Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0005-15T2
01-04-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY LANE, Defendant-Respondent.
Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Messano, Carroll, and Sumners. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Accusation No. 08-01-0120. Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
The State appeals from the July 13, 2015 Law Division order granting defendant Larry Lane's petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand this matter to the Law Division to determine whether defendant's petition is time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12, and for further proceedings in light of State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295 (2012).
On March 27, 1997, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b, as amended from second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1). The State also agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. Defendant was sentenced on May 19, 1997, to a four-year term of imprisonment. The record before us does not include the plea or sentencing transcripts. However, neither the three-page plea form nor the judgment of conviction (JOC) indicate that "Megan's Law" or community supervision for life (CSL) applied to defendant's sentence. Additionally, on the JOC, the box next to the statement "[y]ou are hereby sentenced to community supervision for life" is not marked.
"Megan's Law", L. 1994, c. 127 to 134, established a system of registration and community notification for certain sex offenders, and set forth various sentencing and community supervision requirements pertaining to such offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 was also adopted as part of Megan's Law, and provided that a judge imposing sentence on a person convicted of certain designated sexual offenses "shall include" a special sentence of community supervision for life. See L. 1994, c. 130. The statute was amended in 2003 to change "community supervision for life" to "parole supervision for life." See G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 401 N.J. Super. 392, 401 n. 4 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd, 199 N.J. 135 (2009). Because defendant committed this crime before these revisions were enacted, he remains under the former designation, community supervision for life. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.11(a).
The judge entered an amended JOC on October 26, 2003, which was identical to the 1997 JOC except that the judge marked the provision, "[t]he defendant is hereby sentenced to community supervision for life." The record does not disclose the reason for the amendment, whether defendant was present in court, or how or when defendant first learned of the amended JOC or the CSL and Megan's Law consequences stemming from his 1997 conviction.
Defendant remained offense-free until December 2007. During an unannounced visit to defendant's residence, his parole officer was allegedly informed by defendant's brother, Garry, that defendant had recently moved out. Consequently, defendant was charged in Essex County Accusation No. 08-1-0120 with one count of fourth-degree failure to notify law enforcement of a change of address, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2d, and two counts of fourth-degree failure to obtain permission to change residency, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. On January 14, 2008, defendant waived his rights to indictment and a jury trial and pled guilty to the failure to notify charge. The remaining counts were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced that day, without a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), to thirty-nine days' time served. Appropriate monetary penalties were also assessed. The judge, who was not the original sentencing judge, verbally confirmed that defendant remained on parole and reminded defendant of his duty to register with law enforcement. Again, the box for community supervision on the 2008 JOC was not checked off.
Defendant did not appeal from his 1997 or 2008 convictions. In 2014, defendant sought to be relieved of his Megan's Law/CSL requirements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4c. He alleged that he then learned, for the first time, that his 2008 conviction would delay his ability to do so. On May 22, 2014, defendant filed a pro se petition seeking to vacate his 2008 conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel was subsequently appointed to represent defendant. Counsel filed a brief and argued that plea counsel was ineffective because (1) plea counsel only met briefly with defendant in a group holding cell to discuss the charge; and (2) plea counsel failed to advise defendant "that the [2008] conviction would make him ineligible to be relieved of his registration requirements."
The PCR judge, who had not presided over either of the earlier proceedings, conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 18, 2015, at which defendant and his brother Garry testified. Garry, who is hearing-impaired, required the use of a sign language interpreter, and clearly displayed difficulty in understanding and responding to his questioning. Ultimately, however, he testified that in December 2007, when the "policeman" came, defendant was still living with him at the registered address.
Defendant also denied that he had moved from his registered address when the parole officers visited in December 2007. He testified that he had recently obtained a job and that he went to meet his sister at Newark Penn Station to borrow commuting money from her. He then promptly returned to his brother's Newark residence, where he continued to reside. Upon his return, Garry informed him of the parole officers' visit. Defendant reported to the Parole Office in East Orange the following morning to inform his parole officer that he "got a job and [] was supposed to start . . . at 3:00 o'clock that day." Defendant continued:
A. . . . but they didn't listen to me and they just told me turn around, put my hands behind my back and they locked me up, and I never got a chance to start the job, and I was locked up for a month and . . . a week."
Q. What did they tell you the charge was?Defendant described his one-time interaction with plea counsel as follows:
A. Failure to notify that I moved, and I never moved, and after I was released I still went back to the same address that they said I moved from because that was the only address I had.
Q. Now, obviously you remember pleading guilty to . . . failing to [notify parole of] change of address?
A. Yes, . . . at the time I was in a holding cell and the lawyer . . . came in, [and] was like . . . do you want to go home, . . . and there was like three other people in there, he never [] pulled me to the side and he was like . . . they gonna let you go home if you just say that yeah, . . . it's a little minor . . . charge, but he never explained to me that it would prevent me from being able to get off of the registration.
. . . .
Q. And did you ever ask [plea counsel] whether . . . this could prevent you from being removed?
A. No, I didn't have a chance to. I asked him [] can we go out of the cell and talk, . . . but he was like . . . in such a rush, it was like no, do you want to go home, if you want to go home I can . . . help you get home. You know, you can go home today if you will just say yes. It's a . . . minor thing, but I never got a chance to really speak with him . . . about [] my situation, why they locked me up.
Q. When he said to you that it was a minor thing what did you interpret that to mean?
A. It was . . . really no charge, it was like . . . a little [] misdemeanor thing, misunderstanding . . . . I didn't know that it was this big, that it [would] you know, stop me from being able to be released off of registration.
Q. Were there any other men in the holding cells while you were in there?
A. [T]hree other men.
Q. Was there an ability to talk to your attorney by yourself?
A. [I]f he would have asked them to let me out the cell and pull me to the side to talk to him, but he didn't.
Q. That didn't happen?
A. No. I asked him, I said . . . can we go talk and he was like no, [] Judge don't have time, we don't have time, just if you want to go home now -- you know, he [] like rushed me through it and I wanted to go home.
. . . .
BY THE COURT:
Q. Now, Mr. Lane, [] the attorney that represented you on this case, had you ever met him before?
A. No . . . . He never even came to see me while I was locked up. [] I only [saw] him that one time when . . . I went to court.
Q. [S]o when he came into the holding cell and spoke to you was that the first time you met him?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that the first conversation you had with him?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have any subsequent conversation with him later on?
A. No.
Q. Were you sentenced that day?
A. To time served, yeah.
Q. [D]id you ever get a pre-sentence report done, because this was a fourth degree charge?
A. No, I never got anything, Your Honor . . . . I sat there [from] December til like February and I didn't know what was going on.
Q. Do you know [] at what time you were notified that you had an attorney?
A. [N]o, I don't remember.
Q. [] So . . . would it be fair to say that you met the attorney that represented you that day --
A. Um-huh.
Q. -- that was your first and only conversation with him --
A. Um-huh.
Q. [H]e told you if you just answered yes you could get out --
A. Um-huh.
Q. [A]nd you have not been involved in the criminal justice system since?
A. No.
In lieu of calling plea counsel as a witness at the PCR hearing, the parties stipulated that, were he to testify, he would state "his belief is that he did not inform [defendant] of [the CSL/Megan's Law] consequence and . . . that he did not because he does not believe he knew of it. That is what he thinks probably occurred."
In her oral decision, the PCR judge concluded that defendant's proofs satisfied the two-prong Strickland test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge found it "clear there was no investigation done" and that counsel's "ineffectiveness has been shown." Having heard Garry's testimony, the judge found it "very questionable [] whether he fully understood what was being asked of him when he responded." Since the evidence establishing defendant's guilt centered on the parole officer's questioning of Garry, the judge opined: "I think it would be very hard [for the State] to establish that if . . . the parole officer did not go there with anyone with assistance or knew to intentionally keep their voices at a very high volume that he knowingly answered those questions appropriately."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). In Strickland, the Court held that, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient. Ibid. Second, he must show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. When a guilty plea is involved, defendant must prove that but for counsel's deficient performance he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996).
The PCR judge additionally determined that the potential for defendant's 2008 guilty plea to delay his future eligibility under the fifteen-year "good behavior" provisions of Megan's Law and CSL was a "penal" rather than a "collateral" consequence of that plea. The judge accepted defendant's testimony that he would have never pled guilty had he known that it would re-start the fifteen-year waiting period for seeking relief from the Megan's Law and CSL registration requirements. The court entered a memorializing order granting defendant's PCR petition, thereby vacating his 2008 guilty plea and reinstating the accusation. In doing so, the judge did not address the State's procedural argument that the PCR was time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(1).
The State moved for leave to appeal, which we granted on August 31, 2015. The State presents the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
A GUILTY PLEA'S EFFECTS ON A DEFENDANT'S FUTURE ABILITY TO RELIEVE HIMSELF OF HIS MEGAN'S LAW OBLIGATIONS OR HIS CSL SENTENCE IS A COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE. AS SUCH, A DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADVISE DEFENDANT OF SUCH CONSEQUENCES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT DENYING DEFENDANT'S PCR PETITION AS TIME-BARRED.
We first address the State's contention that plea counsel's undisputed lack of familiarity with, and failure to inform defendant of, the "good behavior" provisions of Megan's Law and CSL, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The "good behavior" provisions permit a registered sex offender who attains fifteen crime-free years to de-register. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f; N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4c. The Megan's Law "good behavior" section provides:
[e]xcept as provided in subsection g. of this section, a person required to register under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate
the obligation upon proof that the person [1] has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and [2] is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.The CSL "good behavior" section similarly provides:
[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f.]
[a] person sentenced to a term of parole supervision for life may petition the Superior Court for release from that parole supervision. The judge may grant a petition for release from a special sentence of parole supervision for life only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence [1] that the person has not committed a crime for 15 years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, whichever is later, and [2] that the person is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others if released from parole supervision.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4c.]
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2g pertains to an adjudication by reason of insanity and thus is inapplicable here.
Thus, both the Megan's Law and CSL "good behavior" provisions permit a registered sex offender to petition for termination of their registration and/or parole obligations upon a two-part showing: (1) that they have not committed a crime or offense for fifteen years from the later of either the JOC or their release from prison; and (2) that they are unlikely to pose a threat to the safety of others. Here, defendant's record between 1999, the year of his prison release, and 2014, the year of his potential eligibility for de-registration, was crime- free. Thus, absent his 2008 guilty plea, defendant would have been eligible to apply for relief under these statutory "good behavior" provisions.
As noted, the State argues that "a guilty plea's potential effects on a defendant's future ability to seek some statutory benefit . . . are classic collateral consequences, outside the scope of advice defense counsel must give under the Sixth Amendment." The State thus urges reversal here on the basis that plea counsel had no obligation to advise defendant with respect to the effect of his guilty plea on his future eligibility for relief under the "good faith" provisions of Megan's Law and CSL.
A guilty plea may be accepted only if the defendant understands the consequences of the plea. R. 3:9-2. "[A] guilty plea entered without sufficient understanding of the penal consequences is ordinarily invalid. Even misinformation about a collateral consequence may vitiate a guilty plea if the consequence is a material element of the plea." State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 225 (App. Div. 2003). "Although a court is not responsible for informing a defendant of all consequences flowing from a guilty plea, at a minimum the court must ensure that the defendant is made fully aware of those consequences that are 'direct' or 'penal.'" State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005). See also State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 139 (2003).
In analyzing whether a defendant must be advised of a particular consequence of a plea, it is necessary to determine whether a consequence is direct or penal. In Bellamy, supra, the Court addressed civil commitment and held "when the consequence of a plea may be so severe that a defendant may be confined for the remainder of his or her life, fundamental fairness demands that the trial court inform defendant of that possible consequence." Ibid.
In Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), a convicted sex offender, who had successfully completed parole, and had been living and working in the community, challenged the constitutionality of the registration and community notification provisions of Megan's Law. Id. at 26. The Court held that those requirements were remedial and not punitive. Id. at 12-13.
On the other hand, we have recognized that:
Community supervision for life under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 has long been considered a punitive consequence of a criminal sentence. A defendant pleading guilty to an offense triggering the requirements of community supervision for life is entitled to expect his attorney to provide him with complete and accurate information concerning the ramifications of this material aspect of a plea agreement.
[State v. Smullen, 437 N.J. Super. 102, 109 (App. Div. 2014) (citations omitted).]
In the present case, we need not resolve whether any delay in defendant's ability to satisfy the fifteen-year "good behavior" provisions of Megan's Law and CSL is "collateral" or "penal" in nature. Rather, our review of the record leads us to conclude, as the PCR judge did, that plea counsel undertook no effort to ascertain the circumstances surrounding, or any defenses to, the charges contained in the 2008 accusation. We recognize that adequate preparation is the hallmark of effective counsel. "[C]ounsel has a duty to make 'reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.' A failure to do so will render the lawyer's performance deficient." State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 618 (1990) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695). It is undisputed that plea counsel failed to do so here. Hence, defendant satisfied the first prong of the Strickland analysis.
The State's proofs involving defendant's alleged failure to report a change of address focused on the parole officer's conversation with defendant's brother. The testimony established that Garry Lane was hearing-impaired since birth, and he required the assistance of a sign-language interpreter at the PCR hearing. After listening to Garry's testimony, the PCR judge concluded that it was unlikely that he answered the parole officer's questions appropriately, thus casting doubt on the State's ability to sustain the charges. Accordingly, Strickland's second prong is met, as defendant established a "reasonable probability that, but for" plea counsel's failure to ascertain and investigate the circumstances surrounding the filing of the charges, "the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
Our decision in this matter should not be construed as endorsing the proposition that a defense counsel's failure to advise a Megan's Law or CSL registrant of the statutory "good behavior" provisions in and of itself renders counsel's performance deficient. We accept that a delay in terminating a defendant's Megan's Law or CSL requirements may not fairly be categorized as a "penal consequence." Nonetheless, in appropriate cases, courts should not necessarily be limited by such strict categorizations. That is especially so here, where the impact upon defendant is severe and long-lasting. Indeed, "[i]t matters little if the consequences are called indirect or collateral when in fact their impact is devastating." State v. Heitzman, 107 N.J. 603, 606 (1987) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
In any event, we conclude that in this case defendant's ignorance of the consequences of his guilty plea upon his future ability to satisfy the statutory "good behavior" provisions, is clearly relevant to the second prong of the Strickland analysis. After hearing defendant's testimony, the PCR judge was convinced that "but for not having all this information defendant would not have pled guilty." We defer to the judge's factual determinations. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (noting standard of review following PCR evidentiary hearing), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005).
Our finding that defendant established ineffective assistance of plea counsel under the two-prong Strickland test does not, however, end our analysis. In order to obtain relief, a defendant's PCR application must be timely filed, or otherwise demonstrate compliance with Rule 3:22-12. A first petition for PCR must be filed within five years of the date of the judgment of conviction. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). A late filing may be considered if the petition itself shows excusable neglect for the late filing and that a fundamental injustice will result if defendant's claims are not considered on their merits. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 400 (App. Div. 2013).
In determining whether to relax the time bar, a court should consider "the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 485 (1997) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)). Absent compelling extenuating circumstances, the burden to justify filing a petition after the five-year period will increase with the extent of the delay. State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997). Where the deficient representation of counsel affected "a determination of guilt or otherwise wrought a miscarriage of justice a procedural rule otherwise barring post-conviction relief may be overlooked to avoid a fundamental injustice." Brewster, supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 400 (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518 (2013)).
Here, defendant filed his PCR petition on May 22, 2014, more than six years after his 2008 conviction. The State argued before the PCR court, as it does here, that defendant failed to show any "excusable neglect" that would warrant relief from the five-year time bar established in Rule 3:22-12(a)(1). The court failed to address the issue. While we might otherwise be inclined to simply affirm the order of the PCR judge with respect to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument, we hesitate to do so due to our additional concern that we next discuss.
Our independent review of the record before us suggests that the action of the original sentencing court in amending the JOC in 2003 to explicitly impose CSL under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 may impair defendant's rights under the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. V, and N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11. Despite not having been raised by the parties, the issue concerns constitutional rights warranting consideration. See Neider v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234-35 (1973). Because that issue was not raised and, was therefore, unexplored in the Law Division, and may require an evidentiary hearing, we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
In Schubert, supra, 212 N.J. at 299, the Supreme Court considered the defendant's claim that the trial court's imposition of community supervision for life after the defendant had completed his sentence violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy contained in both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 11 of the New Jersey Constitution. In 1996, an indictment had been returned against the defendant charging him with second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), among other crimes, and in 2000, he agreed to plead guilty to that charge in return for the State's agreement to dismiss all other charges and to recommend that he be sentenced as if he had pled guilty to a third-degree crime and receive a sentence of non-custodial probation. Id. at 299-300.
At the plea hearing, the defendant executed a plea form, including the "certain sexual offenses" plea form in which he acknowledged that the court "will impose a special sentence of community supervision for life." Id. at 300. During the plea colloquy between defendant and the court, defendant acknowledged that he would be examined at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel and would have to register and provide address verifications. Ibid. At sentencing, the court noted receipt of the Avenel report and imposed a probationary term of three years. Ibid. Defendant was discharged from probation in June 2003. Ibid.
In October 2007, the New Jersey State Parole Board wrote to the sentencing court and asked if the defendant's sentence should be amended to include a provision for community supervision for life. Id. at 300-01. In response to the court's subsequent inquiry to the original prosecutor and defense counsel, the defendant's former counsel stated he had not represented the defendant in "years" and could neither consent nor object to any amendment of the JOC. Id. at 301. The court entered an amended JOC on April 30, 2008, which explicitly imposed community supervision for life. Ibid.
Upon learning of the entry of the amended JOC, the defendant promptly filed a PCR petition and argued, among other things, that the court's action subjected him to double jeopardy. Id. at 302. The sentencing court, relying upon the defendant's explicit acknowledgment in the plea form of the court's obligation to impose community supervision for life at the time of sentencing, denied the petition. Ibid. We reversed the sentencing court and concluded that the court's action in amending the JOC after the defendant had completed his sentence violated his double-jeopardy rights. Id. at 303. The Supreme Court affirmed our ruling and remanded the matter to the sentencing court to re-enter the 2000 JOC. Id. at 299, 308-13, 316.
The Supreme Court stated that the imposition of community supervision for life pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 "is punitive rather than remedial at its core[,]" id. at 308, and explained that while the defendant's initial sentence was illegal because it failed to impose mandatory community supervision for life, id. at 309, the sentencing court's action, undertaken after the defendant's original sentence was completed, nonetheless was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at 316.
The circumstances in Schubert appear to closely mirror those here, although certain distinctions are apparent. The defendant in Schubert signed a supplemental plea form that referenced the CSL sentence; defendant here did not. However, unlike the present case, the defendant in Schubert timely filed for PCR within the five-year period following entry of the amended JOC.
We therefore direct that, upon remand, there should be an appropriate effort made to obtain the 1997 plea and sentencing transcripts or, if they are unavailable, to reconstruct them under Rule 2:5-3(f). The court should also endeavor to ascertain when and under what circumstances defendant was first informed of the 2003 amendment to the JOC. The facts revealed by such inquiries and any other evidence adduced at the remand hearing may well bear upon the double jeopardy issue and application of the time-bar of Rule 3:22-12 to that issue and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Moreover, different consequences may obtain if defendant is found to be entitled to relief under a double jeopardy claim, as opposed to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A constitutional violation of double jeopardy protection would require vacating the imposition of CSL. See R. 3:21-10(b)(5); Schubert, supra, 212 N.J. at 316. On the other hand, a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim may require vacating the plea. See R. 3:9-2; Bellamy, supra, 178 N.J. 127 (2003) (vacating the defendant's guilty plea where he was not informed of the consequences of the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38).
The order of the Law Division is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION