Opinion
65669-4-I
01-30-2012
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. MAURICE C. KUIT, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Spearman, J.
Maurice Kuit appeals his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, arguing the trial court erred when it refused to give his proposed substantial compliance jury instruction. For the reasons described herein, we reject his arguments and affirm the trial court.
FACTS
Kuit was convicted of voyeurism in 2003 and as a result, was required to register as a sex offender. In September 2008, Kuit registered his address in Bellevue. His landlord asked him to move out in May 2009. In June 2009, Kuit was incarcerated for violating his community custody for failing to participate in sexual deviancy treatment. He was released on June 27 and was required to register within 24 hours. He did not do so. Instead, on June 30, he told his corrections officer he was sleeping in his office. Sometime later, he left a message informing her he was staying in a motel in North Bend. On July 8, he told her he was staying with a friend in Redmond. She verified this was true. As of July 30, however, he still had not registered the address. When contacted by his correction officer on July 30, he first told her he "thought" he had registered, but eventually admitted he had not done so. His corrections officer instructed him to register as soon as possible, and Kuit registered that afternoon.
The State charged Kuit with failing to register as a sex offender between June 27 and July 30. At trial, Kuit proposed a jury instruction that read, "[s]ubstantial compliance is a defense to the reporting requirements of a state agency." The trial court refused to give the instruction, noting, "I'm not going to instruct on substantial compliance because I'm convinced it's not an available defense under this statute." The jury convicted Kuit, and he appeals.
DISCUSSION
Kuit argues the trial court erred when it refused to give his proposed substantial compliance jury instruction. A criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury fully instructed on his theory of the case. State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 461, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). A defendant is not entitled to an instruction that misstates the law, however. State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn.App. 716, 737, 214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d 1060 (2010).
We have held that substantial compliance is not a defense to failure to register as a sex offender. See State v. Prestegard, 108 Wn.App. 14, 20, 28 P.3d 817 (2001); State v. Vanderpool, 99 Wn.App. 709, 711, 995 P.2d 104 (2000). Kuit contends that the holding in Vanderpool was dicta and that strict compliance with the statute is not necessary to carry out the legislative purpose. Although Kuit is correct that the defendant in Vanderpool raised substantial compliance for the first time on appeal and that the court held any error was not manifest constitutional error, the court nevertheless analyzed the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine in the alternative, and held the doctrine does not apply under the facts of that case. For the reasons described herein, we adhere to Vanderpool and likewise hold substantial compliance does not apply.
"Substantial compliance has been defined as actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. It means a court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted." James v. Kitsap County, 154 Wn.2d 574, 588, 115 P.3d 286 (2005) quoting In re Habeas Corpus of Santore, 28 Wn.App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702 (1981)). The substantial compliance doctrine developed as a result of the "judiciary's longstanding effort to give legislative commands a rational interpretation founded upon their design." Williamson, Inc. v. Calibre Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 394, 401, 54 P.3d 1186 (2002). To determine whether a statute is susceptible to substantial compliance, we must determine whether strict compliance is necessary to achieve the legislature's statutory goals. Johnston v. Von Houck, 150 Wn.App. 894, 898-99, 209 P.3d 548 (2009).
At issue here, as was the case in Vanderpool, are the purposes and objectives of the statute requiring sex offender registration. These purposes include assisting law enforcement agencies in their efforts to protect the community from sex offenders; public notification of sex offender residences; and making sex offenders easy to locate. State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 9, 154 P.3d 909 (2007); Vanderpool, 99 Wn.App. at 712 (purpose of the statute "is to allow law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations and quickly apprehend sex offenders"); Prestegard, 108 Wn.App. at 20; State v. Pickett, 95 Wn.App. 475, 480, 975 P.2d 584 (1999). To effectuate these purposes, the legislature specified the manner of registration: a sex offender "shall register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence. . . ." RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a).
Kuit urges us to hold his "conduct in notifying his [correction officer] of his address" achieved the purposes of the statute. According to Kuit, once a correction officer knows an address, law enforcement or the public "need only contact [the correction officer], a simple enough step, not significantly more difficult than checking the sex offender registrations." But Kuit's proposal would read the requirement to register out of the statute entirely, and would increase the burden of the public and law enforcement in locating a sex offender. This does not amount to "actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute[, ]" James, 154 Wn.2d at 588, nor does it further the Legislature's goals of protecting the community from sex offenders, public notification of sex offender residences, and making sex offenders easy to locate. We adhere to Vanderpool, and hold the trial court did not err by declining to give Kuit's proposed substantial compliance instruction. Affirmed.
WE CONCUR