful review of the record, we cannot agree with the State's argument.
The record reveals ample evidence supporting Langley's convictions for first-degree murder, robbery, and theft. However, we do not believe the record reveals substantial evidence to support the elements of kidnapping. The evidence presented by the State simply establishes that Willis was last seen at the Weiperts' auto body shop and his body was discovered days later in a secluded area. There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to where Willis went from the time that he left the Weiperts until the time of his death. There is no evidence that Willis was confined or removed from one place to another by force or fraud. The evidence leads only to speculation and conjecture as to how, or even whether, Willis was removed to the rural area where his body was discovered. We find the evidence presented at trial "does not raise a fair inference of guilt" regarding the element of removal. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d at 334. Accordingly, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support Langley's conviction for kidnapping in the first degree. Therefore, we reverse his conviction for kidnapping in the first degree and remand for dismissal of that charge.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Langley claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's failure to seek to exclude irrelevant and prejudicial prior bad acts evidence that Langley had helped Brady procure marijuana, that Langley and other witnesses smoked marijuana the night of the incident, and that Langley had been cited for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Because Langley's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arise from his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, our review is de novo. State v. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2003). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted from this omission. State v. Constable, 505 N.W.2d 473, 479 (Iowa 1993). To prove the first prong, Langley must overcome the strong presumption that counsel was competent and show that counsel's performance was not within the wide range of normal competency. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994). To prove the second prong, Langley must show there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Id. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either breach of duty or prejudice. State v. Query, 594 N.W.2d 438, 445 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
Generally we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to afford the defendant an evidentiary hearing and to permit the development of a more complete record. State v. Rice, 543 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Iowa 1996). However, we will resolve such issues when the record on appeal is adequate. Buck, 510 N.W.2d at 853. In this appeal, we find the record adequate to address Langley's claims.
Upon review of the record, we find Langley has not proved his counsel failed to perform an essential duty by not seeking to exclude evidence that Langley helped Brady obtain marijuana, that Langley and other witnesses smoked marijuana on the evening of February 20, 2004, and the citation for possession of drug paraphernalia issued to Langley.
Brady testified he and Langley left his house for a short time on February 20, 2004, to "go get some weed." Bahnsen and Long testified they were all smoking marijuana that evening. Langley argues his counsel should have objected to this evidence of prior bad acts. Instead, his counsel used the evidence to challenge these witnesses' credibility and recollection of the events on February 20, 2004. The defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We conclude trial counsel's failure to object to the testimony that the teens obtained and smoked marijuana, and his decision to utilize the evidence to attack the witnesses' credibility and recollection was a reasonable and strategic trial decision under the circumstances. Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989). We will not second-guess reasonable trial strategy. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 564.
We also find Langley has not shown his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to admission of a citation issued to Langley for possession of drug paraphernalia. Generally, evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show the person acted in conformity with the prior acts. Iowa R. Evid. 5 .404( b); State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Iowa 2004). Such evidence may be admissible, however, if it is relevant to a legitimate issue in dispute, and there is clear proof the defendant committed the act. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 25. The citation issued to Langley was found in Willis's abandoned vehicle upon its discovery in Illinois. Admission of the citation into evidence was relevant to help establish that Langley had been in Willis's Jeep and to "complete the story of the crime." State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). "Evidence immediately surrounding the offense is admissible to show the complete story of a crime, even when it shows commission of another crime." Id.
If the evidence is relevant, we next consider whether the probative value of the evidence is substantiallyoutweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 124 (Iowa 2004). Evidence may be considered unfairly prejudicial "when the evidence would cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the proven facts and applicable law, such as sympathy for one party or a desire to punish a party." Id. Here, the evidence of prior bad acts did not rise to the level of the conduct alleged by the State in the present crimes. We conclude the admission of the citation issued to Langley for possession of drug paraphernalia could not be considered unfairly prejudicial. We determine Langley has failed to show he received ineffective assistance due to counsel's failure to object to the evidence at issue here. Therefore, we affirm Langley's convictions for first-degree murder, robbery and theft.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court for first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree theft. We reverse the judgment and sentence for first-degree kidnapping, and remand for dismissal of that charge.